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NEO-HEGELIANISM

BY

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PREFACE.

This book is a study rather than a history of British Neo-Hegelianism. A strictly historical treatment of a movement, represented mostly by contemporary writers who have influenced each other, does not seem to me to be possible. Nevertheless, it will not, I trust, be found to be quite unlike a work on the history of philosophy.

I do not know whether Neo-Hegelianism is the right name to give to the movement. But as it has become current, it is useless to quarrel with it. What must not be forgotten, however, is that the writers who may be said to belong to this school are in no sense disciples of Hegel. They have, no doubt, been strongly influenced by him, but each of them is a very independent thinker who has his own distinctive way of apprehending and expressing the central truths of idealism.

The idea of writing this book was suggested to me by the following sentence in Professor J. W. Scott's article on Neo-Hegelianism in Hastings's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics:* "Until some adequate history of the movement appears the only way to get a grasp of what it had to teach is to read a few works of typical representatives of it." I have tried to give a fairly full and accurate account of the movement, but how far I have succeeded I do not know.

Whatever may be the measure of my success, the task has been congenial to me. For such philosophical ideas as I have, I am indebted to no system of thought more than to Neo-Hegelianism, except Hegel himself. The study and interpretation of Hegel and the philosophical movement which has arisen from his influence has been the chief occupation of my life. At the very commencement of my career as a teacher of philosophy 36 years ago, I wrote a little book (now out of print) with a view to give the student a general idea of the main principles of Neo-Hegelianism. It was well spoken of by such authorities as Hutchison Stirling and Edward Caird. And now when that career is drawing to a close, I feel happy to be able to offer to those who are interested in philosophy this account of what I regard, in the English-speaking world at least, as the greatest movement of thought in modern times. If it helps in any measure to popularise doctrines which ought to be more widely known, I shall consider myself amply rewarded.

I have not attempted to expound the logical theories of Bradley and Bosanquet. Within such limits as must be observed in a work like this, I found it impossible adequately to interpret highly technical discussions. It could be done only in a book mainly devoted to logic and not in a general study such as this. Rather than give a meagre and superficial exposition, I have given none. I have remembered Hegel's dictum that if a man is to achieve anything he must set a limit to himself.

I reprint, as an appendix to this book, an essay entitled *Hegelianism and Human Personality*, written in 1910 and published by the Calcutta University. In it I have tried to show that, according to Hegel, the

Absolute is not a unitary self, but a self-conscious unity of many selves. I know very well that Hegel has been interpreted in so many different ways that it is impossible to be unduly confident of the truth of any particular interpretation. All that I claim is that there is as much to be said in favour of my interpretation as for any other. I briefly restated the argument of this essay in an article on "Leibnitz and German Philosophy" in the *Philosophical Review* for July, 1917.

HIRALAL HALDAR.

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CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT: J. H. STIRLING.

The conflict between science and religion, between the instinctively religious view of the world of which the human mind cannot easily divest itself and the tendency to explain all things by means of mechanical principles arising from the scientific spirit, is perhaps more characteristic of the second half of the nineteenth century than of any other period. Ideas and beliefs which could be entertained before the triumphs of science were achieved were no longer possible after them. In an unscientific age it is easy to discern the finger of Providence everywhere, but when the mind becomes accustomed to the idea of the uniform and inviolable course of nature, to the belief that nothing can happen of which some definitely computable cause cannot be discovered, it is hard to understand how any such thing as the divine control and guidance of the world is to be possible. To the extent to which the scientific ideal of finding the reign of law in the universe is attained, the possibility of interpreting it in accordance with the demand of the religious spirit would seem to vanish. If all things are subject to unvarying laws, if nothing can happen without a cause, the introduction of any incalculable element into the course of the

world which God's intervention must mean appears to be impossible. No wonder then that the age which witnessed the marvellous progress of science was also deeply troubled by the difficulty of reconciling science with religion. Loyalty to science seemed to be incompatible with the acceptance of the orthodox ideas about religion. The most enlightened minds of the age, therefore, found it increasingly difficult to retain the traditional dogmas of Christianity. Their hold on the educated mind was inevitably loosened. It is not that there was any open and widespread movement against established religious ideas; but more and more the world of culture was alienated from them. Indifference rather than active hostility to orthodox notions was the general attitude among men influenced by science. But though the doctrines of the Churches were not acceptable, the spirit of the time was by no means irreligious. On the contrary, the need of a spiritualistic interpretation of the world, as the best poetry of the age unmistakably indicates, was acutely felt. The religious instincts of the mind are not easily uprooted. It is not ordinarily possible for man to remain satisfied with a purely secular view of the world. If the head demands satisfaction, the heart too has its claims which are not less insistent. And between the head and the heart there can be no permanent breach. An adequate theory of the universe must commend itself to the whole mind and not merely to the abstract intellect. It must fulfil the requirements of the scientific spirit as well as of the religious tendency.

The great problem of the Victorian age, therefore, was to find a method by following which it is possible to reconcile science with religion, to be loyal to the discoveries of the secrets of nature made after patient

research without sacrificing the highest interests of humanity. The traditional philosophies of Great Britain, empiricism and intuitionism, were hopelessly inadequate to meet this requirement. The schools of Hamilton and Mill wrangled over questions which had very little to do with the need of finding a theory of the universe which should at once be scientifically tenable and religiously satisfying. Whether certain beliefs and notions of the mind are of empirical origin or underived is a question upon the answer to which the solution of the problem of reconciling science with religion in no way depends. The validity of a principle is not determined by its origin. In whatever way the issue between intuitionism and empiricism may be decided, the task of philosophy has still to begin. It is therefore not surprising that the deeper minds of the age failed to find satisfaction in the current philosophy of the day. What was needed was a system of thought which should at least make an honest effort to comprehend the true nature of the universe we live in, to justify the standpoint of religion without neglecting the conclusions of science. To precisely such a system, just when it was most likely to be helpful, the attention of some of the profoundest students of philosophy of the time in Great Britain was drawn, and the foremost of them was James Hutchison Stirling. It was the system of Hegel. When Stirling's great book was published, Hegel was a mere name in England. Then, as now, he, of course, was amply refuted, but of real knowledge of him there was very little. The only thinker who possessed some inkling of what Hegel had to teach, straightforwardly confessed his inability to fathom his depth. "Who has ever yet," asks Ferrier, "uttered one intel-

ligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen—not any foreigner—seldom even himself. With peaks here and there more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere in which no human intellect can breathe. Hegel is impenetrable, almost throughout, as a mountain of adamant." That Ferrier's statement is not exaggerated will be evident from the queer notions of Hegel's philosophy which even the greatest intellects of the time entertained. Hegel, says J. S. Mill, affirms that "'contradictory propositions cannot both be true' does not apply to the Absolute" and "by this among other things has fairly earned the honour which will probably be awarded to him by posterity, of having logically extinguished transcendental metaphysics by a series of *reductiones ad absurdissimum*" (*Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 60). No wonder then that Mill refused to support Stirling's candidature for the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh University in 1868 on the ground that "he did not think that the study of Hegel would have a salutary effect on the immature minds of university students." Sir William Hamilton, who enjoyed the reputation of possessing expert knowledge of German philosophy, speaks of Schelling, Hegel and Cousin as the most illustrious representatives of the doctrine that "mind and matter are only phenomenal manifestations of the same common substance." Mansel, another authority of the day on German philosophy, tells us that "thought in the system of Hegel is represented as an impersonal, absolute, indeterminate, universal, unconscious substance determining itself in opposed and yet identical modifications, becoming all things, constituting the essence of all

things, and attaining to consciousness only in man" (*Metaphysics*, p. 312). This philosophy, we are assured, "instead of commencing with God as the beginning of all existence, commences with Zero," and the dialectical process "may thus be described as a creation of the deity no less than of the world" (*Ibid.* p. 315).

Such was the situation when Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* was published more than sixty years ago. It was without question an epoch-making work. For the first time the real meaning of Hegel was set forth by a British thinker in clear and forcible language. The unintelligible was at last made intelligible, the sea of darkness was successfully navigated. The accomplishment of so stupendous a task without the help of anyone else necessarily involved a prodigious amount of labour. "No one since his time," says Lord Haldane, "has got further, possibly no one so far. He penetrated into the inmost essence of the Hegelian system as none but a man of genius could have done, and his work remains unrivalled to this day. His exposition is charged with meaning and his flow is that of a torrent. . . . Through long years of study he mastered the meaning of that most difficult and most rewarding of modern writers on philosophy. At the end the result he had reached was returned in a torrent, in language the force and picturesqueness of which were only matched by the conviction every sentence breathed forth. The book embodies a result which is likely to be enduring. It will hardly be superseded, for it has the quality of genius. Along the road it has travelled one cannot get any further" (Preface to *James Hutchison Stirling, His Life and Work*, pp. v, vi).

In the brilliantly written preface to the *Secret of*

Hegel, Stirling sets forth the grounds of his conviction that the Hegelian philosophy is of supreme value and its study indispensable, if further progress of philosophical thought is to be possible. The modern enlightened mind does not find it easy to reconcile the traditional dogmas of religion with reason. This is largely due to the failure to distinguish between the outer symbol and the inner meaning, the mere letter and the informing spirit. Attack as well as defence of the figurate conceptions in which spiritual truths are embodied is futile. What is necessary is to comprehend the inner meaning of symbols and metaphors, to reduce Vorstellungen to Begriffe. To have done this is the merit of Hegel. He has nothing but contempt for men who quarrel about the husk and fail to perceive the kernel. Picture thinking is indispensable to the bulk of mankind, but the business of the philosopher is to bring out the thought which underlies outward forms.

Another achievement of Hegel is that he substitutes concrete thinking for the abstractions of the understanding. To separate things from each other, to suppose that each entity is real by itself and has no necessary connection with others, is the inveterate habit of the unreflecting mind. Hegel carries his readers to a higher level of thought and shows that reality is ultimately a single, coherent and all-inclusive system of which particular objects are merely elements. It is only as mutually implying each other as integral factors of this system that things have being. Isolated, self-sufficient objects are nothing but false abstractions, empty illusions arising from poverty of thought. It is the plain man innocent of philosophy and not Hegel that lives in an unreal world of abstractions.

Nothing, Stirling urges, is further from the truth than the supposition that Hegel is a vain dreamer who has no concern with experience, but evolves from his inner consciousness a theory of the universe bearing no relation to actual facts. From the beginning to the end he deals solely with the world of experience, the world in which we live and of which we form a part; only that he is not satisfied with the first appearance of things, but insists upon grasping their ultimate meaning. It will not do, he teaches, to fix attention upon this or that aspect of experience and to base a theory upon it. What is necessary is a careful analysis of reality with a view to find out the various aspects of it and to comprehend the relations in which they stand to each other and to the whole. The feet of Hegel are all along planted on the solid ground of experience. His single aim is to understand thoroughly the nature of what actually is and to avoid all one-sided interpretations of it.

Stirling lays stress upon the significance of Hegelianism as a constructive system. The right of private judgment is the principle on which modern civilisation takes its stand. No true child of the present age can acknowledge the validity of customs, usages and institutions upon which reason does not set its seal of approval. Everything, it is demanded, must be examined in the light of reason, and what does not satisfy reason must be rejected outright. Appeal to mere authority has no validity in the court of reason. The judgment of the individual is the supreme criterion, and the value of all things, secular as well as religious, must be determined by it. Hegel does not deny this. He is unshaken in his loyalty to the right of private judgment. The only question is, what exactly this

means. Now, the error of rationalism lies in its using the principle in a one-sided manner. "Of the two words private judgment," as Stirling puts it, "the Aufklarung accentuates and sees only the former. The Aufklarung asks only that the private man, the individual, be satisfied. Its principle is subjectivity pure and simple. But its own words imply more than subjectivity—its own words imply objectivity as well; for the accent on private ought not to have blinded it to the fact that there is equally question of judgment" (*Secret of Hegel*, new edition, p. liv). Reason, as Hegel shows, is not the private property of the individual; it is universal and objective, and is embodied in the institutions and systems of thought which regulate our conduct. In insisting on the paramountcy of reason, rationalism is not wrong; its mistake is to oppose the subjective to the objective, the individual to the community, apart from which he is nothing. It is only in so far as the individual shares in the common reason of humanity embodied in social and political institutions that he is a rational being. Apart from society, which is his substance, man is only an animal. Aufklarung is myopic, its vision does not extend beyond the individual, and it therefore fails to see that the reason which it justly extols is a universal principle which carries the individual beyond himself and brings him into living connection with his fellows, thereby organising them into a whole of which they are members. The principle which, rightly understood, will be found to be the essential bond of union of humanity, is misinterpreted by rationalism and turned into a watchword of anarchism. "We all live now," says Stirling, "*divorced from substance*, forlorn each of us, isolated to himself—an absolutely abstract unit

in a universal, unsympathising, unparticipant *atomism*. . . . The Aufklarung has left us nothing but our animality, nothing but our relationship to the monkey. It has emptied us of all essential humanity—of philosophy, Morality, Religion." Hegel while fully accepting the principle of the Aufklarung seeks to correct the one-sidedness of the movement, and it is for this reason that his philosophy, in Stirling's view, is calculated to meet the requirements of the present time. But just as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle failed to arrest the disintegrating movement which brought about the downfall of Greece, so has the Hegelian philosophy so far failed to stem the tide of the anarchism of the present age. "The Aufklarung, dead among thinkers, has descended upon the people; and there is hardly a hamlet but has its Tom Paines by the half-dozen—its Tom Paines of the tap all emulously funny of the one subject. I witnessed such a thing myself last summer in the country—the bewildered defeat of my landlady under the crowing triumph of her son, a lad of seventeen or so, who had asked her to explain to him where Cain got his wife!" "In the study and the library, it is true, books have been restored to their shelves, chairs and tables once more stand in their places; but down in the servants' quarters, cook and scullion and chambermaid are still hurling out of window, with shouts of derision, pots and pans and brooms and shovels and all the other paraphernalia of the kitchen."

Stirling regards Hegel's philosophy as the logical outcome of the Kantian critiques. It consistently develops the main idea of the deduction of the categories. Fichte and Schelling, no doubt, are very fruitful in their suggestions, but are not the logical

continuators of Kant. Whatever may be Hegel's indebtedness to them, he ultimately dispensed with both and started afresh from Kant. "But very little material could be pointed to as separating Hegel from Kant, and generally in all respects it was Hegel who specially continued and developed into full and final form all the issues which Kant had ever properly begun." The critical philosophy, in short, so Stirling thinks, finds its culmination in the philosophy of Hegel.[1]

The Copernican change which Kant brought about in philosophy is to show that the objective world of experience is constituted by the mind. Sensations which in themselves are not possible objects of knowledge are received into the two subjective forms of perception—time and space, and brought into relation to each other in certain definite ways by the synthetic activity of the self. The forms of synthesis are the categories, and it is through subjection to them that sensations are turned into cognisable objects forming parts of a single system which we call nature. Knowledge, that is to say, arises out of the combination of the data of sense arranged in time and space with the categories, and this combination is the work of the mind. Apart from relation to the self, nature has no meaning, and the self is conscious of its own unity

[1] Hegel's relation to Kant is undoubtedly close and intimate. But it is a mistake to regard his philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant's system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel's philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato's *Parmenides*.

through the synthetic activity by means of which chaotic sensations are reduced to elements of the cosmos of experience. The drawback of such a theory is that it absolutely fails to explain how two such heterogeneous entities as sense and understanding can ever come into harmonious relationship with each other. If percepts and concepts are inseparably united, if self-consciousness and the consciousness of the objective world mutually imply each other, the conclusion which legitimately follows is that knowledge is an organic whole within which the various elements of it can be distinguished from each other, and not that it is the result of a mechanical combination of disparate elements. Sense and understanding are not alien to each other, but are the correlated elements of the one world of experience. It is not *we* who impose the categories upon the manifold of sense; they are the basal principles of things themselves, and are, therefore, not subjective but objective. Nor is the mind to which nature is relative the finite mind of this or that individual; it is the mind of nature itself, the spiritual principle of unity revealed everywhere and in all things. Hegel sees all this clearly, and transforms Kant's halting idealism into Absolute Idealism. The categories for him are neither twelve in number nor subjective. They, in Stirling's words, are "the universal principles of reason which constitute the diamond net into the invisible meshes of which the material universe concretes itself." Nature is made by the understanding only in the sense that it is the outer embodiment of a mind universal and objective of which the categories are constitutive elements. "Reason is the thing of things, the secret and centre of the whole."

Kant's method of discovering the categories is artificial and arbitrary. He deduces them from the forms of judgment recognised in formal logic and imagines that they are mere instruments employed by the self for the purpose of manufacturing knowledge out of the materials supplied by sense. Their relation to the self therefore is quite external and unessential, and there is no necessary connection between them. But if the categories are the constitutive principles of things themselves, if they are the determinate forms of thought self-expressed in nature, the true way of discovering them is to survey and scrutinise nature itself. This is the method which Hegel employs. He gets his categories from the various sciences and spheres of experience and does not think of prescribing any arbitrary limit to their number. They are as many as the distinguishable forms of things. And as experience is an organic whole, the categories are held together by an inner bond and form a complete system, and the proper method of deducing them is to trace out their mutual relations. Hegel uses the dialectical method for this purpose. His aim is to show that the categories are the successive stages through which thought rises from the most abstract and inadequate view of reality to the most concrete and adequate view of it. We may if we choose begin by conceiving of it, like Parmenides, as pure being; but, if we think consistently and systematically, we must ultimately say that it is mind. The categories therefore can be arranged in an ascending order of complexity and value. The lower is not set aside, but is taken up into and retained as an element of the higher. The highest category into which all other categories enter as its moments is the notion or, in its developed form,

the Absolute Idea, by which Hegel means mind regarded as subject-object and not, one-sidedly, as mere subject. The Absolute mind, then, abstractly considered, may be regarded as the unified system of the categories. The self is not other than the categories, as Kant thinks, but is the organised unity of them, and, as such, it is not any finite self but the universal self, the self of the total system of things.

The categories form the content of the notion. They, however, constitute only the universal aspect of reality and have for their counterpart the particular facts of experience in which they are concretely embodied. The universal has no meaning apart from the particular, nor the particular apart from the universal. They presuppose each other and together constitute what is real. The universe is on one side a system of general notions and on the other a totality of particular facts. The categories of thought and the particulars of sense which, in the system of Kant, are two independent elements of human knowledge mechanically brought together, are for Hegel only two distinguishable aspects of the world. Thought is the other of sense-perception and sense-perception is the other of thought. "The universe is but matter modelled on thought. Thought is a system, and this system is the universe, and the element of sense, or what we conceive as that element, is nothing as against this system, and can only be named with propriety the other" (*Secret of Hegel*, new edition, p. 111). The universal mind is through the medium of the categories realised in nature, and nature, permeated and sustained by the categories, finds in mind its own essence and meaning.

To Fichte the Absolute is Ego. He reduces nature to the position of a mere limiting principle of the ego.

Schelling regards nature as the correlative of mind. In mind nature is idealised and in nature mind is realised. The Absolute is neither the one nor the other one-sidedly. It stands above and is the source of both and is to be conceived as the neutrum. Hegel pours contempt upon the neutrum. It is but the night in which all cows are black. Things do not disappear in the Absolute; it is the Absolute that appears in them and is their principle of unity. It is subject that overreaches the distinction between itself and its own object.

God, nature and the finite mind are for the ordinary understanding three distinct entities, and popular philosophy has always been at its wits' end to determine exactly the place of each in its relations to the others. To Hegel they are only different phases of the Absolute Spirit. "Thought is the real contents of the universe: in Nature, it is but as other, and in a system as other; in Spirit, it returns from Nature, its other, into its own self, is by its own self, and is its own energy. The Absolute Spirit, then, God is the first and last, and the universe is but his difference and system of differences, in which individual subjectivities have but their part and place" (*Ibid.* p. 112).

Such, in brief outline, is the teaching of Hegel which Stirling was the first to expound in English. If it is to be called idealism at all, it is essential to remember that it is not idealism in the ordinary sense of the term. From beginning to end Hegel is wide awake and thoroughly realistic. He never says that the world in which we live is not as real as it seems. His contention is that it is *more* real than it is taken by the realist to be. The physical is, in its last interpretation, spiritual without ceasing to be physical.

That which, from a lower point of view, is a world of matter is, from the standpoint of philosophy, the self-revelation, the externalisation, of mind.

The mission of Hegel, Stirling insists, is not to destroy but to fulfil. "His one object is the reconstruction of religion, both natural and revealed, and on the higher basis which the Aufklarung, so far as it has approved itself to the essential interests of humanity, demands." "A philosophy whose purpose and effect are not to countenance and support all the great interests of religion is no philosophy, but a material for the fire only."

Stirling does not claim that the system of Hegel is perfect in every detail. "We do not say and Hegel does not say that it is complete, and that no joining gapes. On the contrary, in the execution of the details there will be much that will give pause. Still in this execution—we may say as much as this on our own account—all the great interests of mankind have been kindled into new lights by the touch of this master hand; and surely the general idea is one of the hugest that ever curdled in the thought of man. Hegel, indeed, so far as abstract thought is concerned, and so far as one can see at this moment, seems to have closed an era, and has named the all of things in such terms of thought as will perhaps remain essentially the same for the next thousand years. To all present outward appearance, at least, what Aristotle was to ancient Greece, Hegel is to modern Europe" (*Secret of Hegel*, new edition, p. 97).

Stirling's attitude towards the dominant moral philosophy of his time is one of uncompromising hostility. "Eudæmonism," he declares, "never appears in this world but when the community is in dissolution and

the individual must look out for himself. And theoretically we would point out that there can be no *philosophy* of subjectivity but only of objectivity." His political creed is based on the conviction that the particular will of the individual must conform to the general will, if civilised life is to be possible. All sound political principles must be determined by the fundamental fact that individuals can realise their ends only in fellowship and co-operation with each other, which involves their subordination to the whole, the state to which they belong. This means that "in a state *there must be a principle of central authority*." Unchecked democracy seemed to Stirling to endanger this principle. "I am," he says, "a conservative, but it is not as a common tory for class privileges and mere tradition: it is only for organisation. It seems to me at present as if, in the tendency to an extreme democracy, we were losing the balance of our constitution. . . . Under modern liberalism, we are simply returning to our woods again—what Darwin would call the civilisation of the Chimpanzee and the Gorilla!"

CHAPTER II.

T. H. GREEN.

The publication of Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* was an epoch-making event in the history of British thought. It introduced ideas into Great Britain with which the traditional intuitionism and empiricism of the country had very little in common, but without which further progress of British philosophical thought was scarcely possible. It gave an impetus to the study of German idealism and particularly of Hegel, and led to the foundation of the school of philosophy to which, rightly or wrongly, the name of Neo-Hegelianism has been given. About the time of the publication of Stirling's great work, other students of philosophy also had been studying Hegel. Among them were T. H. Green and Edward Caird. The spread of Hegelian ideas in England and Scotland was in no small measure due to their teachings. At Oxford, during a considerable period of the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, Green's influence was supreme. He was a striking personality, and his elevating influence was extraordinary. Perhaps the man was greater than his philosophy. When he began to teach philosophy at Oxford, J. S. Mill exercised the most potent intellectual influence there. Green and Mill were the protagonists of opposite modes of thought, and in them the British and German lines of speculation came

into conflict. Green succeeded in supplanting Mill, and became the coryphæus of a band of thinkers who drew their inspiration largely from Kant and Hegel. The basis of Green's thought was unquestionably Hegelian, but he was never a mere disciple of the German philosopher. He started from Kant and used Hegel mainly for the purpose of removing Kant's inconsistencies and defects. Throughout his writings, Kant's doctrines are constantly referred to, but Hegel is seldom mentioned, and in the *Prolegomena to Ethics* is not mentioned at all. Nevertheless, he was deeply convinced of the value of Hegel's teaching and, in spite of his profound distrust of the dialectical method, regarded it as the last word of philosophy. "When we think out the problem left by previous inquirers, we find ourselves led to it by an intellectual necessity, but on reflection we become aware that we are Hegelian, so to speak, with only a fraction of our thoughts—on the Sundays of 'speculation,' not on the weekdays of ordinary thought." The vital truth which Hegel had to teach, Green thinks, requires to be presented in a more convincing form, and "whoever would so present it, though he can not drink too deep of Hegel, should rather sit loose to the dialectical method."

Green was a systematic thinker. "There was," says Lord Bryce, "nothing random or scattered in his ideas." All his views, metaphysical, ethical, political and religious, are interdependent elements of a comprehensive system of thought. "He was not," says Nettleship, "a mere discoverer of sporadic good ideas; his tendency was to form his conclusions into a whole, in which nothing was isolated or out of relation to the rest."

Green's philosophical ideas are brought out largely through criticisms of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spencer, Lewes and Kant. They are also presented in a constructive form in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, *The Principles of Political Obligation*, and some minor essays.

I.

The *Prolegomena to Ethics* opens with the query, "can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature?" Green's answer to the question is that if by nature we mean the system of objective facts presented in experience, the knowledge of nature cannot be a part of nature, for the presupposition of such a system is the consciousness apart from which it has no meaning. The facts of experience are determined by the relations in which they stand to each other. A thing we call real is such by virtue of the position it has in the whole of experience. The source of these relations is the unity of consciousness to which all the related facts are referred. Things are known only on one condition, and this condition is that they are held together in consciousness as mutually related elements of a single whole. If a particular fact is constituted by the relations in which it stands to others, and if such relations mean that the related facts are co-present to a common element which is consciousness, then consciousness itself cannot be one of the related facts. It must be regarded as logically prior to them, upon which their existence as facts depends. The question whether anything is real or not means, is it or is it not related as it seems to be related, and it implies the conception of nature as "a single unalterable order of relations." Such a conception has

no meaning except to a consciousness that has it. It is not possible for a conception of an order of nature to be produced by anything other than itself. If experience is to be regarded as the source of it, it must be "experience of matters of fact *recognised as such*." Out of a mere series of related events the *consciousness* of the series cannot arise. It must be equally present to all the events of which it is the consciousness, and, as such, transcends them. The *knowledge* of nature is not a process of nature or the effect of anything natural. It is that through which alone nature is real for us.

Can we say that not only the knowledge of nature but the existence of nature presupposes a spiritual principle? The possibility of answering the question in the affirmative would seem to be precluded by the antithesis, emphasised by Locke, between the real and the work of the mind. How can understanding make nature when what is due to it is merely the work of the mind as distinguished from nature which is real? But if we withdraw from the real all qualities constituted by relations, nothing is left. To say that relations are the work of the mind and to oppose the work of the mind to the real is to maintain that nothing is real. Relations are inherent in things and they are known by means of them. They, therefore, are as real as the things of which they are the essence. The real is not determined by contrast with the unreal, for nothing is unreal. Even an absolutely false idea is real. The truth which this erroneous distinction misrepresents is that the relations by which we suppose a thing to be determined may not be the relations by which it is actually determined. Relations may thus be ascribed to it in which it does not as a matter of

fact stand. In this way it seems to be what it is not. Such erroneously or inadequately conceived relations, however, are alterable. But what a thing truly is, it is unalterably. This unalterableness, however, belongs to the system of relations in which facts stand to each other, and may, through confusion, be ascribed to the mere facts apart from their determining conditions.

The presupposition of our inquiry into the real nature of appearances is a single, unalterable, all-inclusive system of relations of which all particular things are constitutive elements. For our finite intelligence, it is not possible to find out all the conditions by which an object is determined. There will always be unascertained conditions on which its real nature depends. But the fact that our conception of a thing changes as we pass from a less complete to a more complete determination of it points to an unalterable order of relations in which all things are included.

What does such an order mean and what is implied in its existence? This is the question which philosophy must attempt to answer. To the unthinking mind nature is an aggregate of objects which, no doubt, exist side by side with each other, but are independent of and bear no essential relationship to each other. But, on reflection, we perceive that a thing is only in so far as it points beyond itself to something else. Its reality consists in being determined by the various relations in which it stands to other things. The qualities which things possess are due to the influence which they exert upon each other as related elements of a connected whole. Relation means the existence of many in one. Whether we say that a related thing is in itself one, but manifold in respect of its relations,

or that there is one relation between many things, we are equally affirming the unity of the manifold. That alone has reality which is itself and not itself in one, a unity in difference or a differentiated unity. Take away from the things their relations and there is nothing. It is not that things first exist and then enter into various relations. Apart from the relations they have absolutely no meaning. The one world, in short, consists of many phenomena and the many phenomena are what they are by virtue of the relations that reduce them to the unity of the world.

Individual things in entering into relations do not cease to be individual. On the contrary, relation between them is possible because they remain distinct from each other. But several things cannot of themselves become united into one world. There must therefore be "something other than the manifold things themselves, which combines them without effacing their severality." With such a combining principle we are familiar as our own mind. Successive events of consciousness are possible because each event in the series is qualified by its relation to what goes before it and comes after it through their relation to a unifying consciousness which is not one of them but is common to them and brings them together without obliterating their distinction from each other. Similarly, the consciousness of objects in space is possible because a plurality of separate things are held together in knowledge. If by nature we mean a system of related facts, the presupposition of it must be a spiritual principle to which all the facts are present. Things are constituted by relations and relations imply a relating mind that distinguishes itself from them. The union with and distinction from each other of the constituent

elements of the world is possible because of their relation to a universal principle common to them. Things exist not on their own account, but in virtue of the relations in which they stand to each other, and they can be in relationship with each other because of their relation to a spiritual principle which at once unites and distinguishes them. The correlative of nature as an all-inclusive system of related phenomena, therefore, is mind. This universal mind is not any particular thing, and is therefore not related to nature as one of the things comprised within it is related to another. The presupposition of the world-system —that which is present to everything but is limited to none—cannot itself be a component part of it.

Against a view like this it may be urged that to show that understanding makes nature is not to prove that the real world of things in themselves is constituted by thought. It is no doubt true, as Kant shows, that the objective world of experience owes its existence to the synthetic unity of consciousness combining sensations with each other in certain definite ways. But the experienced world organised by mind is not the world of things in themselves, and because the former is essentially related to the self it does not follow that the latter also is similarly conditioned. What the things in themselves are we do not know, except this, that they acting on us produce sensations. The spirituality of nature therefore does not necessarily mean the spirituality of what is ultimately real.

Green argues that it is impossible to find satisfaction in such a theory. If sensations are caused by things in themselves, the latter must be phenomena, for only phenomena falling within experience can be related to

each other as cause and effect. To suppose that things in themselves are wholly out of relation to experience and undetermined by thought, and yet to speak of them as one or many or as causes of sensations, is, on Kant's own principles, absolutely self-contradictory, for the categories of unity, plurality and causality are applicable only to experienced facts. Again, the consequence of conceiving of sensations as produced by things in themselves is that they must be regarded as having two natures absolutely inconsistent with each other. They, as elements of knowledge determined by relations, have one nature; as effects of the action of things in themselves on us, they have another nature, and between these two natures nothing whatever is common. Two wholly unrelated worlds, the 'cosmos of our experience' and the order of things in themselves, determine the same sensations. "If this be so the conception of a universe is a delusive one. Man weaves a web of his own and calls it a universe; but if the principle of this universe is neither one with, nor dependent on, that of things in themselves, there is in truth no universe at all, nor does there seem to be any reason why there should not be any number of such independent creations. We have asserted the unity of the world of our experience only to transfer that world to a larger chaos" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1st ed., p. 45).

Because the matter of experience is not reducible to the form of it, Kant supposes that it has a character independent of the latter. Sensation, the material out of which knowledge is organised, is attributed to an extra-mental reality and relations to the organising mind, and experience is conceived as arising out of the combination of the two. To account for the

matter of knowledge, the hypothesis of things in themselves becomes necessary. But mere sensation has no place either in the world of facts or in the consciousness which it implies, for sensation unqualified by thought is an abstraction. "Feeling and thought are inseparable and mutually dependent in the consciousness for which the world of experience exists, inseparable and mutually dependent in the construction of the facts which form the object of that consciousness. Each in its full reality includes the other. It is one and the same living world of experience which, considered as the manifold object presented by a self-distinguishing subject to itself, may be called feeling, and considered as the subject presenting such an object to itself may be called thought" (*Ibid.* p. 55). What Kant evidently has in mind is that understanding cannot be regarded as the creative source of the facts of experience. This is quite true, but from it the inference does not follow that feeling is separate from thought. Neither can be reduced to the other. Nor is there any such thing as mere feeling or mere thought. These expressions only "represent abstractions to which no reality corresponds either in the facts of the world or in the consciousness to which those facts are relative. We can attach no meaning to 'reality' as applied to the world of phenomena, but that of existence under definite and unalterable relations, and we find that it is only for a thinking consciousness that such relations can subsist."

From the conclusion, then, that nature as an order of mutually related objects and events implies a self-distinguishing mind as its necessary correlative, there is no escape. Objects, for example, co-exist in space. This means that they are at once together and separate

from each other. A relationship of this kind, however, is impossible without self-consciousness, the only thing "in which a manifold is united without ceasing to be manifold." Take, again, the case of time. If one event were simply over when another occurred, succession would not be possible. In order that one of them may be before or after another, both of them must be present to a unifying consciousness not in time. Succession is possible only through relation to a consciousness which brings together the succeeding events without being one of them. Similarly, substance means change in which it is expressed and change presupposes substance, but the correlativity of the two is rendered possible by the unity of the self to which both are referred. From whatever point of view we may look at the matter, it will be seen that the universe as a "system in which every element, being correlative to every other, at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other" implies an eternally complete consciousness as the condition of its being. If the world as a connected system of facts exists, then, as the principle that makes it possible, God exists, and if God did not exist, the world could not be in existence. Ultimate reality, that is, is neither mind *per se* nor matter *per se*. It is "a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is the essence to be self-conscious, that is, to be itself and not itself in one."

In what relation does man as a thinking being stand to the non-natural principle implied in the existence of nature? As included within the world, we, no doubt, are parts of it, but it is also true that, as capable of knowledge, we are raised above it and brought into relation to the self-distinguishing subject for which it exists. That man transcends nature is affirmed on

the ground that he exercises powers which he could not if he were a mere part of it. But an analysis of the ordinary processes of cognition leads to the same conclusion. Our experience is, on the one hand a series of events in time; on the other hand, it is a consciousness of this series. This consciousness cannot be a part of the course of nature. Successive facts of experience, in order to be known, must be related to and distinguished from each other, and this involves the operation of a combining mind to which the facts are presented. It cannot, therefore, be itself one of the related facts. The psychical process of knowing is not to be confused with the content of knowledge. The former is an order of events occurring in time, but the latter presupposes the activity of a self-distinguishing consciousness which puts together the various items of experience as mutually related facts and cannot, therefore, be one or a series of them. Knowledge may be of phenomena, but it cannot itself be a phenomenon, for its possibility depends upon the known facts being presented to consciousness as connected elements of a whole. All this, of course, does not mean that we have the power to make or unmake objects as we please. What is maintained is simply this, that, given experience, an analysis of it shows that its support is a consciousness which is not reducible to what is experienced.

As subjects of knowledge, then, we are not parts of nature, but unifying principles presupposed in knowledge akin to the self-distinguishing, self-objectifying mind for which the universe exists. At the same time, it is a fact that our finite consciousness, though, in knowledge, it holds together successive events as equally present, has a history in time and changes from moment

to moment. This state of the case "can only be explained by supposing that in the growth of our experience, in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism, which has its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness" (*Ibid.* p. 73). The finite self of man is a partial reproduction of itself on the part of the eternal mind. This does not mean that there are two minds in man "but that the one indivisible reality of our consciousness cannot be comprehended in a single conception. In seeking to understand its reality we have to look at it from two different points of view; and the different conceptions that we form of it, as looked at from these different points, do not admit of being united, any more than do our impressions of opposite sides of the same shield." If the universe as an all-inclusive system of related objects implies a mind eternally complete, and if our knowledge of it at any particular moment is incomplete and grows in time, acquisition of knowledge on our part "is only explicable as a reproduction of itself, in the human soul, by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists —a reproduction of itself in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ."

If man as intelligence is a reproduction of an eternal consciousness "not in time but the condition of there being an order in time, not an object of experience, but the condition of there being an intelligent experience," then he is not subject to the law of causality. The relation of cause and effect obtains between particular facts of experience. The invariable antecedent or the sum of conditions into which an event may be analysed is the cause. What necessarily follows from a set of conditions is the effect. But the condition of the pos-

sibility of things being mutually determined in this way is the synthetic activity of a unifying principle to which all facts are equally present, but which distinguishes itself from them all, while relating them. The relation of the unifying principle to the objects which it unifies is, therefore, not the same as the relation of one of the objects to others. The principle of unity of all things through the medium of which they are related to each other is itself not one of them and is, consequently, not subject to the relations of which it is the source. It is determined by nothing, but all things are determined by it in the sense that their determination by each other is made possible by its presence to and self-distinction from them. Causal determination is determination from without. But the self is not external to the world and cannot, therefore, be the cause or the effect of it. However much the cause and the effect may be dependent on each other, they, as external to each other, have their separate natures. But the world and the unifying principle which makes it possible are two aspects of the same thing. Neither has a nature of its own apart from the other. "There is nothing to qualify the determined world *as a whole*, but that inner determination of all contained in it by mutual relation, which is due to the action of the unifying principle; nor anything to qualify the unifying principle but this very action, with the self-distinction necessary to it" (*Ibid.* p. 81). Because in determining the world the constitutive principle of it is not determined by anything other than itself, but is self-determined, it may be called the "free cause" of the world.

Now, man, as subject of knowledge, as one who conceives time and therefore is not in time, is, like the

spiritual principle in nature whose reproduction he is, a free cause, although the events of his natural life, as parts of nature, are subject to the laws of nature. The activity of knowledge through which he is conscious of the world and of his own personal history is the action in him of an eternal consciousness that uses the processes and functions of his life as its organs and reproduces itself through them. Partaking of the freedom of the eternal mind, he is free. This does not mean that he is only in part free, because, as an animal, he is a product of nature. The animality of man is transfigured by its contact with his spiritual nature and the actions which in an animal would be wanting in freedom, become, as performed by him, the modes of expression of his free causality.

In the foregoing account of Green's metaphysical theory, stress has not been laid on the passages in which he seems to teach that the universe is reducible to a system of mere relations focussed in an eternal mind. Critics of Green have fastened upon such passages and have obtained easy victory over him by showing, what hardly requires to be shown, that the system of nature cannot be resolved into "some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions." Lord Balfour, for example, justly maintains that "it is hard to see how it is possible to conceive a universe in which relations shall be all in all, but in which nothing is to be permitted for the relations to subsist between. Relations surely imply a something which is related, and if that something is, in the absence of relations, 'nothing for us as thinking beings,' so relations, in the absence of that something, are mere symbols emptied of their signification; they are, in short, an illegitimate abstraction" (*Foundations of Belief*, pp. 151-52). Green, surely, is

not forgetful of this truth and his own argument against Kant, as the passages already quoted clearly show, is based on it. If, at times, he seems to reduce the world to "a congeries of relations," he is most emphatic in repudiating the Kantian separation between the form and the matter of experience. The fact is that the form of Green's argument and his phraseology are largely determined by the dominant philosophy of his time. At Oxford he had to fight constantly against the empiricism of Mill, Locke and Hume. Spencer and Lewes were always in his mind. In opposition to the empiricist reduction of mind and reality into aggregates and series of unrelated impressions, he urges, with all the emphasis at his command, that, apart from relations, sensations are simply nothing. Even the philosophy of Kant, out of which his own is largely developed, led him to accentuate the importance of relations. For Kant, like his predecessor Hume, believes in the reality of unrelated sensations, only that he regards them as incapable of being known, while Hume assumes them to be possible objects of knowledge. The doctrine, so familiar to us at the present day, that sensations are real only as elements of the "cosmos of experience" had, in Green's time, in Great Britain at least, yet to establish its claim to acceptance, and it is not surprising that in championing it, he should be led at times to over-emphasise the importance of relations. The passages in which reality is characterised as a system of thought-relations occur more frequently in his polemical writings than in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*. But Green's writings must be judged as a whole, and on the whole. So judged, they cannot fairly be regarded as justifying the strictures of critics like Lord Balfour. All that can be said is that in the zeal of his crusade

against empiricism, he sometimes uses incautious language which seems to suggest that relations alone constitute reality.

Green is never tired of insisting that apart from the relating activity of the self a cosmos or intelligible world is not possible. This does not mean that experience is manufactured out of the particulars of sense by a self operating upon them from without and reducing them to unity. In the passages which appear to convey this meaning, Green only seeks to point out the correlativity of perceived facts and conceived relations and their necessary reference to a self-conscious principle that makes such correlation possible. It is not easy to express complex thoughts in adequate and unambiguous language. In calling attention to the presupposition of sensations, supposed by Hume and his followers to be discrete and unrelated, Green inevitably uses expressions which seem to imply that that presupposition is something *added* to them. But what is really meant is that the self and the world of interrelated objects mutually imply each other. Neither precedes the other in time. Relations and the self which is their centre and source belong to things and are inseparable from them.

"How can we," asks Lord Balfour, "who start from the basis of our limited self-consciousness rise to the knowledge of that completed and divine consciousness of which we share the essential nature?" How could we, one may ask in reply, know that we are finite beings without rising to a point of view from which the limitations of our nature can be seen? A merely finite being would never be conscious of its finitude. He who perceives the boundaries of a thing is enabled to do so because he occupies a position from which it

is possible to look beyond them. The very consciousness we have that we are finite individuals proves that there is an infinite principle in us which is beyond all particular selves and is their unity. It is through relation to this principle that it is possible for us to know that we are finite beings. The one is nothing without the other. If there is a 'we' at all, it is because, as Green says, the self of the universe is communicated to us.

Although the human self is inexplicable unless we regard it as a limited expression of the divine self, Green's conception of the relation between the two is not free from difficulties. In us, he says, the eternal mind is manifested through an animal organism. Our growing knowledge of the world is only explicable as a reproduction of itself in the human soul by the consciousness for which the universe of related facts exists in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ. Statements of this kind convey the impression that the eternally complete consciousness is complete independently of the animal organism and the sensitive life connected with it and that the individual consciousness which has a history in time is merely an excrescence upon the world to which it bears no necessary relation. Are the processes of our intelligence but superfluous reflections of the Absolute thought embodied in the objective world in its actual totality or are they included in the Absolute thought as its essential ingredient? Is the time order real and a necessary element of the eternal order or is it only a false appearance arising from the necessity we are under of comprehending the world bit by bit, of passing "from condition to condition, from effect to effect?" To suppose that the self-distinguishing, self-objectifying mind of the universe

is complete without the finite minds and their fragmentary experiences is to make the latter purposeless and to set up a new dualism in place of the old. It is also, in the words of Sidgwick, "to split up [the individual consciousness] between an eternally complete consciousness out of time and a function of an animal organism which this eternal mind, limiting itself somehow, makes its vehicle." If idealism is to be a tenable theory, it must make room for movement and change, novelties and fresh developments in the universe as it exists not merely for us but for God. It is not enough to trace the differences of the world up to an ultimate principle of unity. The principle of unity must be seen to be realised in the changes and differences of the world. It is true that Green does not deny this, but, on the whole, his tendency in developing his theory is to represent the Absolute reality as timeless and statically perfect.

The inclusion of finite minds in the Absolute mind, it has been maintained, is unintelligible. Self-conscious individuals exclude each other, and it is inconsistent with their nature to suppose that they are constituent members of a single whole. Many minds unified in one mind or one mind realised in many minds, so the argument runs, is an impossible conception. But is not the whole difficulty due to our preconceived notion that a self-conscious personality must be numerically one and indivisible? What is there to show that a self must be insulated from other selves? As known to us, the self is never an isolated individual: it is what it is by virtue of its membership of society. Individual minds are real not in their separateness but through their participation in the social mind. The latter, therefore, has a higher degree of reality than the former,

and if mind is to be the explanatory principle of the universe, the type of it must be the social mind. From this point of view, the self of which the objective world is the expression would appear to be a unity of many selves rather than a single atomic self.

With one more word, we will take leave of Green's metaphysics. He is content with showing that the universe implies relations as its sustaining principles, and that relations "only exist through the action of a unifying and self-distinguishing spiritual subject." But, surely, the relations are of different kinds and their value is not the same. The mutual relations of things, for example, cannot be on the same level with their relation to the spirit for which they exist. How are the various relations which make up the world of experience distinguished from and connected with each other within a system? This is the question to which it is the business of a criticism of categories to furnish an answer. Green's disparagement of the dialectical method shows that he does not feel the need of a critical investigation of the categories with a view to determine their value and meaning and their relations to one another. The categories of thought of different kinds and significations cannot all be properly designated by the single term 'relation.' They are capable of being arranged in a scale of increasing complexity and value, and the lower is taken up into and completed in the higher. The aim of an idealistic philosophy is not fulfilled unless it is shown that whatever may be our first view of reality we must ultimately say of it that it is mind. From the most meagre conception of it, we are forced to move forward until we reach the final thought that it is spirit whose nature it is to be itself and not itself in one. The categories of thought are

the stages through which we have to pass in this forward movement, and their importance is determined by the degree of their proximity to the goal of it.

II.

Green's idealism provides the foundation on which his ethical theory is built. The animal organism through which the self-conditioning and self-distinguishing mind implied in the existence of nature reproduces itself in us is organic not merely to impressions but also to wants and the impulses for the satisfaction of them. As sensations are not to be confused with percepts, so the animal wants and impulses must not be mistaken for the consciousness of wanted objects and the effort to realise them. When a self-conscious being, as distinguished from a mere animal, feels a want and has the impulse to satisfy it, he presents to himself the wanted object from which he distinguishes himself. Thus arises, in its most elementary form, the distinction between what is and what should be. The objects of knowledge are already real, but to the wanted object reality has to be given. The food and the eating of it which is wanted are not the same thing. It is true that without susceptibility to wants and impulses, consciousness of wanted objects would not arise, but the latter is made possible by the supervention of the self upon animal wants. Human actions, that is to say, presuppose wanted objects which are their motives. This does not destroy the freedom of man as a moral being, for motives are not natural phenomena, but are constituted by the active being himself. The object which moves me to action is that which I present to myself as something in the attainment of which my satisfaction is to be found. It is always an idea of personal good.

In being determined to action by a motive, a man is determined by something which his own self-consciousness has constituted and is, therefore, self-determined. In this consists his freedom. There is no such thing as liberty of indifference or the power of unmotived choice between different motives. Both parties in the time-honoured controversy about free will must be judged to be in the wrong. The mistake of the determinist is to suppose that motives are natural phenomena external to the will and acting upon it from without. The mistake of the libertarian is to think that will is separate from motives and that free choice means choice without any motive. Both commit the same mistake of supposing that the motive and the act are two separate entities. But "the motive lies in the man himself": it is the idea of his own personal good, and is, therefore, not other than his will. To identify oneself with a particular desire, to have a motive, is to will. The strongest desire, of course, determines the will, but it is such by reason of the self giving preference to it.

Motive, no doubt, is the outcome of character and is largely conditioned by the circumstances in the midst of which one is placed. But character is the habit of will, and is therefore something which a man has formed for himself. It does not belong to but *is* the man. To say that character determines action is only to say that a man's conception of personal good, to the realisation of which his efforts are directed, depends upon what it has been in the past. Conduct cannot be independent of the past history of life, but "to make this history there has been necessary an action of the ego, which has no history, has not come to be, but which is the condition of our being conscious of any history or

becoming." As for the circumstances, their power to influence motives arises solely through the reaction of the self on them. They affect action because the agent makes use of them for the purpose of carrying out his own end. The self presupposed in knowledge and action transcends all particular objects and cannot be determined by circumstances as one thing determines another. If we do not forget that both character and circumstances are conditioned by a self-distinguishing consciousness, the view that motive is the result of them is not inconsistent with freedom.

Green maintains that on this view only can actions be imputed to the agent and remorse and self-reformation become intelligible. "If a man's action did not represent his character but an arbitrary freak of some unaccountable power of unmotived willing, why should he be ashamed of it or reproach himself with it?" The dependence of my present and future on my past would be incompatible with self-improvement only if in the past my action had been the outcome of natural forces and not been determined by an idea of personal good. Throughout the history of a man's life there is operative a self, a reproduction of the eternal self-consciousness through organic processes, which makes that history possible. This, of course, does not mean that the self is an entity other than particular thoughts, feelings and desires. Such a self is a false abstraction quite as much as thoughts, feelings and desires not referred to a self.

In insisting that "what a man now is and does is the result of what he has been and done," Green seems to forget that the present must also vary from the past, if growth is to have any meaning and what is now done is not to be a mere repetition in another form of what has already been done. It is true that conduct is the

outcome of character, but the whole of character is not to be identified with what it is at any particular stage of its development. At the back of his finite nature there are the infinite potentialities of man, and these potentialities urge him on to realise himself in fresh and ever-varying ways, to seek to be what he is not and has never been. It is Green's own doctrine that man is at once finite and infinite from different points of view, but he seems to forget this in laying stress on the dependence of a human being for what he is to-day on what he was yesterday. In the case of a living being the past not only conditions but also grows into the present.

If action without a motive is impossible and if motive is, in all cases, the idea of personal good, what becomes of the distinction between the good will and the evil will? Green holds that in order to be in a position to understand the reason for this distinction, it is necessary to consider the nature of will and its relation to desire and intellect. Desire, intellect and will are not three independent faculties of the mind. They are inter-dependent forms in which one and the same self manifests itself. Desire, as distinguished from an animal impulse, implies the consciousness of the desired object from which the desiring self distinguishes itself. There is the subjective feeling of want; contrasted with it is the wanted object of which the mind is conscious as something on the attainment of which self-satisfaction is to be found, and, finally, there is the effort to realise what is wanted. Desire, without the consciousness of the object desired, is impossible. Green omits to mention in this connection that feeling also is involved in desire. I can desire a thing only if it is calculated to afford me satisfaction by removing some want.

Pleasure may not be the object of desire, but what is desired must be pleasant. The action of self-consciousness is further implied in the manner in which the desires of a human being mutually qualify each other. "We are never so exclusively possessed by the desire for any object as to be quite unaffected by the thought of other desired objects, of which we are conscious that the loss or gain would have a bearing on our happiness." This is so even when all effort seems to be concentrated on the satisfaction of a single desire. Each desire is always qualified by the thought of the satisfaction or frustration of other desires. In all his activities man seeks his own general well-being, but that well-being can be attained only through the satisfaction of particular desires. It is because of this that our desires are reduced to a system having "its bond of union in the single subject, which always carries with it the consciousness of objects that have been and may be desired into the consciousness of the object which at present is being desired."

Desire and intellect are correlated with each other. Neither can be reduced to the other, nor can they be regarded as distinct faculties of the mind. The element common to them is that both involve the consciousness of opposition between the self and the world and the effort to overcome it. Desire is for some object which, in the first instance, exists only in idea and has got to be realised, and intellect seeks to realise its ideal of the unity of all things by tracing out relations between things which at first seem to be an unconnected and unintelligible manifold. This fundamental community between desire and understanding "we may properly indicate by calling our inner life, as determined by desires for objects, practical thought, while we call

the activity of understanding speculative thought." Further, desire always accompanies understanding, and understanding, desire. It is impossible to try to know anything without desiring to know it. The goal of every kind of intellectual activity must be an object of desire. And in desiring anything we must know the conditions on which the fulfilment of the desire depends. Without the consciousness of its object and of the means which must be adopted if it is to be realised, desire would not be possible.

Will seems to be capable of resisting desire and, therefore, different from it. Of several conflicting desires, it can apparently prefer one and reject others. But Green holds that the conflicting desires are, properly speaking, not desires at all. Before the self identifies itself with any of them, they are mere solicitations of which it is conscious. The desire to which the self gives preference is wrongly called the strongest desire, for its relation to the self is different in kind from that of the rejected desires. Nor can it be maintained that the chosen desire is no longer desire but will. The essential distinction is between the mere solicitations of desire and the desired object with which the self identifies itself, and to refuse to call the latter 'desire' is arbitrary. If we call only that 'desire' with which the self has identified itself, there is no difference between it and will on the inner side.

Green's view of the relation between desire and will is somewhat confusing. If the adopted desire is will, what is choice and what is the activity by means of which effect is given to it? Is it not better, in accordance with usual practice, to call the solicitations 'desire' and the self's identification with a particular desire 'choice,' reserving the term 'will' to denote the self-

conscious process of carrying out the choice? No doubt, Green says that the adoption of a desire or rather a solicitation is will on its inner side; but between will on its inner side only and will both on its inner and outer sides, there is a difference which should not be overlooked. Green's theory virtually obliterates all distinction between will and desire.

Although intellect and will mutually imply each other, it must be remembered "that the understanding employed in the exercise of desire relates to the desired object and to the conditions of its realisation, while the desire involved in a process of thinking has for its object the completion of that process." Between the practical and the speculative activity of the mind, therefore, there is a real difference, and if we call the former 'will' and the latter 'intellect,' there is certainly an opposition between them. But this opposition is relative and not absolute. Underlying it and making it possible, there is the man himself who in willing understands and in understanding wills.

The common feature of all acts of willing is that in them a self-conscious individual seeks to attain an object in which he finds satisfaction. Nothing can be done by us unless we think that in what is done our personal good lies. The *form* of all actions, good or bad, is therefore the same. The distinction between the good will and the bad will depends on the nature of the object willed. But hedonism denies this and maintains that the only possible object of desire is pleasure. Whatever is done the object aimed at is always the gaining of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and, therefore, there can be no intrinsic difference between motives. It is in respect of its consequences that one action differs morally from another. That action is right

which produces more pleasure than pain. The plausibility of this theory which "offends the unsophisticated conscience" is due to a confusion. In the attainment of the object of desire in which self-satisfaction is sought, there is pleasure, but it is not the object of desire. The pleasure which follows the fulfilment of desire cannot be the exciting cause of it. Desire for an object may be strengthened by the contemplation of the pleasure arising from its satisfaction, but if it by itself is made the object of pursuit the chances of getting it are lost. The good is that which satisfies some desire and not abstract pleasure. Of course, pleasure is the consequence of satisfying desire, and therefore what is good is necessarily pleasant, but "its pleasantness depends on its goodness, not its goodness upon the pleasure it conveys."

What then is the moral good or the true good? Green's answer is that it is "that which satisfies the desire of a moral agent or that in which a moral agent can find the satisfaction of himself which he necessarily seeks." There is a divine principle at work in man, for he is "a certain reproduction of itself on the part of the eternal mind." He is not merely the child of nature that at first sight he seems to be. From another point of view, he is one with the self-determining, self-distinguishing mind implied in the existence of the world. He therefore cannot remain satisfied with his actual present condition and inevitably seeks to be what he ideally *is*. The infinite in him impels him to realise his potential nature. It is his vocation "to make himself what he has the possibility of becoming, but actually is not; and hence not merely like the plant or animal, undergoes a process of development, but seeks to, and does develop himself." If what is willed is the outcome

of the effort after the better arising from the operation in us of our ideal nature, it is morally good. On the other hand, the will which is antagonistic to the realisation of our capacities, which tends to keep us as we are or to lower us, is morally evil. The distinguishing feature of the moral life is "that it is governed by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be attained, some vocation which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable, whatever the individual may for the time desire; that it is in ministering to such an end that the agent seeks to satisfy himself" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1st ed., p. 184). What the ideal life in its perfection is, it is impossible for us to say, but the tacit conviction that it is real makes moral progress possible, and from reflection on what the human spirit has already achieved we may know in what direction we must move in order to attain it.

The presupposition of the moral life, that which makes it possible, we have seen, is the operation in man of a divine principle. Because the one divine mind is the source of his being, his true good consists in seeking to satisfy himself by realising his inherent capabilities. But how does the eternal mind progressively manifest itself in man? Does it realise itself in individuals or only in the human race? Are men ends in themselves or only means to the furtherance of the end of humanity? The answer must be that only in *persons* can the divine principle be regarded as realising itself. It is because we ourselves are organising centres of experience that we can think of the world as the object of a single mind, and the impossibility of reducing the self to anything else is the reason why we must think of it as the expression of the mind for which

the universe exists. To suppose that God can realise Himself otherwise than in person is, therefore, impossible. It is quite true that apart from the community, an individual is an abstraction, but it is equally true that without persons a community is nothing. Progress of humanity has no meaning "unless it means a progress of personal character and *to* personal character—a progress of which feeling, thinking and willing subjects are the agents and sustainers, and of which each step is a fuller realisation of the capacities of such subjects." The idea of human progress, with which our actual experience of the world is not easily reconcilable, implies that in the eternal mind the capacities gradually realised in us in time is eternally realised, and "that the end of the process should be a real fulfilment of the capacities presupposed by the process." For the developing subject, the ideal of perfection is something to be attained, but there would be no meaning in saying that in possibility it is, unless the end of its development really existed "not merely for, but *in* or *as* a self-conscious subject." Further, development is not a mere process to which there is no end, but must be relative to an eternal state of perfection in which self-conscious personality, the subject of development, is not extinguished but preserved and is not treated only as a means. In thus laying stress on personality one, however, must not forget that the self-realisation of individuals is possible only in society. It is possible for us to make progress towards the attainment of our common end only in so far as we co-operate with each other and bear each other's burden. Men are members one of another, and each serves himself as he serves others. The self that is sought to be realised in moral life is not any isolated, atomistic self but the universal self of which

the social organisation is the outer form. The necessary condition of the development of personality is society, and the function of society is to promote the development of persons. This does not mean that all persons must be developed in the same way. There is, for example, the distinction between the sexes. "As there is a necessary difference between their functions, there must be a corresponding difference between the modes in which the personality of men and women is developed." Again, on account of the unequal capacities and endowments of men, there must be distinctions of social rank and power. But through these very differences it is possible to attain a richer and fuller corporate life, provided that the one thing needful is not wanting, viz. the spirit of devotion to the highest good.

The moral ideal, in a being who has impulses that draw him away from it, takes the form of what Kant calls the categorical imperative. It commands us to obey the moral law unconditionally, to do the duties through the performance of which man has so far advanced along the path of self-improvement. But particular duties are always relative to special conditions and circumstances, and if these change materially, they may cease to be absolutely binding and become liable to exceptions. But any breach of them is justifiable only if it be required for a fuller realisation of the moral ideal and not for the sake of the pleasure of any particular individual.

The self as completely realised is the end of morality, and to the attainment of this end all our efforts as moral beings are ultimately directed. But the self, Green insists, is essentially social and the good is the common good. The fact that one infinite being is manifested in all men constitutes an immanent bond of union

between them. No one, therefore, can realise himself unless he makes others his partners. To recognise others as persons and to be recognised by them as such, to contribute, each in his own way, to the furtherance of an end which is the end of one and all, is of the very essence of morality. No one can travel alone along the path to perfection. But if a social life based on the idea of a common good is to be lived, everyone must have a definite place in the social organism and his relations to others must be specifically determined. The usages, customs, laws and institutions in which the idea of a supreme good expresses itself determine the stations of men in society. Obedience to laws, loyalty to established institutions, means conformity to the conditions on which the realisation of a common good depends. The injunctions of society, rightly viewed, are the injunctions of my own higher self; for they represent the necessary means without which what I conceive to be the highest good, the good of myself and of my fellow beings, cannot be attained. Reason is "the capability in man of seeking an absolute good and of conceiving this good as common to others with himself," and is, therefore, the source of the laws and customs which keep society together. The germ of social consciousness, not to be confused with mere animal sympathy, must have been present in any primitive community from which the civilised society of to-day may be shown to have been developed.

The development of morality implies, in the first place, the gradual extension of the area of the common good until it covers the whole of the human race. In early communities, the recognised duties are only of men to each other within the same circumscribed group. A Jew, for example, has no obligation to a Gentile, nor

a Greek to a barbarian. But the modern cultivated person recognises, in theory at least, that the duty of man is to man. This duty cannot be legally enforced, but all the same the good man feels that it is as binding on him as his duty to his immediate neighbour. It cannot therefore be regarded as arising out of selfish considerations. The humanitarian idea has its origin in the same reason which is involved in the simplest form of the idea of the common good. Members of a particular community are held together by the bond of a common ideal to which the consciousness of their potential capacities gives rise and for the realisation of which they, each in his own way, labour. It involves the imposition of restraint on their selfish propensities. The recognition of the brotherhood of man is only a fuller expression of this spirit of fellowship. It implies a quickening of the sense of justice. The righteous man, in whose estimation all human beings, as rational, are equal, does not seek his own good by means which interfere with the good of others. He judges himself by the same standard by which he judges others. Bentham's formula, "every one should count for one and no one for more than one," expresses this attitude of mind. It has no necessary connection with hedonism. But the idea finds better expression in Kant's maxim. "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, always as an end, never merely as a means." Its merit lies in laying stress on the absolute value of man.

In the second place, along with the extension of the area of the good, there goes the concurrent process of an increasing determination of the idea of the good. Owing to the presence in man of a universal principle, the attainment of no particular object of desire can

give him permanent satisfaction. He, no doubt, realises himself through the satisfaction of particular desires, but what he seeks is something abiding which will permanently satisfy him, and the idea of it is the standard by which the value of particular achievements is judged. It is not the idea of the largest sum of pleasures. No such sum is possible, for as we pass from one pleasure to another, it vanishes and the pleasures enjoyed in succession cannot, consequently, be added up. A sum of pleasures is not a pleasure but only a concept. The view that the good is the greatest sum of pleasures arises from the mistaken identification of the pleasure arising from the satisfaction of a desire with the object of that desire. The true good is that which widens and deepens the life of a man, and, therefore, even in its more elementary form, it must be a social good. The well-being of a family is a good of this sort. In devoting himself to it an individual rises above his particular self and identifies himself with something which is his own larger and more durable self. The universality of man's nature is the source of the idea of a permanent good which is not private to anyone but social, and of which the distinction of good for self and good for others forms no part. It is embodied in modes of life and arrangements of society in the maintenance and furtherance of which everyone conceives his true good to consist and for the sake of which he is ready to resist the attractions of pleasure. "It is only as living in a community, as sharing the life of others, as incorporated in the continuous being of a family or nation, of a state or church that [a man] can sustain himself in that thought of his own permanence to which the thought of permanent well-being is correlative." The lowest form of this interest in a common well-being is care

for the material needs of a family. Out of this humble origin the humanitarian ideal of the good of all men is gradually developed. In the former the latter is implicit. The common root of both is the idea of a social good in realising which an individual has to identify himself with others. In the activities directed to the end of providing for the material requirements of a family there is already at work a principle of which the full development is to be found in the co-operative life of virtue lived by men as members of the same spiritual community. The development of the moral ideal means a gradual widening of the circle of men who recognise mutual obligations and a progressive determination of the content of the moral end, the transition from the belief that our good lies in the possession of external things to the belief that the only true good is to be good. "The one process is complementary to the other, because the only good in the pursuit of which there can be no competition of interests, the only good which is really common to all who may pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good—in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the person of others. The conviction of a community of good for all men can never be really harmonised with our notions of what is good, so long as anything else than self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service is the end by reference to which those notions are formed" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1st ed., p. 262).

The gradual specialisation of the idea of the true good finds expression in the accepted standards of virtues and duties. From the idea that human well-being consists in the possession of external things, men, by degrees, have advanced to the notion that their real

good lies in a "fulfilment of human capabilities from within, not an accession of good things from without." This change of ideal has reacted on the conception of social merit. Duties and virtues are estimated not with reference to their outward consequences, but to their ultimate end, viz. perfection of character. It gradually comes to be recognised that such habits of will are virtuous as tend to promote human development, to make individuals and the society of which they are members more perfect. When the age of philosophical reflection comes, an endeavour is made to define the main ends of human activity and to reduce them to a unity. From Socrates and his followers has come the theory of virtues and duties which has profoundly influenced modern Europe. They endeavoured to show that the different virtues are interdependent forms of one and the same supreme virtue, the will to be good. The Greek philosophers, of course, did not invent the virtues, but only made explicit the principles of conduct by which the good citizen had all along been guided. The practical importance of their work was immense. For virtuous activities performed with a clear consciousness of the end to which they are directed are of a higher order than instinctively good acts. The conception of the good which we have inherited from the Greek philosophers has not ceased to be valid. "When we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (*i.e.* to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the

state, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to but what is due" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1st ed., p. 276).

The difference between the Greek and the modern standards of virtue lies mainly in this, that for us the end has become more comprehensive and, as a consequence, the requirements of the good life have come to be more numerous and more exacting. This will be evident if we compare modern ideas about courage and temperance with those of Aristotle. By 'fortitude' Aristotle understands the readiness of the soldier to die in battle for his country. At first sight, the identity between this virtue and that displayed by the philanthropist in the service of the weak and the helpless, without being noticed and without reward, is by no means apparent; but, on reflection, we find that in both cases the temper of mind is, in principle, the same. The warrior as well as the philanthropist devote themselves to a worthy end, and, in the effort to attain it, resist pain and fear. The difference is that while the soldier's field of activity is narrow and circumscribed and his duty only of a particular kind, the benevolent worker dedicates his life to the service, in innumerable ways, of men who are lowly and humble and do not count in the estimation of the great, and towards whom the Greeks would have recognised no duties whatever.

Temperance is the name given by Aristotle to the virtue which finds expression in the control over animal appetites. In the mere renunciation of the pleasures incidental to the satisfaction of animal appetites there is no merit; but such renunciation is demanded by the requirements of the life of the good citizen. If a man

is to render service to the state, if he is to be an efficient member of society, his attention and will must not be too much occupied by desire for pleasure. It is the interest in and devotion to something higher than the private good of the individual and not the renunciation of pleasures, unless it is an indication of such interest, that has moral value. In principle, therefore, the virtue of temperance, as Aristotle understood it, is the same as the more comprehensive modern virtue of self-denial. It involves the foregoing of pleasures of every kind and not merely those of animal appetite in the service of humanity. The self-sacrificing Christian citizen acknowledges duties to the whole of mankind and not exclusively to the narrow community to which he immediately belongs, and, in the effort to uplift the mass of depressed men, practises self-denial on a scale not contemplated in ancient times. A fuller realisation of human nature was the ideal of the Greeks for the privileged few only, and it was to be attained through the exclusion of the unprivileged multitude. But the Christian conception of the brotherhood of man has led to the removal of all artificial distinctions between man and man, and, in consequence, the ideal sought to be realised at the present day is the full development of the personality of every human being. Of the pursuit of this ideal, a life of constant self-sacrifice appears to be a necessary condition. While, therefore, self-denial is, in essence, the same as the Aristotelian virtue of temperance, it is practised in a wider sphere and in the promotion of an ideal far more comprehensive than that of the Greeks.

The Platonic or Aristotelian conception of virtue as consisting in the will to be good, a will directed to the perfection of human nature, is in substance valid

for all time. Its defect lies in its concrete application. The idea of human brotherhood had no meaning then, and the scope of the virtues was, in consequence, extremely limited. But in the modern world, all men are regarded as equal and owing mutual service to each other. Our social requirements therefore are more varied and more comprehensive. The work of the philosophers together with the effects of Roman conquest and the influence of Christianity has prepared the way for the idea of the brotherhood of man. Under the influence of this idea, "the good has come to be conceived with increasing clearness not as anything which one man or set of men can gain or enjoy to the exclusion of others, but as a spiritual activity in which all may partake, and in which all must partake, if it is to amount to a full realisation of the faculties of the human soul."

In order to be completely good, it is not enough that an action should produce desirable consequences; it must also be done from the best of motives. The effect to be taken into consideration is not the amount of pleasure produced but the extent to which the end of human perfection is furthered. That alone is good in the full sense which is done with the object of contributing to the good of man and does actually tend to produce such a consequence. But it is not easy to ascertain the motives of men, and in judging the actions of others we have often to confine ourselves to the consideration of their results only. In estimating the value of our own deeds, however, it is our duty to compare the motives from which they arise with the true ideal of virtue and not to be satisfied with anything done of which that ideal is not the determining principle. "The comparison of our own

practice, as we know it on the inner side in relation to the motives and character which it expresses, with an ideal of virtue, is the spring from which morality perpetually renews its life." Faithfulness to the ideal of goodness, unceasing effort to make our conduct conform to it, raises society as well as the individual to a higher plane. The origin of current moral practices is to be attributed to the working of the same conscientious spirit in the past. To the good man who strives constantly to act from the highest motives, whose one solicitude is to be good and help others to be good, more excellent ways of doing what is right than the customary ones will continually suggest themselves. "He is like the judge who is perpetually making new law in ostensibly interpreting the old. He extracts the higher meaning out of the recognised social code, giving reality to some requirements which it has hitherto only contained potentially." And this spirit of devotion to the ideal, though it does not by itself give us knowledge of the probable results of actions, "will turn the products of intellectual enlightenment and scientific discovery, as they come, to account in the way of contribution to human perfection." Apart from all this conscientiousness, a life of moral aspirations, has an intrinsic value, not derived from any of its consequences.

A theory of the moral ideal, however true, cannot take the place of conscientiousness. "No philosopher can supply a moral dynamic." Proper guidance in the regulation of conduct can come only from sincere and faithful devotion to what is good and noble. The service which moral philosophy renders is mainly negative. It does not teach us what to do, but how to avoid perplexities arising from conflict of rules

supposed to be of universal application or the perils of moral scepticism resulting from inadequate theories. Moral ideas are often clothed in imaginative forms, and when reflection shows that these forms, taken literally, are indefensible, the truths which they symbolise are apt to be thrown away along with them. Philosophy distinguishes the substance from the form, the kernel from the husk, and points out that the validity of the ideas is not affected by the insufficiency of the forms in which they find expression. In cases of genuine perplexity of conscience in which moral laws of equal validity seem to be in conflict, it shows that no particular rule, being relative to special conditions and circumstances, can be unconditionally binding. The one fundamental law is that we should seek to be actually what we ideally are, and whatever mode of action is enjoined by this law in a given situation is the rule of action in that situation. In a particular set of circumstances, there can only be one duty, and a conflict of duties, therefore, is impossible. What that duty is we, as a rule, learn from conventional morality. It becomes unavailing only when a situation arises in which existing laws of conduct do not apply or an ideal higher than that embodied in the established institutions and forms of life becomes operative in one's mind.

The keynote of Green's ethical theory is that man is what he is by virtue of the self-communication to him of an infinite spirit, that such self-communication is the source of the idea of a perfect life to the realisation of which the whole energies of a good man are devoted, and that it is impossible to make progress towards the attainment of such a life without the identification of each with all and all with each from

which the recognition of particular duties and the spirit to discharge them faithfully arise.

III.

"The lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," as Nettleship says, "form in some degree an illustrative commentary on the *Prolegomena to Ethics*." In this great work on political philosophy, Green's object is to inquire into the nature of the moral purpose served by the laws defining the rights and duties of men which the state enforces. The main conclusion reached is that the laws and institutions of society are justified to the extent to which they contribute to the realisation and exercise of the moral capacities of its members. The two principles to be kept in view for the criticism of law are that only outward acts can be matter of obligation and that the standard by which laws are to be judged is the moral end which it should be their aim to further. An act, in order to be moral, must, of course, be done from the best of motives, but it is not the function of the state to look into the motives of men. Its business is to enforce and forbid actions the performance or non-performance of which is necessary to the realisation of the moral end of society. Law can consider only the intention of an action. Its ideal is to remove obstacles to and create conditions favourable for the performance of actions directed to the realisation of the moral end. Such actions, however, must be spontaneous, and cannot be legally enjoined. No one can be made moral by an act of parliament. Only the external act can be enforced. A merely legal act is not moral, but without being legal or what ought to be legal, it cannot be moral, unless any breach of law

is in the interest of morality itself. The moral good is essentially a common good, and it can be realised only in so far as men live a life of mutual helpfulness and co-operation as members of some political society. The duty of the state is to "maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible," and the right of its citizens is to be free not to do what they like but to exercise their powers in order to contribute to the common good. "A right is a power claimed and recognised as contributory to a common good." The rights of men are therefore correlative to their one fundamental duty of seeking to realise the common good, and have no existence apart from it. They arise from their membership of the state. "No one can have a right except (1) as a member of society and (2) of a society in which some common good is recognised by the members of the society as their own ideal good, as that which should be for each of them" (*Works*, Vol. II., p. 350). The view, therefore, that men in an unsocial state possessed certain 'natural rights,' for the secure enjoyment of as many of them as possible they entered into a contract to form society, is fundamentally erroneous. "Natural right as a right in a state of nature which is not a state of society is a contradiction. There can be no right without a consciousness of common interest on the part of members of a society. Without this there might be certain powers on the part of individuals, but no recognition of these powers by others as powers of which they allow the exercise, nor any claim to such recognition; and without this recognition or claim to recognition there can be no right" (*Works*, Vol. II., p. 354). The result of the notion that individuals had rights in a state of nature "is seen in the inveterate

irreverence of the individual towards the state, in the assumption that he has rights against society irrespectively of his fulfilment of any duties to society, that 'all powers that be' are restraints upon his natural freedom which he may rightly defy as far as he safely can" (*Ibid.* p. 373).

The state is essentially a product of self-consciousness. In its laws and institutions the collective mind and will of the people is embodied. It is within and as members of it that individuals can recognise and respect each other's rights. These rights are the powers without the exercise of which it is not possible for us to promote the common good. The justification of them is that only through the use of the powers secured in them man, as a moral being, can fulfil his vocation. As the organs of a living body can discharge the functions necessary for the continuance of life only as constituent elements of it, so, as citizens of the state alone, is it possible for human beings to possess the rights of which the exercise is necessary for the attainment of the moral end. The state, therefore, is the presupposition of the possibility of individuals living as moral beings. It is not a power set over against the individuals whom it controls from without. Man versus the state is as absurd a conception as the hand versus the body. The state is the organised unity of self-conscious persons apart from which they have neither occupations nor rights.

The answer to the question, why should I submit to the power of the state? is, therefore, this, that in obeying the laws enforced by the state I only conform to the necessary conditions of my living the life of a rational being. The institutions by which a man's conduct is regulated express the idea of a common

good; in them the general will takes body and form. It is the presence of this idea in him and not fear that makes him acknowledge their authority over him. Will, not force, is the basis of the state. Force, no doubt, is a necessary element of sovereignty. Its use is necessary for the repression of those in whom regard for the common weal is wanting, and also, occasionally, for the maintenance of law and order. But it, by itself, is not the bond of society. What is necessary to the existence of a political society is "not indeed that every one subject to the laws should take part in voting them, still less that he should consent to their application to himself, but that it should represent the idea of common good which each member of society can make his own so far as he is rational."

Political subjection is to be distinguished from that of the slave, because it secures rights to the subject and is based upon his recognition that it is for his own highest good. It and morality have a common source which is "the rational recognition by certain human beings—it may be by children of the same parent—of a common well-being which is their well-being and which they conceive as their well-being whether at any moment any one of them is inclined to it or not." Because of this common source both morality and political subjection imply resistance to inclinations opposed to what reason conceives as an adequate good.

But, it may be asked, is it not an unwarrantable assumption that the existence of the state depends on the will of the subjects? Of how many men can it be said that their perception of the fact that the state furthers the common good is the reason of their allegiance to it? Most of us obey the injunctions of

the state because we cannot help it. It is true that the abstract idea of a common good does not regulate the conduct of the bulk of men. They are guided by the conventional rules of life and instinctively recognise that the claims which they put forward for themselves are conditional upon their recognition of the similar claims of others. But it is through the discharge of the obligations of daily life that the common good is realised. The knowledge that the conditions of a decent and reputable life are secured to him by the authority of the state is sufficient to make a man loyal to it; but something more, Green thinks, is necessary if he is to be an intelligent patriot as well. He must actively participate in the work of the state and have a hand in making the laws which he obeys.

It cannot be denied that the founders and organisers of states have often been unscrupulous and selfish men and have not hesitated to make use of questionable means to carry out their ends. But they have succeeded not because of their selfishness but through the association of an ideal motive with it. Their individual deficiencies and peculiarities have played but a small part in the result achieved by them. Their success was due to "their fitness to act as organs of impulses and ideas which had previously gained a hold on some society of men and for the realisation of which the means and conditions had been preparing quite apart from the action of those who became the most noticeable instruments of their realisation."

Because a supreme coercive power is essential to the existence of a state, it has been wrongly supposed that it is based on force. The effectiveness of force, however, is due not to its use simply as such, but "according to law written or customary and for the

maintenance of rights." The name 'state' is best given to a society which has such a system of law and a supreme power to uphold it. It is not a mere collection of individuals under a sovereign, but an organised whole of men who have a common mind and a common purpose and exercise powers secured to them in furtherance of what is conceived to be a common well-being. It "presupposes other forms of community with the rights that arise out of them and only exists as sustaining, securing and completing them." The development of it takes place through the assimilation of fresh societies and the consequent widening of the range of common interests and the creation of new rights. Force can be said to have contributed to the formation of states only in so far as its use has been necessary for the maintenance of rights.

Rights belong to an individual related to other individuals within the state. They are possessed by them on condition of their recognising each other as free human beings capable of self-realisation. An individual isolated from society, if such isolation were possible, would have no rights whatever. He can claim to exercise his powers provided that he recognises the like claims of others as members of the same community. "In analysing the nature of any right we may conveniently look at it on two sides and consider it as on the one hand a claim of the individual, arising out of his rational nature, to the free exercise of some faculty; on the other hand as a concession of that power by society, a power given by it to the individual of putting the claim in force" (*Works*, Vol. II., p. 430). These, however, are only distinguishable sides of one and the same thing and have no separate existence.

"It is only a man's consciousness of having an object in common with others, a well-being which is consciously his in being theirs and theirs in being his —only the fact that they are recognised by him and he by them as having this object—that gives them the claim described" (*Ibid.* p. 450). No citizen, therefore, has any right to act otherwise than as a member of the state. "The individual has no rights founded on any right to do as he likes."

Are we then to say that opposition to the state is never defensible? Must we always obey its laws, no matter how unjust they may be? The general principle to be borne in mind in answering the question is that nothing should be done which upsets the social order on which the existence of rights depends. An individual who feels that some existing law is unjustifiable must, of course, do all he can to get it amended or repealed by constitutional methods; but, until this is done, his duty is to conform to it. In cases, however, where repeal by legal means is impossible, resistance may sometimes become a duty. But such resistance must be for the sake of the common good which the public conscience can appreciate, and never in the interest of any particular section of the community. He who would offer resistance to the state must consider whether, as a consequence of it, there is any prospect of the state being improved without being subverted and whether its overthrow will mean anarchy. Only in a state so hopelessly bad that its improvement is impossible can rebellion be ever a duty. Nothing calculated to undermine the law-abiding habits of men ought to be light-heartedly undertaken.

Rights depend on the social nature of man. The state "is a form which society takes in order to main-

tain them." Though there are rights which come into being only with the organisation of the state, all rights are not of this kind. They presuppose society, of course, but may exist in the absence of a state. The right to life and liberty is one of such rights. Its foundation is "capacity on the part of the subject for membership of a society, for determination of the will, and through it of the bodily organisation, by the conception of a well-being as common to self with others." This right, though it belongs to man as man, was at first recognised only within the limits of a particular society. Under the influence of the Roman law, Stoicism and the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man all arbitrary limitations have been gradually removed and the right of every man to free life recognised. But there is still very little recognition of what it involves. A man is free not to do what he likes but only to fulfil some function in the social organism, to contribute something to the common good. The corollary to the recognition of the right of every human being to life and liberty is to make it possible for him to render service to humanity, to further an end which is as much his as of his fellows.

The right to life and liberty is annulled in war, and, for this reason, it is an evil. But war is not murder, of which the essence is to kill with malice against the person killed in order to gain some private advantage. Still it is a violation of the right of life, and the promoters of it are wrongdoers to humanity. It may be argued that war is sometimes the only possible means of preserving the integrity and existence of a state, and when this is so the right to life of its citizens is overridden by the paramount duty of maintaining the necessary conditions of a good and dignified life. But

although the state waging a defensive war may be exculpated from blame, the guilt of it remains and is only transferred to those who are really responsible for it. That such a means of maintaining national freedom should be necessary only shows how low the moral condition of mankind is. Wars arise not because sovereign states exist, but because they are not constituted as they should be. "The state is an institution in which all rights are harmoniously maintained, in which all the capacities that give rise to rights have free play given to them." In so far as a state is true to its end, nothing done by it in its own interests can be antagonistic to the genuine interests of other states. "There is no such thing as an inevitable contest between states." The more states are so organised as to be fitted to fulfil their ends, the greater, as a consequence of this, the connection of men of different nations is with one another, the better is the prospect of the abolition of war. It may be that a spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice is called forth by war. But "till all the methods have been exhausted by which nature can be brought into the service of men, till society is so organised that every one's capacities have free scope for their development, there is no need to resort to war for a field in which patriotism may display itself."

The right of life and liberty is also infringed by punishment. Its justification depends upon the fact that the right of men to live and work in a community, arising from their capacity to realise themselves by contributing to the social good, needs to be protected against aggression. Punishment, therefore, is retributive in the sense that it is the reaction of society against a wrong done to it through the violation of the rights

of its constituent members. But it is also preventive and reformatory. In order to be just, punishment must be for the maintenance of genuine rights and the person punished must know what they are. When these conditions are fulfilled, it will be seen to be the recoil on the criminal of his own deed. It is also intended to prevent the violation of rights through the association of terror with it in the public mind. The amount of it, however, must be such as is really necessary for the prevention of crime, and the system of rights to be maintained must be just. Finally, punishment should, in addition to its retributive and preventive functions, be reformatory as well. By this it is not meant that the state should seek to improve the moral character of the criminal, which is beyond its power, but that, as a means to the protection of rights, his recovery from criminal habits should be kept in view. It should not be forgotten that the criminal, except in rare cases, does not become permanently incapable of rights, and punishment must be calculated to make him fitted for the resumption of them.

The sacredness of human life is getting increasing recognition. It is generally agreed in these days that man's right to a free life should not be interfered with. The *raison d'être* of this right, however, is the capacity of men to be determined in their actions by the idea of a common good, and it is, therefore, not reasonable that so little should be done to make the positive realisation of this capacity possible. But, it being a moral capacity, the development of it cannot be effected by means of legally enforced actions. The end can be achieved only if men act spontaneously under the influence of social interests. All that the state can do is to remove obstacles to the formation of habits of

good citizenship. But in this direction it is possible for it to do much more than it has hitherto attempted.

If, as Green says, the state is an organisation whose end is the fullest possible development of its citizens, is it not putting an arbitrary limit to its action to say that it must be only for the purpose of removing obstacles? Much of what would be described as socialistic legislation he defends on the ground that it is necessary for the creation of conditions favourable for a free moral life, but he opposes "any direct enforcement of the outward conduct, which ought to follow from social interests, by means of threatened penalties." Is the assumption correct that what is legally enforced cannot be spontaneously done? The good man freely fulfils the duties of his station, no matter whether the laws of the state enjoin them or not. So far as he is concerned the element of compulsion does not exist. If a state requires its citizens to serve in the army, it does not follow that they cannot spontaneously and cheerfully render the necessary military service. Law and liberty are not opposed to each other. What is opposed to law is licence. Rational laws are the outward embodiment of freedom, and in being determined by them an individual is determined by his own inner end. The only proper limit to the action of the state is that which is prescribed by its own end. It is justified in legally enforcing whatever is necessary for the realisation of the capacities of its citizens and not anything else. The truth seems to be that in spite of his being the first British thinker who naturalised in England the political conceptions of Aristotle and Hegel, Green was still too much under the influence of the individualism of his time.

Nevertheless, Green's political theory contains the

most effective antidote to individualism. The keynote of it is that individuals and their rights are meaningless abstractions apart from the whole to which they belong. Rights are powers secured to men in order that they may be exercised for the furtherance of a social good. They are the recognised means of doing duty to society. The one essential right of man, therefore, is to be a good man. For well nigh a century and a half the world has been hearing only of the rights of man. That they arise out of his duties to his community is the great truth on which Green lays stress. Forgetfulness of this truth results in the "inveterate irreverence of the individual towards the state." The true end of social and political reform is to make the performance of duties through the exercise of rights easier and not to gain the paradise of rights only and no duties.

With the right of life the right of property is closely connected. Property is the instrument of life and is the outcome of the appropriation of things by a permanent self demanding free expression. That into which a man puts his will becomes his property. Its existence depends upon appropriation and the recognition of that appropriation by others. Men banded together for the furtherance of interests recognised as common, and acknowledging each other as free human beings by means of their activities that contribute to a common well-being, become creators of property. It is, therefore, an ethical institution. "As a permanent apparatus for carrying out a plan of life, for expressing ideas of what is beautiful or giving effect to benevolent wishes," its possession is the necessary condition of attaining a moral life. As men have very unequal powers of conquering nature, as their capacities are

different, property is bound to be unequal. The difference between rich and poor is, therefore, an irremovable difference, and its existence is not a valid reason for abolishing private property. It is only when the freedom to acquire property is so exercised that it interferes with the like freedom of others that it becomes unjustifiable. There is no reason whatever to think that the increased wealth of one man means the diminished wealth of another. As wealth is capable of indefinite increase, it is not necessary that in order to add to one's share of it something should be taken from that of another. The only exception is land. The quantity of it being limited, its exclusive possession by a few may interfere with the right of men to use it for the satisfaction of their wants. The existence of an impoverished proletariat is not due to the institution of property but to various remediable defects connected with its working. It is the duty of the state to see to it that none exercises the right of property in such a way as to create conditions unfavourable for the development of moral personality.

The institution of family life, like the acquisition of property, is due to man's effort to actualise his possibilities. It implies that "in the conception of his own good to which a man seeks to give reality there is included a conception of the well-being of others, connected with him by sexual relations or by relations which arise out of this." The formation of a household is not possible without the free consent of husband and wife to be one person, to merge their isolated personality in a common unity. They, in consequence of this, have reciprocal claims on each other. Marriage, therefore, must be monogamous. The right of husband over wife and of wife over husband is a right against

all others. "It is a right to claim a certain behaviour from a certain person and at the same time to exclude all others from claiming it." Monogamy is also necessary if the claims of children on their parents reciprocal to those of the parents on the children are to be satisfied. Domestic training is not possible unless father and mother exercise joint authority over their children and unless the children love and obey them both equally. The ideal of married life is that the partnership of husband and wife should be for life, and it should not, therefore, be terminable at the mere pleasure of one of them. While facilitating divorce for adultery, the state should not make dissolution of marriage too easy.

IV.

Green's religious views are the direct outcome of his metaphysics. They are expressed in fine and impressive language chiefly in the addresses on the *Witness of God* and *Faith*. The substance of what he preaches is as follows:

God is our ideal self, the possibility of which the realisation is the end of our moral life. This does not mean that He is only an empty ideal. What from the point of view of our present incomplete and ignorant self is merely possible is, rightly understood, the truly real, and what we are apt to regard as the only thing actual owes its actuality to its being the promise and potency of that which it is possible for us to become. "To anyone who understands a process of development, the result being developed is the reality, and it is in its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature." God, as man's ideal self, is one with him, one "not with an abstract or collective humanity but with the individual man."

To say so may seem presumptuous, but the assertion of man's identity with God does not mean that there is no difference between them. Identity is impossible without difference. The child is in possibility identical with the full-grown man, but this does not mean that the child is the same as man. Man's identity with God is "an identity of self with self." In the case of the acorn's identity with the oak, the identity exists not for the acorn but for the outside observer. But "in the process constituting the moral life, the germ and the development, the possibility and its actualisation are one and the same consciousness of self." In being conscious of ourselves we are conscious of God. The knowledge of God, however, cannot be like our knowledge of a particular object. A thing is known as an element of a single world, by the other elements of which it is qualified. The presupposition, the necessary correlative of this world, is the knowing self. But though reason is the source of our knowledge of the world, it does not find its ideal of completeness realised in it. This ideal, however, is bound up with our self-consciousness "as the consciousness of a subject which is at once the negation and the unity of all things; which we do not know but are, and through which we know." In the light of it, we become aware of our imperfection and shortcomings, of something to be known but not yet known, something to be done but not yet done. "It is an element of identity between us and a perfect being, who is in full realisation what we are in principle and possibility. *That* God is, it entitles us to say with the same certainty as that the world is or that we ourselves are. *What* He is, it does not indeed enable us to say in the same way in which we make propositions about matters of fact, but it moves us to seek to become as

He is; to become like Him, to become consciously one with Him, to have the fruition of His Godhead. In this sense it is that reason issues in the life of faith" (*Works*, Vol. III., p. 268).

Such a faith does not and cannot rest on historical events alleged to have taken place in the remote past. The dogmas of Christianity are not to be taken literally. They are to be understood as expressing, figuratively, the central truths of religion of which reason alone can be the witness. In the death and resurrection of Christ, for example, the essential nature of the divine spirit is exhibited and the way to the blessed life of oneness with Him shown. God is one only as He returns into Himself from His own self-alienation in the world. He is not somewhere beyond the clouds. He is close to us, lives in us, is incarnated in us. In our thoughts, feelings and actions, He thinks, feels and acts; in our triumphs He triumphs, and in our failures He fails. But He is also above and beyond us. Only as such is He a spirit and not a mere supreme being. The way to attain reconciliation with Him is to re-enact in our daily life the crucifixion of Christ. It is our selfishness, the attempt to find satisfaction in what cannot afford it, that keeps us separated from God. The root of sin is to know nothing higher than the finite self and to be absorbed in its petty and circumscribed aims. To get salvation one must die in Christ to the lower self in order to rise in Him into the spiritual life of love and charity. In "the temple of Christian fellowship, where no man seeks his own, but everyone another's good," God dwells. The true believer in Christ is he who, like the Saviour himself, rises above his limited self and realises his oneness with God and Humanity. "It is our sins and nothing else that

separate us from God. Philosophy and science, to those who seek not to talk of them but to know their power, do but render his clearness more clear, and the freedom of his service a more perfect freedom. His witness grows with time. In great books and great examples, in the gathering fulness of spiritual utterance which we trace through the history of literature, in the self-denying love which we have known from the cradle, in the moralising influences of civil life, in the closer fellowship of the Christian society, in the sacramental ordinances which represent that fellowship, in common worship, in the message of the preachers through which, amid diversity of stammering tongues, one spirit still speaks—here God's sunshine is shed abroad without us. If it does not reach within the heart, it is because the heart has a darkness of its own, some unconquered selfishness which prevents its relation to him being one of 'sincerity and truth'" (*Works*, Vol. III., pp. 248-49).

The consciousness of God is not merely a proof of His existence: it is the very presence of God in us. "You complain that by searching you cannot find out God. No eye can see, or ear hear him. The assertion that he exists cannot be verified like any other matter of fact. But what if that be not because he is so far off, but because he is so near? You cannot know him as you know a particular fact related to you, but neither can you so know yourself, and it is your self, not as you are, but as in seeking him you become, that is his revelation. 'Say not in thine own heart, who shall ascend into heaven or descend into the deep,' to find God in the height of another world or in the depths of nature. 'The word of God is very nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart.' It is the word that has

been made man; that has been uttering itself in all the high endeavour, the long-suffering love, the devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind, and that now speaks in your conscience. It is the God in you which strives for communication with God.

> 'Speak to him thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet,
> Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'"

CHAPTER III.

EDWARD CAIRD.

In the exposition and defence of an idealistic theory of the world, Green's associate was Edward Caird. After Green's untimely death in 1882, Caird carried on alone the work which had originally been shared between them. He was a teacher of great originality and power. His influence in Scotland for a whole generation is comparable only to that of Green at Oxford during the seventies of the last century. "No teacher of philosophy," says Professor Watson, one of his most distinguished pupils, "has ever produced a greater influence on his students, a result which was mainly due to the utter veracity of the man, his quiet but assured faith that all things work together for good, and the simple yet felicitous phrases in which ideas by no means easy to comprehend were expressed" (*Philosophical Review*, Vol. XVIII., p. 108). "His ordinary class," says Professor Mackenzie, another of his famous students, "sometimes contained as many as 250 students at a time, and few left it without some lasting mark of his influence. As a teacher, he was generally recognised as one of the most effective—if not the most effective—of his time" (*Mind*, New Series, Vol. XVIII., p. 511). Caird was not only a great teacher and a great philosopher, but also a man whose "large-hearted reasoned faith in God and all goodness" found

expression in his outward life. "No man of our generation," writes Professor J. A. Smith, "was more free from self-seeking, from vanity or personal ambition. Small and mean things vanished in his presence. He loved great things and great men, and above all he loved truth, and sought single-heartedly to win and communicate it" (*Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, p. 160).

At Oxford, during his student days, Caird enjoyed the friendship of Green and was greatly influenced by him. The two thinkers had much in common, and the fundamental principles of the idealism which they teach are, in all essentials, the same. "Seldom have there been in the history of philosophy," writes Professor Muirhead, "two men who so entirely entered into each other's mind and so entirely understood each other, seldom, I think, two such friends as Caird and Green" (*Ibid.* p. 131). Both of them develop their ideas largely through the criticism of thinkers from whom they differ. While Green subjected to a very searching examination the principles of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spencer and Lewes, Caird devoted himself to the criticism of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Comte. He never expounded the system of Hegel in detail, but contented himself with writing a monograph on him, "a small but golden book," as Professor Watson truly calls it, in which a bare sketch of his main principles is given. Caird never criticises for the sake of mere destruction. His aim always is to bring out the deeper thoughts of the philosopher criticised, of which he himself had only an imperfect grasp. The point of view from which the work of criticism is done is that of Hegel. It would not be incorrect to call Caird a Hegelian. His idealism is, in substance, identical with that of Hegel. Though

the main work of his life was to expound and estimate the Philosophy of Kant, he was much less a Kantian than Green. But though Caird borrows largely from Hegel, he always makes what he borrows his own and cannot, therefore, be described as a mere disciple of Hegel. As he himself says, "there are few, if any, in any country, who could now take up the same position towards Hegel, which was accepted by his immediate disciples. The days of discipleship are past."

Agreeing in the main with Green, Caird differs from him in one important particular. He points out that the spiritual principle of unity presupposed in the existence of the world is not only that to which all things are to be referred but is a unity of differences in which it is revealed. Asking, like Kant, how experience is possible, Green reaches the conclusion that it, consisting of mutually related things, has for its presupposition a unity of consciousness in which it is centred. Apart from an eternally complete consciousness, the universe has no meaning. But while Green supports this conclusion with an abundance of convincing arguments, he is rather chary of saying anything positive about the eternal consciousness. "As to what that consciousness is in itself, or in its completeness, we can only make negative statements. *That* there is such a consciousness is implied in the existence of the world, but *what* it is we can only know through its acting so far in us as to enable us, however partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience" (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 54). This conclusion, Caird thinks, is hardly consistent with Green's own view that "there is a spiritual self-conscious being of which all that is real is the activity or expression." It is true that the spiritual principle cannot be known as it knows itself

or be explained by reference to anything beyond itself, as one thing is explained by means of the relations in which it stands to others, but this does not mean that we are unable to say what it is. Green himself teaches us that it is a unity of consciousness "whose nature it is to be itself and not itself in one," a universal mind, that is, which is subject on one side and its own object on the other. As Caird puts it, "if it is possible for us to carry back the world of experience to conditions that are spiritual, there seems to be nothing that should absolutely hinder us from regarding the world positively as the manifestation of spirit and from reinterpreting the results of science by the aid of this idea—however difficult it may be to realise satisfactorily such an idealistic reconstruction of science" (*Mind*, Vol. VIII., p. 561). The difference between Green and Caird is that while the former is content with tracing the world up to a spiritual principle of unity, the latter maintains that it is also possible to show that the world is the manifestation of spirit. In so far as Caird succeeds in doing this his idealism is an improvement upon that of Green.

I.

It is not easy to give a connected exposition of Caird's philosophical theory, for it is, for the most part, developed through the criticism of others, particularly of Kant. In what follows is given an outline of the idealism which he, animated by the spirit of Hegel, educes from Kant:

In his transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant seeks to prove that knowledge presupposes the synthesis of the manifold of sense by means of the categories of the understanding. Nothing, he argues, can

come within the scope of our knowledge which is not an affection of the mind, a sensuous representation. The sensuous representations, however, become objects of knowledge only when they are combined into a single whole of experience through their co-presence to the unity of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness relates isolated impressions to each other and thereby converts them into cognisable objects forming parts of a single system which we call nature. The correlative of nature, therefore, as an orderly whole of parts necessarily related to each other, is mind. The most fundamental laws of nature are the modes of connection, the forms of synthesis (the categories) according to which the mind relates sensations to each other, so as to transform them into permanent objects of experience. But if the self conscious of its identity with itself is the presupposition of nature as an orderly whole, it is equally true that the unity of the world is that in relation to and in distinction from which the mind is conscious of its unity with itself. The unity of the world, in other words, is the objective counterpart of the mind's unity with itself. The presupposition of nature is the synthesis of the manifold according to the categories effected by the understanding conscious of itself as the identity to which all sensations are referred, and the presupposition of the mind's consciousness of itself as a unity is the synthetic activity whereby the world of experience is constituted. Apart from relation to the unity of the self, the world would fall asunder into unrelated particulars, and apart from relation to the unity of the world the self would be resolved into many disconnected selves. In short, in Kant's view, self-consciousness and the world mutually imply each other.

The element of permanent value in Kant's deduction of the categories, according to Caird, is the demonstration of the truth that knowledge depends on the correlativity of sense and understanding and implies the opposition and necessary relation to each other of self and not-self. Unfortunately, however, he failed to perceive the organic character of knowledge and conceived of it as the result of the combination of separable elements. If percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty, if the consciousness of the objective world presupposes the consciousness of self and the consciousness of self rests upon its distinction from and relation to the objective world, surely the right conclusion is that knowledge is an organic whole of elements distinguishable but not separable from each other, and that it is a unity which at once creates and overcomes the distinction of subject and object. But from the fact of the necessary implication of the different elements of knowledge with each other, Kant draws the conclusion that they are *combined* with each other to constitute it. He does not see that it is impossible to convert mere states of the mind into objects by artificially bringing them under concepts foreign to them. Subjective feelings will remain subjective feelings to the end of the chapter, no matter how much they may be loaded with the categories. Kant himself has shown how inner consciousness is posterior to the consciousness of an external world to which it is relative. Inner experience is not something additional to outer experience, but is outer experience itself viewed as the experience of the mind. It is objective consciousness conceived as the consciousness of the subject for which it exists. In the mind's consciousness of the world, the world becomes conscious

of itself. We cannot therefore regard subjective consciousness as prior to objective consciousness from which the latter is developed. To think that it is so is to make the presupposition of a thing dependent on it. Inner experience contains everything that is in outer experience plus an additional determination. Kant, the main lesson of whose transcendental deduction of the categories is that the self and the world are real only as correlated elements of a single whole, does not altogether succeed in shaking off the error of the subjective idealist who reduces objects to mere states of the subject. In opposition to the subjective idealist, he shows that the consciousness of objects cannot be resolved into the affections of the ego, because it is only in distinction from and in relation to the object that the ego becomes conscious of itself, but he lapses into the same error when he says that the inner states of the self must be synthesised by imagination before they are brought under concepts. Sensations, as parts of the experience of a self, must be referred to objects, for it is in relation to objects that it is possible for the subject to have any experience. "The consciousness of a self as one with itself through all the changes of its inner experience, must contain all the variety of an outer experience, with the further qualification that such outer experience is at the same time the history of a mind—a mind whose consciousness of itself is developed by the same process whereby its knowledge of objects is increased" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I., p. 419).

The whole difficulty of Kant, Caird points out, arises from his attempt to build his theory which virtually overcomes dualism upon a basis of dualism. The duality of subject and object *within* knowledge he seeks to explain by the mutual interaction of a noumenal subject

and a noumenal object *out of* knowledge. What the transcendental deduction of the categories proves, however, is that the self is conscious of itself only through the synthetic process by which it combines particulars of sense into the unity of the objective world and the objective world has reality only in relation to the unity of the self. The consciousness of self rests upon the consciousness of the world, and the consciousness of the world has for its presupposition the consciousness of self. But the *consciousness* of the correlativity of the self and the world implies a unity which finds expression in and transcends the correlated elements. If the self is aware of itself as that in distinction from and in relation to which the consciousness of the world takes place, it is because it is also the unity which goes beyond the distinction and makes it possible. The conclusion to be drawn from the strict correlativity of subject and object which Kant demonstrates is that they are the opposed aspects of a spiritual principle of unity which realises itself in and through them. It is this spiritual principle of unity that is the ultimate reality and not a noumenal subject or a noumenal object incapable of being known. What is incapable of being known is for that very reason unreal. The distinction between self and not-self falls within knowledge, and hence the self is not a mere subject but the ultimate unity bifurcated into subject and object. What conceals this truth from view is the imperfection of our knowledge and the growth and change which characterise it. The ultimate reality cannot be anything developing. All development is within it, but it itself as a whole does not develop. If, therefore, our knowledge undergoes development, it cannot be the ultimate reality. However true this contention may be, it does

not follow from it that the supreme reality is beyond knowledge. The very consciousness of our finitude and imperfection bears witness to the presence in us of an infinite principle which progressively realises itself in the processes of our lives. For, a being which has not an element of infinitude in it could not be conscious of its own imperfection and limits. *Our* self is not indeed the spiritual principle presupposed in the existence of the world, but it is a manifestation of it and is therefore capable of knowing it. "The consciousness of defect in our knowledge of the world is a consciousness of disunion in ourselves; or, what is the same thing, it is a consciousness of union with, and at the same time separation from, a perfect intelligence for which the process of development is completed. To say that we only gradually come to know the world as it reveals itself to us, is another way of describing the same fact which is expressed when we say that our conscious life is the realisation in us of a perfect intelligence; *i.e.* of an intelligence which knows all that as self-conscious subject we have the possibility of knowing, and, therefore, is all that we can become" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I., pp. 423-24).

The true way of explaining the objective world of experience is not to attempt to analyse it into simpler elements which somehow combine to produce it, but to correct the first view of it as a *res completa* by bringing to light its essential relation to the self of which it is the necessary expression. The objective world is properly understood when it is viewed as an integral element of the Absolute life and consciousness of which our selves are partial manifestations.

In the Principles of the Pure Understanding, Kant attempts to prove in detail the thesis put forward in

the deduction of the categories. The substance of the truth which Caird extracts from Kant's prolix discussions by means of constructive criticism may be thus stated:

We can be conscious of an object as a whole only by putting its parts together and of it as a unity through the process of distinguishing it from other objects with which it is combined into a single whole of experience. A part of an object cannot be known independently of its relations to other parts nor the object apart from its relations to other objects. But such mutual relations of objects and their parts imply a consciousness of all of them together. It is this necessity of knowing things, distinguished from each other, in one and the same act of cognition, that makes it inevitable that all intuition should be extensive quantities. The same remark applies to time, which can be conceived as a whole only by the simultaneous apprehension of its successive moments. Space is the necessary form of external perception because all perception of external objects is the perception of them and their parts together, and time is the form of internal perception because the apprehension of objects as co-existing in space involves the synthesis of imagination which is a process in time. To know things and their parts, as distinguished from each other, together, is to know them as extensive quantities or, in other words, to perceive them in space. If objects absolutely excluded each other they would not be objects to a single consciousness and we could not speak of them as objects at all, and if they did not exclude each other, they would shrink into a geometrical point and thus vanish into nothing. It is because things at once repel and attract each other,

are a many-in-one, that they are spread out in one space. Whatever the qualities of particular objects may be, they, in order to be objects of knowledge, must conform to the essential condition of being differentiated from and integrated with each other by a consciousness for which they are objects. To say this is to say that all intuitions are extensive quantities or that space is a necessary form of external perception.

The consciousness of change, which is an essential feature of the world, presupposes the reference of it to a substance that does not itself change. The question is not how or why changes take place, but what is the condition implied in the knowledge and possibility of them. Now change which is not a change of something is meaningless. A phenomenon occurring in time can be determined as such only if we regard it as a state of a permanent substance. If there were nothing but a process of change in the universe, it would not be anything conceivable or nameable. To know change as change is to go beyond it and to relate it to a permanent substance of which it is the expression. Substance, in short, is the presupposition of changes, for no idea of the latter is possible unless we conceive of them as the successive determinations of the former.

But if change implies substance, substance equally implies change. As the conception of changes depends upon the reference of them to an identical substance, so we can think of the latter only as the connecting principle of changes. Substance is not an unknown and unknowable substratum in which its determinations inhere, but is the principle which finds expression in its successive states and, as such, is the link that

connects them with each other. The first movement of thought is to perceive that beneath changing phenomena there is a permanent principle that makes them possible. Next, we see that if we merely refer changes to substance, only lead them *to* it but do not derive them *out of* it, we get simply an abstraction as unreal as the One of the Eleatics. As changes are unmeaning apart from substance, so substance is unmeaning apart from changes. Substance and change are both adequately comprehended when we conceive of the former as expressed in its successive determinations, thereby connecting them with each other according to a fixed rule. We thus pass from the idea of substance to that of causality. Cause and effect are not two distinct phenomena externally brought into relation to each other by the understanding but are the successive states of the *same thing*. Heat is the cause of expansion because the heated body is identical with the body that expands.

As substance by its own immanent dialectic passes into causality, so causality, properly thought out, leads to reciprocity. The existence of a thing depends upon its relations to other things, upon the place which it occupies in the one connected system of experience. Any change, therefore, which it undergoes is only possible through the alteration of its relations to other things. "Change can be conceived only as an alteration of substances in their relation to other substances, and all causation is external. And in a single substance conceived as existing by itself, or in the world as a whole, we cannot conceive of any change as taking place." The presupposition of causality, that on which the changes of things depend, is the reciprocal determination of substances. Objects reciprocally

influencing each other undergo changes which are connected according to the law of causality. The apparent untenability of the view that cause and effect are the successive states of the same substance is due to our failure to distinguish causality from reciprocity. The sun melts the wax. Here what is taken to be the cause, viz. the sun, is different from the effect, viz. the melting of the wax. But in reality the cause is not the sun but the wax as heated by the sun, and no one can deny that the heated wax is identical with the molten wax. And the wax in being heated by the sun gives rise to a change in the sun itself, viz. the loss of heat which it sustains, however imperceptible and practically negligible this loss may be. If we are to state the facts correctly, we must say that the sun and the wax mutually influencing each other pass through changes which are related to each other as cause and effect. The wax as heated is the cause of the molten wax and the sun heating the wax is the cause of the comparatively less hot sun which is the result.[1] Causality, it will thus be seen, implies reciprocity.

To say that things are juxtaposed in one space and constitute the unity of nature only as they mutually determine each other is to say that they are the expression of an ideal principle immanent in them. Substances which have no being independently of their mutual relations are at bottom one, and this unity must necessarily be a spiritual unity, for nothing else can have the peculiar property of embracing all things within itself and of being present to each one of them without being confined to any of them. If things are incapable of being isolated from each other and are

[1] The illustration given is mine.

real only as mutually qualifying elements of a connected whole, what is proved is that they are the embodiment of an all-pervading spirit. If we correct the common-sense view that objects are self-subsistent and bear no essential relationship to one another by pointing out that their reality depends upon their being reciprocally determining parts of a single system, we must go further and correct even the scientific view by bringing to light the presupposition of the mutual relatedness of objects, viz. their essential relation to the self for which they exist and of which they are the expression. In short, we must realise that the world, in its ultimate interpretation, is the self-revelation of mind.

All this, Caird points out, is virtually implied in Kant's doctrine that the synthesis of the manifold of sensations according to the principles of the understanding is the work of the unity of the self. The main defect of this view is that it seeks to keep the self apart from the world which it constitutes, instead of conceiving of it as the inner principle, the centre of that world itself. The pure analytic unity of the self, according to Kant, becomes synthetic in dealing with the matter of sense foreign to it, and though it becomes conscious of itself in relation to the experienced world, that relation is only a negative relation, for it consists in the return of the self upon itself from the world which it makes. But, argues Caird, the self thus returns upon itself because it goes out of itself to the objective world, which means that the relation of opposition between it and the world presupposes the reconciliation of that opposition in a higher unity. If percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts empty, if experience

involves their opposition to and union with each other through the relation of both of them to the unity of the self, the conclusion which legitimately follows is that the self and the objective world are opposed expressions of the one all-embracing spirit and not phenomenal appearances of noumenal entities.

To show that the world is through and through spiritual is not to reduce it to mere ideas of the mind. Kant justly contends that "even our internal experience is possible only under the supposition of outer experience," and thus turns the table upon the idealist who maintains that all experience is internal experience. It is no doubt true that object has no meaning except in relation to subject, but Kant points out that the converse of this proposition is equally true, viz. that subjective consciousness presupposes objective consciousness. Psychical processes are possible only in contrast with the external world to which they are related. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things." It is impossible to refute Berkeley when he argues that matter unrelated to mind is an inconceivable abstraction, but because matter does not exist independently of mind, it does not follow that it is nothing but ideas of the mind. To show that a thing cannot exist apart from its correlative is not to reduce it to that correlative. Just as the external world is real only in relation to mind, so the processes of the mind are possible only in relation to the external world. If outer experience presupposes inner experience, inner experience equally presupposes outer experience.

The external world in relation to which alone internal experience is possible is not independent of mind. It

is the other of mind and for that very reason exists *for* mind. Mind is the unity which opposes itself to itself, gives rise to the relative distinction between subject and object and overcomes it. The error of materialism is to ignore the subject for which objects exist, and the error of Berkeley is to ignore the object in relation to and in distinction from which subjective processes are possible. What Caird and other idealists like him urge is that the world which in its immediate aspect seems to be purely physical is, on reflection, seen to be the self-revelation of mind. It is spiritual without ceasing to be material. "The result of Kant's teaching when it was freed from the contradictory notion of the 'thing-in-itself'— that Irish Bull in philosophy, as Heine calls it—was not to cast any, even the slightest doubt on the reality of the external world, but only to show that a new element must be added to all that we know of it as an external world, namely, its relation to the subject. No doubt, this new element brings important modifications into our previous views of objectivity. For, on the one hand, it absolutely precludes the attempt to explain the spiritual by the material, and, indeed, compels us to conclude that there is no material world which is not also spiritual. And, on the other hand, as the correlation between the self and the not-self is not one-sided, it brings with it also the conviction that there is no spiritual world which is not also material, or does not presuppose a material world. Thus the reality of that which is other than the self-conscious intelligence is seen to rest on the same basis with that of the self-conscious intelligence itself, and the one cannot be denied without the other" (*Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge*, p. 4).

A theory like this is not open to the charge of intellectualism. To show that what is real is ultimately spiritual is not to reduce everything to abstract thought. The meaning of 'thought' is somewhat elastic. When the idealist speaks of it as the constitutive principle of things, he is supposed to ignore will and the element of particularity in experience. But writers like Caird use the term 'thought' in a comprehensive sense, meaning by it a universal principle which is realised in the plurality of the particular facts of experience and of which will is a necessary phase. The self-differentiating and self-integrating movement of thought which originates the system of concepts also creates and transcends the relative distinction between the universal concepts and the particular objects of perception. Identity and difference, universal and particular are correlatives which have no meaning apart from each other, and the differences of the objective world are thought's *own* differences through which it returns upon itself. It is true that the unity in difference of thought in itself is not the same as the unity in difference of thought and being, but the differences of being are the counterpart of thought's own differences and the relative opposition of intelligence and the intelligible world is based upon the nature of thought itself. Thought conceived as going out of itself to the differences of the world is will. The antithesis of intellectualism and voluntarism arises only when thought and will are regarded as two independent entities. They are, however, not two separate things but two distinguishable aspects of one and the same thing. There is no thought without will and no will without thought. The world's reference to mind is the mind's conscious-

ness of the world, but the other side of this truth is that in the world of which it is conscious, mind itself is embodied. So viewed it is will.

Caird conceives of mind as a unity beyond all difference, but he is careful to point out that unity has no meaning without difference. To insist on a unity beyond all difference and through all difference is not to deny the reality of the differences. "The one and the many, so far from being opposed, are factors of thought which cannot be separated without contradiction." A unity which does not unite different things is an abstraction, and "an absolute difference would be no difference at all, for it would annihilate all relation between the things distinguished, and, in doing so, it would annihilate itself." The distinction between one and many is not denied; what is denied is that the distinction is absolute. "The parts of the intelligible world mean nothing except in the whole, and the whole means nothing except as distributing itself to the parts, and constituting their spiritual bond."

But if mind is a unity expressed in its own differences the differences cannot be mere objects but must be minds as well, particular forms of the universal mind to which it imparts itself. The ultimate reality, Caird rightly maintains, "must be regarded as a principle of unity which is present in all things and beings, and from which they, in their utmost possible independence, cannot be separated." "In producing differences it produces *itself* in them." Now, a spiritual principle which produces *itself* in the differences of objects and cannot be separated from them is realised in them as *their* selves and must be conceived not as a unitary self but as a unified system of a plurality of selves.

I may be permitted to quote here what I have said elsewhere on this subject.[1]

"Nature, as a systematic totality of inter-related things, presupposes a spiritual principle of unity of which it is the necessary manifestation. But what is the relation between the things which make up nature and the mind it reveals? We are told, and with truth, that the unity of mind and the differences of the world mutually imply each other, that unity is *of* differences, and differences have no meaning apart from the unity of the self in which they are centred. 'The main result of modern philosophy, and especially of modern idealism,' Caird tells us, 'has been to put a concrete in place of an abstract unity, or, in other words, to vindicate the essential relation of the self and the not-self.' The unity for which idealism pleads is not a unity *beyond* all difference but *in* difference. But if this unity is conceived as only the correlative of the many, it inevitably becomes distinguished from and, therefore, limited by the many, and is, in consequence, reduced to the level of one among many. The one regarded as the correlative of the many is what the many are not, and is, therefore, only a numerical unity. Of course idealism goes further than the mere conception of the correlativity of the one and many, and regards the many as the expression of an inclusive unity. But the full consequence of this view is not realised. The many which body forth the ultimate one partake, as Plato saw so clearly, of the one; and each of them, in spite of the finitude arising from its distinction from and negative relation to the others, is, in virtue of its participation in the one, also whole and infinite. In other

[1] In an article on "The Absolute and the Finite Self" in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvii, No. 4.

words, what we call things are also minds. They are, of course, not minds in isolation from each other and on their own account, but as integral parts of the Absolute mind. If objects are real only as elements of the world-system, and if that system is the embodiment of a universal mind, they cannot be mere objects, but must be centres of an all-inclusive experience, individualised expressions of the one ultimate mind. The differences in which the Absolute finds expression are determinate forms of the Absolute itself, and each of them must, therefore, be conceived as an infinite mind, infinite, in Spinoza's language, *in suo genere* and *in* the Absolute. What appear to us as things are, in their inner being, the centres from which the Absolute experiences and appreciates in infinite ways the one world in which it is revealed. They are like the monads of Leibnitz, but not sundered and self-centred, conscious of the whole world, not potentially but fully and adequately, and individuals not in their own strength, but as included within and contributing to the life of the Absolute individual. As Royce puts it, 'whoever conceives the Absolute as a self conceives it as in its form inclusive of an infinity of various but interwoven and so of inter-communicating selves, each one of which represents the totality of the Absolute in its own way, and with its own unity, so that the simplest conceivable structure of the Absolute life would be statable only in terms of an infinitely great variety of types of purpose and of fulfilment, intertwined in the most complex fashion. . . . We have to regard the Absolute in its wholeness as comprising many selves in the most various inter-relation.'

"The Absolute experience is the totality of the experiences of the individuals embraced within it, in which

its whole meaning is embodied. These individuals are relative wholes within the unity of the Absolute and contribute in various and unique ways to its total purpose. The Absolute purpose is realised in and through the purposes of its constituent individuals, and the several meanings of these individuals are co-ordinated with each other through their subordination to the life of the Absolute in its wholeness. This does not mean that the Absolute life and purpose is anything other than the meanings of the individuals in which it is realised, any more than the ideal and purpose of the state is other than the aims and ideals of its citizens which are brought into co-ordination with each other through their subordination to it. Just as the others partaking of the One in Plato's *Parmenides* are themselves one and whole, having parts, each part being infinite, no matter to what proximate whole it may belong, so the individuals in which the Absolute is expressed, possessing its nature, are subordinate wholes realised in their own differences which, parts of parts as they are, retain, as integral elements of the Absolute, their inalienable property of being whole and infinite. The subordinate wholes do not necessarily exclude but may overlap each other in consequence of the same parts forming constituent moments of different wholes. As the same citizen may be a member of various corporations within the unity of the state, so the same self may belong to different individualised systems within the ultimate unity of the Absolute. The complex and comprehensive meaning of the whole controls and determines the distribution and organisation into subordinate systems of the finite-infinite individuals in which the Absolute is realised, and if that meaning requires it, the constitution of these systems may

undergo changes through the rearrangement of the elements forming them.

"The type of idealism outlined above is, of course, monism, for it insists upon the unity of the Absolute, but what is important to remember is that the Absolute is one, not in spite of but because of the differences in which it is expressed. These differences, to be sure, are objective existences, but objective existences which, by reason of the embodiment of the Absolute mind in them, are also selves. It, therefore, is by no means hostile to the principle for which pluralism contends, only it urges that the plurality of the finite but all-inclusive selves rests upon a unity in which they are all gathered up without detriment to their distinction from each other. The plurality of selves does not simply disappear in the Absolute, nor does the Absolute transcend these selves while sustaining and upholding them, as Lotze and others seem to suppose. The content of the Absolute is no other than the contents of its constituent selves, though it is not a mere sum of them. As the synthesis of them, it gives a new value to them, but is not other than they. As a living organism consists only of its members, but is not simply their aggregate, as society is made up of individuals but is not merely a collection of them, so the Absolute self is a complex unity which does not go beyond, and yet re-interprets and gives a higher significance to the experiences of the finite but perfect individuals[1] that compose it.

"The view that objects of experience are in their ultimate nature selves does not mean that they are reducible to ideas of the mind or that there is no distinction between things and minds. A thing is a

[1] The expression is M'Taggart's.

self only in the sense that, viewed from within, it is the subject to which the whole circle of objective experience, relatively opposed to it, is referred. It is one of the infinite points of view from which the Absolute contemplates and appreciates the world and thus ensures the richness and complexity of its experience. The external order of the physical world has for its counterpart a system of inter-penetrating selves in which the Absolute is realised and of which it is the unity. The reality of nature as a system of reciprocally determining things is not denied. All that is done is to point out that such a system has for its presupposition an individualised system of minds.

"The finite self is a partial reproduction of the Absolute. No other explanation is consistent with its essential nature. But we have seen that the Absolute life is distributed into its component centres of experience and has no content over and above them. Man, therefore, can only be a fragmentary expression of a differentiation of the Absolute or of a subordinate system of such differentiations. Every object is, ideally, a finite but perfect self in which the Absolute is realised. The human body, therefore, must be viewed as a centre from which the Absolute experiences in a unique way the whole of existence. As such a centre it is a determinate form of the Absolute self. The fragmentary being, man, is only a very limited area of this deeper self detached from it, and it is through it and not directly that he is included in the Absolute. The limited content of his mind is supplemented by that of his transcendental self, and as so supplemented forms an element of the Absolute life and experience. The deficiencies of finite consciousnesses, that is to say,

are made good before they are allowed to enter the sanctuary of the Absolute."

II.

Although Caird occupied for many years the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, he did not write any systematic treatise on ethics. His views on moral philosophy are to be gathered from his criticisms of other writers, particularly of Kant. Caird never took delight in merely refuting a philosophical theory. He always sought to bring out the inner meaning of a writer by means of constructive criticism, and in the process of doing so gave indications of his own ideas. It is in this way that his views on ethics are developed. This method, says Professor Muirhead, "gave scope to the power, in which he was not excelled by Hegel himself, of criticising philosophies from within" (*Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, p. 304). In order to know what Caird had to teach on moral philosophy, it is essential to study carefully the chapters on Kant's ethical works in the second volume of his *Critical Philosophy of Kant.*

Kant makes a rigid distinction between the rational nature and the animal nature of man—the *Homo noumenon* and the *Homo phenomenon.* The will is moral only in so far as it is determined by pure reason, by the abstract idea of the good. The will that wills reason, which is the same thing as the will that wills itself, is alone the virtuous will, and the virtuous will is also the free will. Freedom, in Kant's view, consists, negatively, in resisting the solicitations of passion, and positively, in the will being determined by pure reason. Opposed to the moral will is the will which is influenced by passion, by the animal propensities of our nature.

To be determined in our action by ends prescribed by our sentient nature is to lose freedom and to be immoral. The attainment of the moral life, therefore, according to Kant, depends on our being able to override passion and to be guided by motives springing solely from reason.

Now, what Caird urges against Kant is that reason and passion cannot thus be divorced from each other. It is a mistake to think that in the human soul animality and rationality are simply juxtaposed. The impulses and desires of a man are very different from those of a mere animal. Their nature is changed by their contact with reason. "The consciousness of desire changes desire." So far from being alien to reason, desires are the mediums through which reason finds expression in our practical life. It is therefore idle to talk of extruding passion from our nature. Into the motives by which man's actions are determined, feeling inevitably enters as a necessary element. Nothing can move the will to action which is not desired, and what is desired must be a source of self-satisfaction. The will in being determined by particular motives, in the constitution of which our sentient nature must have a share, does not cease to be free. The error of Kant is to set the universal in absolute opposition to the particular. It is in the activities determined by particular ends that the universality of the self is realised. In willing the particular the universal is willed, and a universal that is incapable of being expressed in the particular is only an abstraction.

The relation of the self to an object, argues Caird, is not like the relation of one object to another. It is not a relation of externality. All objects are for the self and, in the ultimate point of view, the manifesta-

tion of the self. They are external to one another because they are held together by a common self which is their correlative. That which makes the relation of externality possible cannot itself be subject to that relation. Therefore, in being moved to action by the object of a particular desire, the self is determined not by what is extraneous to it but by that which depends for its existence on its necessary relation to it: its determination by particular motives is essentially self-determination. Desires are, on the one hand, related to their appropriate objects, and, on the other hand, to the self for which these objects exist. Their satisfaction, therefore, is also the satisfaction of the self. "Desire is always for an object which presents itself as a form of the satisfaction or realisation of the self. In the satisfaction of desire there are, indeed, two moments ideally distinguishable, the satisfaction of the particular desire and the satisfaction of the self, but the former cannot exist in the rational being as such" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II., p. 228).

But although in action the self makes a particular object of desire its end and so identifies itself with it, it also distinguishes itself from it. "For in a particular object as such I, as universal subject, cannot be realised, and the satisfaction I get from it as an individual is therefore mingled with dissatisfaction." It is this dissatisfaction that finds expression in ascetic systems of morality. They truly perceive that no amount of satisfaction of isolated desires can ever permanently satisfy the human self. Between the universality of the self and the particularity of an object of desire, there is a disparity which it is impossible to ignore. But asceticism errs in making the opposition between reason and passion absolute. Because self-realisation means

more than the satisfaction of particular desires, it does not follow that it consists in the annulment of passion and in the attainment of a life of pure reason. "A negative implies a positive," and "if we attempt to treat a negative relation as negative only, we make it cease to be a relation at all or, indeed, to be anything." What we have to perceive, therefore, is that although in the moral life desires and impulses are in their immediate form negated, they are nevertheless retained as elements of an organised whole. "In the consciousness of desire the self is withdrawn from immediate union with the desire; it has the desire before it as a motive, which stands in relation to all other motives through its relation to the self. Hence, it is impossible for it any longer to wish to satisfy that desire apart from wishing to satisfy itself and so from wishing to satisfy other tendencies of the self" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II., p. 217). "It is only when taken by themselves as ends that the particular objects of desire must be negated or rejected; while, as related to the universal, and as indeed forms of its manifestation, they become elements in the good, which is the end of all moral action." The desires of a rational being like man are not lawless and chaotic impulses; they are essentially forms of self-realisation. "It is only as we regard an object or end as having a place in a totality of ends, the realisation of which is one with the realisation or satisfaction of the self, that it can be a motive to us."

But the same universal principle through relation to which our desires and impulses are reduced to elements of a rational life also carries the individual beyond himself and unites him with other individuals as members of a social organism. In other words, the

organisation of the desires and impulses of individuals and the activities prompted by them is dependent upon the organisation of the individuals themselves into the social whole. Orderliness of individual life is impossible without an orderly social life. On the social character of morality Caird lays particular stress. "Man as a moral being," he maintains, "always is,—and is more or less definitely conscious of himself as being, —a member of a community, which, just because it subordinates him as an individual, is the sphere in which his spiritual nature is realised." It is true that the modern man has the consciousness of being a law and an end to himself, but Caird points out that such a consciousness is itself a social product and is possible only for the civilised man. The savage is innocent of any such consciousness. Subjective morality—the morality which opposes the inner law of conscience to the objective social standard—is the outcome of the consciousness of a higher moral ideal than what is embodied in the existing laws and institutions of society. It therefore could not have existed independently of customary morality. "In absolutely opposing itself to the morality of law and custom, reflective morality only shows that it has forgotten its own origin. A moral consciousness is in reality the consciousness of an end which has realised and is realising itself in human society. Its 'ought to be' therefore always rests on the 'is,' or rather it points to a deeper 'is' of which the immediate facts are only the appearance." Individualistic morality arises when the current ways of life fail to satisfy and a higher ideal has not yet been reflected in social institutions. Its value lies in its leading to a better reconstruction of society.

Caird constantly reminds us that in their moral life men are not isolated. Superficially viewed, they seem to be self-centred beings, but, in reality, they are what they are in virtue of a universal principle which binds them together. "We are *knowing* subjects only as we transcend our individual existence, and regard it as an object among others in the one world, an object which, therefore, we are able to regard from a universal point of view, and to measure by the same standards which we apply to other objects. In like manner, we are practical or *moral* subjects only as we are conscious of ourselves as members along with others of *one* society and are able, therefore, to view ourselves like them, impartially with reference to the ends of society. . . . Morality, in fact, springs out of the inevitable mediation of the consciousness of self by the consciousness of our relations to others, and the consequent necessity of judging ourselves from a social point of view, whether it be the point of view of the family, or of the nation, or whatever be the society to which we thus relate ourselves. And if, subsequently, the moral law can be conceived in its abstraction as a law resting on the consciousness of the individual of an inner life, in which he is alone with himself, yet this conception can only be the result of an *individualistic* return upon the self, which involves a reaction against social forms that have become insufficient, and is a step in the transition towards the development of a higher social consciousness" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II., p. 399).

Such a theory is no mere altruism. The self-surrender of an individual is not to other individuals, but to the social universal of which all are equally members and to which all are equally subordinated. If it is wrong

to be selfish, it is no less wrong to promote the selfishness of others. "An unreasoning eagerness to surrender all to the will of another tends to manufacture a gigantic self in the individual to whom the surrender is made." Duties to self and duties to others are alike duties to society. "The true moral self-surrender is not simply the surrender of one self to another, but of all to the universal principle which, working in society, gives back to each his own individual life transformed into an organ of itself. What gives its moral value to the social life is that it not merely *limits* the self-seeking of each in reference to the self-seeking of the rest, nor even that it involves a reciprocal sacrifice of each to the others; but that a higher spirit takes possession of each and all, and makes them its organs, turning the natural tendencies and powers of each of the members of the society into the means of realising some special function necessary to the organic completeness of its life" (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II., p. 402). The error of altruism is in essence the same as that of egoism. Both forget that "the surrender of the individual as a natural being, and his recovery of his life as an organ dedicated to a special social function, is the essential dialectic of morals, which repeats itself in every form of society."

The principle which enables Caird to reconcile egoism and altruism in ethics also enables him to reconcile individualism and socialism in politics. If by socialism is meant the suppression of individuals, he has nothing to do with it. If the individual apart from society is an abstraction, society apart from the individuals is no less an abstraction. It is in the lives of the individuals that the social ideal is realised, and to further the interests of the community at the expense of the indi-

viduals is to pursue a chimera. Caird, therefore, is in entire sympathy with the ideal of making the individual self-reliant and efficient. He is opposed to individualism not because it lays stress on the supreme importance of individual liberty, but because it forgets that such liberty is possible only through membership of the state. Only by discharging the functions which belong to them as citizens of the state can men become free beings. Freedom is the mark not of isolated but of corporate life. Law and liberty are not antithetical to each other. "Freedom and association are not opposed but interdependent ideas, in such a sense that separated from each other they lose all their meaning."

Holding such views, Caird does not admit that the individual has any right against the state. It is from the state that all his rights are derived. But he is prepared to concede that "in modern times, neither the State nor the Family any longer represents the highest moral unity of which we can conceive; although, as a matter of fact, no higher unity has yet taken an organised form. But the very anticipation of such a unity, however vague, leads to a kind of emancipation of the individual from the State and the Family, and so causes an apparent separation of Law from Morals."

III.

In the interpretation of the religious consciousness by means of the fundamental principles of his idealism, Caird's most original work consists. In the two volumes of Gifford lectures entitled the *Evolution of Religion*, the facts of the religious life are surveyed, and an attempt is made to exhibit the underlying unity of all forms of religion with the aid of the idea of development. The book is remarkable alike for the profundity

of its thought and the lucidity of its style, and, in the English language, there is perhaps no other work which is equally helpful to the reader in enabling him to apprehend the essential meaning of religion and to separate what is of permanent value in it from what is accidental and transitory.

The phenomena of man's religious life are subject to law quite as much as other phenomena, and are, therefore, capable of scientific treatment. This does not mean that they can be explained by means of the same principles by which facts of nature are explained. The world does not consist of things all on the same level. "It is more fitly described as a hierarchy in which the lower orders of being are both presupposed and explained by the higher." When, therefore, we pass from phenomena of a lower order to those of a higher order, we must have for their interpretation a new and a more adequate principle. The only result of seeking to explain things by means of a principle too narrow for them is that they come to appear as lawless and inexplicable. From the fact that the principles used for the explanation of the physical world throw no light whatever on the religious consciousness, it has been inferred by some that that consciousness is devoid of any rational meaning, and by others that it is based on faith and is, therefore, superior to things of which a scientific or philosophical justification is possible. But the true conclusion is that the phenomena of the religious life require for their explanation categories higher than those that suffice for the interpretation of the outer world and that, in their own way, they are no less subject to law than the facts with which sciences like physics, chemistry and biology are concerned.

It is the principle of development, together with the

idea of the unity of mankind, that is of most service to us in explaining religion and its different forms. The unity of mankind must be understood to mean "not only the identity of human nature in all its various manifestations in all nations and countries, but also as implying that in their *co-existence* these manifestations can be connected together as different correlated phases of one life, and that in their *succession* they can be shown to be the necessary stages of one process of evolution." It is from this point of view alone that the facts of religious history become intelligible. So various are the religious beliefs of men, so bewildering is the conflict of creeds and dogmas, that it seems to be difficult, if not impossible, to find any principle of law and order underlying them. To reduce to unity facts so heterogeneous would appear to be an enterprise well nigh hopeless. But the idea of evolution puts into our hands the means of transforming what is apparently a chaos into a cosmos. "The different religions are not merely co-ordinate species varying, one in this direction, the other in that, from a single general type. They are, in many cases at least, to be regarded as successive stages in one process of development, in which the later includes and presupposes the earlier." It is as unprofitable to ask what is common to the various religious ideas of men as to inquire what is common to the infant, the child, the youth, and the full-grown man. The meaning of an earlier stage of a growing thing becomes intelligible only from the point of view of the final stage into which it develops, and the final stage itself is fully understood when it is seen in the light of the process of its development. The earliest form of that which grows is the most imperfect form of it and furnishes very little clue to its real nature. If, therefore, we are

to acquire an insight into the nature of religion, we must consider how it has grown with the growth of the human mind and through what stages it has passed in the process. Its essential features are most disclosed in the latest and highest form of it. In seeking to define religion, it is futile to try to discover something common to all religions. If any common element is found, it cannot have much value, for it would mean leaving out of account the distinguishing features of higher religions and reducing them to the lowest in the scale. What is really necessary is to "look for a principle which is bound up with the nature of man, and which, therefore, manifests itself in all stages of his development. A definition of religion in this sense, if we can attain it, will express an idea which is fully realised only in the final form of religion, while in the earlier stages it can be seen only obscurely, and in the lowest and earliest it might escape us altogether but for the light thrown back upon it by that which has arisen out of it. It will thus enable us to cast the light of the present upon the past, and to explain man's first uncertain efforts to name and to realise the divine, in the light of the clearer consciousness and more distinct utterance of a later age" (*Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I., pp. 46-47).

But what is it that makes religion possible? An element of human life which has had such a far-reaching influence on it, and the power of which has increased rather than diminished with the progress of civilisation, must be very closely connected with human nature. What then is the root in our intelligence from which religion grows? Why cannot man remain satisfied with finite aims and interests, and why does he so persistently hanker after the infinite? The answer which Caird gives is that the source of religion is to be found in the pre-

supposition of our life as rational beings. The consciousness of object depends upon its distinction from and relation to the subject for which it exists. The object is the one world of experience "all of whose parts are embraced in *one* connexion of space and all of whose changes take place in *one* connexion of time." The self is not a part of this system, for the fundamental condition of its existence is that it should oppose itself to this system. Just as the centre in relation to which the circumference is possible cannot itself be a point in the circumference, so the unity of the self to which objects as members of a connected whole are necessarily referred cannot be one of those objects. The subject and the object are at once opposed to and inseparable from each other. "We know the *object* only as we bring it back to the unity of the self, we know the *subject* only as we realise it in the object." But this means that subject and object are the opposed manifestations of a principle of unity which goes beyond them. Just as the centre and the circumference are the opposite counterparts of each other within the unity of the circle, so the self and the world have meaning in and through their distinction from and relation to each other within the all-embracing unity of the Absolute mind. The idea of God, therefore, is the presupposition of the ideas of subject and object. "Every creature who is capable of the consciousness of an objective world and of the consciousness of a self is capable also of the consciousness of God. Or, to sum up the whole matter in one word, every rational being as such is a religious being."

All this, of course, does not mean that every man who has a religious consciousness is acquainted with and is a believer in the philosophical theory of the

relation between the self and the not-self stated above. In the reasonings of the most uncultivated man the principles of logic are implied, in every sentence which he utters the laws of phonetics are illustrated, but he neither knows nor has the capacity to know what they are. All falling bodies obey the law of gravitation, but until Newton came everybody was blind to it. So the consciousness of an external world and its distinction from and relation to the self that knows depends upon a condition of which the unreflecting man has no idea. When, however, philosophical reflection makes explicit what is implicit in every act of cognition, it is seen that the essential presupposition of knowledge is also the basis of the religious consciousness. Whoever is conscious of himself as a thinking being and distinguishes himself from other things and beings, places himself without knowing it at a universal point of view, and in this lies the possibility of religion.

Beneath and beyond our consciousness of ourselves and of the outer world there is the consciousness of God, of an infinite being who is the source of all that is. For this reason religion gives a unity to life "by at once allying man with nature, and joining him with his fellows in some more or less comprehensive society." It "is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things." Because an all-embracing unity is the root of his being, man "in all his secular consciousness of other objects and of himself is necessarily haunted by the idea of something which is beyond them, yet in them—something in opposition to which they are as nothing, in unity with which they are more than they immediately seem to

be." The idea of infinite is not, as Max Müller supposes, a merely negative idea. What lies beyond the finite necessarily stands limited by it and is, therefore, only another finite. Spencer is more in the right when he conceives of the infinite as the positive background of the finite, as that through the limitation of which the finite arises. It is like the one endless space in which particular figures are drawn. But he errs in supposing that we have no definite consciousness of it. How can a being through relation to which we are able to perceive the limits of ourselves and others be unknown and unknowable? That in the light of which a thing is seen cannot itself be enveloped in darkness. Spencer, like Spinoza, reaches the infinite by removing all lines of distinction between finite things. Thought, however, cannot rest in such a blank indeterminate being. The transition to the idea of God as a principle of unity self-revealed in the differences of things and in the distinction of subject and object is inevitable. The infinite is truly conceived when it is realised "as the unity which reveals itself in all the differences of the finite, especially in the last difference of subject and object, and which through all these differences remains in unity with itself." It, therefore, *includes* the finite within itself. Max Müller begins with the idea of the finite and then adds the infinite to it as something beyond it; Spencer begins with the idea of the infinite and then adds to it the finite derived from it by limitation. Both, therefore, commit practically the same mistake and miss the organic relationship between the finite and the infinite. The error of Spencer and other thinkers like him is to suppose that the relation in actual experience between thought and being, subject and object, mind and matter

is one of opposition only in spite of their parallelism and that the explanation of this parallelism is to be found in a unity beyond knowledge in which both are merged and of which both are phenomenal expressions. The truth, however, is that "the feat of combining the consciousness of self with that of the not-self is performed by us every day and in almost every act of thought; for we are constantly putting our inner experience in relation to outer experience and our outer experience in relation to inner experience." Intelligence has meaning only in so far as it finds its own content in the intelligible world, and the intelligible world has for its sustaining principle intelligence. The very idea of the separation of the subject from the object involves a contradiction. "Our whole intellectual life is a continual return upon ourselves from the outward world; our whole practical life is a continual effort after the realisation of ourselves in the outer world." The union of the self and not-self is as essential as their division and opposition. If this is so, what is proved is that there is a unity beyond their opposition, a unity which is not indeterminate and barren, but self-determining and productive and manifested in the differences of the finite without losing its unity with itself. The consciousness of self in distinction from the consciousness of the world and the consciousness of the world in distinction from the consciousness of self, that is to say, involves the consciousness of God.

The idea of God presupposed in all experience is, with the progress of the human race, determined with increasing fulness. The most adequate form of it is that in which God is conceived not as an object among other objects, nor as a pure self antithetical to the

object, but as the principle of unity manifested in the opposition of the self and the not-self. For the most developed religious consciousness, God is immanent in the world, in outward things as well as in the mind of man. But it is only after a long process of historical development that religion takes a form in which its meaning finds adequate expression. The stages in the evolution of religion are determined by the main factors of the idea of God which underlies our consciousness and in which it culminates. God is subject-object. But this comprehensive and synthetic view can be attained only after the mind has passed through the stages in which He is regarded as object more than subject and as subject more than object. The natural tendency of the primitive mind is to pay exclusive attention to the object and to be absorbed in it, although the object has no meaning apart from the subject. By degrees self-consciousness is attained and the knowing mind learns to distinguish itself from and oppose itself to the object it knows. The fundamental condition of such distinction and opposition is a unity within which it arises. "It is the basis and presupposition of our rational life, the atmosphere in which it moves, the bond which holds it together." The order of progress, therefore, is from the consciousness of objects to the consciousness of self and from the consciousness of self to the consciousness of God. "We look outward before we look inward, and we look inward before we look upward." This, however, does not mean that one form of consciousness entirely disappears before another takes its place. The various elements of life imply each other, and in the earliest stage of it the elements to be found in the later stages are not wholly absent. Even when man's consciousness is most objective, he

is not altogether without the consciousness of self and the consciousness of God. The priority of the consciousness of outward things to self-consciousness and of self-consciousness to the consciousness of God "only means that in successive periods each of these elements in turn determines the form of our consciousness and so becomes the mould in which all our ideas and ideals are cast." In the first stage of the development of the religious consciousness, the idea of God assumes a predominantly objective form; in the second, He is viewed as a pure spirit standing apart from nature and bearing no essential relation to it; and in the third, He is realised as the life and soul of all that is, as the universal mind from which all things proceed and to which all things return.

Religion, like everything else connected with human life, is a subject of development. Between one stage of its growth and another, there is no breach of continuity, however dissimilar to each other these stages may seem to be. The identity of religion is always preserved in the midst of its changing forms. The whole meaning of it is implicitly present even in its most elementary form. This is the reason why ideas characteristic of the highest religion are, often, vaguely anticipated by religions low down in the scale. Religion is essentially a consciousness of the infinite bound up with the consciousness of the finite and presupposed in the duality of the self and the not-self, and it is therefore not surprising that even in his most primitive condition man should sometimes have glimpses of the highest truth. The consciousness of God does not assume its proper form until the final stages of its evolution are reached. Its first form is objective. The visible and the tangible is all that the savage can

appreciate, and his idea of God, therefore, is necessarily cast into the objective mould. God is regarded not as a spiritual being immanent in things but as one object among other objects. The primitive consciousness materialises everything. For it the universal can exist only as something particular. Nevertheless, the object to which divinity is attributed is charged with a meaning wholly beyond its form, and, consequently, in order that it may be possible to worship it, it is necessary to free it from its limitations and to raise it above other objects. The natural, in short, can take the place of the spiritual only after imagination has transfigured it. In this way, from the very beginning of religion, its inner meaning reacts against and modifies its outer form, until, finally, it completely breaks away from everything objective and takes a shape more appropriate to it.

Religion is most intimately connected with the practical life of man and is not a mere matter of theory. As it involves the consciousness, although at first only implicitly, of a principle of unity beneath the differences of things, it not only unites us with nature but with our fellow-men as well. "To take a religious view of life is not only to see a divine agency in the world; it is to recognise that agency as a power which, in lifting us above ourselves, unites us to other individuals and them to us." But when God is conceived as an object, the bond which unites men with each other and with Him necessarily fails to be apprehended as spiritual and is supposed to be one of natural relationship. It is only the tie of the same blood. God is the principle of unity of a society because the members of it are represented as descended from Him. Different tribes, therefore, are regarded as having different gods, and

we have a plurality of gods in consequence. The breaking up of a growing tribe into several tribes or the fusion of different tribes into one also leads to a multiplication of gods. Further, as fresh aspects of nature are discovered new divinities are introduced to give expression to them. Objective religion, from its very nature, is polytheistic. But side by side with the tendency to increase the number of gods is found an opposite tendency to reduce them to unity. "The very attitude of worship is an attitude of devotion, of absolute self-surrender, which in the intensity of its feeling excludes all reservation and so tends to lift its object beyond all the limits which at other times may be recognised for it." With the development of a broader national consciousness and the attainment of the capacity to look at things from a comprehensive standpoint, there arises the idea of a God to whom family and tribal deities are subordinated. Ultimately this generalising tendency culminates in the absorption of the multiplicity of finite gods into an abstract and indeterminate being and pantheism is the result. Religion "can save itself from such an *euthanasia*, such a gradual loss of all positive content or meaning, only by abandoning the purely objective representation of God, and by recognising that in the inner life of the self or subject, there is a higher revelation of Him than can be found in any object as such, or even in the whole world of objects."

Midway between objective religion and subjective religion stands the religion of Greece. It represents the stage of transition from the former to the latter. The gods of the Greek pantheon are not merely personified objects or forces of nature, but are humanised and individualised beings, differing from man only in respect

of their greater wisdom and power and freedom from mortality and its consequences. In most of the objective religions, things furthest from man and utterly dissimilar to him are regarded as divine beings, mainly in consequence of their vastness and power, but the Greek religion looks upon man as the highest of natural objects and, on this ground, takes him to be nearest to God. But he is still conceived more as an object than as a subject, and therefore, in spite of its affinity to subjective religion, the religion of Greece remains a naturalistic polytheism. Conceiving of the Deity under the form of man, its tendency is towards the idea of Him as a subject; but it is not actually a subjective religion, because as yet man is viewed not so much as a spiritual being having an inner life as as an object.

Although our first idea of the divine is that it is an object, yet what is worshipped as god is by the poetic imagination raised above other objects and made the symbol of some universal principle. A merely finite thing connected with other finite things in time and space is neither beautiful nor sacred. In the object regarded as a god, the religious consciousness apprehends something more than what immediately meets the eye. The universal without which nothing particular is possible is in it envisaged in a sensuous form, for, in the infancy of the human race, the mind is unable to grasp an idea without giving to it a body and form. But the growing spirit of man cannot long remain in this condition. A time must come when the universal is disengaged from and opposed to the particular. The principle of unity of all things cannot be permanently treated as a particular thing. Mythology, that is, must, in due course, be replaced by the matter-of-fact consciousness. "The

fair unity of poetry, in which fact and thought are blended together, must be broken up into the prosaic consciousness of fact on the one side, and the prosaic consciousness of law on the other." The strength of the positivistic spirit lies in its refusal to go beyond facts and in its conception of them as necessarily related to each other as elements of the one world. Its weakness lies in banishing from the world all ideal elements which appeal to the æsthetic and the religious consciousness. In its estimation, what is not fact is not true. It is impossible to meet its argument by supposing that while nature is ordinarily subject to necessary laws, its uniform course is occasionally interfered with by supernatural agencies extraneous to it. There could not be anything "above nature anywhere, if there were not something above nature everywhere." There is nothing in nature which can be finally explained by means of mechanical principles alone. Science is perfectly justified in abstracting from many necessary elements of the world in order to interpret it from its own special points of view. But what is abstracted from must not be altogether forgotten. The ordinary attitude of mind in which the object alone is supposed to be real is encouraged and strengthened by science. But the scientific conception of things is not the ultimate conception. The final meaning and explanation of things is to be found only in a principle of reason akin to the mind of man. The basis of positivism is the ordinary view of things in which no notice is taken of the subject for which they exist. Yet the world of objects is a false abstraction apart from its relation to the subject. If the intelligible world is to be rightly understood, attention must be paid to its relation to intelligence. The results of science must

be reinterpreted from the point of view of the unity that transcends the opposition of subject and object.

In the evolution of the religious consciousness, then, before God can be known in His proper form as the unity beyond the difference of subject and object, it is logically necessary to pass through the stages in which He is conceived first as object and then as subject. Upon the self to which all objects are relative, we are bound sooner or later to recoil. Failing to find God in the outer world of change and decay, man by a natural reaction is inevitably led to seek for Him in his own soul, and the religion in which God is viewed as an external object gives place to subjective religion. The main types of subjective religion are Buddhism, Stoicism and Judaism. The first represents the extremest form of it, in which the subject is completely withdrawn from the object. The world, in its eye, is a vain show only, and the wise man is he who extinguishes his passions and desires that attach him to it and retires into the solitude of a purely inner life. Even the individual self is an illusion and is to be destroyed. The will to live is the source of all evil, and, in order to attain the salvation of Nirvana, it is necessary to get rid of it. Buddhism arose out of a reaction against the superstitions of Brahminic polytheism, and in the days of its triumph rendered great service to humanity. "Not even in the New Testament do we find the royal law, not to return evil for evil but to overcome evil with good, more explicitly announced than in the ethical writings of the Buddhists." But "in its recoil upon the inner life of the subject, it overbalanced itself and ultimately lost all things, even the subject itself, in the silence of Nirvana." It may, therefore,

be regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of subjective religion.

Stoicism, like Buddhism, is the outcome of a reaction against the objective attitude of mind, but it differs from Buddhism in thinking that "the universal principle is realised in each man as an individual self." According to it, the highest good does not consist in the absorption of the individual into the universal, for reason in the individual is the same as universal reason. In each man, therefore, it is possible for the absolute good to be realised. That good lies in turning away from everything external and in living a life determined solely by reason. But in virtue of the identity of human reason with divine reason, determination by the inner law of reason is at the same time determination by God. What is most individual is thus at a stroke transformed into what is most universal. This contradiction is due to "seeking the absolute in the subject as opposed to, and exclusive of, the object; while, by its very definition as the absolute, it must transcend this distinction."

The highest form of subjective religion is Judaism. In it, nature is not divorced from but subordinated to spirit. It does not reveal God. At most, such things as the tempest, the earthquake and the thunder of Sinai are only the symbols of the divine. In the presence of a transcendent God, nature dwindles into nothing. It is His creation only which He can preserve or destroy at pleasure, and not His living garment. God is a spiritual being exalted above nature and revealed only in the inner life of man. His relation to human beings is more like that of the lord to his subjects than that of the father to his children. Every man stands in an ethical relationship to Him and is accountable to Him. The moral law comes directly from Him and is revealed

to man through the medium of his conscience. The moral responsibility of each individual, therefore, is separate, and the relation of all men to God is the same. It is true that Judaism begins as a national religion with a naturalistic basis like objective religion, but, in the course of its development, it continually tends, in spite of numerous lapses, to break away from its limitations and to attain the consciousness "that each individual spirit of man has an inward relation to the Father of spirits, the God who is the source at once of all spiritual and of all natural existence." To do the will of the Lord, to conform to the moral law in all his actions, is, according to it, the highest duty of man. What *is* is not what *ought to be*, and, therefore, to make the real conform to the ideal is the great end of every individual. It is an infinite task, for the carrying out of which constant struggle against selfish desires and natural inclinations is necessary. As a natural being man does not fulfil the moral law which, as a spiritual being, he must fulfil. Made in the image of God, he is immeasurably superior to merely natural objects, but in the presence of an absolutely holy will, he shrinks into utter insignificance. "The *closeness* of the relation, and at the same time the *disproportion* of the relation, between God and man, oppress the soul with an awe from which it cannot liberate itself." If man is infinitely great, he is also infinitely little. The burden laid upon him is to make the facts of actual life conform to the inner ideal. The ideal ought to be realised. However unbridgeable the gulf between the ideal and the real may seem to be at present, an ultimate reconciliation between them is certain. Nothing in the long run can prevail against the righteous will. As a faithful servant of the Lord, man must fight on, no matter how

tremendous the odds against him may seem to be, and he may be sure of victory in the end. God is certain to bring the course of the world into conformity with the moral ideal in the fulness of time. This essentially militant and prophetic attitude of the Jewish religion differentiates it from all religions of the objective type. To the contemplative pantheism in which objective religions culminate, God is present everywhere. He is revealed in the world as it is, and the religious mind, therefore, is in perfect harmony with it. No discrepancy is felt between the ideal and the real, and there is an easy tolerance for everything. There is no struggle, no hope, no aspiration, but joyous contemplation only. All that is is good, for the world is the very temple in which God dwells. In God, as revealed in nature and man, the pious soul finds its rest. But for a subjective religion like Judaism, God is manifested not without but "in the categorical imperative of a law of righteousness." It "commits man to an endless war with nature and circumstance, and an endless effort to realise the kingdom of God upon earth." Its ideal is not to be restful and contemplative, but to wage unceasing warfare against all forms of evil in order to realise a perfection to be found nowhere on earth. No greater contrast is imaginable than that which exists between objective religion and subjective religion. "For, on the one side, we find the religious mind laying all its emphasis on the idea that God is immanent in the world; that, indeed, the world is nothing but the garment of deity; and that, therefore, its apparent imperfection and evil exist only *for us*,—in so far as we fail to see the unity which underlies all its difference and change and which is continually bringing them back to itself. And, on the other side, we find the religious

mind dwelling on the idea of God as a transcendent Being, who separates Himself from all the creatures He has made—from nature as its creator, and from man as his stern and righteous judge; and we find it regarding the whole process of human life in the light of an ideal which condemns it as imperfect and evil" (*Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II., pp. 13-14).

In spite of its conception of God as spirit and its moral idealism, the religion of Israel is as one-sided as the objective religions to which it is opposed. It is as impossible to think of God as a subject only negatively related to the object as to think of Him as an object, for He is the unity that transcends the distinction of subject and object. In the religious development of man, it is, no doubt, necessary to realise the importance of the subjective, but it will not do to forget that the subjective is an empty abstraction apart from its relation to the objective world. Conceiving of God as a transcendent Being, subjective religion removes the bond that unites man with his follow-men and nature. "It sets the individual man alone with himself and with God, and makes him regard everything else as comparatively indifferent." For this reason, it fails to idealise the world and misses the truth as completely as objective religion. "A spiritualism which despises nature, a monotheism which separates God from His world, and a subjective morality which divorces the inner from the outer life and breaks the organic bond between the individual and society,—these cannot be conceived as a final goal of progress in which man can rest."

The reconciling principle of Christianity mediates between subjective religion and objective religion and reduces them to elements of a fuller truth. "In Chris-

tianity religion has risen to its own true form." God is no longer conceived as an object of nature, or as a pure spirit exalted above nature, but as mind self-revealed in nature and, more fully, in the individual and social life of man. The monotheism of the Jewish religion and the pantheism of the Hindus are reconciled with each other in the higher synthesis of Christianity. The Christian idea of God is that of a Being who overcomes the differences of the world not by simply setting them aside but by realising Himself in them. He is manifested more fully in human history than in the processes of the outer world, and is not equally in all things, "as full and perfect in a hair as heart." The spirituality of God must not be understood to mean a denial of His immanence in nature. He is revealed "in the upward process of nature to humanity, as well as in the farther process whereby human life rises towards the attainment of its highest ideal." In Christianity the antithesis of the subjective and the objective, the spiritual and the natural is transcended and God is comprehended in His true nature as the Universal Mind who manifests Himself in and yet distinguishes Himself from the world. He is the spiritual bond of union of all men. "The unity of man with God finds its adequate manifestation only in a unity of all men with each other—a unity to which both individual and national differences are subordinated." Man's unity with God implies his unity with his fellow-beings, and his unity with his fellow-beings implies his unity with God. The conception of God as manifested in the world leads necessarily to the conception of human beings as members of one "divine-human society."

Such an idea enables Christianity to overcome the

antithesis of the real and the ideal, of what *is* and what *ought to be*, which is most pronounced in later Judaism. The opposition is not glossed over, but it is perceived that it is not absolute. The ideal is not something to be attained in the dim and distant future, but is the deepest nature of what already is. The Jewish mind is more and more inclined to abandon the present to a power of evil and to look for the triumph of righteousness in the future, through the miraculous intervention of God. But Christianity, while admitting the antagonism of the ideal and the real, points out that there is a principle of unity beyond them and that here and now it is manifested in what seems to be most opposed to it. "The kingdom of God is already in the midst of you,"—this is the burden of the teaching of Jesus. Christianity therefore is not a religion of prophecy, but one of fulfilment and fruition. In its view, the good does not exclude the evil but triumphs over it and retains it as a negated element of itself. "Evil is or appears to be triumphant, because its immediate triumph is necessary to its final extinction." "There is a soul of goodness in things evil," and however unpromising things may appear for the moment, they are sure, in the end, to be turned into the very means of establishing the supremacy of the good. The ideal is not to be realised some time in the future all at once catastrophically, but is being realised here and now even in the midst of the failures and miseries of life, and will continue to be realised more and more fully as the years roll on. The optimism of Christianity does not evade the facts on which pessimism is based. On the contrary, it accords full recognition to them and shows how their existence points to a principle of righteousness which is continually overruling them. It is not

the optimism of the lucky man for whom life has been one long Lord Mayor's day, but of the man of sorrow fully conversant with the sufferings and evils of life. "The greatest optimist whom the world has ever seen" is represented in the Gospels as "bearing the sins and sorrows of men." No matter how forbidding the darker aspects of life may be, Christianity is convinced that nothing can withstand the power of good and that evil exists in order to be conquered. "It is this certainty of ultimate triumph, this combination of the despair of pessimism with an optimism that overreaches and overpowers it, nay even that absorbs it as an element into itself, which constitutes the unique character of the religion of Jesus."

Like religion in general, Christianity also has had its evolution, and its full meaning is revealed only in the highest and latest forms of it. But its germinal idea is already expressed in the life and teaching of Christ. The keynote of that teaching is that God is not merely an Almighty Being before whom men are to tremble in fear, but the Father of Spirits in whom they live, move and have their being. The opposition between God and man is not absolute. It presupposes a deeper principle of unity of which it is possible for all men to be explicitly conscious. Jesus claims the sonship of God not for Himself alone but for all men. Everyone can say, "I and my Father are one." It is true that the unity of the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite, is the basic idea of pantheism also, but the pantheist attains this unity by making the finite disappear in the infinite. Jesus, on the contrary, proclaims that God is not of the dead but of the living. He does not absorb man into Himself, but *reveals* Himself in his life. In order to live a

life of union with God man must rise above his particular self and identify himself with the wider life of humanity. This does not mean mere ascetic renunciation of the self. It is to die in order to live. The way to self-realisation lies through self-renunciation. He who subordinates himself to the whole gains the fuller life of the whole. "The sacrifice of selfishness is the birth of the true self." God is manifested in nature and in the *community* of men, and man can truly realise himself and be conscious of his oneness with God through union with his fellow-men only and not in selfish isolation. "He that saveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall save it."

This principle, of course, is the basis of all morality, and cannot be said to have been brought into the world by Christianity. What Christianity has done is to make the recognition of it explicit and constant. Before its advent, this principle, if recognised at all, was recognised along with other principles incompatible with it. Only the members of a specially privileged race were supposed to be capable of the higher life. Others were simply left out of account. The Jew had no idea of brotherhood with the Gentile, nor the Greek of brotherhood with the barbarian. But with Jesus "The principle breaks away from these limits and shows its positive value. God is again brought near to man as the Father of all, the universal principle of social unity. All absolute exclusions of individual by individual or of nation by nation are abolished." It is seen that man as a self-conscious being rooted in God "is at war with himself so long as he is at war with any of his fellow-men."

Christianity is essentially a universal religion. But

before it could appeal to the minds of men of all races and nationalities, it needed to be freed from the accidents of its first expression and its close association with the incidents of the life of its founder. Only one who was not an immediate disciple of Jesus and stood at some distance from him was fitted to do this work. Such a man was St. Paul. For him Christianity was a religion not for the Jews only, but for the whole world. He universalised the meaning of it and laid stress on the new idea of the relation of man and God which it introduced into the world. That meaning is exemplified in the death and resurrection of Christ. The kingdom of God is established not by a Messiah who conquers the world by force, but by one who shows that the life of spirit is attained only through the renunciation of the natural self. Christ's death on the cross and his resurrection is the outward symbol of "a *moral* death to sin and a rising again to newness of life in his followers." The great lesson which it teaches is that "man's salvation must result from his giving himself up to a Power which is revealing itself in all that is within and without him, apart from which he is nothing, but as the organ of which he is reconciled with himself and has therefore all outward good things added to him."

In generalising the lesson of Christ, however, St. Paul fails to do justice to the human element in his nature. He regards the earthly career of Jesus as a mere interlude between a life in heaven before his birth and a life in heaven after his death. He, in this way, ignores the most important teaching of Jesus that man is one with God. The one essential message which the founder of Christianity had for mankind is that God is not God without man and man is not

man without God. The finite and the infinite, the human and the divine are organically related elements of an indivisible whole. This great truth is somewhat obscured in the teaching of St. Paul, who freed Christianity from its early Jewish limitations and proclaimed it as the universal religion for all men. In the Gospel of St. John the divine and the human are once more brought together and Christ is conceived as the man in whom the Word is made flesh. The universal meaning of Christianity is brought into relation to the actual human life of Jesus, although it was idealised and dissociated from the conditions and circumstances of a Jewish nationality. Christ is represented as "divine *just because* he is the most human of men, the man in whom the universal spirit of humanity has found its fullest expression," and, on the other hand, "as the ideal or typical man, the Son of Man who reveals what is in humanity, *just because* He is the purest revelation of God in man."

The Christian doctrine, as contained in germ in the New Testament, had to pass through a long course of development before it transformed the ideas of the western world and assumed a fully matured form. It came into contact with the civilisation and culture of the Greeko-Roman world and the mind of the barbarians who destroyed that civilisation, absorbed various elements from them and turned them into the means of its own growth. It had, in the first instance, to struggle for supremacy with ideas more or less alien to it, and, in consequence, lost much of its original purity and catholicity, but it ended by making them instrumental to its attainment of a higher and more complex form. Christianity shows its supremacy to all other religions by incorporating them into and

reducing them to mutually complementary elements of itself. In its evolution it sways from side to side and alternately approximates to objective and subjective religions, without ceasing altogether to be a religion in its proper form, before becoming a truly universal religion. Under the influence of the Greek, particularly the Neo-Platonic, dualism of matter and spirit and as understood by the barbarians who externalised everything, the religion whose mission it was to proclaim the unity of God and man, of mind and nature, became predominantly objective in its spirit and outlook. Until the Reformation, Christianity was more occupied with the other world than with this. Its conception of God was objective and polytheistic rather than subjective and monotheistic, and its morality ascetic. Intellect was subordinated to the Church, and a system of discipline was set up whose aim was to bring man into subjection to a divine law supposed to be externally imposed upon him and of which the Church alone was the interpreter. The great teaching, "the kingdom of God is already in your midst," was forgotten, and this world came to be regarded as a foreign country where we are only temporary sojourners and release from which is the one thing to be devoutly wished for.

But the matter of a religion whose principle is to overcome dualism was bound to react against and prevail over its objective form. After the Reformation there took place an inevitable reaction and Christianity assumed a form closely similar to Judaism. God was conceived as a pure spirit with whom man's relation is intimate and direct. The end of life was taken to be not ascetic mortification of the self, but the realisation of its many and varied capacities. The supremacy

of reason over everything was proclaimed, and stress was laid upon the rights and liberty of man. The medieval other-worldliness was discarded and the duty of establishing the kingdom of God on earth emphasised. But though in all this the Reformation corrected the errors of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages which reproduced the features of objective religion, it was equally one-sided. Its great defect was to pit the inward against the outward, the subjective life of the individual against all objective interests. But the soul that has got rid of all outer limitations soon reduces itself to utter emptiness. An extreme individualism is bound ultimately to destroy itself. However great may have been the services of Protestantism to the world, it cannot be denied that it was the source of "the disease of introspection and self-contemplation which puts the exaggerated image of the self between the individual and the world, between the individual and his fellow-men, and even between the individual and God." From this "great plague of our spiritual life" the modern world is slowly recovering.

The problem of the present age, concludes Caird, is to bring together with clear insight the elements of Christianity which, in the course of its evolution, tended to fall apart from each other. This has been done by the philosophical Christianity of the present day. For it there is no absolute distinction between the natural and the spiritual, the human and the divine, the secular and the religious. It rises above the limitations of a paganised Christianity and a Judaised Christianity and thinks of God not as a transcendent being somewhere beyond the world, but as self-revealed in nature and in human society. The moral life does not consist in turning away from the world and in

repressing our natural tendencies, but in abandoning a life of selfish isolation in order to realise ourselves as members of the one universal society. The supreme duty of everyone is to contribute towards the destruction of the artificial barriers which have hitherto kept men apart from each other, so that "all men, even the lowest and most wretched, may be made sharers in the great heritage of humanity." The true service of God is the service of man. The essence of the Christian spirit is to see God in all things and in all the concerns of life and not to fix one's gaze upon another world. Only by cultivating this spirit will it be possible for a religion fitted to satisfy modern requirements to "cope with all the unsolved problems of the present, without losing itself in anarchy, revolt, and nihilism; or in vague socialistic schemes which, even if they could succeed, would satisfy only the hunger of the body."

If there is one thing more than another on which Caird, in all his writings, constantly insists, it is that the world is not merely related to God but is the manifestation of God. No one who has learned the lesson of idealism can take exception to this view. But the question is, is the world, as we know it, the complete expression of the Divine Mind? Of that which constitutes the content of the Divine Mind, comprehensiveness and coherence must be essential features. All its elements must be in such transparent unity with each other as to show that they form a self-contained and harmonious whole, not pointing to anything beyond it. The facts of the world of our experience are not of this nature. They plainly betray their incompleteness, and their failure to express a consistent meaning is obvious. But if the teaching

of idealism is not false, they must nevertheless have such a meaning. For this conviction ground is provided only if we suppose that the incomplete world of our experience is a constituent element of a larger world in which alone the Absolute Mind is fully embodied. Modern idealism rejects the view that God is apart from the world and conceives of Him as immanent in it. This, however, has, not without reason, seemed to many to identify God with nature too closely. In order to avoid this result without relapsing into dualism it has been held by some that God is both immanent and transcendent. If this means that God, in so far as He is not manifested in the world known to us, is not manifested at all, one has only to remember Hegel's repeated observation that it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself. God may not be fully revealed in nature, but if the idealistic contention that subject without object is unmeaning is sound, He must be conceived as revealed in a world of which nature is but a part. What is called the book of nature is not really a book, but only a chapter of a book with which, at present, we are not acquainted. Much of this chapter is enigmatical to us, because we do not know what the context is which alone can throw light on its meaning.

If we take this view, it will be possible for us to accept the medieval distinction between this world and another world beyond this, in a new sense. The distinction is not between a purely material world and a purely spiritual world, but between two spheres of one and the same world which, superficially viewed, is material, but, when thoroughly comprehended, is seen to be spiritual. The unseen universe, as consisting of facts, is bound to be as material, if by 'material'

we understand what is objective to thought, as the visible universe, but the presupposition and ground of both is spirit. Spiritual life, therefore, can be lived quite as much in our present abode as in any other possible sphere. Caird's contention that Christianity as the Absolute Religion removes the distinction between the secular and the religious and proclaims the kingdom of heaven to be in our very midst, if only we have the eye of faith to see it, is indisputable; but it is not inconsistent with the belief that God's kingdom is continued and further developed in other worlds, differing from this not in kind but in the details of their constitutive features. Indeed, such a belief would seem to be demanded by the failures and tragedies of our present life. However staunch our faith in the rationality of the universe may be, however robust our optimism, it is not easy to reconcile the actual facts of experience with belief in the ultimate triumph of reason and goodness, if to this world only our vision be limited. But there is nothing unphilosophical in the notion that the present world is only an antechamber to a more spacious apartment where alone we can permanently dwell and fully develop our nature. "In my Father's house are many mansions."

CHAPTER IV.

JOHN CAIRD.

The religious aspect of Neo-Hegelianism is nowhere presented more lucidly and more attractively than in the pages of the eminent theologian John Caird. He was the eldest brother of Edward Caird, and was, like him, an ardent believer in the main principles of Hegel's philosophy. So charming is his style, so brilliant is his power of exposition, that the reader, whether he agrees with him or not, can hardly be ever in doubt about his meaning. It is difficult to present abstruse philosophical ideas more clearly and effectively than John Caird has done. As masterpieces of literature, quite apart from their philosophical merit, his works undoubtedly occupy a very high place. Caird, says his brother, "was interested in Hegel mainly by two things; first by the thoroughness with which he carries out the idealistic principles, and, secondly, by the strong grasp of ethical and religious experience which is perhaps Hegel's greatest characteristic" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, L., xxiv). He shared to the full Hegel's conviction that "the hidden being of the universe has no power in itself that could offer resistance to the courageous effort of science," and, therefore, had no patience with those who make use of idealism for the defence of religious truths and yet shrink from its legitimate conclusions. He agreed

with Hegel in thinking that the only safe foundation of religion is reason which contains as elements of itself feeling and will. The truths of religion which by most men are, in the first instance, intuitively apprehended, must, in the end, be capable of being translated into the language of reason.

Of Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* Green truly says that "it represents a thorough assimilation by an eminent Scottish theologian, who is also known as a most powerful preacher and teacher, of Hegel's philosophy of religion. At the same time, it is quite an original work—original, if not with the highest kind of originality, which appears but once in a century, yet with that which shows itself in the independent interpretation and application of a philosophical system very remote from our ordinary ways of thinking. An Englishman to whom the language and prolix technicalities of Hegel's writings—or rather of that ill-organised compilation of notes of lectures in which alone his doctrine is preserved—form a hindrance to profitable study, will here find the essence of what he had to say on the most interesting of subjects, presented by a master of style" (*Works*, Vol. III., p. 138). Caird presents Hegel's thoughts on religion so fully and exhaustively that, as Green says, "a student who wished to know what Hegel had to say about religion would not lose anything of importance by taking Dr. Caird as his interpreter."

Closely following Hegel, Caird endeavours to show that religion is essentially rational and not the object of blind faith. But any attempt to make faith intelligent and intelligible, to treat of religious ideas scientifically, is met, at the very outset, by the objection that religion is concerned with the supernatural,

with the unconditioned and Absolute as distinguished from the relative and phenomenal, which alone is accessible to us, and is, therefore, incapable of scientific and philosophical treatment. The sphere of religion, it is held, is the unknown and unknowable background of natural phenomena, and the effort of thought to unravel its mysteries is, in consequence, bound to be futile. Caird does not deny that the subject-matter of religion is different from the objects with which the ordinary sciences have to deal and requires for its study a method very different from the usual procedure of science. But this is not what the agnostic philosophers mean. Their contention is that to know is to distinguish, limit and relate. Only the finite, therefore, can be known. To know the infinite or the unconditioned is to subject it to the conditions of knowledge, which is impossible. All human knowledge being relative, it is for ever impossible for us to know God or the Absolute. But, asks Caird, if this argument is valid, how is it possible even to affirm the *existence* of the Absolute? To deny that we have the consciousness of the Absolute is impossible, for the assertion that we know phenomena only would be meaningless except by an implicit reference to the infinite. If we knew finite things only, it would be impossible for us to characterise them as finite. The knowledge of a limit involves the transcendence of it. But if we think coherently, "we cannot deny all consciousness of the Absolute in order to maintain that human knowledge is limited, and in the same breath assert a consciousness of the Absolute in order to justify our cognisance of that limitation." The only legitimate conclusion which follows from the agnostic premiss is not, as Spencer maintains, that we

have an indefinite consciousness of the Absolute, but that no such being exists. Even a vague consciousness of the Absolute is some positive knowledge of it, and if we have this minimum of knowledge, the whole theory of relativity on which agnosticism is based falls to the ground.

The truth is that the Absolute, as the agnostic conceives it, is a false abstraction. He first supposes it to be out of all relation to thought and then imagines that it undergoes a transformation of its nature by coming into relation to thought. But a reality beyond thought and unrelated to thought is only a chimera. What is ultimately real is through and through spiritual, something which exists for thought and is the embodiment of thought. Thought and being, subject and object, can no more be separated from each other than the North Pole from the South Pole or the concave side of an arch from the convex side. The Absolute, rightly viewed, is not an unknowable entity bearing no relation to thought, but is mind self-expressed in a system of things or a system of things centred in mind. Finite things as related to each other have for their presupposition the Absolute mind, and the Absolute mind has for its content the connected system of things. The finite and the infinite, the Absolute and the relative, have no meaning apart from each other. "What remains when we segregate being from knowing, reality from thought, is not an unknowable something, but utter nonentity." It is true that there are innumerable objects beyond the knowledge of any particular mind or of all particular minds. But to say that things exist independently of *my* mind is not to say that they exist independently of *mind*. "Nothing can have any reality for us save as it is capable of

entering into thought or is, in itself, a thinkable reality; but the thought which is in nature and in man, in all things and beings, is not a thought which we create but which we find in them, not a system of relations which our minds can make or unmake, but which we discern or discover—a rationality which is independent of us but to which our reason responds" (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new edition, p. 22). So far from the Absolute being incapable of being apprehended by us, its essential nature is to reveal itself to us and in us.

But, it may be argued, although the knowledge of God is not impossible for us, such knowledge is direct and immediate and not the product of philosophical reflection. We know God intuitively; the assurance of His existence does not arise from any reasoning process, but from an experience which raises us above the things of time and space and brings us into living contact with Him. Caird's answer to this contention is that it is not necessary to deny the intuitive character of religious knowledge in order to vindicate the claim of philosophy that it alone can give us the most adequate idea of God. But it is necessary to remember that what seems to be immediate and certain is not always so and may be the outcome of unconscious or forgotten processes of reasoning, and that so far from being true, it may often be nothing more than some inherited prejudice or superstition. The function of thought is not to supersede immediate knowledge but to critically examine it and bring out its inherent rationality, if it has any. Philosophy does not seek to produce religious faith any more than æsthetics seeks to make men poetical or logic to make them capable of reasoning. Nobody wants to *substitute* scientific

for intuitive knowledge. But there is no reason why, although we begin with intuition, we should not advance to knowledge based on reflective thought. Between the life of faith and philosophical meditation there is no incompatibility whatever. "Faith is but implicit reason, reason working intuitively and unconsciously, and therefore without reflection or criticism of its own operations." But "faith speaks, and necessarily speaks, in the language of one world, the world of sense and sight, concerning the things of another world, the world unseen and eternal" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I., p. 55). The aim of philosophical thought is "to translate the necessarily inadequate language in which ordinary thought represents spiritual truth into that which is fitted to express its purely ideal reality." In accomplishing this task, it has, in the first instance, to resolve the content of immediate and living experience into its distinguishable aspects, and to this analytical procedure much of its apparent narrowness and coldness is due. It seems to deal only with barren abstractions. But reason is not to be confused with the merely analytical understanding. The analysis which it makes is only "a necessary step in that progress by which we are to substitute for the rude unities of popular observation the real and profounder unities of thought—of identity of principle under diversities of form, of relation, order, organic development, beneath seeming disorder and aimless contingency and change."

Another objection to the philosophical interpretation of religion is that the truths of it are supernaturally revealed to men and are above reason if not contrary to it. The idea of religion undoubtedly implies revelation. It is not the outcome of any process of reasoning

of the finite mind, but arises from the self-communication of God to man. But revelation does not exclude reason. The truths which are revealed to us must be capable of being comprehended and interpreted by reason. They are not so many unintelligible things arbitrarily forced on our minds. Moral and religious principles must be appropriated by the spirit by its own thinking activity, and cannot be simply communicated to it in the form of mere fact. "The true idea of revelation, that which is most honouring to God, is at the same time that which is most ennobling to man —the idea, that is, of a revelation which addresses itself, not to the ear or the logical understanding only, but to the whole spiritual nature, which does not constrain us mechanically to receive the truth, but enables us to know it, which does not tell us merely what God would have us believe, but raises us into conscious intelligent sympathy with His mind and will" (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new edition, p. 61).

The very nature of man as a finite but self-conscious being is such that he is bound to transcend his finitude and to enter into that conscious relationship with God on which religion depends. He not only may but must rise to the knowledge of God. By this is not meant that every human being must necessarily be religious, but that in self-consciousness there is implied a principle which, when made explicit, means communion with the eternal and unseen. Only on the basis of his union with the infinite is it possible for man to be conscious of himself and of all other things and beings.

But a direct challenge to the attempt to prove the rationality and necessity of religion is made by

materialism. If everything has evolved out of matter, if the whole universe, mind included, can be explained by means of purely mechanical principles, if the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, then there is no possibility whatever of a spiritualistic explanation of the world. Caird thinks that those who have sought to controvert materialism have unnecessarily weakened their position by making a concession to the materialist to which he is not entitled. They have been too ready to admit the existence of matter independently of mind. But if there be any such thing as matter unrelated to mind, the attempt to explain all things by means of it must be held to be not the weakness but the strength of materialism. For by trying to reduce all that is to matter, the materialist succeeds in avoiding the difficulties inherent in dualism and in giving an explanation of the world which has the merit of simplicity. It is the defender of religion who handicaps himself by undertaking to prove the existence of an external creator of the universe. Between the world and an extra-mundane deity no bond of union can be shown to exist. The God who is conceived as other than the world stands limited by it and cannot, therefore, be an infinite being, and the world separated from God loses that which makes it a world, namely, its principle of unity.

The whole fabric of materialism is based on an illusory foundation, the outcome of false abstraction. So far from mind being the product of matter, no conception of matter is possible unless we make use of the categories of thought. As soon as we proceed to think of matter, we are forced to employ such notions as unity, plurality, totality, substance, cause, effect, reciprocal determination, etc., and these are all

forms of thought. They, as it were, are the framework in which the picture of sense-perception is set. Abstract from what is called matter its relation to thought and nothing is left. The power which holds together the objects of experience and brings them into connection with each other is the power of thought. The constitutive principle of the objective world, that without which it would not be anything real, is the unity of self-consciousness. The unthinking man supposes that the external objects he knows are simply reflected in the mirror of his mind, but philosophical reflection brings to light the truth that in all that is known the synthetic and organising activity of the mind is presupposed. Matter apart from mind is as much a chimera as one side of a thing without the other side. To the objection that things as known only and not things as such are related to the mind, Caird's answer is that relation to thought is an essential ingredient in the make-up of things, and that the very distinction between things and things as known is the work of thought. The materialists' attempt, therefore, to prove that mind is evolved from matter is foredoomed to failure. "Before you could reach thought or mind as a last result, you must needs eliminate it from the data of the problem with which you start; and that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own shoulders or outstrip your own shadow."

Another grave defect of materialism is its attempt to make mechanical causation the supreme principle of explanation of all things. The distinction between objects of different grades is obliterated and the higher is brought down to the level of the lower. But the application of mechanical causation cannot be universal. When we pass from the inorganic to the organic and

from what is not conscious to what has life and consciousness, new and higher categories are needed for their interpretation. As Kant puts it, no Newton will ever arise who will be able to explain a single blade of grass by purely mechanical principles. A living thing is not a mere sum of its parts which externally determine each other; it is a whole on which the parts depend for their existence and meaning. In it the parts presuppose the whole quite as much as the whole presupposes the parts. The members of an organised being are what they are in virtue of the special functions discharged by them in furthering the end of the whole. If we examine life closely we find that it involves the following characteristic: it is a systematic unity of inter-related elements, each of which has meaning in virtue of its place and function in the total system. The totality here is something more than the aggregate of its parts, the differences of the parts being reduced to order and brought into relationship with each other according to a general plan and purpose. In a mechanical whole, a stone, for example, the parts are absolutely indifferent to each other; you can remove some of them without in the least producing a change in the others. But in an organic whole the parts are as meaningless apart from their relation to the whole as are the scenes in a drama separated from their context. Further, an organised being is an end in itself. It is a self-developing and self-sustaining unity, and as such differs from a mechanical contrivance or a work of art. In such things as a house or a clock we find the same skilful arrangement of dissimilar elements for the realisation of a common end as in a living body, but the end is foreign to them and is imposed upon them from

without; whereas in a living body the end is not external to the means, but is their own immanent end. It is a unity manifested in its members, and hence the members are not merely dependent on each other but produce each other. It is a self-differentiating and self-integrating whole.

It has been held by scientific specialists that there is nothing in organised objects which cannot be resolved into inorganic substances, that there is no such thing as a vital force irreducible to physical and chemical elements, and that at some stage of the world's evolution life must have grown out of what is not life. It is not necessary to contest such theories in order to see that when we pass from the inorganic to the organic world we require a new and a higher conception in order to understand the nature of the latter. In matter there may be the promise and potency of all forms of terrestrial life, vital phenomena may contain nothing beyond physical and chemical forces, but, all the same, it cannot be denied that when we reach life, whatever the determining conditions of its evolution may be, the fact before us requires a higher category for its interpretation. There is no new force in life, but all the old forces acquire a new meaning and significance. We no longer have, as in the inorganic world, a unity external to another unity, but a higher unity which goes out of itself to differences and returns into itself. The phenomena of organisation may arise out of inorganic phenomena, but it is impossible to understand them without the idea of self-causation.

Although an organism is a unity which is prior to and reveals itself in its parts, we nevertheless *perceive* it to be a mere aggregate of parts determining each

other externally. The *idea* of it is not in harmony with its reality as an object of nature. Hence it is that in the attempt to explain it we cannot help employing mechanical principles, even when we perceive that such principles cannot make its essential nature intelligible to us. This, however, only shows that we cannot rest finally in the category of life, but must go beyond it to the ultimate category of self-consciousness, which alone is a unity *for* itself expressed in its *own* differences, namely, the objects which co-exist in space and reciprocally determine each other. In self-consciousness "we have the absolutely new and higher result of a multiplicity of differences which are wholly retracted out of a spatial outwardness."

The disproof of materialism, however, is not enough to justify the religious attitude of mind. For this purpose it is necessary to show that in the very nature of the finite spirit there is something which elevates it into union with God. The finitude of material objects consists in their exclusion from each other. But a finite self-conscious being is aware of its finitude and therefore transcends the distinction between itself and that by which it is limited. It makes what lies beyond it the means of its own development. "It is the characteristic of a spiritual, intelligent being that it is not and cannot be shut up in its own individuality, that it shares in the life of the world without, in the life of Nature and of all other spiritual beings, so that it is its growing participation in *their* life that constitutes the measure and value of its own." This means that self-consciousness involves a potential infinitude. It is possible for a finite being to include in its consciousness the surrounding world by which

it is limited, because it is lifted above its finitude through its oneness with the infinite spiritual principle of which the total system of things is the expression. To actually be the infinite which he potentially is becomes therefore man's ideal. Growth of knowledge means "a discovery to mind of its own latent wealth," and moral progress means "an escape from the narrowness and poverty of the individual life and the possibility of a life which is other and larger than our own, and yet which is most truly our own," a life, that is, of oneness with the family, society, the nation and, ultimately, Humanity. It is because we share in a universal reason that it is possible for us to be conscious of ourselves as finite beings and of the relations in which we stand to other things and beings. In short, "when we examine into the real significance of the rational and spiritual nature and life of man, we find that it involves what is virtually the consciousness of God and of our essential relation to Him."

The significance of the so-called proofs of the existence of God is to show that it is impossible for the human mind to rest in the finite and that by its own necessary movement it is led to rise to the knowledge of God. Viewed as formal proofs of the existence of God, the cosmological, the teleological and the ontological arguments are open to all the objections which Kant and others have urged against them. But the right way of conceiving them is to regard them as expressions of the successive stages through which the mind rises from the secular consciousness of the world to the religious and philosophical view of it. It is impossible for the human mind to rest satisfied with the finite and transient world. The least reflecting

man cannot fail to discern more or less clearly that the sensible world is so unstable and changeful that it can have no existence except in relation to a necessary being. The sense of the unreality and vanity of the world is the characteristic of every religion, and it is more because of what it is not than of what it is that we are forced to seek for a higher principle explanatory of it. The cosmological argument represents the transition of the mind from the finite world to its infinite background. It is impossible to defend it if we take it to mean that the necessary being is because the contingent is. The hypothesis of an infinite and necessary being is not justified in order to account for a finite world, and a being beyond and therefore limited by the finite world cannot be infinite. The real significance of the argument is that it sets forth the movement of the mind whereby it rises above the transitoriness of the mundane world.

But if we merely negate the finite world and refer it to an infinite beyond, we make no progress. An infinite which merely annuls the finite and does not explain it is an empty abstraction. We can no more rest in it than we can breathe in a perfect vacuum. The only effect of referring finite things to it as their background is that its impotence to explain and give a new meaning to them is demonstrated and we are compelled to retrace our steps back to them. It is for this reason that in the history of human thought there is found a pantheism that swallows up everything finite alternating or even co-existing with polytheism. The true infinite must not merely negate the finite, but vitalise and impart a new meaning to it.

Now, the teleological argument makes good the defect of the cosmological argument indicated above.

It seeks to prove the existence of a God who is the positive determining principle of it. God, according to it, is the creator of the world and the cause of the order and harmony of which it is full. In so far as this argument transcends and supplements the cosmological argument it is valid, but its weak point is that it does not overcome the dualism of form and matter with which its inner spirit is incompatible. The cogency of the argument rests upon the transference to the relation between God and the world of ideas derived from human skill and workmanship. Just as the artist imposes his own end on materials more or less refractory and combines them into an ingeniously contrived thing, so we conceive of God as transforming a vast mass of chaotic material into the orderly cosmos we see. But in this way we reach only the idea of a world-architect who is necessarily limited by the existence and nature of the materials at his disposal. A world-architect, however, is not God, who is the life and soul of the world, and not merely its cunning contriver. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, we say that God is the creator of matter, we only fall into new difficulties. How can a perfect being first create matter and then, as an after-thought, introduce order into it? Further, it is not possible by means of inductive reasoning to prove the existence of a being perfectly good and wise from such adaptations of means to ends as we find in nature. Nothing is more easy than to draw up a formidable catalogue of the evils of life. If on speculative grounds we are satisfied that the universe is rational through and through, we may argue that its apparent irrationality is due to our incomplete knowledge of it, and must be capable of being reconciled with the rationality of

it as a whole. But if we start from the particular facts of experience, we find that they are exceedingly ambiguous and that it is not possible to base a definite conclusion about the existence and attributes of God on them.

The weak points of the teleological argument are all removed if we conceive of the order of the universe as not imposed upon it by an extra-mundane deity, but as the self-revelation of God immanent in it. God is not a mere Demiurgus, but the infinite spirit manifested in the world. This is the idea that the ontological argument expresses, and hence this argument transcends and incorporates into itself the truth of the teleological argument exactly as the latter does that of the cosmological argument. In other words, the ontological argument adequately expresses the truth, the different stages of the mind's progress towards which are represented by the other two arguments. The ontological argument, as it is stated by Anselm and Descartes, is, as Kant has shown, utterly indefensible. To begin with the idea of God and then to prove His existence by merely analysing that idea is certainly absurd. But there is more in the argument than its usual form suggests. The real significance of it is its insistence upon the ultimate identity of thought and being in spite of their relative opposition. All existence is for thought, and thought is a nonentity, a meaningless abstraction, unless it is manifested in being. All particular objects have existence only as elements of the one all-inclusive system of things in which an ultimate spiritual principle is revealed. The unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them is the precondition of the existence of every finite object. Just as a

member of the body has reality only as a component factor of the organism in which a single vital principle is expressed, so each sensible object has being only as an organic element of the whole universe in which the Absolute mind is revealed. The idea of God is not an empty notion in our head, but is the presupposition of the existence of the world. It is the centre without which the circle of being would not be possible. The unity of the divine mind finds expression in the multiplicity of the world in time and space, and the multiplicity of the world in time and space has its centre in the unity of the divine mind. God and the world can no more be separated from each other than can the centre be separated from the circumference. The opposition of the thought of God and the being of the world presupposes the ultimate identity of the Absolute in which that opposition is reconciled. The ontological argument, properly understood, simply means that all objective existence presupposes a universal mind for which and in which it is. Being is for thought, and thought has its content in being.

The basis of religion lies in the power of thought to rise above the limitations of finitude and to enter into communion with the Absolute. The self can distinguish itself from the objective world because it is able to transcend the distinction and to relate itself to the universal mind of which subject and object are opposed expressions. But although the rational nature of man is the foundation of religion, it does not follow that it is a purely intellectual thing and has no concern with feeling and will. The self is an unbroken unity of which thought, feeling and will are organic elements. "There is no feeling or volition which does not contain in it implicitly an element of knowledge, nor any kind

of knowledge which does not presuppose feeling, or in which the mind is in an attitude simply passive and receptive, without any element of activity. A spiritual unity cannot be conceived of as a repository, like a case of instruments or a box of tools, in which so many things are placed side by side, but rather as a unity of which the various elements necessarily involve each other or are the correlative expressions of a common principle" (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new edition, p. 153). Thought, however, has primacy over feeling and will, because it is the central principle "which runs through, characterises, gives organic relation to all our spiritual activities." It is on this central principle, this self-conscious nature of man, that religion is founded.

It has been held that religion is altogether a matter of feeling. We are religious not because of the acuteness of our intellectual powers, but in virtue of our love of God. A man may be a great scholar, a penetrating critic, a keen controversialist, and yet altogether lacking in that simple faith without which religion is an impossibility. On the other hand, one whose intellectual development is at a low point may have true piety and real spiritual insight. Knowledge divides rather than unites. It separates the knower from the object of knowledge to which he opposes himself. But in love the opposition disappears. He who loves God becomes one with Him. Caird admits that there is an element of truth in this view. Knowledge without feeling cannot be the root from which religion grows. The error lies not in perceiving the importance of feeling for religion, but in excluding from it the elements of knowledge and will. The

value of a feeling depends upon the worth of the thing which evokes it. Apart from their objects all feelings, no matter how intense they may be, are on the same level. "Within the sphere of feeling, the raptures of the sensualist and the devout devotion of the saint are precisely on a level; the one has as much justification as the other." It is impossible to say that the stronger an emotion is, the greater is the value of the object which calls it forth. The keenest feelings are those which are connected with our animal nature, and the more subdued ones are those that arise from intelligence. Further, it must be remembered that intensity of feelings also depends upon individual character and temperament. "Natures of a soft, pliant, susceptible texture are ready to respond to every breath that sweeps the chords of feelings; they are elated or depressed, attracted or repelled, roused into superstitious raptures or plunged into despondency and despair, on occasions when colder and deeper natures remain unmoved." So variable and accidental a thing cannot by itself correspond, on the human side, to the infinite object of religion.

Religion must indeed be closely connected with feeling, but its most essential element is knowledge. It must be grounded on objective truth. This does not mean that the form of knowledge which religion implies is "scientific or speculative knowledge, truth grasped in its absolute necessity and coherence as an organic system or process." There is a less elaborate kind of knowledge possible for all men. Truth may be apprehended in a representative form, in the form of facts and images symbolical of spiritual ideas. The figurate conceptions in which popular thought finds expression are sufficient for the practical purposes of

life. The mind uses them as its instrument but is seldom under their bondage. The ordinary dogmas of religion express the truths of it in a sensuous form, and cannot therefore be literally interpreted. Nevertheless they convey real knowledge.

But pictorial thought has serious defects. It fails to adequately comprehend spiritual realities. The sensuous forms and imageries which it employs hamper it and betray it into error. The idea is apt to be subordinated to its material form, and we are in danger of introducing into the world of mind conceptions which have meaning only as applied to the things of time and space. Metaphors may, in short, be substituted for thoughts. Working with ideas derived from the external world, ordinary unphilosophical thought fails altogether to understand the nature of the unity which belongs to spiritual things. The parts of a material object are simply juxtaposed and bear no essential relationship with each other, but spiritual objects are unities of elements, each of which has reality and significance only in and through the rest. Of such unities popular thought can make nothing. It succeeds neither in solving the apparent contradiction of the differences in which an organic unity finds expression nor in grasping the nature of that unity. A particular element of the whole is arbitrarily taken to be fundamental and all other elements are either sought to be reduced to it or are explained away. The spiritual unity, for example, which finds expression in and transcends the duality of subject and object, matter and mind, is missed, and the idle question asked whether mind is reducible to matter or matter to mind. Similarly, the finite and the infinite are set in unmediated opposition to each other and the problem is

raised how is it possible for the finite to know the infinite and for the infinite to communicate itself to the finite. How can the finite avoid being engulfed in the infinite and the infinite being limited by the finite which is other than it? The logic of the understanding whose main weapons are the principles of identity and contradiction is powerless to solve such problems. Its merely analytical procedure only serves to heighten the contradiction. "Instead of giving any real unity to the differences of the spiritual world, logical ratiocination only serves to exaggerate them. It may dissect and exhibit in isolated detail the various members of the organic whole of truth, but it can no more reproduce the living unity than the anatomist can reunite in harmonious vital action and reaction the *disjecta membra* of the organism he has dissected."

Understanding by its analytical work no doubt helps to make our conceptions clear, but if the movement of thought did not advance further, "it would only have deprived us of the satisfaction of uncritical and unquestioning faith without enabling us to reach that deeper satisfaction after which reason aspires." The highest kind of knowledge is not reached until the elements of it "are apprehended, not as isolated and independent terms or notions, accepted each on its own evidence, but as related to or flowing out of each other, so that one being given the others follow and the whole body of knowledge constitutes one organic system." Guided by the formal principles of identity and contradiction and unable to apprehend the nature of a unity which realises itself in its own differences, understanding sharply opposes God, nature and man to each other and fails to perceive that they are not separate entities but moments, distinguishable phases,

of a single organic whole. Conceiving of God, the world and the finite self as three distinct self-identical realities, it is unable to bring them into harmonious relationship with each other. Either the infinite is regarded as all in all and the finite merged in it, or the latter is so opposed to the former that it becomes reduced to a mere supreme being. The former alternative is adopted by pantheism. It so emphasises the unity and infinitude of God as to reduce the world to a nullity and to abrogate the freedom and moral life of man. "It gives us an infinite which obliterates instead of comprehending and accounting for the finite." In so far as pantheism proclaims the unity and spirituality of the world, it is true, but its error lies in its inability to perceive that unity has no meaning apart from difference. It is impossible to do away with the finite, the many and the changeable. To call the differences of the phenomenal world an illusion is only to give them a new name and not to explain them. Even an illusion is a fact of experience and has got to be seriously treated. The infinite of pantheism is an abyss into which all things disappear and from which nothing returns. It is barren and lifeless and incapable of accounting for the wealth of the concrete world. It is not "an infinite of larger and fuller life but an infinite in which all thought and life are lost." In its ethical aspect, pantheism makes personality, freedom and responsibility meaningless and abolishes the distinction between moral good and evil.

The opposite error is that of deism. It results from a natural reaction against the exaggerated monism of pantheism. Deism conceives of God as external to the world and as related to it as its creator and preserver. It is essentially dualistic, and its idea of God is based

on analogies derived from the relation of a human artist to his work. But it is impossible to think of God as lying somewhere beyond the world and operating upon it from outside. A God who is other than the universe can in no sense be infinite, for He necessarily stands limited by it. Nor is it possible to regard the various kinds of things and beings in the world as created out of nothing. Why should God, who at one time was without the world, think of creating it at all, and how could something be brought out of nothing? An external creator is not God but only a super-man. And neither material things nor living beings can be conceived as manufactured from without. "Even a stone has a distinctive character, is a centre of relations, a unity of manifold differences, the existence of which cannot be embraced under the notion of almighty power, or conceived as imparted to it by an external agent. The relations that constitute the existence and nature of a stone imply, with reverence be it said, a God who from the first moment of its existence is *in* the stone and constitutes the inner essence of its being" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I., pp. 120-21). Far more absurd is the notion of a *made* mind, a spiritual, self-conscious being created by an outside power. "In thought, intelligence, self-consciousness, in moral activity and attainment, you come upon an order of things in which the very notion of an external relation vanishes, and the hard and fast division between the creator and the created ceases to be any longer tenable. It is of the very essence of a spiritual nature that it cannot be originated or determined from without. Knowledge, morality, goodness are not manufactured articles. Spiritual qualities are not things that can be rained

into the soul or deposited in it ready made" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I., pp. 122-23).

Having shown the inadequacy of religious knowledge in the ordinary unscientific form and exposed the fallacies of pantheism and deism arising from the devices of the understanding to systematise knowledge, Caird proceeds to show that the only idea of God which satisfies reason is the speculative idea of Him as the Absolute Mind self-revealed in nature. God is not the external creator of the world. He is the inmost essence of it, its constitutive and sustaining principle. He can no more exist apart from it than it independently of Him. The very nature of the infinite mind is to manifest itself in a world of finite things and beings without which it has no reality. This does not in any way detract from the individuality and independence of nature and man. On the contrary, such independence as they have is due to their being the manifestation of God. Things are real not because they are isolated from but because they are implicated with each other. As essentially related to each other, they form organic elements of one world. They are at once differentiated from and integrated with each other, are a many-in-one and one-in-many. This means that their ultimate basic principle is mind, which alone can reduce them to unity without obliterating their difference. The existence of nature, therefore, presupposes its necessary reference to the universal mind. The universal mind, similarly, has its content in the manifold differences of the objective world. Abstracted from that world it is nothing. Mind which is not revealed in things and things which are not rooted in mind are both meaningless abstractions. God and the world are not two independent entities, each

complete by itself; they are the opposite counterparts of a single spiritual whole. "If it be true, on the one hand, that, without the idea of God, nature and man would be unintelligible, there is a sense in which it is also true, on the other hand, that without nature and man God would be unintelligible" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I., p. 154). If nature exists, then, as its presupposition and ground, God exists, and if God exists, then, as the content of His mind, nature exists. Reality, in its last interpretation, is the Absolute spirit manifested in nature and in the society of rational beings.

Made in the image of God, man is not only a self-conscious, but also a self-determining being. Essentially related to the universal and the infinite on the one side, and to nature, of which he forms a part, on the other, his end is to unfold his nature, to transform himself by means of his own conscious effort into a fully developed spiritual being. As at once finite and infinite, universal and individual, it is not given to him to lead a life of peaceful ease and contentment. "That which makes man a spiritual being makes him also a restless being. Reason is the secret of a divine discontent." He is divided against himself and has got to win his perfection and ideal freedom as the result of a conflict between his higher and lower natures. Moral and spiritual perfection does not come to us as a free gift; it has to be acquired through struggle and self-mastery. The elements between which the conflict takes place are both comprised within the unity of our self-conscious nature. If reason and passion were merely opposed to each other, if there were no unity transcending that opposition, no conflict between them would ever be possible. Sensuous desires

and impulses are mine quite as much as the reason which seeks to control them, and it is because the former are armed with a power derived from the latter that a strife between them becomes possible. In man the natural impulses are no longer what they are in the animal. They are rationalised, and in this way acquire a spurious universality. Moral evil is not due simply to the presence of the animal nature in us. It arises when the lower tendencies absorb our whole being and when through the satisfaction of them we seek to attain that contentment which the realisation of the universal ends of reason alone can give us. To turn away from the ideal of perfection of which the universality of our nature is the source and to allow ourselves to be imprisoned in our animal nature is the essence of moral evil. "A life lived only for the finite, for the attainment of finite ends and the satisfaction of finite desires, would be innocent and harmless if man's nature were wholly finite. What makes such a life evil is to be seen only when we consider it in the light of its inherent capabilities, and of the self-contradiction it involves; or, in simpler language, when we think of the wasted powers and misdirected aims, the ruin and wretchedness of a nature made for God, when it squanders itself on shallow and finite satisfactions" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. II., p. 21).

In the moral life is found the solution of the contradiction between the universality of man and his particular animal nature. Morality does not mean an ascetic extinction of desires. The rooting out of our impulses and desires is not possible, and if it were possible it would not be desirable. A passionless life of pure reason is only a mystic dream incapable of

being actually lived. In the concrete unity of human nature, reason and passion are in close organic relationship with each other. Any attempt to effect a forced separation between inseparable elements of life would mean not the fulfilment but the extinction of the moral life. "To seek perfection in a life without desire and passion is to seek the *ideal* moral life by the destruction or elimination of that which makes any moral life possible." Upon the foundation of animal impulses and desires the moral life is built. It means not the annihilation but the organisation of the natural tendencies, the transformation of them into the means of its own realisation. The lower elements of our nature may be said to constitute the raw material of morality. They are not to be left as they are, but to be reduced to elements of a system in which reason is embodied. A harmonious life of co-ordinated activities determined by ends into which feelings and impulses enter as necessary elements and of which reason is the guiding principle is of the very essence of morality.

Such organisation of the individual life, however, is not possible without a wider organisation into which individuals enter as elements. Only in so far as I renounce my private atomistic self and identify myself with a fuller and more comprehensive life beyond me do the various propensities of my nature cease to be lawless and chaotic and become reduced to an orderly system. Co-ordination and harmonisation of the feelings, desires and activities of an individual is the outcome of his being controlled and inspired by the social whole to which he belongs and subordinates himself. The individual is a moral being because he is really more than at first sight he seems to be. As

a member of the body is nothing apart from the position it has in and the function it discharges as an essential part of the organism, so an individual who has not a station and its duties in society, who does not realise himself by doing some work necessary for the community within which he is included, is an unreal abstraction. "In one sense the members of the social organism in which I live, the institutions, the civil and political organisation of the community to which I belong, are outside and independent of me, and there are certain duties and obligations which they authoritatively impose on me. They constitute a moral order, an external or objective morality, to which I must submit. But in another sense they are not foreign to me, they are more truly me than my private self. Apart from them I have no real self, or only the false self of a fragment taking itself for a whole. It is when the moral life of society flows into me that my nature reaches a fuller development; and then only are my social duties adequately fulfilled when they cease to have the aspect of an outward law and pass, in love and self-devotion, into the spontaneity of a second nature" (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, new edition, pp. 264-65). The highest development of social morality is attained when an individual rises above his particular community and identifies himself with the whole human race.

In morality we get but an incomplete solution of the contradiction between the ideal and the actual, between man's potential infinitude and his finite nature. The moral life is a life of never-ending progress. The goal at which we aim is never actually attained. The more we advance towards it, the further it recedes from us. The highest result of morality is only an approxi-

mation to its infinite ideal. No society, no state, with which an individual can identify himself is ever perfect or inclusive of all men. It is not an infinite whole, but only "a definite form of its objective realisation." Of the total system of things it is nothing more than an insignificant fragment. "Beyond the corporate life of mankind there is a wider life of which all nature and history, all finite existences present and future are the manifestations." It is when we are carried beyond the region of temporal things and brought into union with the eternal and unseen, when, in short, we pass from the sphere of morality to that of religion, that the final solution of the contradiction between the ideal and the real is found. Religion "changes aspiration into fruition, anticipation into realisation. Instead of leaving man in the interminable pursuit of a vanishing ideal, it makes him the actual partaker of a divine or infinite life." On the human side it is the elevation of the soul into union with God; on the divine side it is God's self-communication to man. Man surrendering himself to the infinite being, and the infinite being revealing himself in and to man, are the same thing looked at from opposite sides. It is true that the religious life is progressive quite as much as the moral life, but, in the former, the progress is within, while, in the latter, it is *towards* the sphere of the infinite. The progress of the religious life consists in the fuller appropriation of the rich inheritance of which we are in possession from the very beginning. That which we, from one point of view, seek to attain, we have, from another point of view, already attained. "In religion," concludes Caird, in words reminiscent of Hegel's well-known passage in the *Philosophy of Religion*, "the spirit passes out of

the realm of time, rises above the passing shows of things, the vain fears and the vainer hopes that pertain to the things seen and temporal. The outer life may be still in some measure a life of effort, struggle and conflict; but in that inner sphere in which the true life lies, the strife is over, the victory already achieved; hope has passed into fruition, struggle into conquest, restless effort and endeavour into perfect peace —the peace of God which passeth all understanding" (*Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. I., pp. 194-95).

In his Gifford lectures entitled the *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, posthumously published, Caird gives a philosophical explanation of the main dogmas of Christianity. The standpoint is much the same as that of his brother in the *Evolution of Religion*, except that, as the latter puts it, he committed the error of supposing that the whole Christian doctrine "could be reinterpreted by philosophical reflection without any essential change." He also, perhaps, differs from most of the British Neo-Hegelians in regarding the founder of Christianity as a "perfect human personality." The central idea of the lectures is that through the medium of the life of Jesus the fundamental truth of the oneness of God and man was for the first time definitely revealed to mankind. It was long before the Christian world fully and properly apprehended this truth. The various heresies of the Church were due to attempts to exclude or modify the human or the divine element in the nature of Christ. Starting from the presupposition that divinity and humanity are mutually exclusive, theological writers either sought to prove that Christ was a mere man differing from other men only in respect of the special kind of divine influence he

received or to show that only his body was human but the spirit that animated it was divine. It was not understood that "there is a sense in which it may be said that God would not be God without union with man and man would not be truly man without union with God," and that the personality of Christ was a unique exemplification of this truth. In the life of Jesus, the essential nature of God was manifested under the form of time. Christ is not to be regarded as merely a great historical person that lived on earth two thousand years ago. "He is an indwelling ever-present spirit, co-operating with us, animating and inspiring us, reinforcing our better nature, blending His thought with our thought, His will with our will, His life with our life." The essence of Christ's life is that "it was the self-revelation of the Divine in the human, the Infinite in the finite—the absolute identification of the mind and will of God with the mind and will of man." It was for this reason that the real import of Christ's personality could not be properly appreciated until he was withdrawn from the presence of his immediate disciples as a particular individual. After his death only he could exist in the midst of his believing followers, not as an individual person in outward contact with them, but as the universal indwelling principle of their corporate life. The salvation of man, his redemption from sin, lies in his imbibing the spirit of Christ, in the absolute surrender of his soul to God. He must give up his isolated particular life, cease to assail the very principle of his being by asserting a false independence, and, by wholly blending his mind and will with the mind and will of Christ, become a member of the kingdom of the spirit in which he lives for ever.

CHAPTER V.

WILLIAM WALLACE.

The expositor of Hegel who contributed towards the comprehension of his meaning more than any other British writer, more perhaps than even Stirling and Caird, is William Wallace. The main work of Wallace was the interpretation of Hegel and the translation of his lesser *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Mind* into English. If his career had not been cut short in the prime of life by an unfortunate accident, he would doubtless have made further substantial contributions to philosophy. His initiation in the study of philosophy was due to Ferrier, whose lectures he attended in the University of St. Andrews, and when he went to Oxford he came under the influence of Green, of whom he speaks as "that example of high-souled devotion to truth, and of earnest and intrepid thinking on the deep things of eternity." He succeeded Green as Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1882, and exercised profound influence on several generations of students. In his philosophical tendencies he was essentially a Hegelian. "No one who has understood his exposition of Hegel," says Professor Muirhead, "can fail to recognise the Hegelian in all that he wrote." He generally eschews the technicalities of Hegel and gives us a free but a very faithful rendering of his thought. "The Hegelian philosophy,"

Edward Caird tells us, "had its strong hold upon his mind mainly because he seemed to find in Hegel one who united idealism with a more than positive insistence upon the emptiness of abstract ideas, and whose thinking was a continual effort after the comprehension of the actual in its concreteness and complexity."

Wallace, in many respects, presents a marked contrast to his predecessor Green. Both represent the idealistic school of thought. But, unlike Green, he makes no attempt to develop a system and prefers to express his own ideas through the exposition and criticism of others. This tendency he has in common with many other British exponents of idealism. Green's style is heavy and sometimes rather involved, in spite of occasional passages of great perspicacity and power. Wallace, on the contrary, is a singularly attractive writer. His work may indeed be regarded as literature quite as much as philosophy. Green was a great controversialist and a remorseless critic of systems of thought to which he was opposed, although, at the same time, he was one of the most broadminded and tolerant of men. Wallace, on the other hand, rather disliked controversy and preferred to discover points of agreement with thinkers of other schools. His criticism, in the words of Caird, "is always appreciative, and, we might say, at times appreciative to a fault." Into the point of view of another "he took infinite pains to enter and even to suggest reasons to justify what seemed paradoxical and extravagant."

Wallace's interest is not so predominantly theological as that of the Cairds. His sole aim is to comprehend the ultimate meaning of the system of things to which we belong. "The reality on which his gaze was anxiously bent," says Professor Muirhead, "was the

reality that is in life and things and not any reality beyond them. Philosophy was not so much a special kind of occupation different from those of ordinary life, but just those ordinary occupations thoroughly understood" (*Fortnightly Review*, Vol. LXI., p. 689).

It is not an easy task to interpret Wallace. The difficulty of the expositor arises from the fact that, as a rule, he is exceedingly averse to a too definite pronouncement on the moot points of philosophical controversy. Brilliant reflections and criticisms in detail are to be found everywhere in his writings, but there is very little effort to gather up into a coherent and consistent whole the results of piecemeal discussion. As one of his critics remarks, with perhaps some amount of exaggeration, "everywhere valuable hints and suggestions, nowhere a connected argument or line of thought. There is a continual oscillation between opposite tendencies." Except in his incomplete and fragmentary Gifford lectures and some essays on moral philosophy, the views of Wallace are nowhere presented in a positive form. Even the essays, as Caird says, "have a tentative and heuristic character, as of a mind testing different ways of thought and seeking an outlet in one direction after another." In this chapter an attempt is made to give a connected exposition of Wallace's views on religion and morality, as contained in the posthumous volume entitled *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, at the risk of giving a somewhat dogmatic character to the teachings of one who was very reluctant to commit himself to any proposition without a good deal of explanations and reservations.

Of the two courses of Gifford lectures which Wallace delivered in the University of Glasgow, only twelve

have been preserved. The first course is very incomplete. Only three lectures of it are extant. These deal with the scope of natural theology, the Greek origins of it, and the natural theology of Christ. In the first lecture Wallace seeks to vindicate natural theology against the attacks made on it from different sides and to determine its exact functions. He points out the mistake of thinking that its aim is to construct religion. There is, he says, certainly justification for the feeling that life cannot be reduced to mere logic and that analysis and reflection are out of place where faith based on the intuitive knowledge of God is concerned. But natural theology makes no attempt to supersede faith. Its aim is not to produce the religious life but to understand it, to determine its nature and its relation to other human interests. It is the attempt to rationalise religion. The need for this is felt when in the course of the development of the human mind a conflict arises between the religious spirit and the scientific tendency. To effect a harmony between religion and science, between faith and worship and the secular interests of life, is the business of philosophy. Its demand is "that such evaluation of the factors of life shall be made consciously and with due care and not at haphazard." When contradictions emerge between the different elements of life philosophy intervenes and, with a certain aloofness appropriate to it, seeks to estimate the exact worth of these elements and to give to each its proper place in the total scheme of life. Natural theology, so understood, has no quarrel with revelation. It is opposed only to the notion of "the communication of full made truths by a miraculous importation of them into the human faculties."

In the second lecture Wallace shows that the origins of natural theology are to be found in Greece, and after surveying the chief systems of Greek thought points out that "the whole tendency of Greek philosophy was to conceive of God as the great principle of the natural order, as the supreme reality, as the object of all objects. He is the order, or He is the source and author of the order, of the physical universe. He is the supreme condition, on which for the philosopher depends the intelligibility of nature, the final source of all its movement, the goal of all its meaning."

The natural theology of Christ is the theme of the third lecture. Wallace maintains that the uniqueness of Christianity does not lie in its bringing any new truth into the world. It did not add anything to the idea of God which the world, particularly the Greeks, already had. Not a single article of its faith perhaps can be said to be peculiar to Christianity. Its value lies in the practical demonstration it gives of the truth of the philosophical idea of God. Man's sonship of God is made visible and tangible in Christ. His uniqueness consists in "his utter realisation of the immanence of God in this present life." He shows that man is a free being because he is one with God, but the other side of this freedom is his absolute allegiance to God. "The great deed that seems to emerge as the life of Christ is the bringing into one of God and man: the discovery that the supernatural is in the natural, the spiritual in the physical: the eternal life as the truth and basis of this: God manifest in the flesh: removal of the partition wall between God and man: the immanence of the divine, not as a new and imported element in human life, a special

bit of man peculiarly holy, but as the truth and life in life" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, pp. 49-50). The practical consequence of all this finds expression in the commandments to love God with all strength and to love the neighbour as self. "If we separate them and minutely try to balance the several claims, it will lead to unpleasant and profitless casuistry. But they are not separate, and they cannot be balanced against each other. God, self and neighbour,—they form an indissoluble trinity."

In the second course of lectures, of which nine have been preserved, Wallace discusses the relations of morality and religion. These lectures, as Caird says, "contain some of the most original and suggestive pages which Professor Wallace has produced." He begins by pointing out the error of what he calls "a departmental view of human life," which sets religion and science, art and morality, morality and religion in sharp opposition to each other. These great concerns of life are of course distinct from each other, but the distinction is not absolute. The unity underlying them must not be overlooked. Religion is not one thing and morality another. They are neither to be identified with nor to be kept rigidly apart from each other, but are to be viewed as complementary phases of human life. "Religion is the complement and the implication of the moral life." To identify religion with any particular aspect of life or to suppose that it is detached from and unconcerned with ordinary human interests is to misconceive its nature altogether. It is the crown and summit of life, the consecration of all our legitimate activities and pursuits, and its essence is the sense of oneness with God, that living faith in Him which consists not in "assent to a

proposition which is partly doubtful and where assent therefore is regarded as meritorious," but in the knowledge of Him, in the words of Schelling, as "the very heart of life of all thinking and all action, and not a mere object of devout passion or of belief." God, to quote Schelling again, "is either not known at all, or He is at once subject and object of knowledge. He must be at once our very self, our heart of hearts, and yet comprehending all hearts far beyond us."

To religion, so conceived, science, if it understands its business, is not opposed. Its proper task is not to offer a theory of the universe. The humbler rôle which belongs to it is to study particular groups of phenomena with a view to discover coherent relations between them. The laws of nature which science brings to light are not rigid uniformities imposing limits both upon God and man. They are not inflexible rules to which God Himself must bow. From the idealistic point of view nature is "at once *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, as an organic community, an ideal, or as St. Paul might call it, a spiritual body, working by myriad ways to an end which only gradually reveals itself, and using methods or modes of operation, which in parts we can discern, and when discerned we call laws. The reign of law has here become, if not the reign of grace, at least the kingdom of the spirit" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, pp. 98-99). For science, properly so called, there is no systematic whole, no nature. It is the business of reason to be comprehensive, to seek totality, to show that the special laws of nature are but elements which enter into the one organised whole of the universe of which the kingdom of the spirit is the inner side.

Reason, no doubt, is in the individual, but, at the same time, it lords it over the individual and is therefore universal. As conscience is at once our act of judgment and the voice of God, so is reason a universal principle, although it works in and through the mind of the individual. It is not a disintegrating principle, as some writers imagine, but the principle of unity. As Wallace puts it, when we say 'come, let us reason together,' we mean 'let us try to agree and remove the cause of misunderstanding between us,' and not 'let us dispute and divide.' Even disunion presupposes union. "A quarrel unites as surely, and the cynic may say more closely and permanently, than a friendship." Reason grows on the soil of society, it is essentially a social product. To be rational is to be social. "The specific law of human existence is sociality. It is that which makes us human beings." The absolutely solitary, said Aristotle, is either a brute beast or a god. Authority, which Mr. (now Lord) Balfour extols at the expense of reason, is not antithetical to reason: it is collective reason embodied in society.

In order to understand the social nature of man as a rational being, it is necessary to begin with the consideration of his relation to nature. That relation is twofold. While he is in every way dependent on nature, he is also antithetical to it. So entirely is his existence conditioned by nature that, to the superficial observer, he seems to be altogether an accidental product of its forces. In the eyes of materialism man is a mere excrescence upon nature, only a temporary disturber of the mechanically ordered physical system. The Platonist idealist, on the other hand, mindful exclusively of his relation of opposition to nature,

conceives of the rational principle in him as having descended upon it from another world. "The soul has come from heaven, *i.e.* from the supernal abodes of the highest mind, to enter into and dwell with man." Both these views are one-sided. Platonic idealism completely separates the natural and the spiritual and thereby reduces them to meaningless abstractions. The ground and presupposition of the natural is the spiritual. What is nature outwardly is inwardly mind. The evolution of man is the progressive revelation of the mind which nature implies. Between one stage of it and another, between the physical and the spiritual, for example, there is no breach of continuity. "If animal life, though a new thing not reducible to its antecedents, yet comes in the order of nature as their due sequel; in like manner we must postulate that the spiritual life, the life of righteousness, beauty, and goodness, shall be a continuation of the same natural, which is thus in its essence also a supernatural, order" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 138).

Now, it is this universality and spirituality of man that enables him, although a part of nature, to stand above its order and to dominate it. Because there is in him "the presence and power which animates the whole," he is necessarily impelled to establish his authority and influence over all things, to realise, that is, his potential divinity. This, in his uncivilised condition, he seeks to do in a wrong way. Not knowing the secret of realising the infinite possibilities of his being, "he fancies in his impotence that the less others can be, the more he makes them cease, the more will he himself be." He enters upon a career of ruthless destruction in order to establish his own ascendency.

"His grand impulse, his glory perhaps—and he sometimes thinks it for God's glory also—is to kill. He crushes down his fellows. He ruthlessly sweeps away the lower races which check the free swing of his interests. The beasts of the field and the fowls of the air fall a victim often to the mere lust of killing; and the choicest trees and shrubs have been irrevocably cut down by the maddened colonist and trader who knows no god but Plutus. . . . His own species he has sought to enslave, *i.e.* to destroy their separate personality, and make them mere tools of his hand. And, almost universally, he has sought to make his vassal or bondswoman out of the woman of his own kind" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 174). Thus, however, he only undermines the foundation of his own being. "If there is one truth more certain than another, it is that for everything destroyed in its own nature and independence, there is a corresponding lack created in the destroyer. We can only be what we are meant to be in proportion as we can establish such a relation between us and other things that they may realise their full being. . . . The enslaving man is a man enslaved, in a worse sense, by his slave" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, pp. 174-75).

Man then can be what it is in him to be only by making others his partners in the business of life. The great basic principle of human existence is co-operation. United we stand, divided we fall. Standing shoulder to shoulder, bearing each other's burden, morality is to live a corporate life of mutual service and helpfulness in furtherance of the end of fully unfolding our nature. It is to do the duties of the place and station to which God has called us, not in a lifeless and

mechanical spirit, but with cheerfulness and enthusiasm born of the knowledge that in this way we are contributing to a common purpose and a common good. Morality therefore is not something negative. It does not consist in merely avoiding certain kinds of undesirable activities, but in pressing forward energetically, by means of social co-operation, towards a complete and harmonious life. It involves unceasing activity in the work of subjugating nature and attaining a truer and more real self. "Virtue of the real stamp is positive ability, the power to act well and vigorously. . . . It is not mere not doing something which is to be condemned; it is doing, or readiness to do, something which is required by law, by ideal, by social demand, by the needs of life." Alone and single-handed man would be simply overwhelmed by the forces of nature. "If he feels himself a match for the powers of the physical world, it is by the strength of his community concentrated in consciousness." Only as a unit of society, as a member of his race, is he able to establish his supremacy over nature and to develop his powers. The two things involved in morality are movement to end and social co-operation. By nature man is an indolent being. "His industry is an effort: his work is only partly a pleasure: he constantly relapses from the strain." But the infinite in him does not allow him to be restful and contented. "He is always in division and tension between what he is and what he ought to be." The essential condition of his fulfilling the task thus imposed on him is social union. The consciousness of end, of possibilities to be attained, depends on sociality. Conversely, sociality is the outcome of the effort to realise the end.

It will thus be seen that "reason is not of the individual, as such, but only of the socialised or civilised individual." All the products of reason, things such as industry and commerce, science and art, morality and religion, present themselves only where human beings are associated with one another within an organised whole. Association, regarded as a mere external fact, is not of course the productive cause of these. What is inwardly free activity determined by rational end, has for its outward form social organisation. Of society viewed as the concrete embodiment of reason, the objective modes of life are necessary features. Property, wealth, trade, commerce, in short, all the external materials of civilisation are inseparably and organically connected with associated human life. They are the outcome of social man putting his will into outward things, and form the concrete content of morality and civilisation. Divorced from the inner spirit they are only "the skeleton, the carcase, the dry bones of life, the machinery of living left apart from the ultimate ends which it subserves." The essence of worldliness is to believe that they are everything, to identify civilisation with "certain objects, a collection or aggregate of things, a stock of objective goods or materials, a machinery of useful and pleasant things, of which we can draw up a list more or less complete." In a natural reaction against this tendency, we may pass to the opposite extreme and declare that "civilisation is an inner subjective thing, a state of mind and character." Such a separation of the inner from the outer, however, is impossible. "Civilisation in the fuller sense is the union, or, to say it better, the identity, *i.e.* the being-in-oneness, of outer and inner, of subjective and objective. But when

we say union or identity we must note that this is not *juxtaposition* or addition. It is not enough merely to add to the abundance of material civilisation a sufficient extension of literary culture, of manners, of common sociality. The two elements must become in a deeper way one. The material must embody the formal; the intellectual life grow out of the corporeal" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 159). Material civilisation "must become the visibility of the spirit." The important thing is to perceive that "a community is civilised in which the solidarity of human effort is the first and foremost principle, in which citizenship is realised as the governing idea of all life. But realised and real it must be, and not merely acknowledged as a mental principle or in words and forms. A community is not civilised in which the subordination of all the materials of civilisation to the common weal does not receive palpable expression" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 159). If it is true that the material conditions of life must be sanctified by the life of spirit to which they contribute, it is no less true that these conditions are part and parcel, essential ingredients of the spiritual life. "The ordinary observer of modern times has been apt to draw distinction between the moral life and the economic or industrio-commercial life, very much to the glorification of the former. Yet, as against this, it must be said that industry and trade are intrinsically parts of the moral life, and that, in so far as they fail to be so, they at the very same moment cease to fulfil their own proper function" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 160). No mistake is greater than to suppose that morality and religion are concerned exclusively with the higher life and

have nothing to do with ordinary mundane affairs. Separated from the external material conditions of human existence, they are absolutely empty things, forms without content. "You think religion will cure the wretched homes of horrid poverty and insolent wealth; but it will not; for religion will not and cannot live where there are such abominations. You fancy morality sits high and safe on the eternal rocks of reason: but, probably, if you got nearer, you would find that the venerable queen of life has long since been petrified in these altitudes" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 165).

In his struggles to be what he ought to be as a moral being, man is supported by the religious conviction that however great the obstacles in his path may for the moment be, his ultimate success is assured, for he has the backing of the supreme power in the universe. The moral ideal, the good, is attainable, because the good is also the true, and is the immanent reality in which we live, move and have our being. To obey conscience therefore is the same thing as to follow God. But "you must realise that, whichever you do, you take your life in your hands; you enter on a grand enterprise, a search for the holy grail, which will bring you to strange lands and perilous seas. For you cannot say, interpreting, 'Thus far and no further, merely, according to the bond and the duty.' In following God you follow by what has been, what is ruled and accomplished, but you follow after what is not yet. 'It may be that the gulfs will wash us down'; it may be that the gods of the past will rain upon us brimstone and horrible tempest. But He that is with us is more than all that are against us. Whoever keeps his ear ever open to duty, always forward,

never attained, is not far from the kingdom. The gods may be against him, the demi-gods may depart, but he, as said Plotinus, 'if alone, is with the Alone'" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 210).

In the nine essays on ethics included in the volume edited by Caird, Wallace discusses some of the most important questions of moral philosophy. Caird has evidently arranged these essays in the order in which the topics considered naturally follow each other. The first essay is on "Our Natural Rights." It gives a very interesting account of the origin and growth of the idea of natural rights and explains the sense in which it is valid. The point of view is substantially the same as that of Green. Wallace shows that one of the most distinguishing features of human life is that it is dominated by the idea of common ends and ideals. "The human being is essentially a social animal; a creature which enters into confederacy with others, which forms groups or unities." The eighteenth century doctrine, therefore, that society is the outcome of a compact made by men possessing natural rights for the safe enjoyment of those rights is absolutely wrong. Man never existed and never can exist independently of society. It is as a unit of a whole alone that he can have his rights. They are powers secured to him by a higher authority to which he is subject. "The mere individual has no rights as such; he has rights only as a person, *i.e.* as member of a society, as embodying in himself, at least partially, the larger aggregate of which he is a unit." By exercising his rights, a person as "an individual realising the universal" performs a social function, the function namely of contributing in some specific manner to the

common good. "Natural rights then are consequences of the fundamental laws of social existence, of those laws which make life in common possible in all countries and all times." The conditions of social life, of course, vary from country to country and from age to age, but, in the midst of all variations, certain essential forms of association remain constant. "These general features of life never presented abstractly by themselves but always realised in a special type are what give rise to what have been called the absolute or natural rights of man." By natural rights one may also mean the conditions of healthy social life as distinguished from the abnormal deviations from them that take place when society is more or less out of order, as, for example, when a particular class thrives at the expense of others. In such circumstances the demand for natural rights means only a demand for justice and equal opportunities, for the removal of arbitrary restrictions interfering with the free play of personality.

Rights then belong only to an individual who is a member of some social system. They "mark out the place which belongs to each in that system, and are only valid when such a system, economy or constitution prevails." Apart from such a system, an individual is not a person and has no rights. "The basis of his rights lies in the system to which he belongs; and to belong to a system is to perform the functions which are required of him in that system, not merely to be a passive and idle member of it, *fruges consumere natus*."

For all practical purposes the maximum of social unity is attained in the state. "It may be taken for the supreme society; and up to it all subordinate

societies refer; or it finally takes cognisance of all inferior societies, as if they were its delegates and instruments. The state then is the ultimate creator, guardian and guarantee of all rights in this world. It exists by the combined action of its members and exists more or less clearly in the consciousness of each." "The state," Wallace concludes, "must realise that it is mortal god, and that in this world it should be ubiquitous and omnipotent."

Rights arise out of personality, which is distinguished from things by its possession of self-consciousness. As a self-conscious being a person is at once universal and individual, confined to narrow limits of time and place and yet capable of looking beyond them. By reason of their finitude as corporeal beings, persons are distinguished and kept apart from each other, but they are also brought together by their rational nature as co-operant members of an organic whole. Without being united they could not realise themselves as distinct individuals. It is in association and competition with others that men attain to personality. Without mutual exclusion and the distinction of *meum* and *tuum* personality is impossible, but the other side of this mutual exclusion is the interconnection of the excluding individuals. Human beings are persons only in so far as they recognise each other as free beings within the unity of society and, confining themselves to their several spheres of action and refraining from interfering with each other, discharge functions essential to the well-being of the whole and, therefore, of themselves. Banded together, their ultimate purpose is to realise their potential universality, to press beyond their limited actuality to their unlimited possibility. They have rights not against the whole, the state, to

which they belong, but against each other. "Right assigns to each his place and prevents one from encroaching on another." It is not necessary that they should be equal. Indeed they cannot be equal, for "they are simply the powers belonging to the individual which are licensed, accepted or recognised by the state." It is notorious that individuals differ very widely from each other in respect of their natural powers. The only equality therefore which is possible is equality before the law, arising from the recognition of the dignity of common humanity underlying all differences of wealth, position and power.

The responsibility of a person lies in his doing what is required of him as a member of an organised system. It "implies an ordered world, in which all things (act) have their place and are related to one another, have mutual connexions" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 304). Every normal human being is a sort of public functionary, who is expected so to act in his station as to promote the order and progress of the community to which he belongs. It is assumed that he has social instincts and sympathies, possesses a healthy sense of reality, is able to form some estimate of the probable consequences of his actions, and has a general knowledge of the law under which he lives, of "the recognised and published conditions" of his membership of society. He is also presumed to be capable of some measure of self-control.

With responsibility duty is closely connected. In fact they may be regarded as different aspects of the same thing. The implication of every man being a member of a group is that he is raised above his selfish isolation and has to live a collective life, "a spirit only

realised by the energies of individuals, and yet living on above and beyond them taken singly." What he in his station must do to promote the interests of his group is his duty. The essence of duty is to work with single-minded devotion for the community into which one's lot is cast. Wallace illustrates this idea by an interesting representation of the career of Frederic the Great.

Throughout his ethical discussions Wallace lays the greatest stress on the social nature of man and on the supreme need of the organisation of human life. His treatment of the question of hedonism from this point of view is most interesting and suggestive. Like many other writers of his school, Wallace points out that the mistake of the hedonist is to hypostatise pleasure. It is not an independent entity, an object *per se*, but "the sign or symptom of self-realisation." It is not itself the end of action, but the sign that we have attained the end. It is the outcome of the adaptation of the agent to the environment and of the environment to the agent. The end of human action is self-realisation, and of progress towards this end happiness is the indication. But "the self which is realised is not the mere self living a solitary life, but a self which, with varying grades of attraction, draws first family, then city, and lastly the whole human kind into the circle of its self-interest" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 367). The pleasures therefore which are to be sought are not, as the hedonist thinks, those which are greater in quantity, but those which are attached to activities that "contribute towards the production of the common well-being or general comfort." The enjoyment of pleasure is not a matter in which an individual is alone concerned.

"All pleasures have a social element, and they cease to be real pleasures except in so far as they are correlated to the consciousness of other men." Happiness therefore does not consist in the enjoyment of the largest possible number of isolated pleasures, but in the reduction of them to elements of an organised system. It "as a general idea of well-led life, of activities perfectly realised, lays down the law to pleasure in its individual appearances. The systematised totality, which is not a mere sum of pleasures, but the organic unity in which pleasures tend to become completely harmonious, is the standard and the measure as against the individual and the occasional. Life organised is the judge as against the several unorganised detail-performances of life. Happiness is the *summum bonum* as against the single or several pleasures" (*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 369). The search for happiness, "if it is not to degenerate into a mere clutching at a maximum of pleasures, and so eventually to contradict and destroy itself, must be regulated by the organisation of human life, by its objective manifestation in institutions and modes of life."

Such an organisation of life is the function of the state. The various aspects of human nature, its fundamental impulses and powers, are embodied in and supported by social institutions of different kinds. These institutions require to be so co-ordinated and subordinated in an organised system that "none can claim more than its due share of the individual life, or attempt to cancel the claims of other aspects. To secure this latter condition is the business of the state which seeks to organise social institutions in such a way that it may be an exact reproduction of the whole

tendencies of the whole man in their normal hierarchy and system." The state, therefore, is intimately connected with every department of life. Its fundamental purpose is the co-ordination of the various associations of men for the promotion of different interests and ideals without which life would be reduced to a chaos. "The rationally constituted state must be the supreme visible organisation of all principles of organisation whatever. With the invisible kingdom of art, science, religion, it cannot, even if it would, deal: in the region of temporalities, *i.e.* of materialised and tangible existence, the state is supreme—not as a supervening domination but as an indwelling organisation. With art, science, religion, as such, as spiritual principles of human energy, the state has nothing directly to do, but wherever they appear as organisations, wherever they rise into materialised action, there the state is present, not as something alien and antagonistic, but as the whole organisation controlling the eccentricity of the parts."

The state, therefore, is, or rather ought to be a system in which every human being finds appropriate scope for the development of his nature and the satisfaction of his interests. It can be maintained only by its members properly discharging their special functions. "The stock from which each takes what he needs for his private use, he must at the same moment replenish, and replenish with interest as well as principal." The essence of the ethics of socialism is to make the solidarity of human beings the guiding principle of their actions, to demand that the social basis of their life shall not be overlooked in practice. Although apart from society man is an unreal abstraction, his egoistic and centrifugal tendencies weaken the bond of

his union with his fellow-beings. To provide motives calculated to resist such tendencies is the merit of socialism. However mistaken its particular aims and policies may be, it is sound in so far as it "keeps the highest common good alive in the several minor or particular associations where particularities are only too likely to harden and ossify."

The constitution of the state, if it is to fulfil its moral purpose, must, Wallace thinks, be democratic. But by democracy he understands something very different from what it is sometimes taken to mean. True democracy is not a community of men bent upon living a soft life of ease and comfort without troubling overmuch about such things as the common good and upon getting the maximum of rights with the minimum of duties, but "the organisation of the total power of a group of human beings in which none is merely a means or instrument of service, but each also enjoys the end of his own and other's action; in which there is fraternity but not necessarily equality or even vulgar liberty, or where the equality lies in common duty of service and the liberty in the removal of all mere passivity." The liberty of doing what one pleases, limited only by the equal liberty of others, the equality of the knave and the fool with the wise and good, and the fraternity of sentimentalism and gush find no place in such a scheme of life. On its negative side "democracy is the power and force of the whole body, as against the decided dominance of one or of several classes in the body politic." On the positive side, it means "autonomy, self-direction, self-organisation. It is not the negation of direction or government, but its completion and universalisation." It is, therefore, the very opposite of mob-rule and anarchy.

CHAPTER VI.

D. G. RITCHIE.

In the writings of D. G. Ritchie, social and political interests predominate and the purely theological interest recedes somewhat into the background. "Pre-eminently a thinker," says his biographer, Professor Latta, "he abhorred thinking *in vacuo*, and his particular strength lay in his combination of philosophic insight with a living interest in human affairs, past, present and future." Like T. H. Green, under whose influence his philosophical principles were formed, he took deep interest in practical politics, and the ideal of social well-being and progress dominated his thought and action. He was strongly of opinion that practical action must be based upon principles and that questions of ethics and politics must, ultimately, be viewed from the standpoint of general philosophy. In his study of practical problems, Ritchie sought to combine the point of view of idealism with that of Darwinism. Idealistic evolutionism is the name he was disposed to give to the theory to which he was led "by the teaching of Thomas Hill Green on the one side and by the influence of scientific friends on the other." As a philosopher, he, of course, saw that Darwinian principles could not be applied to human affairs indiscriminately and without qualification; but his keen appreciation of

those principles distinguished him from idealistic writers like Stirling whose hostility to Darwinism was as pronounced as his sympathy with it.

"Of an absolutely simple and unaffected nature," says Miss E. S. Haldane, "Ritchie pursued the truth he set himself to seek with an entire devotion." He was a very systematic thinker, and sought to deduce all his conclusions from what he took to be first principles. In him, as in Green, the thinker was completely fused with the citizen. "His social optimism," says Professor Latta, "made him an ardent and incessant worker, restlessly intent on thoroughness of thinking, impatient of abstractions and hasty generalisations, and scrupulous in his endeavour to attain accuracy of statement and reference as regards even the minutest details. But there was no hardness in his sense of duty. It was rather a buoyant and optimistic belief springing from his living interest in human well-being and progress. For him the whole duty of man lay not in doing good things but in doing them well, and from this deep moral conviction there passed into his life a courtesy, gentleness and frankness that seemed instinctive in its readiness and ease" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 16).

In metaphysics Ritchie is a thorough-going idealist, but in the construction of his theory he is most anxious to do full justice to the concrete facts of experience. He believes that the strength of idealism lies just in this, that it alone is capable of giving an interpretation of reality as a whole which is consistent with the well-ascertained results of scientific investigation. With reality both science and philosophy are concerned, but their points of view are different. The particular sciences deal not with reality as a whole, but with

limited sections of it. They abstract from the conditions of knowledge under which alone there can be facts for us, and seek to discover the laws governing the phenomena with which they deal. For this purpose they have necessarily to use categories or conceptions without testing them. It is the function of philosophy to criticise these categories, to exhibit their limitations and one-sidedness, and to trace out their organic relations to one another as elements of a single whole. With questions of fact or the controversies that arise within particular sciences, philosophy has nothing to do. Its criticism becomes necessary only when the scientific specialist goes beyond his proper jurisdiction and begins to make pronouncements about the nature and meaning of the universe as a whole. Science deals with particular facts or groups of facts, comprised within the whole; philosophy with the meaning of the whole.

What is reality? What is its ultimate import? This is the fundamental question of philosophy. In attempting to answer it, Ritchie begins by pointing out that the objectively real is that which fits in with the totality of our experience and with the experience of other normal persons. What belongs to a coherent and intelligible system is real. "All thinking, all effort to know and understand the universe in however partial a way, makes the assumption that, so far at least as we can understand it, it is intelligible, *i.e.* it is a coherent, rational system. Philosophy, which aspires to know the universe as a whole, makes the assumption that the universe as a whole is one coherent, intelligible system, though there may be much that to minds such as ours must always remain unintelligible" (*Philosophical Studies*, pp. 72-73). This assumption

science tacitly makes. There would be no sense in seeking to know the secrets of nature if nature were not essentially an intelligible system. The unintelligible we ascribe to defects in our present state of knowledge. Such a system, however, is a "necessary system of thought-relations." What we think about things is not, of course, the things, if by 'we' any particular 'we' be meant. What is real is so through its connection with other reals by means of the principles which make experience possible. If experience is a systematic whole, its elements are real only as they are necessarily related to each other. To say this is to say that whatever is real is so by conforming to the conditions of experience whereby it has a definite place in the total system of experience. The one ultimate reality, that is to say, is the all-inclusive system of things of which thought is the central constitutive principle. The world, no doubt, appears to us as spread out in space and time, but the very fact "that we know space as space and time as time, *i.e.* that we recognise the outside-one-another of things and the after-one-another of events, proves that in some sense (whether we can explain it or not) we are not in space and time. Space and time exist for thought as forms in which we must perceive things" (*Darwin and Hegel*, pp. 88-89). And "the way in which things must appear to us and to other similar beings must be included in a perfect or complete knowledge of the universe, just as the way in which a picture will appear to the spectator is part of what the artist knows about it. There is no reason to suppose that omniscience knows only abstract universals—mathematical formulæ —without any knowledge of the way in which things will appear to beings conditioned by time and space

and perception through a limited number of senses" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 90).

There is no absolute opposition between thought and reality. If they were separate entities, there could be no sort of relation whatever between them. The distinction of thought and reality falls within thought. It is thought that makes this distinction and goes beyond it. As such, it is not mere discursive intellect, but concrete reason that includes all the varied elements of experience within itself.

As to the relation between the one and the many, Ritchie holds that philosophy must be monistic. But monism of the right kind does not mean setting aside the many as unreal. All that it contends for is that beneath the differences of things there is an ultimate unity of which they are the expression. Mere multiplicity is impossible: so is an undifferentiated unity. The many must be viewed as the correlative of the one, and the one must be seen to be "the one *in* the many, not the one alongside of the many." Identity and difference are not mutually exclusive. "A universe which is one system, but a system whose infinite complexity we never grasp and to which we strive to approximate through various kinds and degrees of abstraction—such a 'one in the many' is the presupposition of all science, and a complete comprehension of it is the unattainable ideal of a synthetic philosophy" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 200).

The individual alone, we are told, is real. But what is the individual? Apart from the universals, of which it is the meeting-point, it is nothing. If we think out the notion of individuality, we shall find that isolated self-subsistent individuals are impossible. "Each finite individual," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, in

the second edition of his *Hegelianism and Personality*, "has its place within the one real universe, or the one real being, with all the parts of which it is inseparably connected. But the universe is itself an individual or real whole, containing all its parts within itself, and not a universal of the logical order containing its exemplifications under it." With this Ritchie entirely agrees, but he points out that of such an individual a universal consciousness is the ground and presupposition.

In the problems of ethics and politics Ritchie took special interest. He regarded it as an error to separate the one from the other or either of them from metaphysics. The foundation of both ethics and politics must be provided by metaphysics. It is impossible to consider the theory of conduct without considering the relation of the individual to society and to God. Man is a moral being because he is finite and infinite in one. "Our minds just because we know them finite cannot be merely finite. That which is altogether limited cannot know itself as limited." The self-consciousness presupposed in all knowledge operates in us, but because it is universal, it cannot be known as particular things are known. It is never realised completely in our experience. "We cannot get behind it. It is there, we know it must be there, and yet it is not there." Hence arises the distinction between the actual and the ideal and the realisation of the ideal, the universal self, comes to be our end. The end of conduct is self-realisation and not happiness. "It is a terrible irony to say happiness is the end we ought to pursue. It is a hopeless pursuit. If happiness is the end we may well despair and make pessimism our creed." The self that has to be realised is not the

self as finite and individual. It is a social self, "first the family, clan or tribe, then the city or nation, finally humanity." For practical purposes, the best thing is to treat self-realisation as the good of a community.

It is as members of society working hand in hand for the furtherance of the common good that individuals can develop their nature and be truly individual. Self and other selves mutually interpenetrate and interpret each other. The very differentiation of a man as an individual implies his co-existence with other individuals and his dependence upon the whole to which he and they equally belong. Virtues and duties, therefore, have no meaning apart from the institutions of society which give them concrete form. To suppose that morality is independent of society is the error of intuitionism in ethics. Its defect is its individualistic character. Man is not a lonely being cut off from his fellows, and his moral ideas are not to be found ready-made within his mind. They grow along with the development of customs and institutions and are inseparably connected with them. To say this is not to deny the validity of the moral principles. Origin has nothing to do with validity. The anxiety of the intuitionists to show that duties are independent of social factors and conditions is largely due to the mistaken belief that the value of a thing is determined by its origin. When we have given an historical account of the origin of a subject, we have not explained its worth and meaning. Duties do not cease to be binding on us because it can be shown that they are the outcome of social development. In prescribing absolute moral laws, intuitionism fails to perceive that the moral ideal is progressive and ignores

the importance of customs, usages and institutions. It tends "to fossilise the principles of conduct at the particular stage of social development which commends itself to the particular intuitionist."

The theory of natural rights is in politics the analogue of intuitionism in ethics. Just as duties are supposed to be independent of society, so are rights conceived as belonging to men antecedently to their membership of a community. The intuitionist and the apostle of natural rights have both an individualistic bias. Society is regarded as made by men joining together for the purpose of safeguarding their pre-existing natural rights. It is not seen that "the person with rights and duties is the product of a society, and the rights of the individual must therefore be judged from the point of view of a society as a whole and not the society from the point of view of the individual" (*Natural Rights*, p. 102). Only persons have rights, but personality apart from society has no meaning. It is as animals and not as spiritual beings that we are distinct from one another. "What is the life of each of us apart from the influence of others and the relations in which it stands to the lives of others? The person can only exist in a developed political society which gives him rights and duties."

Although Ritchie strongly insists on the sociality of man as a moral being, he is far from maintaining that rights and duties are finally determined by any actual society. We can always appeal from society as it is to an ideal society. In order to know what moral duties are in their finished form, we must call up a vision of a perfect society and its conditions and requirements. But the ideal society is not something distinct from the actual. In it the meaning of the

existing society is completely realised. The standard of conduct is set not by society as it is but by what it ought to be. Moral order, therefore, implies moral progress, which "consists (1) in an enlargement in the list of virtues but still more (2) in an extension of the range of persons to whom obligations are due." The power of reflection which men have as self-conscious beings makes moral progress possible. They can form some idea of a better state of things by pondering over what they see around them and, from the point of view of the new ideal awakened in their minds, can criticise existing arrangements and institutions. "The healthiest society—as things go in an imperfect world —will be that which is most capable of criticising *and of mending itself*." This necessary task of criticism and reform is done by men who "can act in defiance of custom and even of law in working out some aim of their own choosing, which is not that of those around them." The social rebel, therefore, is a benefactor to mankind. But those who rebel against society may be of two kinds. "He may be the precursor of some new and better society, in the name of which he condemns an existing but corrupt and decaying set of institutions," or he may be the deliberately selfish, self-seeking man for whom a life of self-gratification becomes possible because others are not as bad as he. "Society consisting only of fallible and imperfect beings is apt to commit mistakes, and it may now and then confuse the two kinds of rebels, and crucify a true prophet between two ordinary criminals, though the ratio of true prophets to ordinary criminals is not as a rule so high."

The state is the highest form of social union, and is supreme over all corporations and associations of

men for the promotion of special interests. Its end is the realisation of the common well-being, and all its action "must be such as will give individuals so far as is possible the opportunity of realising their physical, intellectual and moral capacities." The ideal of ethics and politics alike is social. To the socialistic ideal in politics individualism is opposed. The end of the state, according to it, is to give the fullest possible scope to the freedom of the individual, to give him liberty to work out his destiny in his own way and not to interfere between fully grown persons. The sole duty of the state, therefore, is to see to it that none in the exercise of his freedom interferes with the freedom of others. Much of the prejudice against state interference, Ritchie points out, is due to the misconception of the relation between the state and the individual. The state is supposed by men, even by thinking men, to be an alien power imposing its authority upon them from without, and naturally the result of its action comes to appear as the curtailment of their freedom. It is not seen that the state is the organic whole of which its members are constituent factors, and that its action is no more inconsistent with their freedom than is the life and activity of the whole body inconsistent with the functioning of any of its members. The objection to state interference as such is, therefore, irrational. The only proper question to ask is whether the result of the interference of the state is the development of the capacities of the individual and the furtherance of his well-being or the reverse. In the latter event alone the action of the state is condemnable.

The liberty of the individual exists not in spite of but because of state action. The only liberty which

is possible and defensible is the liberty of self-realisation by means of activities that contribute to the common good. It involves the association of men with each other, not their separation and isolation. "If freedom be put forward as the end of the state and therefore of the whole political endeavour of mankind, this cannot mean the mere negative liberty of being left alone, and, unless we suppose changes in human nature for which past and present experience gives us no warrant, such absolute want of control would mean a return to the lowest savagery and a tedious process of building up again the overthrown fabric of order and civilisation" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 51). To suppose that the evolution of society ends in complete individualism is a great mistake. Beyond and above the opposite extremes of social cohesion without individual liberty and individual liberty of the negative sort without social cohesion, there is a higher type of society "in which all that is most precious in individualism must be retained along with the stability of social conditions which individualism has destroyed." In the negation of modern individualism, it is impossible to rest. That individual freedom is essential to man if he is to make the most of himself few will deny; but freedom is a reality only in a strong state. It is the correlative and not the contradictory of the solidarity and organisation of the state. "Abolish the state and we should have, not individualism, but, after a period of anarchy, the patriarchal stage or some other 'natural' grouping of a more rudimentary kind. Society would begin over again from its lowest elements; and only with the rise of the state could it escape from savagery and barbarism" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 56).

Ritchie takes pains to show that the theory of natural selection lends no support whatever to individualism and the political doctrine of *laissez faire*. While fully appreciating the value of this theory, he points out its limitations and its inapplicability to human affairs without essential modifications. Men are thinking beings and are not subject to the biological law of evolution in the same way as the lower animals. Natural selection is no doubt at work among them, but its nature is altered by the power of thought and the range of its operation is restricted. Civilised human beings do not, like the animals or the primitive savage, fight out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, but do their best to put limits to the struggle. Co-operation more and more replaces rivalry and unchecked competition, and spontaneous variation gives place to the deliberate alteration of customs and institutions. The growth of human societies is not due to the mere operation of natural laws but to efforts consciously made by men. For the betterment of society, therefore, ideas are of more value than any hypothetical inheritance of acquired characteristics. But "ideas can only be productive of their full benefit if they are fixed in institutions." Floating opinions, individual beliefs, are of very little use. Just because "it is 'not proven' that acquired characteristics are transmitted, we cannot trust for the improvement of the race to the moralisation of stray individuals now (however desirable and necessary that is in itself). We must reform institutions so that the new individuals shall be born into healthy surroundings." For the progress of the human race Ritchie relies more on "social inheritance—the transmission of ideas, sentiments, practices through the medium of tradition and

imitation"—than on the biological law of heredity. He regards it as essential that men from their early years should be brought up in the midst of such laws, customs and institutions as will stimulate good and arrest evil tendencies. "The moral significance of the organisation of society can hardly be overestimated. It is little use preaching kindliness and consideration for others and hoping that sympathetic feelings will gradually become innate, if the society into which individuals are born be openly and confessedly a ceaseless struggle and competition. For eighteen centuries a gospel of peace and brotherhood has been preached and talked; but the child plays with a toy gun and the youth sees the successful millionaire held up as his model for imitation—the man who boasts that he is 'self-made,' and who, as the American remarked, has by this boast 'taken a great responsibility off the Almighty'" (*Darwinism and Politics*, p. 54).

To the state we must turn as the one power capable of so organising society and its institutions as to make them helpful to the free development of human personality. Ritchie was a strong socialist in his aims and ideal, but he did not accept in its entirety any of the current socialistic doctrines. He was a firm believer in state action as the only means of creating conditions favourable for the attainment of social well-being, and had little patience with the view that unrestricted competition between individuals is the best means of promoting it. "Open competition might give results of some value if everyone were to start fair, run on his own legs, and carry equal weight, but open competition between one man in a sack with a bundle on his shoulders, another on a good horse, and a third in an express train, is a farce and a some-

what cruel one, when the race is being run for dear life." Those who insist that without struggle nothing good can be attained by man may be reminded that "there is a struggle *against* nature, including the blind forces of human passion. There will always be enough to do in this ceaseless struggle to call forth all the energies of which human nature at its very best is capable." To remove the inequalities of life, to give equal opportunities of self-realisation to all, to reform institutions that stand in the way of the perfection of character and the happiness of individuals, to mitigate the severity of the struggle for existence so that everyone may have some amount of leisure to cultivate the higher faculties of the mind, to turn mutual conflict into mutual help—these are the supreme end of state action. Men are not by nature equal. But the ideal is that so far as external arrangements of life can make them so, they ought to be equal. It is, of course, not possible to satisfy everyone's wishes, "but what we have to consider is the well-being and progress of society as a whole. We can only seek to provide the surrounding conditions which we hope will produce such effects." "The fact of natural inequalities can be no excuse for maintaining artificial inequalities which have very little connection with them. The great democratic ideal is to remove all unnatural and artificial barriers between man and man and to diffuse education and culture throughout the community in such a way as to "make social intercourse easy between all its members, between those who are engaged, say, in directing some great industrial enterprise and those who cook food or clean rooms." The ideal to be constantly kept before the mind is that of a society composed of as many free, cultivated and equal

members as possible, and "it is well to repeat such a watchword as equality and fraternity, lest we should forget our ideal and, amid some degree of personal comfort, become ashamed of it." The need for eminent men in the various walks of life will never cease, but "we need all the eminence, intellectual, moral and artistic, that we can get—not that the eminent individual may amass a fortune or receive the fatal gift of the peerage (as for those that care for such things—verily they have their reward), but that he may exercise his gifts, as all the world's greatest men would wish to exercise them, for the benefit of his fellow men" (*Darwinism and Politics*, p. 50).

The reason for the evil repute of state action, Ritchie thinks, is due to its being generally unmethodical and haphazard. "The real and significant distinction is not that between 'state interference' and '*laissez faire*' but between intelligent and scientific, *i.e.* systematic and far-sighted state action on the one side and that peddling kind of playing at an occasional and condescending providence in small matters which is often much worse than doing nothing at all" (*Darwinism and Politics*, p. 28). Nevertheless, "even a partial state action may often be welcomed as a recognition that the state has duties towards its weaker members, however inefficiently it may discharge them." The state is supreme over all minor organisations, and no limit can be put to its action except that which is determined by the nature of its end. How far the state should intervene and how much should be left to the discretion and enterprise of private individuals is a question not to be decided by any *a priori* doctrine of "man versus the state," but by what is expedient and practicable under the circumstances. In principle

Ritchie is not disposed to withhold any power from the state. He recognises its right of interference with individual freedom even in purely personal matters, provided that such interference is necessary for the common good. "I do consider that it is the business of the state (supposing a well-organised state) to regulate, if possible, the birth and certainly the education of children so as to give them a fair chance of growing up into the best possible men and women."

But when is a state well organised? When, answers Ritchie, its constitution is democratic and the people have a voice in the administration of its affairs. It is essential, he thinks, that governments should depend on the consent of the governed. Ritchie is a staunch supporter of the democratic form of government, which, in his view, has the great advantage that "no measure can be carried which has not a very strong public opinion behind it — an advantage most completely secured by the very democratic and yet very conservative device of the *referendum*. Democratic government may be less enlightened, less scientific, and in some ways more stupidly conservative than the government of an intelligent and benevolent monarch; but it has this enormous advantage, that its laws cannot permanently run counter to very widespread public sentiment" (*Studies in Political and Social Ethics*, p. 46). But if the state is to fulfil the important functions which, in Ritchie's view, belong to it, can we afford to have an unenlightened, unscientific, and stupidly conservative government merely because it is democratic? Can a state be strong, efficiently organised, and beneficent in its activities, if its affairs are managed according to the will of the majority which happens to be momentarily prevalent? Ritchie speaks

of the desirability of the segregation of the decadents and failures from the vigorous portion of the community and of preventing them from producing children. Will the majority ever allow this? The foundation of the state is no doubt the general will, but, as thinkers have pointed out, the general will is not the same thing as the will of all, and the discovery of it is not an easy task. It is only wise, disinterested and courageous men of experience, capable of rising above the passions and prejudices of the hour and of taking a long view of things, that can truly interpret the real will of the people. The end of the state is to remove obstacles to the development of the capacities of men, but the greatest of such obstacles is man's own selfishness, short-sightedness, slothfulness and ignorance. If the end is to be attained, the management of the affairs of the state must be in the hands of wise and able men, men of the stamp of Plato's philosopher king, whom the ballot box cannot discover. Those who come to the top at popular elections are, not infrequently, mere windbags and demagogues practised in the art of ingratiating themselves into the favour of the unthinking mob. "The professional politician," says Dr. A. Freeman, "whom democracy has brought into being, differs entirely from other professional men. He is totally unqualified" (quoted by Dean Inge, *Edinburgh Review*, No. 477, p. 27). The result is that the state fails to get the guidance of wise and competent men, without which its prosperity and well-being cannot be attained. "No democratic system," says Mr. C. R. L. Fletcher, "can secure the representation of the *intelligence of the nation*. The nomination boroughs afforded the only chance for young men of ability without family connections to

enter Parliament. Burke, both Pitts, Canning, and Gladstone were all nominees of great men. The last of these maintained in the hearing of the present writer that England was never better governed than in the last age of the old unreformed Parliament. People are too apt to forget that all real, substantial reforms proceed from intelligence alone, that intelligence is always in a minority and that democracy sacrifices not only intelligence but all the reforms that can only proceed therefrom in order to maintain itself and to split political power into fragments more and more minute" (*An Introductory History of England*, 3rd ed., pp. 332-33).

The curse of democracy is the demagogue. Its great problem is to secure the services of good and capable men of principle, but that problem remains unsolved. Under it, so far, trimmers and opportunists alone have prospered. "Democratic institutions," Ritchie tells us, "are defensible in so far as they offer (or can be made to offer) the best means of obtaining a genuine aristocracy or government by the best." Judged by this criterion, democracy must be pronounced to be a failure. Most assuredly it has failed to obtain "a genuine aristocracy or government by the best." Politicians who have to depend for their tenure of power on the results of triennial, quadrennial, or quinquennial elections, held under conditions well known to all, can seldom afford to be guided by their honest and independent judgment of what is really for the good of the people. They are tempted to curry favour with the mob, to play to the gallery. Under the influence of the democratic system of government, men, who in other circumstances might have been sagacious rulers, are inevitably turned into demagogues. The

higher leadership of which Lord Haldane speaks becomes a mockery. "We have to teach our people," says Lord Haldane, "if we would maintain the great station of our own country among the other nations of the earth, that they must see things steadily and see them whole. If we are to do this we must make sure that our statesmen, our local leaders, our teachers and our preachers have themselves something of the mind that is really synoptic, and are in some degree fitted to speak of eternity as well as of time" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 421). Are party politics and electioneering campaigns very favourable to the growth of the power to "see things steadily and as a whole"? Can a politician busy collecting votes afford to have a "mind that is really synoptic" and "speak of eternity as well as of time"?

None in these days will deny that the duty of the state is to further the interests of all and not of any particular class of the community. But this does not mean that everyone is to have the same amount of influence in the management of affairs. Universal suffrage will not cure the stupidity of men. It will not make them unselfish enough to subordinate their private interests to the common good, wise enough to be guided by reason and not by the passions of the moment. To lay stress only on the infinite worth of man is a mistake. As Pascal says, "it is dangerous to let him see too clearly his greatness without his meanness. If he boasts himself I abase him: if he abases himself I exalt him. I contradict him continually till he comprehends what an incomprehensible monster he is." Old-time autocracy perhaps unduly abased him, but is not modern democracy equally unduly exalting him? If democracy means a form of state-organisation

in which there is no privileged class, no favoured treatment of vested interests and no artificial inequality, but in which everyone finds an opportunity to make the most of himself and to contribute to the common good and all offices are open to qualified men irrespectively of their class or creed, no right-thinking person can have anything to say against it; but if by it is meant government according to the fickle will of the thoughtless multitude, incapable of seeing an inch beyond their nose, conducted by their delegates pledge-bound to do their bidding, it can only be adopted by a people whom the gods have marked out for destruction. A state under such a government is never stable and orderly, and there is very little of a central co-ordinating authority in it. It is a government powerless to govern and at the mercy of every turbulent faction. No government that attempts to carry out, not in an amateurish fashion, but persistently, adequately and scientifically, such socialistic schemes as Ritchie favoured, can afford to be always on the look out for popular mandates. Germany is in evil repute now, and the fashion is to cry her down. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing fails like failure. But it was in monarchical Germany that experiments of state socialism were most successfully carried out. "She," observed an English newspaper when she was not yet defeated, "has a most admirable organisation which pervades every sphere of life, from the provision of education to the conservancy of streets, from arrangements for the aged and infirm to those for the convenience of railway passengers. Never was a country better ordered, better cared for materially or more comfortable." No democratically governed country is ever likely to show better results.

It will, no doubt, be said that patriotic and intelligent citizens cannot be content with good government: they must have self-government. But self-government does not mean the exercise of political power by everybody, nor is it distinguishable from good government. It is not synonymous with democracy. Reason is man's real self, and the government whose organisation is in conformity with the requirements of reason in the given situation is at once good government and self-government. It does not matter in the least whether I have a hand in the constitution of it or in the performance of its functions. It is only the vanity and self-will of man that prevent him from seeing this. It is, no doubt, a requirement of reason that in the administration of public affairs the influence of the general will should be effective, but, in order to ensure this, a 'responsible' ministry removable by the vote of Parliament or manhood suffrage is not necessary. In certain circumstances, such institutions, with proper safeguards, may be desirable, but they are not indispensable. A democratic organisation of society has no necessary connection with democracy as a form of government. It may, on the contrary, be best attained through government by an aristocracy of worth and talent. For the purpose of government with the consent of the governed, a general harmony of the spirit of administration with the trend of public opinion is all that is required.

Active and intelligent citizenship does not become impossible because a man has not the right to vote at an election once in five years. For this what is necessary is doing honestly and with devotion the work which falls to one's lot as a member of the social organism. Far greater service may be rendered to the

state by the silent worker than by the noisy agitator. Ritchie is not without misgivings about the worth of universal suffrage. "It is more important," he declares, "that offices should be open to all than all should have votes. Giving all a vote may be merely an escape from the fear of revolution: universal suffrage has nothing glorious about it. Taken strictly, it means the absurdity that all men's opinions are of equal value" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 338). Is not the revolutionary temper largely the outcome of centuries of false teaching? Would not the condition of the world have been better and happier to-day if men and women had heard more of the duties and less of the rights of man? The assertion of individual rights in season and out of season has created an atmosphere congenial to the growth of the self-seeking spirit only. The result is that the avowed socialist is often at heart only an anarchist, and democratically governed communities, instead of being firmly-compacted and well-organised bodies, are apt to be incohesive, inefficient and chaotic.

On questions of world politics, Ritchie has some very wise remarks to make. He points out the impossibility of a state remaining self-contained and isolated in these days of rapid communication and international dealings. The actual state which is only one among many states must, therefore, be in a position to safeguard its interests, to protect its commerce and repel attacks from outside. This means the possibility of war and the necessity of being prepared for it. Ritchie regards the ideal of abolishing war for ever as altogether utopian, so long at least as human nature remains what it is. It is easy to say that all war is wrong, but, unfortunately, in this wicked world, peace has often to be maintained by the use of force. If it is right to use force to put

down individual crime, why should it be wrong to have recourse to it in order to maintain the peace of the world? It is useless to preach pacifism in season and out of season and to talk of disarmament as the one sure means of preventing wars for ever. The world is not full of Quakers or of the followers of Tolstoi, and it is necessary to remember that "there are always people, especially the champions of reactionary and antiquated types of rule, who will recognise no argument unless it is backed up by sufficient force." As a proof of this, we may refer to the origin of the late war. The verdict of the impartial historian must be that it was due as much to the pacificism of England as to the militarism of Germany. If England had performed the elementary duty of being prepared for self-defence, if she had given clear and timely warning to Germany that in the event of unprovoked aggression she would be found at the side of France, the peace of the world would not have been disturbed. President Wilson is an unimpeachable authority on this point. "We know for a certainty," said he, at a meeting in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on March 5, 1919, "that if Germany had thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France and Russia, she never would have undertaken the enterprise."

For the preservation of peace, Ritchie relies more on the federation of the world than on arbitration or disarmament. "Arbitration is a valuable remedy, but it is not a panacea, and the cause of arbitration is only injured by the notion that it can be made a substitute for war in any and every case." The breaking up of the world into a large number of petty and discordant states, such as has happened as the direct and the indirect result of the war, he regards as a set-back in the

progress of the world. "We have no right to assume with some political theorists, that a great number of comparatively small independent nations, leaving the barbarous and the savage races of the world to 'work out their own development,' represents either the highest type of human society or a possible type. May not a few great 'empires' in which self-governing federated communities control the less advanced races, represent a higher stage, more likely to be stable, less exposed to war, and preparing the way for a federation of the world?" (*Studies in Political and Social Ethics*, p. 158). Ritchie lived in days when the world had not begun to suffer from an acute attack of sentimentalism, and the cant about self-determination and the right of small nations was not generally heard. There is no special merit, he points out, in being a small nation. "The sympathy so often expressed for the weaker or smaller state, simply because weaker or smaller, is æsthetic rather than ethical." The absorption of a small nation in some larger, more powerful and more civilised state is, from the point of view of the progress of humanity, to be encouraged and not condemned. This may be an unpopular view at the present moment, but it is true. Ritchie did not hold up his hands in pious horror at the very mention of the name 'empire.' In the best sense of the term, he was an imperialist. A powerful federation of self-governing communities, enjoying local autonomy but ready to subordinate sectional interests to the wider interests of the whole, "with dependencies more or less autocratically governed according to their degree of civilisation," was his ideal. "The armed peace of the German Empire," he wrote in 1901, "may not be an ideal condition of society; but it is infinitely better than the acute agony of the

thirty years' war or the chronic maladies of the Holy Roman Empire—an empire which rested only on sentiment and had no armed force to support it and to keep the subject princes from fighting with each other."

Ritchie's view of religion is determined by his socialistic ideal. He has little respect for systems of faith which are more concerned with the other world than with this. "How often has the recompense of a future life been an excuse for deferring justice in this! The kingdom of heaven and the reign of righteousness have been contentedly deferred to another world, a happy land far, very far, away, and the oppressed have been told to wait patiently, while their oppressors could make their peace with God by a death-bed repentance and a dying bequest for religious or charitable purposes. The best spirits have often had their best energies withdrawn from aiding their fellow-men, in order to contemplate in ecstasy the bizarre splendours of the New Jerusalem. The preparation for death has consumed the zeal that might have been devoted to making life better" (*Philosophical Studies*, pp. 308-9). The ideal of true religion is to realise the kingdom of God on earth, and this, if we look beneath its outer crust, has always been the high purpose of Christianity. To make society and its institutions better and healthier is, in spite of its many aberrations, its constant aim. "It is impossible to continue to live up to a new ideal without attempting to form a society which shall embody it." Spiritual ideas must take shape in laws and customs. As a social religion, the distinctive feature of Christianity is "the proclamation of a gospel to all mankind irrespective of race, class or sex, and of a gospel which was one not of despair of life but of hope for the outcasts and the

oppressed of the earth." Its ideal is to lose life to save it, "which is the spiritual truth in the ideas of incarnation and resurrection (God becomes man, *i.e.* humbles himself, suffers, dies to live that man may do the same), and which is independent of any particular events happening on earth."

CHAPTER VII.

F. H. BRADLEY.

"ENGLAND'S most renowned thinker of recent times," says Höffding, "is undoubtedly Francis Herbert Bradley." In this verdict there will probably be general acquiescence. As Lord Haldane truly remarks, "he has done the work of the great metaphysicians over again in a fashion which is unparalleled in recent times for its thoroughness and acuteness, and he stands at the very head of the philosophical world" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. II., p. 74). Professor Muirhead speaks of him as "the most original writer of our time," who "has been by general acknowledgment the foremost figure in British philosophy (perhaps in the philosophy of our time in any country) for the last generation" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 9). His *Appearance and Reality* is without question the most important constructive work that Neo-Hegelianism has produced. There is very little direct reference in it to the thoughts of others, and the conclusions are throughout developed in an independent spirit, although the author does not conceal his indebtedness to Hegel. The book may be said to mark the end of the period during which British followers of Kant and Hegel were mainly occupied in assimilating and developing their ideas and to begin the era of a more independent handling of the perennial problems of knowing and being. Its influence on the

metaphysical thought of this generation it is impossible to over-rate. Bradley's philosophical achievement has been variously estimated. By many he is regarded as the most brilliant exponent of monistic idealism in recent times, by others he is supposed to be essentially a sceptic, and there are some who think that he should be called a mystic. He has, of course, been subjected to criticism from many sides, but, like Hegel, he has been more refuted than understood. A just appreciation of what he teaches is still a desideratum. In his outlook, if not in his method, Bradley perhaps stands nearer to Hegel than many others who have drawn their inspiration from him. His conception of the Absolute is, in its main outlines, the same as that of Hegel, but he does not, like Hegel, make any attempt to determine the exact place of each element of reality in an articulated system. He is content with showing that if the concepts of ordinary thought and of science and metaphysics are taken as ultimate, they will be found to be riddled with contradictions, and that they can be justified only if they are viewed as limited aspects or 'appearances' of the one ultimate reality.

This ultimate reality is a single all-inclusive supra-relational experience. It is an undivided whole within which everything falls. It is not mere object, nor mere self or mind, but the felt totality from which these arise by means of ideal construction. The Absolute or the universe is one experience which appears in diverse finite centres in each of which it is immanent. By virtue of this immanence, the finite centres are interconnected and are comprised within the Absolute reality. There is no sense in speaking of transcending my finite centre to gain the Absolute, or the Absolute to gain my finite centre. Within the Absolute, a lower

form of reality may be transcended in order to reach the higher, but it is not possible to go beyond the Absolute itself. All divisions and distinctions arise inside it and are made possible by its over-reaching unity. It is a higher experience in which different kinds of fragmentary experiences are unified and harmonised. The error of popular thought is to take some distinction within the whole and to set it up as unconditionally real. Either it, it is supposed, is real, or something else, equally limited and one-sided, is real. It is not seen that everything is real in its own place and degree, but not so as to interfere with others. "It is the true Absolute alone that gives its due to every interest just because it refuses to everything more than its due." To deny, for example, that the Absolute is mere thought is not to affirm that it is not thought, or to maintain that it is not one-sidedly will is not to deny that it is will. Thought, feeling and will are real not as absolute themselves, but as distinguishable and complementary aspects of the one whole. Similarly, change is not ultimately real, but this does not mean that it is not a subordinate appearance of the ultimate reality. The Absolute is not changeless and static. The distinctions which the intellect makes are not illusory. They do qualify reality. But, on the other hand, the terms and relations into which analysis resolves the given whole are not the final truth. By themselves, they do not give us the one harmonious and all-comprehending whole of experience which alone is the supreme reality.

Baldly stated, the above is the thesis which Bradley attempts to establish in his great work, *Appearance and Reality*. He first discusses some of the ideas by which we try to comprehend the universe and shows that they give us only partial views of reality or mere appear-

ances. These appearances, because of their incompleteness, contradict themselves and point to a whole of which they are elements and in which they are supplemented and corrected. The effort to understand the nature of this whole is metaphysics. Bradley makes no attempt to deal systematically and exhaustively with the partial aspects of being or to demonstrate how exactly they come together in the Absolute reality. All that he does is to show that each of them, taken singly, is self-contradictory and completes itself by uniting with the rest in the Absolute of which only the general nature can be known by us.

Bradley begins with the well-known attempt to explain things by the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, extension together with the various relations of space, it is held, belong actually to things and are independent of us, while secondary qualities are derivative and variable and have no existence apart from their relation to our organs of sense. The extended alone is real; everything else is mere appearance. But what appears is there and has got to fall somewhere. Does it belong to reality? If so, it must infect reality with its own unreal character. If not, it has no relation to reality and cannot be regarded as derivative. The so-called primary qualities depend as much on their relation to our percipience as the secondary. As colour is related to the eye, sound to the ear, so is the extended related to our tactual and muscular feelings. And, lastly, it is impossible to separate the primary from the secondary qualities. The former apart from the latter are inconceivable. Extension, divorced from colour, sound, etc., has no meaning. It is a false abstraction when taken as a thing existing by itself. "Yet the materialist, from defect of nature

or of education, or probably both, worships without justification this thin product of his untutored fancy." The distinction of primary from secondary qualities, we thus see, fails to bring us nearer to the true nature of reality.

Nor is it possible to arrive at reality by distinguishing things and their qualities. A thing has different qualities, but it cannot be identified with any one of them. The sugar, for example, is sweet, but it is not simply sweet. It is a unity of its various qualities. But what is this unity? What is there in the thing besides its qualities? In answer, it may be said that it consists in the qualities not taken severally but in relation. This, however, leads us straight to a serious difficulty. We find that qualities and their relations are theoretically altogether unintelligible. Qualities have no meaning apart from relations. Take away from qualities the relations in which they stand to each other and there is nothing. But, on the other hand, they cannot be resolved wholly into the relations. Relations imply terms quite as much as terms imply relations. The qualities must be and must also be related. But this is unintelligible. Each of the related terms must have a double character, as supporting the relation and as made by the relation. Within each thing, therefore, an internal discrepancy arises, and "its contents are dissipated in an endless process of distinction." From the side of relations also, we find that with or without their qualities they are unintelligible. A relation without terms is a mere word. It implies terms. But terms must be beyond their relation. And yet the relation must be something to them, must somehow affect them. If so, a connecting link becomes necessary between a term and its relation, and "again we are hurried into

the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end." All this proves that "a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible."

Space and time also are only appearance and not reality. We are unable to form any self-consistent idea of space. It is not and yet is a relation. As a continuous whole, it is a unity having definite boundaries and is composed of solid inter-related parts which are not mere relations. On the other hand, the parts of space must themselves be spaces resolvable into further parts, and so on without end. A space or a part of space not consisting of relations between its constituent parts is an impossibility. "Anything extended is a collection, a relation of extendeds, which again are relations of extendeds, and so on indefinitely." And, on the other side, taken as a unit, space passes beyond itself in search of a self-contained whole which it cannot find. Further, empty space is an abstraction, and yet we cannot understand how extension is connected with what is extended.

Similar considerations apply to time. The attempt to think of it as one whole made up of discrete moments gives rise in fresh forms to all the difficulties about terms and their relation.

Motion implies the being of the same thing in two places successively in one time, and this involves contradiction. Underlying it is the problem of change, and unless this problem is solved motion stands condemned. Change is little more than a fresh instance of the dilemma of terms and relations. The root of the diffi-

culty about it is the impossibility of bringing together in an intelligible manner the opposed elements of unity and diversity. If a thing changes, it cannot be permanent, and unless it is permanent what is it that changes? If A remains as it is, it does not change, and if it changes it becomes resolved into A^1, A^2, A^3, and is no longer in being. How to bring together permanence and change consistently we do not know.[1] Our usual procedure is to evade the difficulty by shutting our eyes now to the aspect of unity, now to the aspect of diversity, as suits our purpose. This is a makeshift practically convenient, but theoretically the problem remains unsolved. Change, therefore, does not give us the truth about reality.

The claim of causation to express reality is not more defensible. A is the cause of B. But A is not the same as "being followed by B." How then can B which is altogether different from A be yet ascribed to it? If the succession of the effect on the cause is different from the cause there is no intelligible means of connecting the two. On the other hand, if there is no difference, causation does not exist. This is the fundamental dilemma. If it be said that the cause was not A but A joined with C, the question which arises is this: Does C make any difference to A? If so, then A has already been altered and the problem of causation arises within A. We are therefore forced to further modify our position by making the cause recede backwards in time and spread laterally until all possible conditions are taken in. But a completed world at any one moment is not possible. On the other hand, if C makes no difference to A, how can it account for the

[1] May it not rather be said that we do not know how to *separate* permanence and change consistently?

effect? Besides these difficulties, causation, implying time, is involved in the antinomy of the continuity and discreteness of time. We must, therefore, conclude that it is mere appearance.

Activity too is a mass of inconsistency and must be condemned as appearance. It implies the change of something into something else. The change is self-caused. By means of it an object unfolds its nature. The process whereby its ideal nature is realised is what we mean by activity. But all change is caused, and, from this point of view, activity turns out to be passivity. The alteration of a thing is due to the influence exerted upon it by another which is active. What actively changes *suffers* change. And the thing which causes change is itself passive, because in exerting its influence it is dependent on the nature of that which it influences. One thing by itself cannot be active, but if, in its activity, it has to depend on another, it is not active but passive.

The upshot of all these considerations is that not much of what is called a thing is left. If substantive and adjective, quality and relation, the forms of time and space, causation and activity are, one and all, riddled with contradictions, what remains of a thing? It is palpably "undermined and mined." A thing, in order to exist, must have identity, and identity "seems a possession with a character at least doubtful." It must be one of content which is ideal, because it goes beyond what it is at any particular moment, but in what precisely it consists we are unable to say. The identity of a thing, in short, lies just in the view one happens to take of it, and things, therefore, are only appearances.

After thus showing that things go to pieces under

analysis, Bradley proceeds to inquire whether the self can be regarded as real. He distinguishes the various meanings of the self, and argues that none of them is defensible. By a man's self we may mean the present contents of his experience, comprising his thought of himself and of other things and persons, the mass of his feelings, etc. But the self goes beyond any particular moment and the contents of experience are variable. To meet this difficulty it may be said that the self consists of the average contents of experience that remain constant in the midst of changes. It is not easy, however, to discover any such average. In the lifetime of a man there take place fundamental changes, and "the usual self of one period is not the usual self of another, and it is impossible to unite in one mass these conflicting psychical contents." This may lead one to say that the real essence of the self is to be found in an inner unanalysable core of feeling. But how is this inner nucleus to be separated from the ordinary matter of experience? Where is the essential self to end and the accidental self to begin? "This narrow persistent element of feeling or idea, this fixed essence not 'servile to all the skyey influences,' this wretched fraction and poor atom, too mean to be in danger—do you mean to tell me that this bare remnant is really the self?" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 81).

If, in order to surmount these difficulties, it is maintained that the self consists in personal identity, Bradley points out that it implies both continuity and qualitative sameness. But who shall say how much of these is wanted and in what precise relation they stand to each other? What is to be the criterion of continuity? Memory cannot be the criterion. Its limits and defects are well known, and it is dependent on reproduction

from a present basis of self-feeling liable to fundamental alterations. Altogether, personal identity based on memory is a very uncertain thing and is largely a matter of degree.

After dealing with the conceptions of the self as a monad and as "the matter in which I take personal interest," Bradley approaches the consideration of "a most important way of understanding the self," viz. the distinction of subject and object. Both of these, he argues, are developed out of a "whole of feeling given without relation." They are special groups of psychical content formed within a total mass of experience. There is no psychical content which is not capable of taking the form of an object by being set over against ourselves. Whatever is detached from the felt background and brought before our view is an object, and, in principle, there is no limit to this process. Similarly, there is nothing in not-self which belongs exclusively to it. Whatever is not definitely before me at any one moment, the contents of the mind which have sunk below the threshold of consciousness, must be regarded as having passed into the self. The self, that is, consists of the whole mass of feeling except what is loosened from it and opposed to it. The contents of the self and not-self, therefore, are not fixed. "The main bulk of the elements on each side is interchangeable."

The question whether the self in any of its meanings is real, is answered by Bradley in the negative. That it is a fact is, of course, not to be doubted, but it is impossible to regard it as ultimately real. "In whatever way the self is taken, it will prove to be appearance. It cannot, if finite, maintain itself against external relations. For these will enter its essence,

and so ruin its independency. And, apart from this objection in the case of its finitude, the self is in any case unintelligible. For, in considering it, we are forced to transcend mere feeling, itself not satisfactory; and yet we cannot reach any defensible thought, any intellectual principle, by which it is possible to understand how diversity can be comprehended in unity. But, if we cannot understand this, and if whatever way we have of thinking about the self proves full of inconsistency, we should then accept what must follow. The self is no doubt the highest form of experience which we have, but for all that is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and, as it gives them, they are appearance, appearance and error" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 119).

The failure of the attempts to reduce the multifarious facts of the world to unity may result in doubt about the wisdom of making any such attempt at all. Why should we not be satisfied with mere phenomena and their laws, than which, for the purposes of science, nothing more is necessary? This is the position of phenomenalism. There exist, however, ways of thinking which seek to unify things. They may be illusory, but, nevertheless, they are facts, and phenomenalism has got to explain how, consistently with its principles, they can be facts. As to its positive teaching, one must ask how phenomena and their laws are possible. Different facts, in order to be related, must be together, but "what is the meaning of 'together' when once distinctions have been separated?" We find ourselves confronted with the insoluble problem of things and their relations. Are past and future to which the present is related real? If so, how can that which

is not presented be real? If not, how can the real present be related to what is unreal? Then, again, what is identity? This phenomenalism should deny; but undeniably changes occur, and if there is change, there must be something which changes. If it is said that nothing is permanent except the laws which phenomena illustrate, the question arises whether these laws are to be regarded as the unchangeable essences manifested in their fleeting appearances. If so, how are the essences related to one another and to the phenomena? In recognising their existence, has not phenomenalism "adored blindly what it rejected"? On the other hand, if the laws in themselves are only possibilities and become real in presentation alone, what we have to ask is, "What is either side, the elements or the laws, but an unreal and quite indefensible thought?" The dilemma to which phenomenalism is finally reduced is this: "It must either keep to the moment's presentation, and must leave there the presented entirely as it is given—and, if so, then surely there could be no more science; or it must 'become transcendent' (as the phrase goes), and launch out into a sea of more preposterous inconsistencies than are perhaps to be found in any other attempt at metaphysics. As a working point of view, directed and confined to the ascertainment of some special branch of truth, phenomenalism is of course useful and is indeed quite necessary. And the metaphysician who attacks it when following its own business is likely to fare badly. But when phenomenalism loses its head and, becoming blatant, steps forward as a theory of first principles, then it is really not respectable. The best that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous" (*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 125-26).

Failing to find reality in the various orders of phenomena, we may imagine that it belongs to another world superior to ours. This splitting-up of the universe into two regions, however, does not in any way lessen our difficulties. What is maintained is not that our knowledge of reality is imperfect, but that we have no idea of it whatever. But if the real is absolutely unknowable, how can its existence even be affirmed? Are the real things one or many? If many, how do they form *one* world? If the plural is dropped, the question of the relation of the thing-in-itself to the appearances arises. To say that there is a connection between them is to make the appearances the adjectives of reality, and the thing therefore is no longer something by itself. On the other hand, if it is out of relation to the appearances, it either has or has not qualities. To suppose that it possesses qualities is to have once more on our hand the problem about substantive and adjective. And to say that it is without qualities is to reduce it to pure being, which is simply nothing. The separation of the world into two hemispheres, we thus see, only doubles our difficulties. We gain nothing by this device. The thing-in-itself is a "wretched abstraction, worthless and devoid of all interest." What has human value is, after all, the appearances, and to turn away from them and to say that "this purely irrelevant ghost is the ark of salvation" is ridiculous. The truly real is not incapable of appearing. All appearances belong to it and contribute to make it what it is.

Passing on to the consideration of the nature of reality, Bradley begins by pointing out that what is rejected as appearance is not mere non-entity. It forms a constituent element of the real. "The character of

the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form." It is a self-consistent whole and excludes contradiction. What is self-contradictory cannot be real. This is the absolute criterion, and it is by means of it that we are enabled to distinguish reality from appearance. The attempt to deny the validity of this criterion involves the use of it. Now if the real is self-consistent and if all appearances belong to it, we get the result that the Absolute "embraces all differences in an inclusive harmony." Further, the real must be one. A plurality of reals is impossible, for, in order to be plural, the reals must co-exist, and co-existence is incompatible with independence. Togetherness implies relations, and "relations are unmeaning except within and on the basis of a substantial whole." The universe is one not by excluding differences but in the sense that "its differences exist harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing." The Absolute, that is, is "an individual and system."

But, it may be asked, what is the concrete nature of this system? What is the matter that makes it up? Experience, answers Bradley. "Sentient experience is reality, and what is not this is not real." What does not fall within experience, what is not known, perceived or felt is in no sense real. "Find any piece of existence, take up any thing that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 145). The Absolute is a single, all-inclusive and harmonious whole of experience within which all distinctions, including the distinction of subject and object, fall. Inside it facts are in perfect accord with each

other and with the ideas which they embody. And if the transcendence of discords of every kind means pleasure and if pain produces disquietude and unrest, we are led to the conclusion that in the Absolute there is a balance of pleasure over pain.

It is true that our knowledge of the Absolute is incomplete. But what knowledge we have of it is positive. No finite being, without ceasing to be finite, can have a knowledge of the details of the Absolute life. But this does not imply that we cannot form a general idea of its main characteristics. Immediate presentation or feeling, which is a whole of differences not yet parted by relations, suggests an all-embracing experience of a higher kind at a level above that of relational thought "where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one." The same thing is suggested by our ideas of goodness and of the beautiful, which "involve the experience of a whole beyond relations though full of diversity." From these sources "we can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness."

The Absolute is not mere thought. It is more than thought, which is only one of its elements. Thought is relational and discursive, and, as judgment, involves the distinction of subject and predicate, a what and a that. The predicate is never a mere quality or a mental image, but an ideal content, which, while belonging to a subject, is not limited to it but goes beyond it. Facts and ideas are not two different things externally brought together. They imply each other and have no meaning apart from their connection. Facts which are not ideal, whose content is not loosened from

existence, are simply nothing. On the other hand, ideas do not float but always attach themselves to definite objects. For thought, however, facts and ideas are never in perfect accord with each other, and it is unable to heal the division of existence and content. It aims at a harmonious whole of experience which it is unable to reach. What it wants is an ultimate unity embracing all things, but what it gets is only a maze of relations. If thought succeeded in overcoming the dualism on which it is based and in attaining its goal, it would cease to be thought and would become absorbed in a richer experience containing thought, feeling and will as its constituent elements. Such an experience "would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find in feeling, and in [it] all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience entire containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 172).

After setting forth the general nature of reality, Bradley proceeds to defend his conclusions against various objections. How can things like error and evil, time and space, whose existence cannot be doubted, it may be asked, be compatible with the Absolute? The question assumes that we must either explain things or explain them away. Such an alternative, however, does not exhaust all possibilities. Our failure to explain particular facts only proves our ignorance. It cannot invalidate a theory adopted on general philosophical

grounds. What seems to be self-contradictory to us on account of our limited knowledge may, as supplemented by facts beyond our ken, not only be consistent with but actually contribute to the harmony of the whole. Error, for example, is incompatible with reality, and yet, as something existing, it must somehow belong to reality. Its essence is the attribution of an inconsistent content to a subject, the qualification of a thing by what is self-discrepant. The way to obviate the difficulty caused by it is to perceive that it is not absolute untruth but partial truth transformed into full truth when it is supplemented. We do not know in detail how such transformation actually takes place, but "it is possible for errors to correct themselves, and, as such, to disappear in a higher experience. But if so, we *must* affirm that they are thus absorbed and made good. For what is *possible* and what a general principle compels us to say *must be*, that certainly *is*" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 196).

Evil is to be dealt with on the same principle. It has several forms, viz. pain, failure to realise ends, and immorality. That pain exists and is an evil no one can doubt. But in the Absolute, it may be taken up into a larger composite pleasure. It is reasonable to believe that the perfection of the Absolute implies the neutralisation of pain in a higher experience which, on the whole, is pleasurable. Similarly, the failure to realise particular ends may only mean that, within the limits of our narrow experience, idea and existence fail to come together, but that the frustration of the ends chosen by us contribute to the realisation of a wider purpose in which they are all included. As regards moral evil, there is something additional in it. It implies not merely a discrepancy between the ideal and the real, but

a strife between the good will and the evil will. But in the Absolute it may be overruled and turned into the means of furthering a higher good. "Heaven's design, if we may speak so, can realise itself as effectively in 'Catiline or Borgia' as in the scrupulous or innocent." We do not know how all these partial phenomena are harmonised and reduced to unity in the Absolute, but we may be sure that the content of not one is lost. "The Absolute is the richer for every discord, and for all diversity which it embraces; and it is our ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 204).

Time and space, we have already seen, are only appearance, but, nevertheless, they exist and must therefore belong somehow to the Absolute, though we cannot say how. It is possible for these appearances to be merged into a harmonious whole which contains and transcends them. If time as such were real, the Absolute of course would not be possible. But as it contradicts itself and points to something higher into which it is taken up, it is mere appearance and not reality. "The Absolute is timeless, but it possesses time as an isolated aspect, an aspect which, in ceasing to be isolated, loses its special character. It is there, but blended into a whole which we cannot realise." There is no unity of time. Within the Absolute there may be many different time-series bearing no temporal relation to each other, although in each series the events must of course be related in time. Nor need the *direction* of time of all the series be the same. These various time-series, however, must all qualify the Absolute. As comprehended within the experience of the Absolute, they counterbalance one another and their natures are altered.

They are preserved, no doubt, but not in their original character.

What is true of time is true also of space. It seeks to be a self-contained whole but fails. "Its evident inability to rest within itself points to the solution of its discords. Space seeks to lose itself in a higher perception, where individuality is gained without forfeit of variety."

The particularity of feeling, "the this and the mine," it may be urged, is a serious objection to the individuality of the Absolute. What is felt immediately is unique and cannot be resolved into anything else. It is, on one side, 'the this,' and, on the other, 'the mine.' But the Absolute also is positive experience at a higher level. The felt unity of immediate experience is broken up by thought into terms and their relations. These, however, are absorbed into the supra-relational totality of the Absolute experience. The felt existence of a sensible whole is not incompatible with the Absolute, for of the Absolute also the sense of immediate reality is a necessary feature. It is true that there is a plurality of particular presentations, but they are all embraced and absorbed in the Absolute. "The universe is richer, we may be sure, for all dividedness and variety." Our want of knowledge of how this happens is no argument against its possibility. "That partial experiences should run together, and should unite their deliverances to produce one richer whole—is there anything here incredible?" The 'this' no doubt has a negative aspect. It implies the 'that' from which it is distinguished. Particular facts of experience are always exclusive of each other. But negative relations "exist within and by virtue of an embracing unity," and apart from it neither they nor their terms would be possible. There

can be no such thing as an absolutely exclusive singleness. Every feature of a given something is a universal, a what that brings it into relations with other things all of which it qualifies. Although the content of what is immediately given is inexhaustible, there is nothing in it that does not yield to analysis. On the other hand, it is individual and not a mere congeries of universals. But its genuine individuality is the individuality of the whole into which it is taken up. Particular facts of experience do not remain self-centred and apart. They all blend with each other and are merged in the experience of the one ultimate Reality.

But have we any reason to believe in the existence of anything other than our private selves? Is it not true that I cannot go beyond my experience and that whatever exists must therefore be states of my self? The answer is that in direct experience the self alone is never presented. In the original mode of feeling out of which knowledge is developed, there is no distinction of self and not-self at all. And when that distinction comes to be made, the subject and object appear in correlation. The mere self is never an object of experience, and if this is admitted the foundation of solipsism is destroyed. We cannot remain confined within the limits of direct experience. What is immediately given must be transcended. It always points to things lying beyond its limits. "The whole movement of the mind implies disengagement from the mere this; and to assert the content of the latter as reality at once involves us in contradiction." A particular fact of experience is real because of its inclusion in a larger whole. There is nothing which is not felt, but "the Reality to which all content in the end must belong is

a direct all-embracing experience." What I experience now cannot stand out against inclusion in a fuller totality. "My 'mine' becomes a feature in the great 'mine' which includes all mines." If the argument of solipsism were sound, I should be unable to go beyond my present self to my past self. But I do thus transcend myself, and the process which takes me over to my past and future selves is in principle the same as that which connects me with other selves and with the universe at large. It is true that the world must appear in my experience and that through it alone I can be in contact with reality, but to say this is not to say that there is nothing except the states of my private self. Because experience is mine, it does not follow that what I experience is only my state. The error of solipsism is that "my private self is first set up as a substantive which is real independent of the Whole; and then its palpable community with the universe, which in experience is forced on us, is degraded into the adjective of our miserable abstraction" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 259).

The section of reality which appears to finite minds as a system of related phenomena is nature. It is not something independent but only an element in one all-embracing experience. But, as presented to us, it consists of qualities and relations, each conditioning and at the same time presupposing the other, and is therefore a self-contradictory appearance. Apart from the perception of finite beings it has no existence. What lies beyond finite centres is, properly speaking, not nature at all. It is for us the object of mere thought, but for the Absolute it is more. "There somehow, we do not know how, what we think is perceived. Everything there is merged and reabsorbed in an experience

intuitive, at once and in itself, of both ideas and facts." The position of physical science is not in the least affected by such a view. Its object is not to ascertain ultimate truth but merely to understand the co-existence and sequence of phenomena. For this purpose it makes the legitimate abstraction of regarding the physical world as real by itself and uses certain working ideas to explain the occurrence of various events. Trouble arises only when science forgets its limits and puts forward its ways of conceiving particular aspects of the universe as first principles, or when metaphysics attempts to interfere with the business of science. From the ultimate point of view "nature by itself has no reality. It exists only as a form of appearance within the Absolute." The fact that nature as something given must be finite and yet as finite must pass indefinitely beyond itself points to a whole of which it is a subordinate element. In this whole, time, space and all other limited modes of being are supplemented and corrected. We have no reason to think that there is only one system of nature. "When we reflect we see clearly that a variety of physical arrangements may exist without anything like spatial inter-relation. They will have their unity in the Whole, but no connections in space each outside its own proper system of matter" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 288).

Bradley discusses at considerable length the nature of the connection between body and soul. Both, he maintains, are mere appearances, and hence their mutual relation is unintelligible. Without knowing how they come together in the Absolute, a perfect comprehension of the relation between them is not possible. A body is a part of nature, and nature is only an aspect of the total reality set apart by abstraction. And the soul "is

a finite centre of immediate experience, possessed of a certain temporal continuity of existence, and again of a certain identity in character." It is not the mere psychical content of a particular moment. That content refers itself to what is beyond it through a separation between its existence and meaning. It is bound up with an experience which ideally seeks to expand into the whole universe, and yet is gathered up into a personal centre. A soul is thus a self-inconsistent construction, a half-way house between the immediacy of feeling and the Absolute experience. It belongs to "a field of struggle in which content is divorced from and strives once more towards unity with being." This phenomenal view of the soul does not mean that it is an adjective dependent on the body, for the body also is phenomenal. Nor is the discontinuity of the soul, its temporary cessation and reappearance as in sleep, an argument against its identity. The ultimate reality of course cannot be in time, but the soul is not the ultimate reality. The notion that unbroken continuity is essential to its existence as an identical thing is a mere prejudice. We do not gain anything by supposing that the psychical series implies a transcendent ego as that which gives unity to it. Such an ego is one finite related to other finites, and its unity is not reconcilable with the plurality of the series of events. It is true that the soul does not consist of mere psychical facts. These facts are always more than themselves. They imply a universal element, an ideality that goes beyond them without losing its hold on them. The ideal and the real are inseparable aspects of the concrete whole of mind. By imagining that the ego stands above phenomena, we merely place it alongside of them and thus reduce it to a phenomenon. The ego is nothing

without its content. At the same time, it is not the mere content but its ideality also.

The relation between soul and body is a relation between phenomena only. Bradley rejects the view that they are two concomitant aspects of the same thing on the ground that it necessitates the separation of each soul with its body from the rest of the world and the recognition of a plurality of finite souls within the Absolute. The appearance certainly is that between the physical and the psychical there is a causal connection which is not one-sided. Neither is the idle adjective of the other. The natural view that body and soul influence each other remains, Bradley thinks, proof against attack. But he is careful to point out that body by itself never acts on the soul by itself and *vice versa*. There is no such thing as body *per se* or soul *per se*. Every event has two sides, the psychical and the physical, and in all changes of mind and body, the causes as well as effects are psycho-physical, though for practical purposes we are often forced to attend to only one of these sides. This, however, is only a statement of facts and not an explanation of them. In the end, we do not know how the psychical series and the physical series are connected with each other. Body and soul are not realities but appearances abstracted from the whole. "To comprehend them while each is fixed in its own untrue character is utterly impossible. But, if so, their way of connection must remain unintelligible." In the Absolute they come together, and in being merged in what transcends them their special characters are lost.

Bradley concludes his discussion of the relation of body and soul with some observations on the communication between souls and their identity and differ-

ence. The immediate experiences of finite minds are personal and incapable of being shared. Nevertheless, they can communicate with each other through the medium of their bodies and their physical environment. The possibility of a common understanding implies some kind of sameness. The difference, that is, of the experiences of finite beings must rest upon an underlying identity. Difference without identity has no meaning, and identity not realised in differences is a false abstraction. The contents of souls can differ because they diverge from the common basis of an all-inclusive experience. This ultimate identity, however, need not mean any special intimacy between the differing souls. In spite of it, these souls appear to influence each other not directly but only through their bodies.

Although body and soul being appearances are both untrue, still the latter, as possessing a larger measure of self-dependence, is far more real than the former. There are degrees of truth and reality, and the soul realises individuality at a stage higher than body.

The idea of degrees of truth and reality, although introduced somewhat late in his discussion of first principles, is a vital part of Bradley's thought. The Absolute, being perfect, has of course no degrees, but its appearances are of varying degrees of truth and value and are capable of being arranged in an ascending scale of worth. The particular aspects of the universe, that is, are not all on the same level, but realise in different measures the one ultimate principle. Bradley does not attempt to show in detail how this is so, but on the principle that truth and reality are of different degrees he strongly insists. The perfect has the character of self-subsistent individuality. It must be all-inclusive and all its constituent elements must exhibit the mark

of internal harmony. The finite cannot be a coherent whole. What is excluded from it affects it from the outside and disturbs its inner harmony. "To be defined from without is, in principle, to be distracted within." The more comprehensive a thing is, the less self-discrepant it is. The two aspects of comprehensiveness and coherence go together. To be more or less real, therefore, is to be separated by a lesser or greater interval from a single all-embracing individuality. This provides us with the standard by which degrees of truth and reality are to be measured. "The truth and the fact, which, to be converted into the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 364). To remove its defects, we should have to make a comparatively small amount of alteration. But that which is low down in the scale of truth and reality would require to be considerably supplemented and rearranged before it can take its place as an aspect of the real.

Only such a standard enables us to assign its proper place to sense-perception. The view that sense-perception by itself is real has its opposite counterpart in the view that the world of supersensible thought alone has true being. Both are equally one-sided and false. Thought and sense each passes into and finds its counterpart in the other in the Absolute. Just as mere sense is unmeaning, so thought without existence is nothing. Existence is not foreign to thought superadded to it. "The union in all perception of thought with sense, the co-presence everywhere in all appearances of fact with ideality—this is the one foundation of truth." Thought finds its consummation in a whole of which sense is a necessary element. The real must of course exist, but what merely exists cannot be said

to have much of reality. That which appears has a higher degree of reality than the appearance. The phenomena of time and space are the necessary manifestation of the Absolute, but taken apart from the Absolute, their reality is of a very low degree. "Comparative ability to exist, individually and as such, within the region of sense, is a sign everywhere, so far as it goes, of degradation in the scale of being."

From the point of view of degrees of truth and reality, we are enabled to understand better the position of good and evil. The opposition between them is not absolute. What is an evil in relation to something higher is good in comparison with the lower. However much the different grades of goodness may be necessary to the Absolute, they are only aspects of it and are "overruled and transmuted" in it. Although in the various stages and forms of goodness the Absolute is realised, the good is not the Absolute. It is only a subordinate aspect of the whole. Goodness is everywhere "the adjective of something not itself." Apart from the things that are good, it has no meaning. "The good is obviously not so wide as the totality of things." Moreover, it is not self-consistent, for it "implies a distinction of idea from existence, and a division which, in the lapse of time, is perpetually healed up and remade." It demands the removal of the distinction between the ideal and the real, and yet, if that distinction were removed, its very foundation would be destroyed. The two aspects of goodness are self-assertion and self-sacrifice. Although in the Absolute they come together and are transcended, they have a tendency to diverge from each other in our practical life. Within no existing social organism is self-realisation quite reconciled with self-sacrifice. Each is

inconsistent with itself and with the other. "The individual never can in himself be an harmonious system. And in the wider ideal to which he devotes himself, no matter how thoroughly, he never can find complete self-realisation." Goodness, therefore, is but an appearance. It demands something more perfect into which it passes.

Religion has a higher degree of reality than morality and goodness, and in it they end. The goal towards which morality moves is attained in religion. For it, the world, as the expression of a supreme will, is perfect. Errors and evils of every kind are overruled in it and contribute to its perfection. The finite self, as a member of the whole and in its consciousness of oneness with God, frees itself from its limitations and defects and becomes perfect. But, on the other hand, religion is practical, and, therefore, still maintains the opposition between what is and what ought to be which is necessary for practice. The moral standpoint is superseded no doubt, but is yet retained as a subordinate element. In the eye of religion, the world, as God's world, is perfect. Nevertheless, the moral duty of the pious man is to make it better, to reform it according to the will of God. "The whole is at once actually to be good, and, at the same time, is actually to make itself good." The religious consciousness involves this contradiction, and to resolve it is, within the limits of religion, impossible. From another point of view also, the same inconsistency is revealed. Religion implies a relation between man and God. Relation, however, not only unites but also separates. Man, as related to God, is set over against Him, and yet, without God, he is nothing. Similarly, as related to man, God stands apart from him and is limited by him. At the same time "he wills and knows himself

and he finds his reality and self-consciousness in union with man." Religion is unable to avoid this contradiction and is, therefore, only an appearance, although it is nearer to reality than goodness. The God of religion is not the Absolute, for "in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will. When you begin to worship the Absolute or the universe, and make it the object of religion, you in that moment have transformed it. It has become something forthwith which is less than the universe" (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 428).

The fundamental principle on which Bradley insists throughout is that Reality is one and is a single supra-relational experience in which all appearances come together. The essential characteristic of an appearance is that in it the two factors of existence and content, the 'that' and the 'what,' fall apart. For this reason, it is unable to rest in itself and points to that which lies beyond it. It depends on the other appearances, just as they depend on it. Within the Whole, of which the appearances are essential elements, they mutually supplement each other. No appearance is lost in the Absolute. Each one is indispensable and contributes to the whole. Take away from the Absolute any one of its elements and it is at once reduced to nothing. None of the fundamental aspects of the universe can be resolved into the others, and none is useless and insignificant. In relation to the Absolute, they are all equally necessary. On the other hand, the appearances are of different degrees of truth and reality. The Absolute is immanent in each, but not to the same extent. "Everything is essential and yet one thing is worthless in comparison with others." Each grade of

being, from its own point of view, has truth. "It meets, we may say, its own claims, and it proves false only when tried by that which is already beyond it." Everywhere in phenomena the Absolute is present and they are alike indispensable, but, nevertheless, they, as judged by the standard of perfect individuality, are capable of being arranged in an ascending order of reality and truth.

The Absolute is not other than its appearances. At the same time, it is not to be identified with any particular appearance or with any combination of them. It is not mere intellect, nor mere will, nor mere feeling. It is the unity of which these are but partial aspects and in which all things are brought together and transmuted, though not equally. "The Absolute, we may say in general, has no assets beyond appearances; and again, with appearances alone to its credit the Absolute would be bankrupt." It is the whole in which all finite phenomena are absorbed, blended and harmonised. Nothing is lost in it, and yet nothing is allowed to remain precisely as it is in its isolation. The experience of which it consists contains nothing but transmuted appearances as its ingredients. All oppositions such as truth and error, good and evil, beauty and ugliness fall within it and are overruled into harmony. These are in the Absolute, but the Absolute itself is not co-extensive with any of them. "They imply distinctions falling, in each case, within one subject province of the Absolute Kingdom." The all-embracing whole cannot be equated with any of its subordinate aspects.

It follows, therefore, that progress cannot be attributed to the Absolute. Within the whole, there is, of course, progress as well as retrogression, but the

universe itself neither grows better nor becomes worse. "The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number." Embracing movements and processes of all sorts within it, it itself is changeless and perfect. It "has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruits, and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter."

The Absolute is one, and its unity is that of an individualised system. Every finite phenomenon is in the Absolute and "is still that which it is for itself. Its private character remains and is but neutralised by complement and addition." But, somewhat inconsistently, Bradley also tells us that the "process of correction, and of making good, may in addition totally transform and entirely dissipate its nature." However various the appearances may be, they are all in the end reduced to a complete order and system in the whole. An ultimate plurality is meaningless. "Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity." On the basis of an underlying unity alone can differing things be mutually related. The unity of the Absolute is not the unity that is set over against plurality. It is the higher unity of which the one and the many are correlated aspects. If it is asked, of what it is the unity, the answer must be, of experience. "We can discover nothing that is not either feeling or thought or will or emotion or something else of the kind." Whatever is affirmed to be a fact must be some mode of experience. There can be no absolute other of experience. "Show me your idea of an other, not a part of experience, and I will show you at once that it is, throughout and wholly, nothing else at all."

Within an all-containing experience, one part of it may be distinguished from another, but there is nothing falling outside it from which it itself can be distinguished.

Bradley raises the interesting question whether in the Absolute there is anything not contained in finite centres of experience. On the whole, he is inclined to the view that the Absolute is the unity of many different centres of experience, although he does not deny that there may be things experienced in the whole but not in any subordinate centre. Only one thing is certain. There cannot be any absolutely unexperienced element. The Absolute may be the supreme unity of subordinate centres of experience, but it cannot be described as consisting of souls. A centre of experience is not to be confused with a soul or self. The distinction between self and not-self arises within a centre of experience and is "the creature of an intellectual construction." The Absolute, therefore, cannot be composed of souls. Nor can we say that it is made up of finite centres. Such an expression suggests that they are preserved in the Absolute. "But not like this is the final destiny and last truth of things. We have a rearrangement not merely of things but of their internal elements. We have an all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material."

Is the Absolute personal? Bradley's answer is that it is not personal as we are personal. A person is finite and, as such, is distinguished from other persons. In such a way the Absolute cannot be personal. But, on the other hand, it is not less than personal. The error of calling it impersonal is far more serious than that of attributing personality to it. But there is no reason why either mistake should be committed. "The

Absolute stands above and not below its distinctions." It is more appropriate to call it super-personal.

Only a general knowledge of the nature of the Absolute is possible for us. We cannot, if we think coherently, avoid the conclusion that in it all appearances are harmonised into a single system which itself is experience. But what we know is very little in comparison with our ignorance. What other modes of experience there may be besides our own and how precisely they come together in the Absolute experience, we cannot say. We have, in short, no knowledge of the Absolute life as lived by the Absolute itself. "We have thus left due space for the exercise of doubt and wonder." It is only too obvious that we do not know what reality is as an all-embracing system of experience. But we do know that it is not concealed behind its appearances. Nor is it present in an equal degree in all appearances. That reality is wholly immanent in its appearances, but in different degrees, is the last word of philosophy. It is "one experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is the opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realisation of spirit. We may fairly close this work, then, by insisting that Reality is spiritual. There is a great saying of Hegel's, a saying too well known, and one which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with something not very different, something perhaps more certainly the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 552).

Bradley makes no attempt to define his position in

relation to his contemporary idealists. Throughout his writings there is no mention of thinkers like Green and Caird, though there are a few expressions which it is possible to regard as a fling at Green. The only idealist of his own way of thinking who is occasionally referred to is Bosanquet. And yet there is no doubt that Bradley's conception of the ultimate reality is not fundamentally different from that of Green or Caird. Agreeing in principle with Green and Caird, he re-interprets the idealistic doctrine in his own highly original fashion. While they build their idealistic theory on the foundations of epistemology, he attacks the problems of metaphysics more directly. The position of Green and Caird is that there is a spiritual principle in knowledge, and inasmuch as reality is inseparable from knowledge, it too implies a spiritual principle as its presupposition and ground. All that is must therefore be viewed as the expression of a spiritual, self-conscious being. Bradley, on the other hand, puts aside all epistemological considerations and deals directly with the Absolute. He does not think it necessary to make a wide detour in order to approach the Absolute. Green and Caird start from Kant and move on, the latter specially, to Hegel. Bradley ignores Kant altogether and, in his own independent way, constructs a theory closely resembling Hegel's in many respects. But, in spite of all difference of outlook and method, there is a substantial agreement in principle between these thinkers. They are all united in proclaiming the unity and spirituality of the world. In Green the emphasis is put upon thought as the constitutive principle of things. He all along had the English empiricist theories, which were dominant in his time, in mind in developing his own doctrine, and

was naturally led to insist, somewhat one-sidedly perhaps, that apart from relations which are the work of the mind sensations are nothing. From this he has seemed to teach that the universe is reducible to a system of relations focussed in a universal mind. This, however, as has already been argued, is a mistake. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Green's teaching, there perhaps arose a tendency to reduce everything to abstract thought, to identify reality with "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." Against this tendency Bradley enters an emphatic protest and maintains that the Absolute is experience. In doing so he, on his part, tends to pass to the opposite extreme and at times speaks as if experience were the same thing as mere sentient experience. "I urge that reality is sentient experience." "To be real is to be indissolubly one with sentience." All this is no doubt only verbal inexactitude, but still a tendency to lay undue stress on feeling is discernible in Bradley. On the whole, however, he cannot be accused of reducing reality to the level of mere sense, any more than Green can be accused of dissolving it into empty thought. The correlativity of thought and sense within the unity of what is ultimately real is never missed by either of these writers. A false appearance of irreconcilable difference between them arises from the fact that while Green argues that experience is impossible without relations, Bradley holds that "our experience, where relational, is not true." Professor Sorley, for example, goes so far as to assert that "if his (Bradley's) argument about relations is valid, the idealism of Green and Caird falls to the ground" (*History of English Philosophy*, p. 292). But Green and Caird never say that relations are possible except between the component

elements of the world-system in which a spiritual unity is realised. And Bradley's sole point is that relations cannot be regarded as *ultimately* real. He does not say that in the Absolute relations cease to be. On the contrary, he strongly urges that within the universe a plurality of facts is possible only by their being related to one another. "Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts a superior unity." And plurality, which without relations is impossible, "must fall within, must belong to and must qualify the unity."

Although in his conception of the general nature of reality Bradley stands very near to Hegel, there is an important difference between the two in respect of their method. Indeed, Bradley does not follow any definite method at all. "I have," he admits, "really observed no rule of progress, except to get forward in the best way I can." His dialectic is purely subversive, making his transition from appearance to reality forced and arbitrary. The appearances are first condemned one by one as self-contradictory, and are then suddenly declared to be reduced to system and harmony in the Absolute. The difficulty is to understand how it is at all possible to step out of the region of phenomena into the Absolute. Bradley's Absolute has certainly the appearance of being "shot out of a pistol." The only answer he can give to the question why must we believe in its existence, is that appearances, although self-discrepant, are not unreal and must have a place in which to live. What can that place be except the Absolute? If appearances are self-contradictory, reality, to which they belong, must necessarily be a self-consistent system, for they are found wanting only when they are judged by an absolute criterion of self-con-

sistency. Surely this sort of reasoning is somewhat unconvincing. To demolish all phenomena indiscriminately and equally and then to revivify them at a stroke in the Absolute, albeit in a changed form, is a procedure scarcely intelligible, and looks like a miracle. It is true that Bradley's method wears a somewhat different aspect in the light of what is said in the chapter on "Degrees of Truth and Reality," but the teaching of that chapter is not brought into accord with that of his First Book, and has the appearance of being an afterthought. No attempt is made to determine the place of each aspect of reality in an articulated system. Hegel's dialectical method is of a different character. He, like Bradley, shows that the finite forms of thought are riddled with contradictions, but he does not simply set them aside. He points out how each category is taken up into and amended in a higher category, which, in its turn, is found to be self-inconsistent and to require a still higher one into which it enters as a subordinate element. Destructive criticism is throughout combined with constructive work. In this way he passes step by step from the lowest category to the highest, and shows that the various phases of reality form a graded system. A ladder is let down by using which we are enabled to rise from the level of finite phenomena to the height of the infinite and perfect. The conception of the Absolute is shown to be the necessary outcome of reflection on experience. Bradley is fully aware of the advantages of such a method. The most adequate defence of the view of reality he holds, he tells us, "would be a systematic account of all the regions of appearance, for it is only the completed system which in metaphysics is the genuine proof of the principle."

"From the space and atoms of matter to the highest life of the self-conscious self, we can perceive a scale of individuality and self-containedness." It is much to be regretted that Bradley did not act up to this conviction, and was content to get forward in the best way he could find. The result is that he neglects the pathway along which alone a safe and methodical advance towards the Absolute is possible. The abrupt transition from appearance to reality takes one's breath away, and savours too much of the incomprehensible process by which the mystic is transported beyond the region of ordinary experience.

Bradley's difference from other idealistic writers of his time comes out most in his treatment of the idea of the self. He, as we have seen, sets down the self also as an appearance, although it is admitted that it is "the highest form of experience which we have." It is in the self, however, that we have the only unmetaphorical instance of the harmony of one and many which, in Bradley's view, is the character of the real. We find here the absolute criterion of self-consistency. As Edward Caird has pointed out, self-consistency, rightly understood, means consistency with the self. The unity of the self is the only unity we know which realises itself in its own differences. From it we derive the idea of a harmonious system. To put it aside as mere appearance is to make the idea of one-in-many unintelligible. Everywhere in his book Bradley insists that the real is a single, coherent system. He constantly reminds us that all differences are finally reduced to the unity of the universe. But failing to perceive that the self is the supreme form of reality, and that in it alone one and many genuinely come together, he is forced to say that we cannot understand

how in the Absolute unity is reconciled with manyness. The way out of the difficulty is to realise that the most concrete case of unity in difference is the self, and it is from the self that the criterion of a self-consistent system is really obtained.

Bradley's difficulty about the self is due to his identification of it with its content. By the self he understands the total mass of experience, as distinguished from any particular element within it marked off from the rest and specially noticed. But surely it is not this that Bradley's contemporary idealists mean by the self when they conceive of it as the constitutive principle of the world. The self, as they interpret it, is the form of unity of experience and not merely the totality of its content. It is the ideal principle presupposed in the distincton between things and the mind that knows them, the intelligence apart from which the intelligible world has no existence. Curiously enough, this is not one of the meanings of the self distinguished by Bradley. Why he should have ignored the meaning it has in the writings of his fellow idealists, he does not explain. Of course, the self is not the ultimate reality if we understand by it only the focal unity to which experience is referred. But why should it not mean something more comprehensive, viz. the spiritual principle of unity of all things? The self in us is, of course, not such a unity, but it gives us the hint of it and is its limited expression. In principle there is no difference between it and the ideal self. At a higher level and in a more perfect form, the ideal self is what in a lesser degree our own self is. It is the spirit which is subject and object in one. So understood, the self is not an appearance. It is, on the contrary, the final form of reality.

"Everything," says Hegel, "depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but as subject as well." Bradley, of course, does not conceive of reality as substance, but neither does he think of it as subject. In the concluding lines of his book, however, reality is described as "the sole perfect realisation of spirit." "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more anything is spiritual so much the more is it veritably real." But what is the difference between spirit and the self that is realised in its own object? Bradley seems to admit in one form of expression what is denied in another. If the real is spiritual, is it worth while to deny that it is thought or self? These terms, no doubt, have misleading associations, but whatever term we may use will be open to objection on this ground. If it is wrong to characterise the Absolute as thought because thought is relational and loosens the 'what' from the 'that,' it is equally wrong to call it experience, because 'experience' is too apt to mean sensitive experience from which relations are altogether excluded. To quarrel with the definition of the Absolute as thought and to call it experience is only to substitute one inadequate way of conceiving it for another. The essential thing is to remember that the Absolute is a spiritual being self-distinguished into self and not-self, the categories of thought centred in the unity of consciousness and the particular facts of experience giving expression to them. In disparaging thought, Bradley forgets that idealistic writers mean by it not the analytical understanding merely but also the synthetic reason. Thought is able to perceive its own defects as relational and discursive because it is more than this and unites things quite as much as it divides them.

Nor is it only an aspect of reality on a par with will and feeling. If it is distinguished from feeling and will, it also overlaps the distinction and is able to view the various elements of reality from the standpoint of the whole. It is, therefore, the whole and not an element of it merely. Of course, *our* thought is not the Absolute, but the Absolute thought is the completion of our thought. In being consummated in the Absolute, thought does not perish but is perfected.

The result of placing the self under the ban is that Bradley is precluded from saying anything definite about the Absolute except that it is a single, harmonious and all-embracing system of experience superior to mere relations. To form an idea of it we have to fall back upon the immediacy of undifferentiated feeling. But immediate experience is only a limiting conception. We are seldom able actually to have it. As Bradley himself says, "we hardly possess it as more than that which we are in the act of losing." Having outgrown this phase of experience, we can no more revert to it than can one who has acquired the knowledge of good and evil regain innocence. The attempt to comprehend the nature of the Absolute experience with the aid of it is therefore hopeless. The unity of the self implied in the duality of subject and object is the only key to reality, and Bradley wantonly throws it away. If it does not enable us to understand what reality is, nothing else will. Behind us is the mass of undifferentiated feeling from which we have moved on. In front of us is the ideal of completed knowledge towards which we progress. But if, in the meanwhile, the solid ground on which we stand is undermined, the starting-point as well as the goal lose all their

significance. To impugn the self is to cast away the only image of reality which we possess.

In insisting upon the difference between the Absolute and human experience, Bradley has helped to remove a weak point of Hegelianism. In reaction against dualism and transcendentalism Hegel was led to a theory of immanence of an extreme type. From the truth that it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself, he passes to the erroneous conclusion that He is fully and exhaustively revealed in the world as known to us. But to deny that God is a transcendent being is not to affirm that He is immanent only in nature. It is absurd to suppose that in the limited sphere of the material universe and in the history of mankind the whole nature of God is expressed. Bradley has no such illusion. He is most insistent in urging that our experience forms only an insignificant part of the Absolute experience and that in it the contents of our knowledge are supplemented and rearranged. The "ragged edges" of finite phenomena plainly indicate that they are a part torn out of their context. Because of their fragmentary character the facts of human knowledge do not form a completely unified system. Without comprehensiveness there can be no coherence. The want of harmony of our knowledge arises from its incompleteness and points to a richer experience into which it is taken up as an element. Bradley rightly maintains that in the Absolute there must be more than there is or can be in our knowledge. The facts presented to us piecemeal are supplemented and reduced to a complete harmony and system in the Whole. Bradley often speaks as if in the total experience of the Absolute finite phenomena simply disappeared. "Suppressed," "dissolved," "lost" are

some of the alarming terms he employs. But what he really means is that in the Absolute appearances do not remain exactly as they are for us, but acquire a new meaning and value. "They are lost there for our vision, but survive most assuredly in that which absorbs them." Bradley's insight that the Absolute experience is infinitely richer than ours supplies a necessary corrective to the tendency to identify the Absolute and the finite self too closely. At the same time he lays too much stress on their difference. The Absolute is immanent in us, and however much its experience may differ from ours it is, after all, the full development of what we are in germ, "the high water mark," as Bosanquet puts it, "of fluctuations in experience of which we are daily and normally aware." The *content* of our consciousness is only a very small part of the whole, but the *form* of all reality, self-consciousness, is in us, whole and undivided. It is by virtue of self-consciousness that we are one with the Absolute.

CHAPTER VIII.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet has affinity with that of Bradley on many important points. He was one of the profoundest thinkers of modern times, and has made contributions of great value to logic, metaphysics, æsthetics and political philosophy. As a logician he has few equals. Although not always a very lucid writer, he is deep and penetrating, and never fails to be suggestive. "He was," wrote the *Nation* in noticing his death, "an instance of that rare type where all that is best in the man went into his books." "He never deserted the ideal of contemplation, and, like all men whose heart is in their work, he gave passionate devotion to it." Professor J. A. Leighton "esteems him the greatest of English idealists." "So far as I know," he writes, "there is not now, nor has been recently, anyone on the continent of Europe who quite ranks with him" (*Philosophical Review*, No. 192, p. 626). His metaphysical views are set forth in numerous essays, addresses and reviews published from time to time during the last forty years or so, but the maturest expression of them is to be found in the *Principle of Individuality and Value* and the *Value and Destiny of the Individual.*

I.

Bosanquet agrees with Bradley in conceiving of reality as a single, harmonious and individualised system of experience transcending mere relations. Both insist that the real is through and through spiritual. But while Bradley regards thought as merely analytical and discursive, Bosanquet finds in it the concrete and synthetic principle presupposed in all forms of experience. He also differs from Bradley in regarding the immediate not as a clue to reality but rather as its first and imperfect form. No rigid distinction, he maintains, can be drawn between feeling and thought.

Philosophy, Bosanquet points out, has not to do with a universe different from the one with which the plain man is concerned. Its subject-matter is the totality of experience, experience at the maximum of its amplitude and richness. It is opposed to the tendency to break up a whole into its component elements and to be lost in them. An arduous effort is needed if we are not to miss what is central and dominant in experience. As the wood may not be seen for the trees, so the details of experience may blind us to its self-completeness and individuality. Stability is not to be found in the immediate, in the limited and mutually exclusive facts of experience, but in the whole which sustains them. The Absolute reality is in everything, and we know it better than anything else. "A sane and central theory is not full of oddities and caprices, but is a rendering, in coherent thought, of what lies at the heart of actual life and love."

The whole or the Absolute is the concrete universal. Our first tendency is to think of the universal as

standing above the particulars, as a general rule under which a number of different cases come. But a universal which is reached after leaving out the differences of individuals is only an abstraction. In its true nature it is what we mean by a world, "a system of members, such that every member, being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness." The members of a class are of one kind only, but "it takes all sorts to make a world." A world is a system in which there is sameness in the other, sameness not in spite of the other, but by means of the other. The movement of thought is always towards the concrete universal. A self-contained reality is what it seeks. It is therefore not true that our thought is purely discursive. It, no doubt, "presses beyond the given, following the 'what' beyond the limits of the 'that.' But it is also true that in following the 'what' it tends always to return to a fuller 'that.' If its impulse is away from the given it is towards the whole —the world" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 55). An absolutely self-contained experience is, of course, beyond the reach of finite thought, and our thought therefore must have an aspect of discursiveness, but it is always pressing towards an all-inclusive whole. The concrete universal furnishes a clue to the true nature of individuality. "As a living world, complete and acting out of itself," it is also the genuine individual. The whole is individual because it is the concrete universal. "The individual is one in idea with the true infinite, and is the embodiment of the concrete universal, which is the universal as asserting itself to the full, through identity and difference together" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 72).

And it is also the spiritual and inward, not, however, as excluding the outward but as subordinating and absorbing it. What outwardly is a system of things mechanically influencing each other is, inwardly, spirit. The truly spiritual does not set aside but transfigures externality.

Uniformity and general law are not opposed to individuality. The notion that uniformity excludes variability and that the generality of law consists in its applicability to a number of similar cases is erroneous. The essence of uniformity is identity in difference. It means not a meaningless repetition of resembling things, but the coherence of differences in a systematic whole. The spirit of this whole is the true universal, and it is expressed in a connected system of elements, each of which is unique and has a distinctive part to play. The nexus between these elements, none of which is a mere repetition of any other, is what we mean by law. Intelligence is the active form of totality and is realised in the differences of things. "The nexus of these differences, in the system which is the universal, *is* a system of laws, each of which is general by holding together the diverse expression of the one life and spirit" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 105). General laws and the objects to which they apply presuppose an individual system, a whole, of which they are factors. The members of such a system alone are held together by general laws. They are therefore a necessary side of the system, and have no meaning independently of the whole. "A whole is a web of laws."

The spiritual individual or the universe, Bosanquet contends, is inexplicable by means of mechanical principles or the idea of teleology. These set forth certain

aspects of the whole only and do not express the nature of the whole itself. If by teleology we mean the adoption of means by a finite being to realise particular ends chosen by him, it is easy to see that it is a very inadequate basis for a theory of reality. The weakness of the teleological theory is that it opposes the purposive adaptations of means to ends to the mechanical order of things. But no such separation between mechanism and teleology is possible. We fail to comprehend the nature of the individual and wrongly prefer a particular element of experience to the whole. Rightly understood, teleology develops into the principle of individuality. In the broadest sense it means the systematic coherence, the mutual implication of the elements of the world-system. That system is a totality which, from one point of view, is an individual whole and, from another, composed of interacting members. Finite consciousness, therefore, cannot be regarded as the source of teleology. It is but "a manifestation, falling within wider manifestations, of the immanent individuality of the real." In the whole, in which the Absolute mind is immanent, finite individuals as well as mechanical nature are included. The external is a necessary factor in the universe, and finite self-conscious beings are members of it. Without them, the universe would not be what it is, but, at the same time, they are subordinate to it. Their ideals and purposes are only a partial revelation of the meaning of things. They no more guide the evolution of the world than does the coral insect construct the coral reef with conscious purpose. "It is impossible to attribute to finite consciousnesses, as agents, the identity at work within finite consciousness as a whole."

Bosanquet's view of the relation between mind and body follows as a necessary consequence from his rejection of the dualism of mechanism and teleology. As the teleological whole to which mechanism is subordinated is not extraneous to the mechanical system, but is the revelation of the inner life of that system itself, so is the soul not different from the body, merely tenanting it, but is the body itself at a higher level of its being. It is the ideality of the body, the body completely comprehended as an individual whole. The relation of mind to body is a typical example of the true nature of individuality. To separate them from each other and from the rest of the world is to make them self-contradictory and meaningless. Bosanquet therefore rejects the theory of interaction. The mind is neither separate from the body nor, as the materialists hold, a mere by-product of matter. Apart from the body, which is founded upon its environment, past and present, it is nothing, but it is nevertheless the principle of unity in which the outer world is focussed. It is "the centre or awakening of a determinate world which is its presupposition," the organ of the Absolute "for appropriation and appreciation of some context and province of experience." Instead of regarding the self as a spiritual substance operating *ab extra* upon the material world, we should conceive of it as "a perfection granted by the Absolute according to general laws, upon certain complex occasions and arrangements of externality." According to this view, "mind is not so much a something, a unit, exercising guidance upon matter, as the fact of self-guidance of that world which appears as matter, when that reaches a certain level of organisation" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 193). Consciousness does not create an organism and use it

as its instrument. Nor is it the effect of any physiological process. It is a "supervenient perfection," an interpretation and appreciation of the world process.

Finite consciousnesses are not ultimate. They arise from and are based on arrangements of things below them and point to more complete forms of totality above them. Their limited purposes and ideals therefore cannot be regarded as the ultimate guiding principles of the universe. Something higher and more inclusive than themselves works through them and is the power behind them. The finite consciousness, however, is not a mere accident in the universe. Because it implies opposition to and conflict with the not-self, it may appear that it must vanish as the resistance of what seems to be alien and hostile to it is overcome. But the opposition of the not-self to the self is not the whole truth. The negative relation presupposes a deeper relation which is positive. The not-self that resists the self is also responsive to it, because it "belongs to the essential structure of the real." As that which is itself and not itself in one, the self gives us some indication of the nature of reality. The unity in difference of the contents of consciousness suggests that the discords of which the world is full rest upon an ultimate harmony. Our failure to perceive this, Bosanquet thinks, is due to our confounding negativity with contradiction. The latter arises from the ascription of different things to the same term without making such distinctions between them as would give them different places within the same system. "It is an imperfection in the organisation of systems." The way to remove contradictions is not simply to set them aside, but to effect such a readjustment of contents as to make it

possible for them to come together within a new and a more comprehensive totality. Differences still remain, but are adjusted to one another within a more comprehensive unity. Contradiction, that is, is transformed into negativity. In all that is real, negativity is essential. It is "the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and complete itself as a whole." Negativity means solved contradiction, the reduction of opposite things to the membership of a systematic whole. We find an application of this truth in the relation between the self and the not-self. Their very opposition is possible because of a unity that transcends them. "The sense of unity and reconciliation with the world beyond us is a far larger factor in our awareness of selfhood, and one which increases concomitantly with it, than is the sense of collision with the not-self." It is true that the consciousness of conflict with a resisting and hostile not-self is never absent from finite consciousness, but this points to the conclusion that the finite self is consummated and perfected in the Absolute experience, in which all things find their proper places and all discords are reduced to harmony. Finiteness, conflict, pain and evil "are essential features of reality, and belong to an aspect of it which leaves its mark even on perfection itself." Perfection would not be what it is unless they played a part in it. "The burden of the finite is inherently a part or rather an instrument of the self-completion of the infinite."

The Absolute is the complete and self-consistent whole in which finite beings are preserved and perfected, not in their separateness, but as linked with one another. The recognition of it is forced on us by the fact that no adequate definition of man can be given without taking into account his self-transcend-

ence. "His individuality, his self-identity lie outside him as he presents himself in time." The finite, taken by itself, is riddled with contradictions and has no stability. Its unity and individuality has meaning only when it is seen in its proper place in the totality of experience to which there is no outside. The effort of thought to remove the contradictions inherent in what is immediately given leads us straight to the Absolute without a break. The Absolute therefore is not disconnected with ordinary experience, but is its completion and full meaning. In it we come together and attain our true being. It is our impotence that keeps us divided. The illusion that we are separate and self-centred arises only when we are at our worst. In the best moments of our life, when, for example, we fight on the same side or sacrifice ourselves for a great cause, we cease to be mutually repellent units and are fused into one harmonious whole. Our theory of the nature of the ultimate reality should be founded on such experiences. Human beings are not merely legal persons or mutually exclusive selves. The presupposition of them as personalities possessing rights is the social spirit, which is itself not the final form of individuality but one of its sub-forms. The finite selves have no hard and fast limits. There is nothing that can make them discontinuous with each other or with the all-embracing experience. Their ultimate unity, that from which they diverge and to which they return, is the Absolute mind.

Bosanquet regards individuality as the supreme criterion of value. He rejects the view that judgments of value are incapable of being logically supported. It is true that values are relative to feeling. But feeling can be subjected to criticism and is capable

of being educated and modified. This means that there is a logical standard by which judgments of value are determined and that they are not dependent on mere feeling. That standard is individuality, *i.e.* self-completeness and freedom from contradiction. The more a thing is stable and organised, the more its parts cohere with and sustain each other, the greater is its value. And the ultimate standard of value is "the complete individuality of the universe as a conscious being." It is as organic parts of this individuality, therefore, and not as isolated units, that things can be properly valued. Their significance and worth depends upon the place they have in the whole.

"The fundamental conviction which has guided our discussion," says Bosanquet, "has been that the truth, or the real, is the whole. And our anxiety has been lest by neglecting any factor, by committing ourselves to any fundamental antithesis, we should *ipso facto* subordinate mind or spirit to excluded elements, which, so far as excluded, must remain both hostile and superior" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 318). Justice must, of course, be done to every particular element within the whole, to all special forms of appearance, but it must not be forgotten that their reality lies in their being interconnected members of a logical whole. Each of them is what it is in the sense that it cannot be reduced to any other, but this is only the necessary implication of their interdependence. The whole is a spiritual being of which the external world is "the condition and the complement." The true type of individuality, Bosanquet holds, is the concrete universal, a world or cosmos. There is nothing outside it by which it can be deter-

mined, and, therefore, it alone is free in the truest sense of the term. The freedom of a finite being arises from its membership of the world. "A finite individual is in essence a cosmos which is a portion of the cosmos," and "the character of self-completeness, of being a cosmos, carries with it its own mode of self-determination and initiative." There is no hard and fast distinction between it and its environment; it is the inwardness of the environment itself. "You cannot say where self ends and environment begins." Freedom, therefore, does not consist in keeping the self free from the influence of the outer world, but "in the direction towards unity and coherence." "It is the working, the 'logic,' of this relative totality of experience that constitutes the freedom of the concrete self; which thus affirms itself as a part of the eternal deed in which the Absolute sustains its living whole of experience" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 326). To the objection that the present is determined by the past out of which it arises, and the history of the world is therefore "the rattling off of a chain of results inevitably decreed," Bosanquet's answer is that "all logical process is the reshaping of a world of content by its own universal spirit." The process of evolutionary transformation is neither mere imitation and repetition nor inexplicable invention, but the remoulding of the past leading to the fuller realisation of its own meaning in the present. It implies "the awareness of a whole reshaping itself according to the full significance of the constituent contents." Freedom is to be distinguished from both contingency and predetermination. It means not want of determination but self-determination, "the impulse towards unity and coherence (the positive spirit of non-contra-

diction) by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs, and every self to its completion in the Absolute, and of which the Absolute itself is at once an incarnation and a satisfaction" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 340). As continuous with the universe and as the active form of totality, the self is all-inclusive. There is nothing outside it by which it can be fatally determined. All its activities spring from its own nature, and it is "creative and originative according to its own law —the only law of creativeness which prevails in the universe."

Summing up his views, Bosanquet reminds us that nature and the self are not separate entities but correlated elements of a single harmonious system, viz. the Absolute. The mathematical physicists' conception of nature is not ultimately valid. It is merely a convenient way, for the special purposes of science, of representing certain aspects of the world, and is the outcome of abstraction. Nature, as we know it, actually possesses all its various qualities, primary, secondary and tertiary, and is therefore real not by itself but as a fundamental aspect of the totality of experience. It is not less real but more real than it is usually taken to be. Its being implies its continuity with mind. This does not mean that it is reducible to mere psychical states. Bosanquet is most emphatic in insisting upon the opposition of mind and nature, only that he points out that the opposition is relative and not absolute. Nature is complementary to mind. The whole content of mind comes from nature. The only thing in it which is not nature is "the spirit of totality, the attitude which makes everything alive in its bearing on the whole." "Mind has nothing of its

own but the active form of totality; everything positive it draws from nature."

Finite minds exist through nature, just as nature exists through finite minds. In them particular sections and aspects of nature get focussed. Our minds therefore are not foreign to nature but are nature's own mind. Through them it passes into the complete experience of the Absolute. Just as our various moods and tendencies are not allowed to become dissociated but are integrated into a well-organised whole when we are at our best, so are all finite minds at their highest level blended into the unity of the Absolute. The transmutation of experience involved in the subordination of its constituent elements to the whole is a well-known feature of daily life. "A careful analysis of a single day's life of any fairly typical human being would establish triumphantly all that is needed in principle for the affirmation of the Absolute." What the different phases of a harmonious life are to it, that we are to the Absolute. "We might compare the Absolute," says Bosanquet, "to Dante's mind as uttered in the *Divine Comedy*. The point would be that in it external nature, say, Italy, becomes an emotion and a value, not less but more than spatial; each self, say Paolo or Francesca, while still its real self, is also a factor in the poet's mind, which is uttered in all these selves taken together; and the whole poetic experience is single, and yet includes a world of space and persons, which to any common mind fall apart and become 'a geographical expression,' plus certain commonplace historical figures. This inclusion we compare to the Absolute, as it holds together what for us is finite experience" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, xxxvii.).

In the second course of his Gifford lectures Bosanquet proceeds to apply the principle elaborated in the first course to the finite self, to determine its value and destiny in the light of his doctrine of individuality. In reality there is only one ultimate individual, the universe, and the human soul can work out its destiny not as a separate entity, but as a member of the universe. The human soul is "both a concentration of externality and a fragment of the Absolute." It concentrates in itself and represents only a small section of the external world, and although it is originated and shaped by the universe, it nevertheless, in virtue of the active principle, "the spirit of the whole," which it contains, shapes itself. This fact accounts for the "hazards and hardships" of the finite self. The universal spirit being present and operative in it, "it is torn between its existence and its self-transcendence." In the effort to complete itself, to solve the contradiction which its double nature involves, it "will break in pieces every partial form of its own crystallised being, will welcome the chapter of accidents, and clothe itself in conflict and adventure." The cure of this unrest is found in self-recognition, in the knowledge that the finite mind is rooted in and has its true being in the Absolute whole. The source of the troubles of the human soul is also the source of its value. Self-recognition is another name for the religious consciousness of which the essence is "giving ourselves to something which we cannot help holding supreme." In unity with the Absolute the security and stability of the finite self is to be found.

Bosanquet repeatedly urges that the finite self has no being apart from its membership of the whole. The distinctness of particular persons as a fact in prac-

tical life is not to be denied, but it presupposes an underlying unity too often overlooked. The common idea is that men are parted off from one another by their subjective feelings, which are incapable of being shared. Their individuality, it is supposed, consists in their being absorbed in this exclusiveness. But however private and incommunicable feelings may be, they are never complete by themselves, but imply a universal objective content. This objective content is the common possession of all finite minds. It is comprehended by them in different ways, but the content of what is variously comprehended and reacted upon is one and the same. Because a feeling is my feeling, it does not follow that it is that only and nothing else. "The pure privacy and incommunicability of feeling as such is superseded in all possible degrees by the self-transcendence and universality of the contents with which it is unified." The common fallacy is also due to a confusion between supra-social feelings and the purely private and exclusive feelings of the individual. Emotions connected with art, religion and philosophy are non-social, but "are nevertheless universal, and organs of self-transcendence." Because they have nothing to do with ordinary social relations they are apt to be regarded as exclusive and unshareable. "The man who has merged his world in God is mistaken, and perhaps mistakes himself, for one who has never risen out of himself to communicate with the world at all. The artist and the philosopher, whose enthusiasm goes out to all order and intelligence, may, as against a given social group, rank as types of the unsocial and the recluse" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 39).

It is the impotence of finite minds, their inability to

comprehend completely and adequately the one world to which they belong, that keeps them apart. At their best, they are seen to be the elements of a unity that includes and transcends them. Within the one soul there is diversity and between the many souls there is unity. "The increase and deepening of individuality is a progress towards unity with the whole. Self-distinction, no doubt, becomes more marked; but true self-distinction is hostile to self-absorption." Diversity, in short, is impossible without a thorough-going identity.

This world is sometimes spoken of as a "vale of tears." But Bosanquet regards what Keats calls "soul making" as its chief business. For this a good deal of pain and trouble is essential. Soul, like life, of which it is the perfection and completion, is on one side moulded by its natural and social environment. Its evolution is guided by natural selection or by the requirement of being equal to the occasion. By natural selection, in this connection, Bosanquet understands "the operation of a realm of externality in modelling its responsive centre, and thereby coming alive itself in a partial individuality which represents it." Mind or soul gets its content from life and is so shaped by its environment as to be its fitting centre of representation. And "not only are particular centres of experience moulded by natural selection into a deeper harmony with their surroundings, but in so far as the surroundings form a mental or spiritual system—a social mind—the particular centres begin to be adapted as members of an individuality transcending their own." The making of souls, that is, involves their self-abnegation and subordination to a wider unity. All this implies much strain and conflict, for although an expansion of

being is attained, the earlier and simpler adaptations are disturbed.

On another side, the formation of soul through natural and social selection is the soul's self-formation, or what Bosanquet calls the "miracle of will." The soul is "a range of externality 'come alive' by centering in mind." In it a section of the world is focussed, by means of which new facts and meanings are elicited from it. Mind or will is not something different from and above things operating on them from outside, but is a limited form of the spirit of the whole, the active principle of totality. There is therefore in the finite mind always the tendency to be the whole, and the miracle of the will consists in the transformation, in obedience to this tendency, of a given situation which the mind effects by including it in a more comprehensive system. This is made possible by the connectedness of things and the consequent openings into wider possibilities which every situation affords. "For every given situation there is a larger and more effective point of view than that given, and because the spirit of the whole, in the shape of some special want or question, is always in the mind, it can always, in principle, find clues to new possibilities in every given situation" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, xxiv.). The changes which we make in the world is "the reshaping of our world by itself under the influence of the nisus of mind to the whole." Behind the finite mind there is the driving power of the whole with which it is continuous. There is always "more in it than is before it," and what "works in it and on the situation" explains the mind's power to change things for the better.

"Being moulded, on the one hand," concludes

Bosanquet, "and moulding circumstances on the other —coming alive as a world, but as a world reshaping itself and transcending itself through striving towards the unity which is completeness—are the double aspect of the soul or self which is essentially a world" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 130).

The immediate appearance of things suggests that the finite selves are independent beings at arm's length with one another, although connected by relations of right and duty. It is not realised that they are also infinite, and are therefore always beyond themselves. The result is that the world in which we live comes to be regarded as one of claims and counter-claims only. The deeper unity which binds us together is missed. The relations in which we stand to one another are supposed to be merely external relations between independent beings. Life, conceived in this way, says Bosanquet, is "full of hazard and hardship," for, on the basis of relational individualism, no finite self can ever come up to the requirements of right and duty. "It never feels that it does its pure duty, nor that it gets its whole rights. It cannot make its own claims good, nor satisfy the counter-claims upon it." And it never ceases to complain that goods are not apportioned to individuals according to their merits. The view of life, however, of which all this is the consequence is radically false. We really belong not to a world of claims and counter-claims, but to the "great world of spiritual membership." In realised social morality, of which religion is the consummation, "we have already transcended the world of claims and counter-claims, and have entered the sphere where relations are superseded by a true identity, and where finite beings, though still in the main finite, are no

longer at arm's length, but are pulse beats of the whole system." Individualistic claims vanish, and in living a universal life the best men have to bear the heaviest burdens. Being members one of another, we share in a common life and are united in happiness and suffering. The only real claim which each of us has is to be the best that we can be, "at once the highest self-surrender and, no doubt, the completest self-affirmation." Bosanquet admits that this attitude cannot be maintained uncompromisingly by beings such as we are, "having many characters of isolation and distinctness." It is necessary that to each unit of society the conditions of a decent life should in some degree be secured, but the unit must not insist upon its aspect of finitude and distinctness, and must look, "as in religion, from itself and not to itself, and ask nothing better than to be lost in the whole which is at the same time its own best."

The struggles of human life, its pleasures and pains, are the outcome of its double nature. It is because man as a finite-infinite being has the ineradicable impulse to transcend his limited nature that he experiences both pleasure and pain. When the mind's effort towards completeness is successful, the result is pleasure; when it meets with obstacles, it is attended by pain. Pleasures and pains therefore are not mutually exclusive opposites, but necessary incidents in one and the same forward movement of life. The finite being is continually passing out of its narrower self into a fuller and a more complete self, and this passage involves contradiction and friction quite as much as expansion and attainment. It is a pleasurable experience of which pain is a transcended element. Our trials and tribulations and our value have both the same source. As

movement towards perfection implies, in consequence of our limitations, strain and conflict, pleasure does not always correspond to good and pain to evil. The attainment of good may mean much suffering, and the search for pleasure may not be possible without acquiescence in what is evil. On life and activity, which are the conditions of pleasure, pain also depends, for it is the outcome of thwarted activity. Bosanquet therefore denies that pain can ever be eliminated from finite life. All that can be hoped for is a diminution and a transmutation of the character of pain as the world makes progress. As long as man is man, tears must be shed, but "tears [may be] made human by laughter and laughter [may be] triumphant over tears."

The opposition of good and evil, like that of pleasure and pain, depends upon the double nature of the finite creature. Its inherent aim is perfection, and what satisfies this aim is good. All that brings us nearer to perfection is good and has value, and all that is opposed to it is evil. To attain the good is to make progress towards what would really satisfy the self. This means the organisation of desires and volitions into a coherent system brought about by the self being in harmony with society and humanity. It is not possible to distinguish between good and evil without "implicit or explicit reference to the world of spiritual membership in which the apparently finite creature comes to his reality." The self that finds completion in a wider totality is the good self, and the evil self is in conflict with it. Good and evil therefore imply each other. They are made of the same stuff and "exhibit the venture of the finite spirit, striving to pass its limits towards perfection."

The hazards and hardships of which man's life is full arise out of his greatness. They are due to his unceasing effort to realise his deeper nature—to be actually the infinite that he ideally is. As long as he tries to attain the end in his own strength and as a separate being he must fail. The way to emancipation from the bondage of finitude is self-recognition. In the feeling and conviction which we can have in the very midst of the trials and tribulations of life that the foundation of our being is an eternal spirit revealing itself in the world, lies our stability and security. The religious consciousness, in short, lifts us above our finitude and connects us with the eternal spirit. "It is the surrender or completion of finite selfhood in the world of spiritual membership," and has no special connection with the supernatural or divine. The essence of irreligion is self-sufficiency, and we have the religious attitude "whenever we find a devotion which makes the finite self seem as nothing, and some reality to which it attaches itself seem as all." The central thing in religion is devotion to and absorption in something which is regarded as of infinitely higher value than the private self, and its climax is self-surrender to the Absolute. "In the broadest sense, wherever man is devout—wherever he places his value in something beyond his private self, and that something taken to be real—there he has set his foot on ground which so far emancipates him from the hazards, the hardships, the discipline, of finiteness; or rather, emancipates him not so much from these incidents as actually through them. Like the beings of folklore whose life is hidden elsewhere than in their own bodies, his worth and his interest are laid up where accidents affecting his temporal self cannot reach them, and in

the complete and typical case, where no accident or injury can do anything but intensify them" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 239). The religious man cannot get rid of the characteristics and consequences of his finite nature. Not by vainly attempting to rise superior to them but by their instrumentality must he attain completeness. "We cannot be 'saved' as we are; we cannot cease to be what we are; we can only be saved by giving ourselves to something in which we remain what we are, and yet enter into something new" (*What Religion Is*, pp. 8-9).

Following Bradley, Bosanquet distinguishes the God of religion from the Absolute. The perfect whole, the all-embracing experience that contains everything and excludes nothing, is the Absolute. It transcends all its aspects or appearances and cannot be identified with any of them. All finite facts and experiences are in it, not as they are for us but rearranged and transformed. What is evil, for example, in the finite will is in the Absolute, but not as evil. It has been adjusted to the good and absorbed. God is the Absolute conceived not as the completest experience but as "the greater self recognised by us as present within the finite spirit and as one with it in love and will." He is the ultimate reality appearing to and in relationship with the finite spirit, not the ultimate reality itself, which is inclusive of the finite spirit.

On the subject of the relation of the Absolute to time, order and progress, Bosanquet's view is that the perfect whole contains the temporal series as a necessary element of itself. He rejects the Bergsonian theory that reality is not a whole manifested in time but a never-ending process of creative evolution. This theory makes time an absolute reality and perfection

meaningless. On the other hand, the view that some day in the future time will cease and the goal towards which the course of the world is advancing will be attained all at once, expects that to happen in an anticipated golden age which is impossible now. Both these theories make unwarranted drafts on the future. "In what may be called our literature of happiness —serious fiction and popular philosophy—the reliance on the future has become, it seems to me, an actual disease." A true philosophy must see that an eternally realised perfection is not incompatible with but actually demands the progress of the finite in time. Just as a piece of music is impossible without the serial apprehension of it, although it is not the mere serial order, so is the Absolute a whole of which expression in time is the essence. The changes and movements of the temporal order, the conflict of good and evil, are all inherent in it. "We have to assign a place to progress within a whole and as its manifestation." What is to be expected in the future therefore is not the millennium but an ever-increasing measure of self-recognition on the part of the finite being, the amplification of his vision of the whole. The troubles of life are due to our loss of hold on its spiritual foundation. We rely on our own strength and forget the infinite spirit in which we are rooted. The result is that in spite of the immense material progress of the present age, in spite of our scientific knowledge and mastery of nature, there has actually been an intensification of our unhappiness. Our finite acquisitions and achievements are in themselves utterly worthless and acquire value only when they are viewed "as embodiments of the supreme will, or as contributions to the Absolute." The most important change in the future which may

be hoped for is the quickening of the feeling of "at-homeness in the whole," a more general recognition of the truth that the worth of the finite individual lies in its identification with "the ultimate individuality, which the fragmentariness and the conflicts of finite existence are the means of manifesting and sustaining."

It is hard to reconcile Bosanquet's view that the chief business of the universe is the making of souls with his constantly reiterated doctrine that the distinction of finite selves is an appearance only due to their impotence and that from the ultimate point of view their destiny is to be "transmuted and rearranged" in the whole. Does the Absolute take pains to mould and fashion finite souls, to start them on the path to perfection, in order that they may be finally engulfed in it? Is it possible to think that minds laboriously developed at great cost are in the end simply dissolved in a higher unity? That finite individuals have no reality apart from the total system of things to which they belong is of course true, but from this it does not follow that ultimately they are lost in a single, all-absorbing experience. An absolute that does not differentiate itself into a plurality of finite centres of experience is as much an abstraction as finite centres of experience not gathered up into the unity of the Absolute. No one has laid more stress on this truth than Bosanquet himself. The whole of his lecture on "The Concrete Universal," in the *Principle of Individuality and Value*, is a powerful vindication of it; but, nevertheless, he seems somehow to forget the spirit of his own teaching in insisting that the destiny of the finite self is to be resolved and recomposed in the Absolute. In combating the error

of pluralism, he tends to pass to a somewhat Spinozistic monism.

The truth is that individuation has a more important place in the constitution of the universe than Bosanquet is prepared to allow. In being self-expressed in the universe as an inclusive system of inter-related objects, the Absolute so pours its own inner being into them as to become *their* selves. Each of these objects, in its ideality, thus becomes the very centre of the universe, a unique focalisation of its whole content. These selves overlap in their contents, but their distinction as selves, as different centres of experience of a common content, is fundamental and irremovable. The total content of the Absolute experience, the Absolute experiences not in one way but in all possible ways, and each of the viewpoints from which the whole is represented is a determinate form of the Absolute, a self infinite no doubt, but infinite *suo genere*. Our selves are explicable only as limited expressions of these selves. The Absolute is real only as it is differentiated into its constituent selves. It is a harmonious system of complete but relative wholes of experience. Any blending of these constituent selves into an undifferentiated totality is therefore impossible. They are distinct focalisations of the same universe demanded by the universe for its own perfection.

II.

Bosanquet's contribution to political philosophy is as notable as his contributions to logic, metaphysics and æsthetics. There are not many treatises on politics in the English language which equal his *Philosophical Theory of the State* in the insight with which the fundamental problems of social philosophy are handled.

The theory presented in this book is, as he himself puts it, "to be found not merely in Plato and in Aristotle but in very many modern writers, more especially in Hegel, T. H. Green, Bradley and Wallace." The standpoint is much the same as that of Green in his *Principles of Political Obligation*, but he is more unhesitating than Green in insisting upon the value of the state to the ethical life of its citizens. The state, he teaches, is a much more real object than a plant or an animal, and the study of it as it is and not the construction of an ideal society is the aim of social philosophy. "To depict what most people call 'an ideal state' is no more the object of political philosophy than it is the object, say, of Carpenter's *Human Physiology* to depict an 'ideal' man or an angel." Bosanquet makes the central idea of Greek political philosophy his own, the idea, namely, that "the human mind can only attain its full and proper life in a community of minds, or more strictly in a community pervaded by a single mind, uttering itself consistently though differently in the life and action of every member of the community." Such a conception was developed in ancient times in connection with life in the Greek city-states. It lost its supremacy with the increasing prevalence of an individualistic theory of life, and has been revived again in modern times with the formation of nation-states. The modern theory, however, differs from the ancient in this, that it accords full recognition to the freedom of the individual and maintains that it is not by suppressing but by giving legitimate scope to it that the common social life can be realised.

Bosanquet begins by pointing out the contradiction involved in the conception of self-government, and

shows that on the basis of the ordinary dualism of self and others the contradiction cannot be solved. The ground and justification of political obligation is self-government, but the question is, how the idea of self is to be reconciled with that of government. How can the authority which others must exercise over me, if there is to be government at all, be for me self-government? Law and government seem *prima facie* to be opposed to the individuality of man, and yet without them the free play of personality would not be possible. Bentham thinks that in order to acquire rights man must sacrifice part of his liberty, by which he understands the power to do what one pleases. Antecedently to law and government, rights do not exist. They, therefore, are necessary evils to which we have got to submit. But it is impossible to think of law and government as antagonistic to the self, if they are the necessary conditions of the unfolding of its capacities. That by means of which liberty is actualised cannot be destructive to it. The root of the difficulty lies in supposing that between self and others there is a fundamental opposition, and in the consequent failure to perceive that "the one, so far from surrendering some of his capacity for life through his fellowship with others, acquires and extends that capacity wholly in and through such fellowship." Mill's theory that an individual is free in everything that concerns himself alone and is subject to government in so far as his action affects others is open to the objection that it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between self-regarding and other-regarding action. Every action done by me affects both myself and others. No fence can be put up round an individual so as to make him impervious to social forces,

and no mistake is greater than to suppose that the more wayward and eccentric a man is the more he is free. We can get beyond law only by fulfilling it. It is a mistake to think that the difficulty inherent in the conception of self-government is removed if the government is democratic or, as the phrase is, government of the people for the people by the people. It is, on the contrary, increased. The people who rule are not the people who are ruled. The will of the majority is not the same thing as the will of the people, and the self-government of which one hears so much is not the government of each by himself but of each by others.

"On the basis of everyday reflection then," says Bosanquet, "we are brought to an absolute deadlock in the theory of political obligation." If this deadlock is to be removed, "we must take the two factors of the working idea of self-government in their full antagonism, and exhibit, through and because of this, the fundamental unity at their root, and the necessity and conditions of their coherence. We must show, in short, how man, the actual man of flesh and blood, demands to be governed, and how a government which puts real force upon him, is essential, as he is aware, to his becoming what he has it in him to be" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, 3rd ed., p. 73).

The theories of writers like Bentham, Mill and Spencer, Bosanquet aptly calls "theories of the first look." They all assume that society and the individual really are as they immediately appear to be. No satisfactory explanation of self-government is possible on the assumption that human beings are naturally isolated from one another and are only artificially brought together in the state. All right is in the state, says

Bentham. All right is in the individual, says Spencer, for whom "the state has become little more than a record office of his contracts and consents." Both fail to perceive that "if a right can only be recognised by a society, it can only be real in an individual. . . . As long as the self and the law are alien and hostile, it is hopeless to do more than choose at random in which of the two we are to locate the essence of right" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 66-67).

The problem of self-government is more satisfactorily handled by Rousseau, because, on the whole, he manages to get beyond the individualistic standpoint. Bosanquet shows that the popular idea of Rousseau, based upon sentences like "man is born free and everywhere is in chains," is entirely mistaken. In spite of his continual relapse into individualistic ways of thinking and modes of expression, the essence of his message is that in the state the minds and wills of its members are fused into a single indivisible whole. "Each of us puts into the common stock his person and his entire powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and we further receive each individual as an indivisible member of the whole." The state is, therefore, a moral person through participation in whose life alone man ceases to be a stupid and narrow animal and becomes an intelligent being. We attain freedom not by setting ourselves in opposition to the state but by obedience to its laws in which the general will is embodied. With law one's everyday rebellious self may be at variance, but it is nevertheless the expression of one's deeper and more complete self. Conformity to it is, for this reason, the essential thing in self-government.

Rousseau is careful to distinguish the general will

from the will of all. The object towards which the former is directed is the common good, whereas the latter is only a sum of particular wills. The will of all may be unanimous, because individuals, desiring not something general in its nature but what is calculated to promote their various private interests, may nevertheless happen to agree in some particular point. The general will, on the other hand, aims at matters of common concern which may not be obvious to all. It is "that identity between my particular will and the wills of all my associates in the body politic which makes it possible to say that in all social co-operation, and in submitting even to forcible constraint, when imposed by society in the true common interest, I am obeying only myself, and am actually attaining my freedom" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 100). What generalises the will is a common interest and not the number of votes recorded. The will of all is a mere aggregate, but the general will is an organic unity. It is the universal principle that connects an individual with others and unites their particular wills into a coherent whole. "The unity of myself with others in a common good is the same in principle as the unity of myself with myself which I aim at in aiming at my own good." If the will of all were directed to the common good it would be transformed into the general will. The natural tendency of the great majority of men is to be guided by purely private interests, but it requires some amount of effort to discern the common good and to make it the determining principle of conduct.

From the standpoint of the general will, the problem of self-government undergoes a transformation. The opposition between self and others and between self

and government vanishes and sovereignty is seen to be the exercise of the general will, justifying the use of force to compel a recalcitrant individual to be truly free by being in harmony with the general will. In so far as laws and institutions are what they ought to be, they embody the general will.

Rousseau imagines that if free play is given to the particular wills, the general will is likely to emerge out of them through their conflict and the consequent cancellation of their differences. For this reason he condemns representative government and favours small republics in which the citizens can meet and discuss public questions. But this, Bosanquet thinks, is to appeal "from the organised life, institutions and selected capacity of a nation to that nation regarded as an aggregate of individuals," to enthrone, in short, the very will of all which he disparages. But in what Rousseau says about the function of the legislator his judgment is sound. What people really want they do not always know. If they got exactly what they clamour for, they would seldom be satisfied. "In order to obtain a full statement of what we will, what we want at any moment must at least be corrected and amended by what we want at all other moments; and this cannot be done without also correcting and amending it so as to harmonise it with what others want, which involves an application of the same process to them" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 110-11). To do this work of criticism, to elicit the general will from the vague opinions and impulses of "a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it," is, in Rousseau's view, the task of the legislator.

The contradiction in self-government is due to the

antithesis of self and others. It disappears as soon as we perceive that the average individual, absorbed in his private interests and pleasures, is not the real self. The social self extends beyond our private life, and we are genuine individuals only in so far as we identify ourselves with it. We become free not by dissociating ourselves from our fellow-beings and doing what we like, but by acquiescing in a law and order in which our universal self is realised. If, in one sense, this law and order restrains our private wills, in another sense it is the necessary means of our higher self-affirmation. The objective system of rights is the surest guarantee of our being able to become what it is possible for us to be. Self-government, rightly understood, means the subjection of our particular selves to an order which, to a large extent, expresses the general will, and liberty is not mere absence of restraint but "being ourselves most completely." The man whose desires are not narrow and casual, so that in the satisfaction of them he "feels choked and oppressed like one lost in a blind alley which grows narrower and narrower," but whose volitions are connected elements of a total system of life, is truly free. And institutions, without which the affirmation of such a will is not possible, are the embodiment of our liberty and, as such, have a claim on our allegiance.

The state is the incarnation, the concrete form, of the general will. It is not the political organisation merely, but "includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and the University. It includes all of them, not as the mere collection of the growths of the country, but as the structure which gives life and meaning to the political

whole, while receiving from it mutual adjustment, and therefore expansion and a more liberal air" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 139). The state nourishes and sustains the individual. It disciplines him, expands his ideas and "furnishes him with an outlet and a stable purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities—a satisfying object of life."

"Force," says Bosanquet, "is inherent in the state, and no true ideal points in the direction of destroying it." It is not the basis of the state, but is implied in it as the whole that makes the mutual adjustment of laws and institutions possible. "We make a great mistake in thinking of the force exercised by the state as limited to the restraint of disorderly persons by the police and the punishment of intentional lawbreakers. The state is the flywheel of our life. Its system is constantly reminding us of our duties, from sanitation to the incidents of trusteeship, which we have not the least desire to neglect, but which we are either too ignorant or too indolent to carry out apart from instruction and authoritative suggestion" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 141). The stimulating effect of the social order on the minds of its members, in so far as these minds are inert, takes the form of force.

"Self-government," argues Bosanquet, "can only be explained if the centre of gravity of the self is thrown outside what we are continually tempted to reckon as our individuality, and if we recognise as our real being, and therefore as imperative upon us, a self and a good which are but slightly represented in our explicit consciousness at its ordinary level." The error of thinkers like Herbert Spencer is to conceive of the state as a mere association of independent

units whose nature is not affected by their membership of it. They do not see that it is an organisation in which the life of every member is determined not by his immediate and more or less accidental contact with others but by the plan and purpose of the whole. Their error is analogous to that of the associationist psychologists who regard the unity of mind as arising out of the arbitrary association of separate elements. But modern psychology tells us that the mind is a unified system of "appercipient masses" in each of which a number of ideas are held together and organised under the control of a general scheme. It is not a single system but "rather a construction of such systems, which may be in all degrees of alliance, indifference and opposition to one another." But however great may be the opposition of these subordinate mental systems to one another, they must all be under the more or less explicit control of the whole, if the unity of mind is to be preserved. Now society also "is a vast tissue of systems of this type, each of them a relatively though not absolutely closed and self-complete organisation." Within each group, the place and function of every member is determined by the nature of the group. And the same individual may belong to several such groups. Social life could not go on if between these various groups a working harmony were not maintained. It is the function of the state, as the most comprehensive organisation, to secure this harmony "by force if need be." The units of the state are not individuals but organised bodies of men.

Mind and the state are alike in "being organisations, each composed of a system of organisations." Further, "Minds and society are really the same fabric

regarded from different points of view." What, outwardly, are social groups are, inwardly, mental systems. "Every individual mind is a system of such systems corresponding to the totality of social groups as seen from a particular position." The social whole is reflected in the mind of every member of it from his characteristic and unique point of view. It is a self-identical organisation aware of itself in a plurality of centres.

"The conception of society and the individual [being] correlative conceptions through and through," the question whether society is the means to the end of the individual or the individual the means to the end of society is entirely meaningless. There is no antagonism between the two. The universal and its differences are two aspects of one and the same thing. The end of the individual, therefore, is the same as that of society and the state, and this end is the realisation of the best life. It is not necessary for us to know in advance what in detail the best life is. Its nature is disclosed to us more and more as we make progress, because of our intolerance of contradictions, towards the attainment of a harmonious life of fully developed capacities. The function of the state is to remove hindrances to and create conditions favourable for the realisation of the end. It is not in its power to promote the end directly. For this purpose the spontaneous and intelligent action of self-conscious beings is necessary. It is such action alone that makes "the maximisation of our being," the widening of our self through its identification with the social whole, possible. Established and unchanging customs, authoritative traditions, mere routine, unless these are helpful to self-conscious development by liberating energies

available for the purpose, are obstacles to moral progress. It is their influence on life and not the encroachment of others on what I vainly try to make my exclusive sphere of action that destroys liberty. The menace to liberty comes from automatism and not from others. "As in the private so in the general life, every encroachment of automatism must be justified by opening new possibilities to self-conscious development, if it is not to mean degeneration and senility." In so far as automatism checks moral growth, the end of state action must be to remove it.

As the state is not alien to the life of the individual, the minimising of its power cannot be the true ideal. There is no limit to the authority of the state except that which arises from the nature of its own end. Without absolute power the state cannot effect a proper adjustment of the often conflicting claims of individuals and social groups.

In common with Green, Wallace and Ritchie, Bosanquet holds that the rights of an individual arise out of his position in the state. They are "claims recognised by the state, *i.e.* by society acting as ultimate authority, to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life." They may be regarded from the point of view of the whole community and of the individuals who compose the community. From the standpoint of the community they are "the organic whole of the outward conditions necessary to the rational life." Rights do not belong to individuals in their isolation but depend upon the "state-maintained order in its connectedness as a single expression of a common good or will." Their end is the maintenance of external conditions essential to the full development of human personality. From the point of view of the

individual, rights are powers secured to him by the state, in order that by the exercise of them he may make his unique contribution to the common good. Apart from the position of the individual recognised by the state they have no existence. No position, no rights. As rights are connected with social positions or vocations which "have their being in the medium of recognition," unrecognised rights do not exist. They cannot be based on my mere desire to do what it pleases me to do.

In the network of social relations, the rights which are claimed by one man are duties owed to him by others. My right to walk along the public road implies an obligation on the part of others not to obstruct me. Rights and duties are thus the correlatives of each other. But, in a higher sense, all rights are duties. They are powers belonging to me in virtue of my social position which I am bound to exercise in order to realise the moral end.

One of the distinctive features of Bosanquet's theory is that he conceives of the state as consisting of "facts as well as ideas and purposes as well as facts." The institutions of which the state is the organised unity are, of course, external facts in the natural world, but they are also embodiments of ethical ideas. "An institution implies a purpose or sentiment of more minds than one, and a more or less permanent embodiment of it. 'Of more minds than one' because it is to fix the meeting points of minds that the external embodiment is necessary." Apart from the social mind, institutions are no more real than is the universe apart from the Absolute mind.

"The nation-state is the widest organisation which has the common experience necessary to found a

common life." For this reason, "it is recognised as absolute in power over the individual and as his representative and champion in the affairs of the world outside." The state exists in order to maintain the outward conditions of a desirable life. But it is impossible to determine these conditions without reference to the kind of life that is to be realised, and it is only within the limits of a nation state that there can be a distinctive type of life.

In answer to the question whether state action can be judged by the same standard as private action, the essence of what Bosanquet has to say is that a state can be judged only in respect of its act of will as a state and not by what its agents may do on their own account in the name of the state. If they commit any breach of morality, they are certainly censurable, but their acts are not imputable to the state unless they are done with the active support of public opinion, in which case "the guilty state is judged before the tribunal of humanity and history." The important thing to remember is that state actions "cannot be identified with the deeds of its agents, or morally judged as private volitions are judged. Its acts proper are always public acts, and it cannot, as a state, act within the relations of private life in which organised morality exists. It has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised moral world. Moral relations presuppose an organised life; but such a life is only within the state, not in relations between the state and other communities" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 302). What the state does in order to fulfil its mission is, of course, subject to criticism and cannot be morally indifferent, but it is mere confusion

to pass moral judgments on its acts in the same sense as on the acts of private individuals. A public act "is the act of a supreme power which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the form of life of which it is the guardian, and which is not itself protected by any scheme of functions or relations, such as prescribes a course for the reconciliation of rights and secures its effectiveness" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 304).

There is no such thing as Humanity as a single organised community. The great majority of men are living lives scarcely worth living. It is true that in virtue of their intelligence they have capacities which can be realised, but as yet they remain unrealised. That being so, all men cannot be effective members of a common society. "It does not follow from this that there can be no general recognition of the rights arising from the capacities for good life which belong to man as man. Though insufficient, as variously and imperfectly realised, to be the basis of an effective community, they may, so far as realised, be a common element or tissue of connection running through the more concrete experience on which effective communities rest" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 307).

Beyond the multitude of states and the idea of Humanity there are "fuller utterances of the same universal self which the 'general will' reveals in more precarious forms." In passing into the spheres of art, religion and philosophy, "the human mind, consolidated and sustained by society, goes further on its path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity."

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.

PROFESSOR HOBHOUSE ON THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF THE STATE.

One of the ablest attacks on the Hegelian theory of the state is contained in Professor L. T. Hobhouse's *Metaphysical Theory of the State*. He is unsparing in his condemnation of Hegel and Bosanquet, but Green is gently let off and is even appreciated. The cause of this differential treatment is not apparent. In principle, there is not much difference between Green and Bosanquet. Being the first to introduce into individualistic England the political ideas of Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, Green necessarily displays, as Bosanquet puts it, "scrupulous caution in estimating the value of the state to its members," but he is not one whit less emphatic than Bosanquet in proclaiming that an individual can live the life of a moral being only as a member of some state. Perhaps Green's radicalism in practical politics and his fervent faith in democracy make Professor Hobhouse indulgent to him. His attack on Hegel is not the outcome merely of a scholar's meditations in his study but of the desire of an ardent patriot, precluded by the disabilities of middle age from volunteering for active service in the war, to do something for making the world safe for democracy. One fine morning, during the war, Professor Hobhouse sat in a garden annotating Hegel's theory of freedom when

a German air raid took place. This was to him an eye-opener. "In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me." All that he had witnessed, he had no doubt, "lay implicit in the Hegelian theory of the God-state." Inspired by this belief, it is no wonder that Professor Hobhouse fights with the zeal of a crusader. But to less gifted men, the connection between Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and the war is by no means obvious. What is the head and front of Hegel's offending? Is it the teaching that the individual cannot be a moral being without subordinating himself to the social whole? Does the spirit of self-sacrifice endanger the peace of the world and the insistence on one's right to do what one pleases, provided that the same right of others is not infringed, bring about the millennium? It is true that in Hegel's eyes the state is the earthly god; but he has nowhere said that the earthly god is the only God. On the contrary, the burden of his teaching is that the human soul can find satisfaction and rest only in the Absolute Spirit, in the religious and philosophical consciousness of union with God and not merely in participation in the life of the state. Above and beyond the earthly god is the heavenly God. The state, with all its majesty and power, is only a subordinated element of the whole and not the ultimate Reality. The fall of Germany is due not to the teaching of Hegel but to its forgetfulness of that teaching, to its failure to recognise anything higher than the state. No country, in recent times, has repudiated Hegel's philosophy more than Germany. The besetting sin of the whole world to-day is the same, viz. forgetfulness of the eternal verities. It is

deaf to the message of Hegel, reiterated in endless ways, that "God is present, omnipresent, and exists as spirit in all spirits. God is a living God who is acting and working." "Then all the old things were true." "This," says Bosanquet, "is the overwhelming impression which the events of the last five years (written in 1919) have left upon my mind. . . . It is, then, only spiritual goods that is real and stable, earthly and material aims *are* delusive and dangerous, and the root of strife. . . . An immense fabric of civilisation, with its pride and policy mainly directed upon material prosperity, invited, according to all that our teachers have told us, disaster proportional to its magnitude" (Preface to *Philosophical Theory of the State*, 3rd ed., xlv.).

Professor Hobhouse denies that there is any such thing as the general will or that the state is the embodiment of it. But he is most explicit in declaring that society is not an aggregate of individuals. "Every association of men," we are told, "is legitimately regarded as an entity possessing certain characteristics of its own, characteristics which do not belong to the individuals apart from their membership of that association" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 27). "The life of a whole is more than that of its parts. . . . The body is something other than the cells which compose it, for this simple reason among others, that the cells die when separated from the body and therefore rapidly cease to be that which they at present are." Even so are individuals unreal in separation from the social whole whose members they are. After this, one naturally expects an exposition and defence of the idea of organic unity. But no. Instead of this, there comes the announcement that the distinction between the self and others is irremovable. "The self is a continuous

identity united by strands of private memory and expectation, comprising elements of feelings, emotion and bodily sensation which are its absolute exclusive property. No such continuity unites distinct selves, however alike, or however united in their objects. So at last it seems to those whom Dr. Bosanquet dismisses with contempt as "theorists of the first look." For them human individuality is and remains something ultimate. "The difference between self and another is as plain as the difference between black and white, and if a man does not see it, there is nothing plainer to appeal to." How the ultimateness of human individuality is consistent with its being to society what a cell is to the body, Professor Hobhouse does not explain. His idea apparently is that the only alternative to individualistic theories is to set up "the state as a greater being, a spirit, a super-personal entity, in which individuals with their private consciences or claims of right, their happiness or their misery, are merely subordinate elements" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 27). And he proceeds to accuse Bosanquet of advocating such a theory. The individual, we are informed, "is absorbed in the organised political society, the state of which he is a member." Of the organised whole, he is regarded as "a kind of transitory phase." All this, however, is sheer misunderstanding. Bosanquet has nowhere said that the general will is something over and above the particular wills of individuals in which they are lost. What he maintains is that the wills of the individuals, in so far as they make the common good their end, is the general will. "It is in the difference which contributes to the whole that the self feels itself at home and possesses its individuality." "The social whole [is] of the nature of a continuous or self-

identical being pervading a system of differences and realised only in them." In interpreting society, Bosanquet, in short, makes use of the idea of organic unity with which Professor Hobhouse, in spite of his body and cell analogy, is, strangely enough, never in close quarters. Because society is not other than the individuals, it does not follow that it is only a sum of them. It is possible to think of it as a unity realised in the plurality of the minds and wills of its members.

In support of his contention that "the difference between self and another is as plain as the difference between black and white," Professor Hobhouse refers to the fact that the inner experiences of men, their sensations, feelings and desires, are absolutely private to them and are incapable of being shared. The outer world which is experienced is, no doubt, the same, but my experiencing of it is unique and is only mine and cannot be identified with yours. The object is one, but the centres of perception, thought, feeling and will related to that object are many. That the inner life of one man is his only and cannot be the same as that of another man is indisputable; but the inner cannot be divorced from the outer, and the identity of the outer world, upon which different selves are based, furnishes an essential element of the bond of union between them. The subject and the object are opposed manifestations of a principle of unity that underlies them. Different selves, differently experiencing a common world, are therefore necessarily embraced within this concrete principle of unity. Until this fundamental point of idealistic philosophy is disposed of, the way to pluralism is effectively barred. It is no use pointing to the diversities of inner experience. The idealist has never denied them. His contention has always been that in and

through them a universal principle is realised. No universal, no individual. The true core of individuality is not any element of isolation but the unique focalisation of the same world in each centre of experience. Professor Hobhouse is not unaware of the ground on which the idealist takes his stand. He alludes to the doctrine of the concrete universal, but says that it is true only of the system of thought which is not identical with the system of reality. Immediately after, remembering perhaps the doctrine of the identity of thought and being, he makes the admission that "reality itself is not finally intelligible until we take the relation between it and thought into account by a further and more comprehensive thought" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 65). The idealist does not contend for anything very different from this. His point is not that the process of thinking is identical with the object thought of, but that the duality of thought and its object presupposes a "more comprehensive thought" of which they are factors. Once this principle is grasped, there is no escape from the conclusion that different centres of experience constitute a plurality in which an ideal and ultimate unity is manifested.

The system of law, which may be said to be the framework of the state, is, says Professor Hobhouse, "not the product of one will. . . . It is rather the product of innumerable wills, acting sometimes in concert, sometimes in opposition to one another, and through their conflicts and combinations issuing in a more or less orderly system" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 61). "The actual institutions of a society," we are told, "are not the imperfect expression of a real will, which is essentially good and harmonious, but the result into which the never-ceasing clash of wills has settled

down with some degree of permanency" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 86). The question is not whether laws and institutions have emanated from the mind of a single law-giver framing them with foresight, but whether a common purpose, a generally accepted scheme of life, only vaguely apprehended by the bulk of men, runs through the particular wills of individuals. Is there or is there not a common platform on which the members of a community, in spite of their discords, can all stand? Is this common purpose the result or the condition of the "never-ceasing clash of wills"? Out of conflicting wills, not held together by some common ideal, social order can no more be evolved than can an orderly universe arise out of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. That there is such a thing as the inner spirit of a people, Professor Hobhouse will perhaps not deny. But this inner spirit, this ethos, is not an abstraction. Neither does it float in the air. It is incorporated in the laws, customs, usages and institutions of the people. Now, conceive of the outer laws and institutions as sustained and vitalised by the inner spirit and the inner spirit as externalised in the laws and institutions, think of them together as inseparable correlatives and you get the concrete whole which, regarded as exercising supreme authority over its members, is the state. It is not to be confused with an improvised association of men for the furtherance of some particular purpose. There may be any number of such special groups or associations, but there must be a supreme controlling power over them all. Life can go on because a harmony is maintained between these groups, and without the state within which these groups are comprised such a harmony cannot be maintained. Professor Hobhouse seems at times to

understand by the state the Government or the state-organisation for the maintenance of law and order. So understood, it is, of course, ridiculous to say that the state is the embodiment of the general will. But thinkers like Hegel and Bosanquet mean by it the organised whole, the substantive reality on which our lives are founded, and not simply the government.

One reason, perhaps the chief reason, of Professor Hobhouse's hostility to the idealistic theory of the state is his belief that it encourages the tendency to resist all proposals to reform and reconstruct society. If what is real is rational, all that we have got to do, it would seem, is to sing hosanna to the existing order of things. No man need make any effort to improve anything, for there is nothing to be improved. "His business is not to endeavour to remodel society, but to think how wonderfully good and rational is the social life that he knows, with its pharisees and publicans, its gin-palaces, its millions of young men led out to the slaughter, and he is to give thanks daily that he is a rational being and not merely as the brutes that perish" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 87). But is the ideal a thing always to be realised and never actually realised, only to be pursued but never attained? If existing social and political arrangements are wholly devoid of reason, what guarantee is there that reason can ever be effective in the organisation of life? The truth is that the very distinction of what is and what ought to be is made possible by an all-inclusive rational order of which the present growing out of the past and leading to the future is only a phase. If by the real you mean only what is here and now, then, of course, as a mere section of the whole it is not completely rational; but if by it you mean the eternal order within

which the distinction of past, present and future falls, then to question its rationality is absurd. The present social institutions are found wanting only in the light of the ideal which the working of these very institutions has been the means of awakening. It cannot, therefore, be separated from the actual, and is the actual in a more perfect form. Social order and social progress are interdependent. The activities of the individual which *really* contribute to social order also contribute to social progress. And true conservatism is not possible without the liberal reforming spirit. It is only in exceptional circumstances that active rebellion against society becomes a painful necessity. If a society is progressive, if it undergoes necessary reforms, slowly perhaps but surely, then any member of it who impatiently defies its authority and disregards its laws merely because they do not at once conform to what he thinks is the ideal, is, most assuredly, a bad man. On the other hand, to rebel against a fossilised society governed by laws as unchangeable as the laws of the Medes and Persians may be the only way open to the good man to be faithful to the requirements of the higher life. The rebel may sometimes be a benefactor to his country, but, as often as not, he is only a turbulent egotist passing for a patriot or an idealist. True patriotism is not the readiness to do something exceptional. It is, as Bosanquet puts it, " the everyday habit of looking on the commonwealth as our substantive purpose and the foundation of our lives."

If the common social mind or the general will is only a figment of the Hegelian philosopher's imagination, if the distinction between self and others is fundamental and irreducible, how is self-government possible? To this question Professor Hobhouse gives no answer.

Unless it be true that from the point of view of the state the distinction between selves is transcended and that in being guided by the laws and institutions under which I live I am only fulfilling the necessary conditions of my own self-realisation, the authority imposed upon me must be alien authority, even if I happen to be in entire agreement with those who impose that authority. I am obeying *their* will, not mine. Majority rule is not my rule, no matter whether those who form the majority be my kith and kin or not. Only on the Hegelian principle that the state "is the objective spirit and that [the individual] has his truth and existence and ethical status only in being a member of it," does self-government become intelligible. The general will, which is my own substantive will, being embodied in the institutions, the civil and political organisation of the community to which I belong, I, in submitting to them, am not determined by what is foreign to me but by something which, in the words of John Caird, "are more truly me than my private self." It is idle to attempt to create a prejudice against Hegel's theory by constantly repeating that he reduces the individual to nullity. He does nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he insists, in the strongest possible terms, on the importance of the individual. "The modern state," he writes, "has enormous strength and depth, in that it allows the principle of subjectivity to complete itself to an independent extreme of personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back into the substantive unity and thus preserves particularity in the principle of the state. . . . It insists that the interests of the family and civic community shall link themselves to the state, and yet is aware that the universal purpose can make no advance without the private knowledge and will of

a particularity which must adhere to its right. The universal must be actively furthered, but, on the other side, subjectivity must be wholly and vitally developed. Only when both elements are present in force is the state to be regarded as articulate and truly organised" (*Philosophy of Right*, Dyde's Tr., p. 249). What Hegel opposes is licence, not liberty, the freedom of the individual to do what he is inclined to do, limited only by the like freedom of others, not his freedom to exercise all his powers for the furtherance of a common good.

What Professor Hobhouse offers us is not the bread of self-government but only a stone. He seems to suppose that political freedom is attained if a man is allowed to express his views and to influence the policy of his country. "The claim of the free individual is not the impossible one that the common decision should coincide with his own, but that his decision should be heard and taken into account. He claims his part in the common councils, he takes his share of responsibility. In so far as he makes this claim effective he contributes to the common decision even though in a particular case it goes against him. He is free, not because the social will is his own, but because he has as much scope for expression as any one man can have if all are to have it and yet live and act together" (*Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 61). Is that all? Is the mere freedom to take part in discussions of public questions enough to satisfy my desire for self-government? The value of such freedom is precious little. The vote which a man records at an election does not materially affect the result. For his having the vote no one is better or worse. Unless he is a Gladstone or a Disraeli, a Joseph Chamberlain or a Lloyd George,

his influence in shaping the policy of his country is negligible. The average citizen knows this quite well. As Hegel says, "there is necessarily little desire to vote, because one vote has so slight an influence. Even when those who are entitled to vote are told how extremely valuable their privilege is, they do not vote. Hence occurs just the opposite of what is sought. The selection passes into the hands of a few, a single party, or a special accidental interest." The essential thing in self-government is not that I have a hand in making the laws by which I am governed, but that they are reasonable, and, therefore, helpful to me in enabling me to fill a position for which I am fit and thereby to contribute to the common good. The demand that all should have a share in the business of the state involves the assumption that everyone understands this business. This assumption, Hegel truly says, "is as absurd as it, despite its absurdity, is widespread." Self-government does not depend on the satisfaction of this demand. What it really means is the control of the particular self by the social universal expressed in the organisation of the state. To ignore the deeper unity underlying the difference of selves is to make self-government an enigma. Even when the common decision coincides with my own, I do not enjoy self-government for this reason alone. The common decision agrees with but is not my decision, and in being guided by it I am certainly not *self*-determined.

Professor Hobhouse takes Bosanquet to task for saying that as yet Humanity as a single organised entity does not exist. This, he thinks, is tantamount to hostility to all projects of world-federation or a league of nations. But to affirm that, as matters stand to-day, there is no super-state to which the various states of the

world are related as families and other groups of men within a state are related to it is not to say that such an organisation cannot come into being in the future. It all depends upon the possibility of the whole human race being able to discover points of agreement more fundamental and more numerous than points of difference. It may be a good thing to cherish a humanitarian ideal, but let us not cherish illusions. The two dangers to be avoided are abstract cosmopolitanism and a narrow-minded nationalism. The would-be citizen of the world must remember that he has got to begin as a loyal citizen of a particular state, and the ardent nationalist, on his part, must not forget that the true ideal is to regard his state as only a unit in a possible confederacy of nations. But nothing will be gained by a fanatical advocacy of a league of nations. It is wise to recognise that no effective federation of the world is possible in the absence of something approaching a common view of life. "A partial agreement for certain purposes" is not sufficient. A few strong, efficient and highly organised empires maintaining the conditions of a good life and giving full scope to science, art, religion and philosophy are more likely to come together in an effective league than a large number of petty, unstable and discordant states.

CHAPTER IX.

PROFESSOR JOHN WATSON.

Professor John Watson, of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, was one of the earliest and most distinguished pupils of Edward Caird. He is a very clear and forceful writer. His earliest work, *Kant and His English Critics*, now probably out of print, is a powerful defence of Kant's theory as interpreted by Caird against the hostile criticisms of various contemporary writers. Of this book Green says that "it is written with clearness and precision" and that "anyone interested in the controversies to which it relates will be likely to have a better understanding of their essential bearing for their having read it." His later work, the *Philosophy of Kant Explained*, gives a very lucid account of Kant's doctrine, without particular reference to controversial issues. Professor Watson's constructive theory is set forth mainly in his *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, *An Outline of Philosophy* and the *Interpretation of Religious Experience*. He acknowledges his great indebtedness to Hegel and his English exponents, but is careful to point out that "if the Philosophy of Hegel, as Lotze holds, is simply a panlogism; or if its fundamental principle is an abstract and indeterminate absolute; or if it denies all freedom to man, and regards him as but the passive organ of an underlying Something—not ourselves; then . . . it

is widely different from the view I have tried to express." Professor Watson does not think that the type of idealism which he advocates is open to the objection that it has been superseded by certain recent systems "which in principle belong to an earlier stage of thought."

The central idea of Professor Watson's philosophy is that the universe is rational through and through and that in its essential features it is capable of being comprehended by our intelligence. The particular facts of experience, of which empiricism makes so much, depend for their possibility on the unity and intelligibility of the world. In them the whole or the rational system which it denies is involved. The rationality of the universe means that it is an absolute unity and not a mere aggregate of particulars. The units of an aggregate are separate and independent, but the component elements of the universe are "so adapted to one another as to be incapable of existing apart, so that to remove any single element would be to destroy the whole." The one unified system of things includes within itself all the particular facts that it unifies. This means that the unity is differentiated into distinguishable elements. "To be a real unity the universe must, therefore, have two aspects: it must be absolutely one, and it must be absolutely many." These aspects are correlative. As a self-differentiated unity beyond which there can be nothing, the universe is absolutely perfect. This does not mean that it is changeless. On the contrary, it manifests itself without losing its unity in an infinity of changes, in each of which it is equally perfect. And, lastly, as an all-embracing unity of differences, the universe is a coherent system. "Every element in the whole must be related to every other; so that any change

in one element will involve a correspondent change in all."

Such a conception of the real is, of course, far removed from the immediate appearance of things. At first sight, the world appears to be a vast assemblage of independent objects bearing no relationship to one another, except that of existing together in space and time. For the being of each the being of others does not seem to be necessary. It is therefore naturally supposed that whatever relations are found to subsist between things are wholly external to them and are the outcome of our act of comparison. Things are simply presented to the apprehending subject without it making any sort of contribution to their nature. The act of experiencing makes no difference whatever to the fact experienced. The mind that knows is external to the thing that is known, just as one thing is external to another thing. And God also is conceived as an infinite being lying outside the world of His creation. How can all things come from God and yet have a separate existence, how with the world opposed to Him as an independent reality it is possible for God to be infinite, it is not considered. The element of truth in this realistic way of viewing things is that it refuses to reduce them to mere ideas of the mind. The objects of knowledge are neither mere groups of sensations, as Hume, Mill and others suppose, nor sensations reduced to order and coherence through their subjection to the categories, as Kant maintains. They have a reality of their own quite apart from the subjective states of particular individuals. To say this, however, is not to say that things exist independently of mind. They are no doubt opposed to mind, but the opposition is relative, not absolute, made possible by a unity that

transcends the opposition. "To distinguish an object from himself, the subject must comprehend within his embrace both himself and the object." The world, as realism rightly insists, is in no way dependent upon the changing states of particular minds, but it does not follow from this that it is composed of self-subsistent and isolated particulars. The nature of things depends upon their relation to one another. It is as connected elements of a single whole that they are real. The mistake of realism is to suppose that each thing has an independent being of its own. But, on reflection, we discover that it gets its character from its relations to others and that all finite things exist by virtue of their reciprocal determination of one another. This means that they are not mere parts of a mechanical whole but distinguishable elements of a veritable unity which must be conceived as spiritual. Apart from this unity finite things and finite minds are impossible, but as constituent elements of it organically related to one another, they are real and necessary. "The one and only perfectly self-dependent, self-active and self-differentiating unity must be self-conscious, not because it is isolated or independent either in existence or in knowledge, but because it manifests its nature in all modes of being, and most fully in and to man" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II., p. 52).

From the truth that things are not the ideas of the finite mind, realism draws the false conclusion that they are therefore unrelated to and independent of mind. If the world exists independently of the subject, truth can only mean the correspondence of ideas to facts. But it is meaningless to speak of ideas copying facts when between the two there is no sort of affinity whatever.

Truth no doubt implies correspondence, but the correspondence is not between mind and a reality independent of it, but between our judgments and "reality as it is present in the mind that has penetrated to its actual nature." The correspondence theory in its ordinary form is based upon the assumption of a dualism between the ideas of the mind and the things whose copies they are supposed to be. But "the simplest form of experience involves the indissoluble identity of consciousness with its object. There are not two things—an idea of sensation as Locke calls it, and a sensible object—but what is called an idea of sensation is simply the consciousness of a sensible object, and the sensible object is inseparable from that consciousness" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II., p. 69). Subjective idealism misinterprets this truth and resolves things into sensations. The objective world is supposed to be evolved out of them through their being brought under certain universal principles of connection. But out of mere subjective states a stable and coherent world of objects can never grow. So far from objectivity being developed from sensations, sensations are real only as they are referred to objects. The error of realism is to separate objects from ideas; the error of subjective idealism is to reduce objects to ideas. Both fail to perceive that "object and subject imply each other, and therefore they are distinctions within a whole, which manifests itself in both, though not in both equally. If by object we mean whatever is determined as spatial and temporal, and by subject whatever is conscious, the object is a less determinate form of reality than the subject, because the former involves abstraction from the subject, while the latter by its very nature includes the object, while at the same time distinguishing it from

itself" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II., p. 82).

In Professor Watson's method of showing that the only conception of the real which is finally satisfying is that of a universal mind realised in the world-system, the influence of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* is plainly discernible. Like Hegel, he argues that the notion that reality is presented to us in sensible experience is untenable. The impressions of the moment are fleeting and cannot vouch for the existence of anything more durable than they. It no doubt seems to be the case that what is here and now before me is the real, but the here and now of this moment is not the here and now of the next moment. Sense experience is continually slipping from our grasp, and though it *means* the universal it is unable to lay hold of it. The universal which it misses is attained in perception, but it is the universal of sense.

For perception the real is what is permanent in the sensible. The impressions of sense point to things which do not perish like them. In perceiving the object before me I have certain passing impressions, but they refer to a reality which persists. The perceived object is a unity of various qualities. These qualities co-exist, because they belong to one and the same thing. But what is the relation between the thing and its qualities? It is meaningless apart from the qualities, and yet the qualities depend for their existence upon it. They being different from one another, there is no reason why they should be grouped together. Each is quite indifferent to the others, and yet their very isolation means their relation to one another. What is completely isolated is absolutely indeterminate and therefore a nonentity. The differ-

ence of perceived objects, again, implies their unity, but of the nature of this unity *perception* gives no hint. Perception, we thus see, raises problems which it is unable to solve. "The mind cannot be satisfied with anything short of a reality which is all-comprehensive and perfectly coherent." At the level of perception we do not get it. This does not mean that perception has no truth, but that its point of view is not final. The contradictions inherent in it force us to seek for a more adequate way of comprehending the world.

The real must be an all-inclusive, coherent and self-consistent whole. The world of perception is not such a whole, but a mere aggregate of independent objects. The conception of it as one, although composed of things bearing only accidental relations to one another, is self-contradictory. In order to avoid the inconsistency we may be led to distinguish reality from appearance, and to suppose that while the latter is full of contradictions the former is not so. But it is impossible to maintain a rigid distinction between appearance and reality. As everything determinate is appearance, all that we can say of reality is that it is. A predicate-less entity, however, is only an abstraction. Reality is not beyond its appearances, but is *in* them and is qualified by them. It is their perfect and systematic unity.

The distinction between law and phenomena is a particular form of the dualism between reality and appearance. If for perception things are unrelated or only accidentally related, for understanding they are subject to universal and necessary laws. These laws, however, are apt to be viewed as externally imposed upon things. "But a law is not accidental to the

world; it is a living and active principle, without which the world could not exist." Laws, rightly viewed, are constant relations between the elements of an orderly system. They are inseparable from these elements. The perceptual consciousness eliminates from things their necessary relations to one another and regards them as merely juxtaposed in space. To this is due its insufficiency and contradiction. Understanding "lifts perception to a higher plane, not by dropping its distinctions, but by reinterpreting them, *i.e.* by bringing them under laws." The reign of law in the universe signifies that it is a unified system. "Now, every law of nature is a form of energy, and therefore the whole body of laws is a differentiation of the one unchangeable energy. Hence law is not something imposed upon objects by the understanding, it is the recognition of the essential nature of things."

When the universe is explicitly realised as the unity of organically related elements, we pass from the standpoint of understanding to that of reason. The relational way of thinking gives place to the mind's grasp of the whole. In the eye of reason all things as essentially related to one another are at bottom one. The unity of the world is the counterpart of the mind's unity with itself. Objects co-exist in one space because they are necessarily related to one another, and they are related to one another because they are the manifestation of a spiritual principle of unity. Self-consciousness is "the supreme principle, not merely of the world of experience, but of all reality. Without the consciousness of self, tacit or explicit, there is no world of objects; and therefore in self-consciousness we have the prius of all knowable reality."

"Reflection, in its highest form," concludes Professor

Watson, "recognises that finite and infinite have no reality in separation from each other; in other words, that the infinite is the absolute unity presupposed in the finite, and the finite the expression of the inexhaustible energy and self-determination of the infinite; or, to express the same idea in theological terms, God, so far from being unknowable or indefinable, is infinitely determinate and manifests himself in all that has been, is, or will be" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II., pp. 101-102).

Although self-conscious individuals are parts of the world, they are also universal, for the sustaining principle of their lives is the reason which is expressed in the world. There is no such thing as isolated individuality. I am a self-conscious being not in my separateness, but in virtue of the universal self that is manifested in me and in my fellow-beings. Particular selves, therefore, are in indissoluble fellowship with each other, and can realise themselves as moral beings only in so far as they subordinate themselves to a whole that transcends them. The moral life is essentially social in its nature. "Thus there is no opposition between egoism and altruism, such as is sometimes affirmed. To realise myself I must attain that which is best for all other selves as well." Society, no doubt, cannot be without individuals, but neither can individuals be without society. It is as active selves contributing to the common good by subordinating nature to their ends and converting its resources into instruments of spirit that men are moral beings. Spiritual life therefore is based on the natural and cannot be independent of it. "There is but one life, the spiritual, since in it the natural is transformed and thus obtains a new meaning."

Professor Watson regards religion as the basis and presupposition of morality. The moral ideal is realisable because it is the expression in our consciousness of the deepest nature of things. That which from our point of view in the temporal order is something to be, is, in the eternal order, the real nature of existence. Moral struggle and progress is possible because the universe is the embodiment of spirit. It is the Absolute spirit in us that urges us on to be actually what potentially we are. Morality therefore completes itself in religion, of which the essence is the identification of the finite spirit with the infinite spirit. The religious consciousness raises us above the trials and tribulations of finitude into the serenity of life in the eternal. It does not exclude morality, but contains it as a necessary element of itself. It gives us the assurance of the triumph of goodness without any relaxation of the struggle which morality implies. The individual has the conviction that in his fight with evil he is bound to win, because he is a co-worker with God. Religion cannot be resolved into morality; it is not morality "touched with emotion." Nor is it a distinct kind of experience externally added to morality. It is the transfiguration of the whole of life arising from man's consciousness of his oneness with God. It "touches life at every point."

As to the relation between God, nature and man, Professor Watson points out that the two errors to be avoided are making their distinction absolute and obliterating their distinction. Pantheism either identifies God with the world or reduces the world to nullity. Mysticism completely merges man in God, while deism conceives of Him as extra-mundane. They all fail to realise that nature, man and God are inseparable ele-

ments of a single whole. Mysticism does not see that to view human life from the standpoint of the Absolute spirit is not to make it disappear in the Absolute spirit. It is true that the religious consciousness involves the unity of man and God, but it is a unity that does not exclude but presupposes their relative difference. In being conscious of God, who is his own deeper self, man does not lose his consciousness of himself. On the contrary, he must distinguish himself from God if he is to realise his oneness with Him.

Deism commits the opposite mistake. It supposes that God is related to the world as its arbitrary creator, and does not see that nature and man cannot be separate from Him and yet be dependent upon Him for their existence. Nor can God be external to the world and yet infinite. If the world has an independent being of its own, it inevitably limits Him from outside. Creation out of nothing is an impossibility, and is incompatible with the idea of an infinite being. The truth which it imperfectly expresses is that the existence of God is involved in the existence of the world. "The creation of the world only has meaning when it is interpreted as signifying the eternal self-manifestation of God." For the idea of creation and external design we must substitute the deeper notion of a world in whose very being purpose, order and system are immanent. The idea of creation is specially inappropriate in its application to man. To speak of man as made by God as a table is made by a carpenter is absurd. He can be said to be created only in the sense that God is "immanent in him, and that in such a way that he is only truly himself when he realises the purpose of God."

"The ordinary deistic or dualistic view of the

relation of nature, man and God," Professor Watson holds, "must be replaced by a doctrine which, instead of conceiving them as separate spheres only accidentally and arbitrarily related to one another, maintains that they are so intimately connected as to be unintelligible apart from one another." If they are conceived as separate and mutually exclusive entities, it is impossible to bring them together in any intelligible manner. To avoid this difficulty it may be sought to reduce them to one. Nature, it may be said, is alone real, and everything else is derived from it. Exactly the opposite method is to deny to nature an independent being and to resolve it into the experiences of finite minds. And, lastly, both nature and man may be regarded as either illusions or evanescent modes of God. All these theories are agreed that reality must be one, the only question being what the nature of this unity is. The view most prevalent, in scientific circles at any rate, is perhaps naturalism. Everything in our experience, according to it, is reducible to "a mechanical system of mass points that undergo transpositions in space." Between science and naturalism, however, there is no necessary connection. For the purposes of science, it may be necessary to abstract from all the aspects of things except their quantitative relations, but it does not follow from this that they are nothing but quantitative relations. Out of abstract quantity the great variety of qualitative differences cannot arise. And when we deal with life and mind we need higher conceptions than those of mass, motion and energy. Naturalism "confuses the proposition that there are no living processes without mechanism with the very different proposition that living processes are nothing but mechanism." The element of truth in it is that

it denies that there is any principle of life independent of mechanism. A soul separate from the body and only externally connected with it is a fiction. But the fundamental error of naturalism is to suppose that what is only an element of life is the whole. As there is no life without mechanism, so there is no mechanism without life. "The mechanical system expresses that constancy in the system of energies by which the world is characterised, while the principle of life is the informing principle without which that system would have no meaning, and indeed could not even exist" (*Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II., p. 158). Life implies mechanism, but this mechanism cannot have an independent existence. "It is merely the artificial isolation of what actually obtains only within a whole."

The conclusion that the world is not a mere mechanical system is strengthened if we take into consideration the relation of body and mind. Persistent efforts have been made to explain mind on mechanical principles, but without avail. According to epiphenomenalism, the movements and changes which take place in a living organism are governed by the laws of mechanism. Conscious states are only by-products of brain processes and have no influence whatever on them. In the words of Huxley, with whose name epiphenomenalism is chiefly associated, our mental states "are simply symbols in consciousness of the changes that take place automatically in the organism." On this view there is no such thing as activity of mind. All molecular movements in the brain being determined, spontaneity in the corresponding psychical process is impossible. Self-activity is absolutely excluded. And as "no body can receive any energy but

that which is imparted to it by another body, or impart energy to another body without itself losing an equivalent amount," in the physical series also there can be no self-activity. But if there be no activity either in mind or in body, how can the former be regarded as a product of the latter? No direct relation between them is possible, and "each is left confronting the other in abrupt antagonism." We are thus led to the view known as psycho-physical parallelism.

Proceeding to discuss this theory, Professor Watson points out that if the physical series is parallel to the mental series, it is impossible to explain how, being limited to the mental series, it is possible for us to apprehend physical facts. Between the two series a gulf is fixed, and it is impossible to cross over from the one to the other. *For whom* are the two series parallel to each other? To say that they correspond to each other is to have a knowledge of both, and a knowledge of both is only possible if there is a wider principle within which they are embraced. Both of them must belong to the same universe. To meet this difficulty psycho-physical parallelism assumes that body and mind are phenomenal appearances of a reality of which we have no knowledge. But "a reality that lies beyond knowledge, and yet unites two mutually exclusive series of phenomena without possessing anything identical with either, is a conception so utterly self-contradictory that it can only secure adhesion so long as we think loosely and vaguely." The parallelistic theory is on the right course in so far as it seeks to reduce diverse phenomena to an ultimate principle of unity. But this unity must be conceived as the unity of conscious experience, and not as an unknown X lying beyond all knowledge. Body and mind, in

short, are opposed aspects of self-conscious experience. Mind can distinguish itself from body, because it is also the unity that overreaches the distinction. "Mind embraces both itself and body." The view to which psycho-physical parallelism obscurely points is that reality in its last interpretation is an all-inclusive mind within which distinctions of every kind, including that of mind and body, fall. It is not an unknown and unknowable something manifested in the parallel series of psychical and physical phenomena, but a self-conscious subject that realises itself by opposing itself as subject to itself as object.

We are thus driven to the conclusion that mind is the only reality. But "mind in its perfection is found only in God, who must be conceived as the fully developed or Absolute Mind." Although all idealistic systems are agreed that the universe must be interpreted in terms of mind, there is much difference of opinion about the question whether the mind which is the supreme principle of existence is individual or universal. According to personal idealism, reality consists of God and the finite minds. The latter, although they depend for their existence on God, are nevertheless separate from Him and live an independent self-active life. God is immanent in them, but He is also distinct from them, and in so far as He is so, He is limited, although the limitation is self-limitation. The world exists in the mind of God, and is known by us only piecemeal in so far as we have experience analogous to His. "The universe is composed of finite minds and the omniscient mind of God." The life of the finite being is "impervious even to God Himself," and because of this the freedom and moral responsibility of man are not destroyed.

So far as personal idealism denies that there is a material world independent of mind its position is strong and unassailable. If from the object its relation to the mind is removed nothing remains. But because uncognised reality is a fiction, it does not follow that the objects of knowledge are created by the knowing mind. The subject no more creates the object than it is the product of the object. One factor of experience cannot be the cause of another factor. The error that the subject makes the object is the counterpart of the error that it is the product of the object. Experience is a whole involving the correlativity of subject and object. What a particular subject apprehends does not owe its existence to but is only recognised by him. The nature of everything is determined by its relations to the whole world. It is neither a thing-in-itself nor the product of the activity of any finite mind, but a component element of the universe in which the Absolute Mind is realised. Finite minds therefore, as personal idealism holds, cannot be separate from God and from one another. They all belong to a single spiritual universe as its organic members.

With personal idealism, the theistic position is incompatible. If each self-conscious being is so isolated from others that it is incapable of being in any way affected by them, there is no way of passing beyond it to God. The individual subject is so completely shut up within himself that there can be no reason for affirming the existence of any being other than himself. Solipsism is the logical consequence of pluralism. If theism is true, the pluralism which personal idealism implies must be abandoned. In order to be consistent, pluralism must be atheistic. To start from the self-subsistent many and then to go on to maintain the

being of the one while still retaining the mutual exclusiveness of the many is a manifest contradiction. The truth is that plurality without unity is impossible. Different things exist together in one world because they are elements in a system which is a self-conscious and self-determining unity.

In opposition to personal idealism, Professor Watson holds that the "world is not an aggregate of separate subjects, each confined to its own experience, and that no conscious subjects are possible which do not genuinely participate in the life of the whole." But it is very important, he points out, that "we should not fall into the opposite mistake of viewing the world as a unity which completely abolishes all individual subjects, by reducing them to phenomenal aspects of a single unity in which they are transformed or transmuted we know not how." It is true that there is nothing which is not embraced within experience, but experience is not a unity that cancels all distinctions. The Absolute experience does not suppress the individuals, but is "a spiritual or organic whole" in which they retain their individuality and freedom. God is not a being among other beings, nor is He an all-comprehensive unity in such a way as to absorb all finite subjects into Himself. He is "the inner principle of the finite, and he cannot be in the physical world alone, or in the conscious world alone, but he must be in both." Into the elements of the world-system the Absolute Mind is differentiated. That being so, the merging of finite beings in the Absolute is impossible. God is immanent in nature, but is more completely revealed in our self-conscious life. Man does not disappear in God, but God appears more and more fully in man as he grows in knowledge and

morality. Finite as we are, we are capable of rising above the limitations of time and space and of grasping the principle of unity from which everything that is has come. The finite and the infinite are in inseparable union with each other. It is one and the same reality that is finite in one aspect and infinite in another. The true life of the individual is life in the whole, and this means the broadening and deepening of it, not its extinction. "So far from it being true that in the intuition of God all distinctions vanish away, the very reverse is true; for it is by referring all things to God that we learn what a depth of meaning may lie in the globule of dew or the 'flower in the crannied wall.'"

Professor Watson thinks that only from the point of view of a monism of the right sort the problem of evil can be solved. Deism, naturalism and absolutism all fail to account for the presence of evil in the world. If God is the creator and governor of the universe, how is it that pain, suffering and sin exist in it? What comes from the hand of an infinitely wise, powerful and merciful being cannot be full of evils. Premature death, painful diseases, storms, floods, earthquakes, famines, devastating wars, and such other things seem to be irreconcilable with the view that the world is the creation of a perfect and loving God. In the case of man, in consequence of his power to remember and anticipate things, "a kind of eternity is given to the sufferings that otherwise would be momentary." In human history, again, it is hard to find evidence of the sway of reason. "In Hannibal do we not see 'the baffled heroism of an extinguished country, and in the victims of an Alva the fruitless martyrdom of a crushed faith'? Can anyone believe in the wisdom which

allowed the rude soldiery of Macedon to trample upon the civilisation of Greece? Was the triumph of the Barbarian over imperial Rome a triumph of reason? In the presence of the ruthless slaughter of St. Bartholomew's night can we retain our faith in the watchful providence of a compassionate God?"

These difficulties have been sought to be removed in various ways. Naturalism regards pain and pleasure, good and evil, as the inevitable products of the inviolable laws by which the world is governed, while absolutism looks upon them as but appearances that vanish from the highest point of view. Others again think of untying the knot by limiting the power of God or by attributing the origin of evil to the devil. None of these theories, in Professor Watson's view, is defensible. Evil is not the mere absence of good, nor is its connection with the universe external and arbitrary. It is the outcome of the finitude of a being that is in its deepest nature infinite. The root of evil lies in the finite-infinite nature of man. It consists in the individual seeking his good in narrow and circumscribed ends incompatible with his universal nature. Whatever arrests the movement of the finite spirit towards infinitude is evil. "The distinction between a good and a bad act is that between a self which seeks for self-realisation in accordance with the rational nature and one which wills a self that is irrational." The man who opposes his selfish purposes to the common good, furthers the interests of his individual self at the expense of the social self, acts in an evil manner. Not only so, but in the evolution of man's spiritual nature any lower stage is evil in comparison with the higher. "Evil, therefore, is not the abstract opposite of good, but a lower stage of good." If it

were not the case that in our finite lives the one infinite self-conscious being progressively realises itself, there would be no distinction between the ideal and the actual, the higher and the lower, and no moral evil. It is because man is capable of infinite goodness that it is possible for him to do evil. "A being who was absolutely evil would have no consciousness of evil, because he would have no consciousness of good."

How is the suppression of evil possible? How can we pass from it to good? The answer which Professor Watson gives to this question is that by only realising the ideal of life in the whole, as distinguished from a life of selfish isolation, can evil be overcome. In the person of Christ we find this ideal realised, and "in devotion and love for this concrete realisation of the ideal may be found the living principle by which the evil of human nature can be transcended." When man is permeated by the spirit of Christ, he is lifted above his finite individuality and made one with God. In this consists the atonement of evil. The doctrine of incarnation, rightly understood, "brings to light the divine element which is involved in the nature of man, and the human element inseparable from the nature of God." God and man are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive of each other. They, in spite of their distinction, are one. Identity is not abstract self-sameness. In the soul of every man God is present as its oversoul and its informing spirit. It is "by realising in his life the self-communicating spirit of God" that man can conquer evil. Its atonement means "identification with the principle of goodness, a complete surrender of the soul to God, renunciation of all selfish interests, and the persistent endeavour after the ideal of the perfect life."

Such self-surrender to God is not possible through the unaided efforts of the individual. It is only in a community in which men are banded together and help one another in the struggle against evil that the divine spirit is actively present. The religious life is the "realisation in a community or church of the divine spirit." This church is not any particular organisation, but "the true or invisible church, as composed of all who aid in the never-ceasing warfare of good with evil." Evil cannot be conquered, the higher life cannot be attained, without the combined efforts of all men. The process of man's civilisation is the process of his spiritualisation. The activities which spring from the desire to satisfy natural wants gradually lead, because of the silent working in him of the spirit of Christ, to the formation of family, society and the state. The institutions of society and the state "free him from the tyranny of his immediate impulses and make him a member of a whole larger than his individual self." Trade and commerce, science and art, literature and philosophy are developed in increasing measure within this whole. If it is asked, "where is religion in all this development of secular interests? we must answer: not here or there, and not in any transcendent region beyond the world, but now and everywhere. Religion is life in the spirit, and the spirit specialises itself in all the agencies which tend to uplift humanity."

CHAPTER X.

SIR HENRY JONES.

Sir Henry Jones, like Professor Watson, was a distinguished student of Edward Caird, of whom he speaks with reverence as "a very great teacher, one of the profoundest teachers of Philosophy given to the world in modern times." He succeeded Caird as Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow on the latter's appointment as Master of Balliol in 1892. "The burden of the trust," says he, "was almost beyond bearing; for the daily life of Edward Caird was even more flawless in its wisdom and peace than his doctrine." But in spite of this diffidence, he filled the position with great distinction for many years, and worthily maintained the traditions of the chair vacated by his illustrious predecessor. "A great teacher," says Professor G. Dawes Hicks, "Henry Jones undoubtedly was, a teacher who possessed the rare gift of being able to make his subject attractive without becoming superficial. . . . He was a subtle and penetrative thinker, and he had a keen theoretical interest in the investigation of scientific and philosophical problems" (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XX., p. 565).

In his version of idealism, Sir Henry Jones is careful to avoid two common errors—that of opposing thought to reality and that of reducing reality to mere thought.

In his criticism of Lotze he points out that to make thought and reality antithetical to each other is to render knowledge inexplicable. For knowledge implies that the operations of thought correspond to the actual phases of reality. If reality stood apart from thought, how could thought be sure of its own truth? How could it even know that there is any such thing as reality? Without abandoning the dualism of thought and reality, it is impossible to give a rational explanation of knowledge. Thought is not a subjective process added *ab extra* to reality. It is the self-comprehension of reality itself. Idealism, Sir Henry Jones maintains, "conceives that in all his thinking, however inadequate it may be, man thinks of objects. But it refuses to define these objects in such a manner as to make the problem of thinking them insoluble; that is to say, it denies the ordinary assumption that reality implies the exclusion of the ideal. It finds that knowledge is the self-revelation of reality in thought, and that our thought is the instrument of that self-revelation" (*Philosophy of Lotze*, p. 370). It is a mistake to think that the mind knows its objects through the medium of ideas. Between it and the objects that are known no world of ideas intervenes. In perception as well as in thought the mind deals directly with its objects. In and through its processes the world interprets itself.

Such a view is not to be confused with subjective idealism. The mutual implication of thought and reality does not mean the reduction of the latter to the former. Their *difference* is as essential as their unity. The error of dualism is not to insist upon this difference but to make it absolute. In knowledge they are no doubt opposed to each other, but only as

complementary aspects of the same thing. "Mind is not except in relation to its object, neither is the object except in relation to the subject. The dependence is interdependence, and the real is never only one of its aspects. It is neither natural nor spiritual if these are considered apart" (*Philosophy of Lotze*, p. 164). Sir Henry Jones is not a whit less zealous than the most ardent realist in proclaiming the reality of the world. All that he maintains is that the real is also ideal, and that idealism is true because it vindicates the reality of the world.

Like so many other idealists of his school, Sir Henry Jones has no faith in a philosophy that has no concern with the practical affairs of life. If idealism, he insists, is to find acceptance among sober men, it must prove its effectiveness as a practical creed; it must show that it can "stand the strain of a nation's practice." A philosophical theory which is not closely connected with life and is of no use to us in interpreting the facts of life is but a barren thing. The truth to which Sir Henry Jones expects philosophy to open our eyes is thus stated by him in the closing words of his address to the Australian people: "Material prosperity you will attain, I have no doubt; and it is worth attaining. Perhaps power among the nations of the world awaits you, which also is worth attaining. But a kingdom founded upon righteousness, a life amongst yourselves sanctified in all its ways by this faith in man, in the world and in God, is greater far than all these things" (*Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p. 298).

Sir Henry Jones's lectures delivered before the University of Sydney, entitled *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, open with the observation that no people, however much it may be absorbed in practical pursuits, can

altogether dispense with philosophical reflection, for to think is the nature of man. He quotes with approval Hegel's famous words in which he says that there is nothing in the universe which can withstand the power of mind. Without living a life of thought it is impossible to live well. "There is a most true sense in which the great things of life must be sought first and all other things only as addenda and secondary consequences."

The concern of philosophy is with the world within, "the world in which ideals are the only powers." It is not to be conceived as a system of abstract thoughts only, but "as the experience of the world becoming reflective and endeavouring to comprehend itself." As such it is intimately connected with life. The task of self-comprehension is not one which man can at will take up or leave alone. At a certain stage of his evolution he cannot help being reflective. "The future can be faced only in the light of the past which only reflection recovers; and the individual or a nation can achieve a new triumph only if it has learned the lessons of its own deeds." In the thoughts and actions of great men, the dominating ideas of their age find effective expression and become the means of carrying the progress of the world a stage further. The distinctive feature of human life is that it is not swayed by blind impulses only but is guided and controlled by ideas, and it is ideas, after all, that rule the world. To set them free, to make them the object of clear comprehension, is the function of the philosopher.

The expansion of life under the guidance of ideas is the process of its attaining freedom. The idea of freedom is not simple and its meaning is not intelligible unless we study the nature of man in the light

of his relation to the world and to his fellows. It is the process of its growth that reveals its nature. What it truly is is clearly seen only in the final stage of its evolution. In the beginning of social as well as of individual life, freedom is scarcely detectible. Man is then immersed in nature and is completely subject to the authority of society. He is moulded and fashioned by the ideas of his time and has nothing that he can call his own. "The general life flows around him like the deep sea and fills the shell of his spirit to overflowing." The authority of traditions and customs, however, is not opposed to reason. It is a mistake to think that while authority "lays deep the foundations of social life and cements its superstructure," reasoning only divides and disintegrates. The tradition of to-day is the result of the rational activities of yesterday. It has been built up from the conscious and purposeful activities of countless men and is the embodiment of the collective reason of the past. Reason is disintegrating only when its exercise is inadequate. When people reason well they are united in the pursuit of common ends and are able to make tradition "live again in the individual's thought and will." The beliefs and customs which are at first tamely accepted are by and by subjected to criticism and their legitimacy begins to be questioned. The conscience of the individual is opposed to the authority of society and the state. This negative attitude is apt to be mistaken for freedom. It has value not because it is in itself satisfying but because it leads to a better ordering of society, because it heralds a wider good than is embodied in existing institutions. From a spirit of mere negation nothing great has ever come. The true reformer, as distinguished from the young

and inexperienced enthusiast who "like the puppy dog must tear things to pieces while he is teething," does not seek to overturn the old order and to establish something absolutely new in its place. "He battles for the ideal which is already in the world, and against the accidental forms which cramp it. He is not less but more loyal than his fellows; and he chastises because he loves."

Nevertheless, the attitude of the reformer involves an element of negation, and in so far as it is so there necessarily ensues a conflict between him and his community. The freedom of the individual is proclaimed and the question of his relation to the outer powers is raised. This critical spirit is fatal to a corporate life lived only instinctively. The consciousness of the primacy of individuality shatters the framework of a community like the Greek city-state held together by the natural impulse of comradeship only. Old ties and loyalties are cast off, and the tendency of the individual is to go his own way unmindful of the objective order. But the outer order against which the individual is in revolt cannot be got rid of. In it he is rooted, and from it he draws the nourishment of his spiritual life. Without the laws and institutions which he wants to demolish, he would be not a human being at all but only an animal. The inner freedom of the individual must be recognised, but it has got to be reconciled with the authority of society and the state. The freedom which consists merely in emancipation is not true freedom but only the beginning of it. Real freedom must have its external forms. The inner law and the outer law are the opposed aspects of concrete social life, not two different things in irreconcilable antagonism with each other. Their con-

flict therefore cannot be permanent and final, and is but a phase, a necessary phase, of the process of the reconstruction and renewal of the life of a people.

The idea which underlies this process of restoration is that "spirit is more and higher than any material or natural force and has superior rights; and further that the natural world is itself the symbol or phenomenal manifestation of spirit." The social order does not hamper and restrict the free spirit of man which he must annul in order to preserve his liberty intact. Blind obedience to society and uncompromising hostility to it are not the only alternatives. "The law within and the law without may coincide. Man may be obedient and yet free, and the more obedient because he is free." The authority of society, rightly viewed, is the authority of the inner law unfolded into outer usages and institutions. We pursue our own good in rendering submission to it. "The will of the state and the wills of the citizens can be not two wills but one." The state that does not promote the common good is untrue to its ideal, and "the man who does not carry his city within his heart is a spiritual starveling." The highest end of the individual is not other than the end of the state, nor is the end of the state other than the end of the individual. It is therefore to the interest of the state to foster and not to crush the individuality of its members. And it is the interest of the individual to make the state strong and efficient. The former truth is forgotten by many a socialist and the latter by the individualist. A man "acquires value from his social context." His station and its duties do not limit his freedom or circumscribe his life. On the contrary, "they are its substance and steadfast joy."

Freedom, then, is not a merely negative thing. It is much more than the independence of the individual. "It is life within the state; it is the life of the state within its members, for his duties to himself are duties to the state." Positive freedom is gained only when "morality is socialised and society is moralised."

The conception of the unity and spirituality of nature, says Sir Henry Jones, is implied in the harmony of individual and social ends. It is this conception that finds expression in the best poetry and philosophy of the present age. The denial of it would take away from us the only means we have of making the facts of our spiritual life intelligible and coherent. From this alone we cannot, of course, conclude that the conception is true. The philosopher, if not the poet, must be prepared to show that it is justified by reason. It is a fair demand that what claims to be true must stand the test imposed by reason. But the idealistic philosopher also is entitled to make a counter-demand on us. He can justly say that truth is revealed not to indolent minds but only to earnest seekers. "Philosophy has no meaning for men at ease: its synthesis has no vitality except where experience is baffled by its own discrepancies." The doctrines of idealism do not seem to be convincing until other methods of reconciling the contradictions of experience have failed. Our own times, Sir Henry Jones thinks, present to idealism the opportunity it needs. Never before was the unity of life so broken, never was its self-contentment so disturbed. The hedonism in ethics and the individualism in politics which satisfied an earlier generation are no longer able to solve the complex problems of these days. We now see clearly that neither a nation nor an individual can live a separate

life. "Reluctantly but surely the whole world is becoming one mart." The creed that makes the individual self-sufficient cannot be the creed of the new age. It breaks down hopelessly in attempting to deal with present-day problems. In the sphere of religion too momentous issues have been raised. The spirit of free inquiry has shattered completely the foundations of dogmatic theology. It is no longer possible to believe in the existence of an extra-mundane deity or in the infallibility of a church or of a book. How to retain the inner meaning of outworn creeds and to make it harmonise with reason is the question. Idealism will be justified only if its principles are shown to be capable of putting us in the way of solving these problems.

We live in days when, owing to great changes in our circumstances, the principles of life which have hitherto guided us are no longer sufficient. There is nothing to take the place of the ancient formulæ which have failed. People yearn for something they do not know, and "their thoughts are like homeless winds, with moaning in their music." In such a period, demanding constructive ideals, idealism, Sir Henry Jones thinks, finds its opportunity. It heals the divisions of life not by slurring over them, but by bringing to light the principle of unity implied in them. "All things fall into one scheme and are by their very nature compacted together in one indiscerptible whole," but within this whole each thing has a definite and necessary place from which it cannot be ousted. A plurality of unrelated and mutually excluding things and a unity in which all differences are lost are both fictions. There is neither a freedom of detachment and caprice nor an order of iron necessity, neither a lonely God apart from the world which He created

once upon a time, nor a Godless world of lifeless matter governed by rigid mechanical laws, but a spiritual whole whose freedom is the truth of necessity and whose unity is the presupposition of differences. The opposites of experience "are correlative, and they exist only in and through their mutual reference." The ideal and the actual, good and evil, necessity and freedom, nature and spirit have meaning only as correlated elements of an all-embracing unity. This unity is not beyond them and does not obliterate them. It is *in* them as their element of community.

The immanence of reason in the world-order means that between the ideal and the real there is no breach of continuity. "The ideal is real and the real ideal, and our one mission as spiritual beings is to make this presupposition good within ourselves in actual experience." True knowledge consists in the discovery of an order already there in the world, and morality is the revelation of its ideal nature. "In both these activities man's function is repetitive: his thoughts and his volitions, in so far as the former is valid and the latter good, acquiesce in and reproduce the objective order." Man seeks the truth and pursues the good because he thinks that they are "eternally real in their own right" and are the very substance of the universe.

The hypothesis of the unity and spirituality of the world, observes Sir Henry Jones, "is the sanest hypothesis that the mind of man has discovered as yet." It stands all the tests of reason. "Idealism seems to do better justice to the meaning of the world than materialism, spiritual monism than pluralism. The idea of order works better than Disorder; of law than accident and caprice, of God than chance and Fate."

In his volume of Gifford lectures entitled *A Faith that Enquires*, Sir Henry Jones enters upon a fuller exposition and defence of the idealistic doctrine of the unity and spirituality of the world. True religion, he points out, rests upon this doctrine, to which a free intellectual inquiry inevitably leads us. Reason, therefore, is not the enemy but the ally of religion. "Let man seek God by the way of pure reason and he will find Him." We are, of course, told that religion is one of the things which are unintelligible. Its truths are beyond the reach of intellect. Sir Henry Jones has no sympathy with this view. "I doubt whether there can be anything unintelligible except that which is irrational, and I doubt if anything real is irrational except as misunderstood." Man's hold of truths accepted without inquiry is always insecure. Growing experience inevitably gives rise to doubts, and these doubts can only be removed by reason. It is true that religion is not the same thing as the knowledge of religion. Nevertheless, the only solid foundation of a religious faith and a religious life is religious knowledge. "Like vital organs of a living body, they derive their value and meaning, if not their very existence, from their mutual involution." Neither feeling nor intuition can be a substitute for reason in religion. The validity of an idea does not depend upon the satisfaction it brings or upon the mere intensity of the conviction with which it is held. It requires to be tested by reason. The methods of religious and philosophical knowledge are no doubt different from those of natural science, but they are essentially intellectual methods. The immanence of spirit in natural facts on which idealism insists is disclosed only to the eye of reason.

The natural sciences do not deal with reality as a whole, but confine themselves to particular aspects of it. They do not profess to give a final explanation of what is real. The reason is that the purpose of every science is limited, and it therefore restricts itself only to those features of things that are relevant to it. But what is overlooked for a particular purpose cannot be permanently ignored. "A truth omitted from any system, or a quality overlooked in any fact, batters it from without." Intelligence is thus ultimately forced to view all facts and all values as elements of a single whole. Its necessities are in the end indistinguishable from those of philosophy and religion. But like the natural sciences these "witnesses to the wholeness of reality" also are liable to be abstract. Just as the sciences are apt to forget that the natural has no meaning apart from the spiritual, so religion and philosophy, on their side, may forget that "spiritual facts are not real except when they are exemplified or realised in the things and events of time." The merely spiritual is as false an abstraction as the merely natural. It is the task of the philosophy of religion to show this, to bring to light the truth that "the secular is sacred and the natural is also spiritual." "Religion," says Sir Henry Jones, "loses its value for me if its presence and power are not made good everywhere in man's daily behaviour, in the social powers which play within him and around him, and even in the natural world, which is also bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. It must not merely be present, as one thing among many: it must be their truest meaning and highest worth" (*A Faith that Enquires*, p. 41).

The view that there is no breach of continuity between the natural and the spiritual does not mean

that there is no opposition between them. All that is contended for is that the opposition is not absolute. All contrasts fall within an all-embracing unity, and the contrast between nature and spirit, finite and infinite, is no exception. It is a fundamental mistake to suppose that while science has to do with the sensible and particular facts of nature, religion is concerned with the infinite and perfect beyond the finite world. Science and religion both deal with the same world, although from different points of view. Perfection does not exclude imperfection and evil, but somehow includes it within itself. The contrast of them must in no way be minimised, but it must be perceived that "the contrasting terms are in truth elements within a whole, and that they neither do nor can exist otherwise."

The unity "behind or rather within the contrasted elements" must not be overlooked. Nowhere is the interdependence of facts more evident than in man's spiritual life. The correlation and interaction of knowledge, morality, art and religion are as great as their contrast. The secular and the religious are complementary aspects of one whole. "To sever the religious from the secular life, or philosophy from common sense, as is too often done, is to take away the kernel and leave only the shell. Except as the consecration of the secular life and the new use of inner and external circumstance, religion has no value or function, and, except as the reflective reinterpretation of experience, philosophy has no cogency or truth" (*A Faith that Enquires*, p. 73). On the other hand, secular life is utterly valueless if it is severed from religion. Take away from worldly affairs the religious belief that sanctifies them and nothing of significance remains.

"Both believers and sceptics would be less ardent in their advocacy of their severed regions, the one all sacred and the other all secular, if they faced the meaning of the exclusive contrast somewhat more fully and frankly." They would then perceive that although the contrast is not to be minimised, it rests on a deeper unity.

The faith of the religious man which the experiences of life continually verify, and which, according to Sir Henry Jones, is analogous to the hypothesis of science, is that because God exists "this world of ours, and the most wild and incalculable facts within it, namely the lives of men, are factors in a system, to be judged not by themselves but as parts of the system into which they fit and which amply justifies them." For the sceptic who denies this, "the whole order of the universe must collapse." To the objection that a hypothesis is only a theory and a conjecture on its trial, liable to be overthrown by facts it cannot explain or be supplanted by a more satisfactory hypothesis, while religion is essentially faith and experience that has the power to transform character, Sir Henry Jones's answer is that religious conceptions, like all other conceptions, must stand their trial. Their claim to validity must be judged by reason. Hypotheses are not mere irresponsible guesses but "fundamental principles which give systematic coherence to facts." The importance of religious experience as a fact is not to be denied. Wanting in it, the non-religious man is not entitled to express any opinion on the subject. He is "a mere looker on." But experience, in order to be valid, must be shown to be objective and universal. "The subjective side of experience furnishes no test. Men have been deeply moved by bad religious beliefs and they

have done 'heroic deeds' of the most atrocious kind." Reason alone can subject individual experiences to criticism and reveal their objective side. Like the hypothesis of science, religious faith also needs verification, and that verification comes as it is seen with increasing clearness that the course of the world is not consistent with the view that at the heart of things there is no principle of reason. The belief that the order of the universe is due to mere chance is "unrivalled in its stupidity."

Sir Henry Jones discusses at length the relation between morality and religion. He points out that in the course of their evolution they have often been in conflict with each other. Morality, it has been held, is secular and is concerned with the affairs of everyday life, while religion is sacred and a matter of the higher life. Their interests being different, the relation between them is one of mutual indifference. But human life cannot be broken up into fragments in this way. It is a unity manifested in its different activities and purposes. However different morality and religion may seem to be at first sight, they grow from a common root and are interdependent. Both have authority over the whole of life. The chief difficulty of reconciling them arises from the fact that while morality implies the distinction of persons as responsible and free beings, the very essence of religion is to break down the barriers of individuality. The moral man seeks to realise himself, to make his personality more and more perfect, but the religious man becomes one with, is lost in, the object of his worship. The moral life, however, does not mean isolation. Man is free, but is at the same time continuous with his spiritual and natural environment. He is free "not

from his world, but by means of his world." Severance from the world spells utter helplessness. The world is focussed in his consciousness and "is active in and as his will." He is dependent absolutely upon it, of which he is a part, but, at the same time, he reacts upon it with the very powers that are borrowed from it in his own unique manner, and moulds and fashions it according to his plan and purpose. He is therefore a free individual. On the other hand, the religious man "loses himself in God, but only because in that act he has found himself." Oneness with God does not mean the cancellation but the expansion of the finite self. The antagonism of morality and religion is in principle overcome when it is seen that "at the heart of morality there is a positive relation to the universe and its divine principle; at the heart of religion there is a limitless exaltation of the value of the finite personality and a deepening of the effective powers of individuality."

Religion consists in the identification of man with his ideal, with what he conceives to be the highest and best. "The separate, independent, solitary self, facing the responsibilities of its own errors, has been left behind. Its place is taken by a self that is flooded, inundated with its consciousness of God." Instead of the old exclusive self, there is the self that can say "I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me." But from the moral point of view the self retains its distinctive being and struggles to realise an ideal that is not but is to be. Everything done by it falls short of what ought to be; what it pursues it never attains. As morality never succeeds in attaining the ideal which for ever eludes its grasp, it, as compared with religion, may seem to be a failure. It is true that morality

is an unending process, but it is a process *within* a perfect whole. "That which is in process, or, in other words, that which *is* process, or active energy, is at its goal all the time that it is operative." The ideal is not something far off, awaiting to be realised in the remote future. "It is present already as the ultimate reality which manifests itself in the facts and events." Those who separate the ideal from the real "are not dealing with facts but with abstract aspects of them." The process of the real is the manifestation of the ideal. To understand this is to realise that a living religion is not concerned with an empty ideal divorced from facts, but always finds expression in practical activities, and a living morality has for its presupposition the moral being's oneness with the ideal which also is truly real.

The merely moral world is the world of the individualist, described by Bosanquet as the world of claims and counter-claims. Its fundamental characteristic is the isolation and independence of the individuals held together by merely external relations. The claims that demand satisfaction and the duties that are enforced are alike the private affairs of self-sufficient individuals. Such a world, in Bosanquet's words, is full of hazards and hardships. By his own strength no one can succeed in doing his duty or in getting his rights. Separated from one another and from God, men are utterly helpless beings. They are cut off from the power which alone can raise them above themselves and enable them to triumph over sin and evil. The individualist's world, therefore, is essentially one of failures and disappointments. The religious consciousness accepts this conclusion, and bids us turn to God and to hope for justice and reparations for the un-

merited sufferings of this life in another world. But the known must be our clue to the unknown. If the present world is so imperfect, what guarantee is there that any other world will be better? The whole difficulty, Sir Henry Jones thinks, arises from our misinterpretation of the actual social world in which we live. It is not at all an individualistic world in which "men and women are separate and distinct and exclusive, and clink against one another like seaside pebbles." Because *some* relations into which men enter are external and temporary, it is assumed that *all* relations are of this nature. It is forgotten that the very distinction of individuals, their rivalry and competition, presuppose fundamental affinities. It is their universal nature that at once keeps them apart and brings them together in social relations. "Men no more come out of their particularity in order to form society than the leaves of a tree come together and fix themselves upon its branches." If this is true, "if the good man is good just because he has given his self away, dedicated it, and *saved* it by the dedication," there can be no antagonism between morality and religion. "Morality becomes the active operation of the best, that is, the religious life."

The real world then is not one of claims and counterclaims only, but "a world in which morality is reinterpreted in the light of religion, and in which man is recognised as having claims and fulfilling them (or as a being with rights and duties) because he is already in the service of the Best." What, on one side, is man's own self-conscious deed, his constant effort to realise the moral ideal, is, on another side, God's working in him, "the infinite in the process of demonstrating his infinitude." The movement of the world is "*both*

moral and religious, *both* human and divine, *both* finite and infinite."

The faith of the religious man, his conception of the spirituality of the universe, is not a generalisation from experience. It, in Sir Henry Jones's view, is the fundamental hypothesis to which reflection on our own nature and experience inevitably leads us. Particular facts can only furnish tests of this hypothesis. If it is asked whether the existence of evil is consistent with the hypothesis, Sir Henry Jones's answer is that the mere fact that we are unable to reconcile certain experiences of life with divine reason and benevolence is no reason for drawing sceptical conclusions. A law of nature discovered by science is not disproved if we fail to detect its operation in a given instance. That the law is valid in other cases is sufficient reason for believing that it is valid in the present case also. From the failure to trace the law we cannot pass to the conclusion that it does not exist. Similarly, our limited knowledge, our ignorance of the true nature of things, prevents us from discerning the working of a rational and benevolent power in particular occurrences, but it does not justify us in saying that the universe is irrational. The sceptic's hypothesis does not work. It absolutely fails to account for the order and beauty of nature. It does not furnish an alternative to spiritualistic idealism, which alone holds the field.

In judging whether things are good or evil, it is essential that we should use the right standard of judgment, which is not worldly prosperity but the spiritual progress of man. Whatever contributes to the development of a virtuous character is good, what hinders it is evil. Natural events in themselves are neither good nor bad. From this point of view, what

are regarded as natural evils are very often blessings in disguise. It is in conflict with the antagonistic forces of nature that the spiritual powers of man are evoked. "Prosperity before now has ruined men, and calamity has been the making of them." The world in which we live has but one supreme purpose. It is "to furnish mankind with the opportunity for having goodness." To this end natural evils are very often powerful means. Sir Henry Jones, however, believes that "in the long run right behaviour brings physical and material well-being, and wrong behaviour the opposite."

But moral evil presents a more formidable difficulty. Its value is intrinsic. It cannot, like natural evil, be regarded as a means to a further end. Does not then its existence imply that either God is not good or He is not omnipotent? In dealing with this difficulty Sir Henry Jones points out that in a changeless world there would be no room for either moral good or moral evil. But there is no such thing as static perfection. "Change is the law of things," particularly of living and self-conscious beings. The universe is a single never-ending process in which "the variety of its activities so fit into one another as to constitute and maintain the unity of the whole." In the last resort it "is the scene of a self-manifesting perfection." In the process of man's life it operates "in such a way as to permit the possibility of moral choice and therefore of moral evil." The world would not be spiritual if the possibility of moral choice were excluded. It is a school of virtue because man is permitted to choose between good and evil. The existence of moral evil is incidental to the divine love which has given man the power to attain what is highest and best by

the exercise of his own free choice. Moral evil "is thus justified in the sense that its possibility is necessary as a condition of what is best." But it exists in order to be finally overcome. "When it comes full round, [it] destroys itself, leaving behind it distrust of itself and incentives to another way of life." The case of hardened sinners to whom evil has become good only shows that our faith in the ultimate triumph of good is not always verified in our actual experience. But our observation of things is most incomplete. We have not the whole of reality before us. How can we say that divine love has failed to redeem a sinner that dies unrepentant when it is remembered that there is no reason to think that death ends all? There is nothing to shake our conviction that moral evil "will prove to be self-contradictory and ultimately self-deleting," and that "the good man acts more and more consistently with his own rational nature and in accordance with the scheme to which he belongs."

In the philosophical conception of the Absolute the justification of religious faith is to be found. Sir Henry Jones identifies the God of religion with the Absolute of philosophy. The Absolute is the harmonious whole as whose constituent elements finite facts are indissolubly linked with one another. It does not extinguish but cherishes and sustains the differences of its members. Room for them is left within its unity. Wholeness does not mean a "blank sameness, as of ultimate substance in which all differences disappear." It is the living unity that finds expression in the processes of finite objects, the spiritual reality that is revealed in the order of nature, and more fully in the co-operative activities of human beings making for perfection. The Absolute therefore is a self-conscious

individuality immanent in the world. It "shares in the activities of the finite object, and is a doer and sufferer in the world's life." "To him, then, who would know God, the answer of philosophy would be: Observe this never-resting universe as it moves from change to change, nor forget the troubled, tragic, sin-stained, shameless elements in the world of man, and you will find God working his purpose and manifesting himself through it all." The perfection of the Absolute is not static. "For it to be at all is to be operative, outgoing, losing itself to find itself immersed in the universe and returning to itself through the universe." The Absolute is "a best in process," "a moving perfection." In its very nature there is reason for the existence of the world. "An Absolute without a world is empty nothingness, just as a world without the Absolute is impossible. Nature is the experience, the living operation of the Absolute, and the Absolute is not only omnipresent in it, but real in virtue of it."

At first sight it may seem that the conception of man as a higher revelation of God than nature is incompatible with his freedom and responsibility. We are too apt to suppose that freedom means isolation. The independence of man is not inconsistent with but is the correlative of his essential union with his fellow-beings and God. The differences between man and man and between man and God are not to be ignored, but the assertion of difference does not imply the denial of unity. The unity of all things and their difference from each other are not mutually exclusive. They are two sides of the same thing. The "either—or attitude" has no justification, and is the result of abstract thinking. Everywhere in the world we find "unities

existing in and by virtue of differences and differences deriving their very nature from the unities." If self-conscious individuals are independent of one another, it is because in them a comprehensive principle of unity is manifested. "The unity and independence of men not only exist together, but grow by means of each other." In the same manner the self of the religious man is "given utterly away to the object of its devotion," but "it is recovered at the same instant." It is a single act and cannot be broken up. "The dedication is not possible without the simultaneous consciousness of a purified, strengthened, 'saved' self; nor these without the dedication. To give ourselves to God is to have God with us and in us." From this point of view, the freedom of man is seen to be in no way inconsistent with his oneness with God.

"For science," says Sir Henry Jones, "there is one universe. It forms a single system in which all things have their place and function; and it implies one ultimate reality, whose process of self-manifestation the universe is." Apart from this process of self-manifestation God cannot exist. If "a thing is what it does," if it is not "a being which lurks somewhere in the background behind its deeds, and is therefore unknown and unknowable," and if the universe can only be explained by being referred to the Absolute, it follows that "no option remains except to identify the Absolute with the world-process." The process is within the Absolute whole and implies time. But time is not mere succession. It presupposes permanence. It is "eternity breaking out into an endless succession of nows." Reality is revealed in temporal process and is not immobile and changeless. To say this is not to make process ultimate. "It is one thing to say

that everything that is moves or changes, and another that it consists of motion and change. Motion, change, taken by themselves are abstractions. They are not reality, but ways in which reality exists and behaves."

Sir Henry Jones denies that there is any such thing as contingencies in the universe. If by the contingent is meant the unexplained, then, of course, there are numberless facts which may be called so, but if by it we understand what is irrational and inexplicable, then its admission "plays havoc with philosophic theory and religious faith." If the theory of idealism that "reality constitutes one system, that the system is all-inclusive, that within it all its parts have free play and full function, and that these parts or elements so agree as to be rationally coherent" is valid, contingencies must be ruled out.

Sir Henry Jones subjects to elaborate criticism Bradley's view that the God of religion is not the Absolute of philosophy. The Absolute, according to Bradley, is related to nothing, because it is all-inclusive, but religion implies a practical relation, and, therefore, distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. This does not mean that there are two supreme beings, God and the Absolute, but that the one ultimate reality may be viewed in two ways—as the unity that transcends the distinction of God and man and as the unity that is realised in their distinction and relation. In religion the supreme unity is set over against the finite self, and therefore, as Bradley says, becomes something less than the universe. But the finite self, which from the point of view of religion is distinguished from God, is in reality included in His being. The same reality is, in one point of view God, in another the Absolute. Sir Henry Jones does injustice to Bradley in supposing

that he regards God and the Absolute as two different entities. After all, the whole question is one of nomenclature only. If by God you mean the ultimate reality beyond all distinctions then God is the same as the Absolute; but if, as is ordinarily the case, God is distinguished from and conceived as related to the finite self, then He is not the Absolute. Bradley's point is that however much the distinction between God and man may be necessary for practical purposes, it is finally untenable. From the philosophical standpoint, the Absolute supersedes God. The two conceptions cannot be kept rigidly apart. They are constantly shading off into each other. But, in theory, it is wrong not to distinguish them.

Sir Henry Jones lays the utmost stress on the immanence of God in the universe and on His perfection as involving process. "To me," he says, "the idea of God as the *perfect in process*, as a movement from splendour to splendour in the spiritual world, as an eternal achievement and never-ceasing realisation of the ideals of goodness in human history, is endlessly more attractive and, I believe, more consistent with our experience in the present world than the idea of a Divine Being who sits aloof from the world-process, eternally contemplating his own perfections. Love, at any rate, is directly and finally inconsistent with such an aloofness. And the religion of love, which Christianity is, undoubtedly identifies the destiny of God and man: God suffers in our sufferings, and rejoices in our joys. He is our Father; and He moves with us, because He moves in us" (*A Faith that Enquires*, p. 360).

Sir Henry Jones rightly believes that if the principles of idealism are to justify themselves, they must be

capable of throwing light on the nature and structure of society. Much confusion, he points out, has arisen from the attempt to interpret society by means of categories which are not applicable to it. "To every material we must bring the appropriate categories; to every lock its own key." Human society is not composed of mutually exclusive beings like material objects. "It is a rationally compacted system of inter-acting personalities." From the point of view of mechanism, therefore, we cannot understand what it is. Nor are biological conceptions like 'struggle for existence,' 'survival of the fittest' more helpful. They imply that the evolution of human beings is conditioned by their antagonism and conflict. Reason or self-consciousness alone furnishes a clue to the nature of society. Self-conscious beings do not exclude but interpenetrate one another. Mine is made possible by Thine, the good that is personal is realised with the good that is common. Society has one life, one mind, one will, which at the same time is the life, the mind, the will of every member of it. It is the product of reason, the exhibition of reason, and its structure is rational throughout.

The social order is man's creation maintained by his activities for the realisation of his own powers. We cannot pursue our private ends without taking account of one another. Actual experience shows how true the doctrine of the brotherhood of man is. The nature of the individual is through and through social. Man depends as completely on society as society depends on man. It is not that we begin with an individual and then *add* to him his relations to his fellows. Apart from these relations, he is nothing. Remove from his personality its social content and there remains only an

empty form. "As there is no cell or fibre of his physical organism which has not been borrowed and elaborated from his natural environment, so there is no element of his individuality which he does not owe to the social world within and upon which alone his rational nature can be sustained" (*Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p. 278). The personality of man is deepened and perfected as he consciously identifies himself with his social environment and makes it part and parcel of his own being. The converse of this proposition is equally true. If the individual is essentially social, society also is real only in the individuals. Suppress the individual, destroy his freedom, and the very foundations of society are undermined. "The welfare of society depends on providing for the individual the means for the most vigorous growth of an independent personality—means which include, amongst other things, full rights of private property and full scope for private enterprise" (*Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p. 273).

Individual and social ends grow together and are inseparable aspects of one whole. They are in conflict only when society as well as the individual are in contradiction with themselves. As social evolution proceeds, the functions of the individual are increased side by side with the functions of the community as a whole. The attempt to draw a line between the sphere of the individual and that of society on the assumption that any enlargement of the one is a corresponding curtailment of the other is absurd. It is the result of our being swayed by mechanical conceptions. In the domain of organic existence, mutual exclusion is made possible by mutual inclusion. "There what the part gains it gains both by means of, and for, the whole;

and what the whole achieves makes achievement on the part of the members all the more easy." The rights of an individual are not mere private claims but universal in their nature, and their expansion is the indispensable condition of social growth. "Society has no right which is so unconditioned as the right to make the most of its members; and the individual has no right which can compare with his right to do his duty, which is to fulfil his part as a member of society, and therefore to serve society" (*Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p. 248).

The practical conclusion which Sir Henry Jones draws from all this is that the life of the good man must be a life of social service. We must pay our social debts because the extent of our borrowings is so great. Social service does not mean doing something extraordinary or heroic. "The station which the good man fills may be small and his duties may have a narrow range—his contribution to the world's good may be 'a widow's mite.' But if the duty is well done and done as a duty, the sovereign value of the supreme good dwells in it. The good man at his post knows that he has the Moral Universe at his back, and the consciousness of it gives him a strength which cannot be overcome" (*Principles of Citizenship*, p. 70).

Socialism has no terror for Sir Henry Jones if by it we understand the extension of corporate activity. Both the opponents and the supporters of socialism take it for granted that the extension of the powers of the state means the curtailment of individual liberty. If this assumption were correct, socialism would be wholly indefensible. Anything that weakens the individual is an evil. It is through the activities and intelligence of

the individual that society attains its own end. And the end of society is also the ultimate end of the individual. The controversy about individualism and socialism arises from the failure to rise above the distinction of mine and thine. It is not seen that this distinction is possible only within the unity of society. The institution of property seems to lend support to the theory of the individualist. What is my property cannot also be the property of others. From the possession of what I own others are inevitably excluded. This, however, is not the whole truth. To convert a thing into property, a man must not merely hold it, but must secure the recognition of his ownership by society. The existence of property depends upon free individuals mutually recognising each other's rights. The stoutest champion of individual rights expects the state to help him in safeguarding his rights. This means that individual rights are the expression of the social will. On the other hand, the efficiency of society depends upon its according independence to its members. It lives and has its being in them and is an abstraction apart from them. The extension of state and civic enterprise, therefore, does not mean the curtailment of private enterprise. Each in developing strengthens the other. Increase of social organisation goes hand in hand with the development of individual freedom and power. "Owing to the higher organisation and the enlarged functions of the modern state, the individual is a much more powerful agent than the member of a crude community. In other words, owing to the system of institutions which the state comprises and sustains, he can conceive and carry out purposes utterly beyond the reach of the latter: he is a deeper and more effective personality. The modern state is

a rich treasury of resources upon which he can draw, and its organisation constitutes a most powerful machinery on which he can lay his hands. It supplies him with the means of a larger life, and extends and deepens the significance of his individuality" (*Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p. 144). The fact that the individualist does not seek to destroy social order and the socialist to do away with the freedom of the individual shows that their respective ideals admit of adjustment and reconciliation. Freedom without social solidarity and order is as impossible as the latter without the former. Individualism and socialism both are one-sided representations of a fuller truth. The former does not see that personal liberty grows only on the soil of social co-operation and effort, while the latter fails to perceive that state control and organisation has value because it increases the efficiency of the individual. Increase of the power of the state is only another side of the increase of the power of the individual. The man versus the state theory does not see that "the state as a single organism grows in power, even as its citizens acquire freedom; and that the more free and enterprising the citizens, the more sure the order and the more extensive the operations of the state." In organising its citizens the state does not reduce them to nullity but gives them a more effective personality. Organisation, of course, is impossible without limitation, but "what is limited for the individual is not his freedom but his caprice, not his power to do right but his inclination to do wrong."

It must not be concluded, however, that state interference is always and in all circumstances desirable. The sole consideration is the furtherance of the common good, and the intervention of the state is desirable only

when by means of it the well-being of the community as a whole, as distinguished from that of a class, is likely to be secured. If private enterprise can serve this purpose with equal efficiency, it is wrong to interfere with it. All that Sir Henry Jones wants us to be clear about is that the limits of state control cannot be fixed by any *a priori* individualistic theory. We cannot say to the state, "thus far and no further." Whether in a particular instance private enterprise should give place to corporate activity is a question which must be decided by a careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case. Whichever policy promotes the freedom and efficiency of the citizens is good. The power which it may be inexpedient to give to a weak and inefficient state may be safely exercised by one that is strong and intelligent. The rights of personality must be jealously guarded, but, at the same time, it must be remembered that "the sovereignty of the individual's will and its sacredness come from its identification with a wider will." Personal rights are indissolubly linked with the rights of others, and all rights have their root in the general good. "The individual can resist the will of the community or the extension of the functions of his city or state only when he has identified his own will with a will that is more universal, more concrete, and the source of higher imperatives than either." No man is justified in disregarding the authority of the state solely for his private advantage.

If "the state is an individual whose members are also individuals, one will in which many wills are united more or less freely and fully, and which has for its object the common or universal good," it follows that the permanent care of the state is to educate its citizens and that the state itself is, in the last resort, an educational

institution. The state that neglects to develop the manhood of its citizens abdicates its chief function. If it is said that character or the material out of which it is fashioned is something which an individual brings with him into the world and that the state has no power over it, Sir Henry Jones's answer is that character and environment cannot be dissociated from each other. "What we call character from one point of view, we call environment from another. Character and environment are not even separate elements, far less are they independent, isolated, externally interacting objects." In the self-consciousness and character of a man, his world, his environment is inwardised, and the world is the content of his self and character. There is nothing in the outer world which is not sustained by his inner nature and nothing in his inner nature which is not derived from the outer world. The self and the world are the inner and outer aspects of the same thing. Through its control over the external circumstances of life, the state can mould and fashion the character of its citizens. But the task must be undertaken in the plastic period of life, before the environment has definitely become the content of the self. While character is in the process of being formed, much may be done to develop its possibilities, but once it is formed, all attempts to change it prove unsuccessful.

Sir Henry Jones is not disposed to withhold any power from the state which it is necessary for it to exercise in order to promote the moral education of its citizens. "The state may do *anything* that makes for the good life of its citizens, and nothing else; and the citizen may claim anything that makes for the same good life, and nothing else—always bearing in mind that the good life is a common good, the well-being

at once of the individual citizen and of the state" (*Principles of Citizenship*, p. 149).

From Sir Henry Jones's point of view, the revolutionary reformer is as little justified as the hidebound conservative. None but those who understand the good that is already embodied in social arrangements, who perceive that what is to be must be continuous with what is, can be effective reformers. "The reform of the state, and of the social life within it, must be based on loyalty; loyalty must rest on reverence, and we can revere only that which we believe to be in some ways great and good." To reform is in many cases simply to continue the work already done. Nothing new can be introduced which the old is unable to assimilate. The action of the great reformer is never determined by "shallow, abstract, mischievous thought that is not in touch with facts." He comes not to destroy but to fulfil. But, on the other hand, the good is always dynamic. Its embodiment is never complete. For the very preservation of the identity of society, its constant transformation according to the requirements of the times is necessary. Change must be orderly and gradual, but without change no conservation is possible. Evolving things remain identical with themselves "only through the constant transformation of every cell and fibre within them." The demand of idealism, says Sir Henry Jones, is that existing institutions are to be preserved only by being moralised. "It would, to take one instance, leave the social reformer no rest till he had made the workshop, the mine, the counting-house, the shipyard into moral institutions." The aim of idealism is to transform every occupation into "the expression of a free choice of mode of life, and the outlet of devoted energies," to make "the life of

citizenship a mode of divine service." "Such a social revolution as *that*, even although it left the external relations between men just as they stand, would reach sufficiently deep to satisfy the most ardent reformer."

CHAPTER XI.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Professor J. H. Muirhead, long connected with the University of Birmingham and general editor of the Library of Philosophy, has written more on ethics, politics and social philosophy than on metaphysics proper. He has a very vivid sense of the close connection between philosophy and the practical affairs of life, and is insistent in preaching that apart from life philosophy has very little significance. As the theory of reality, philosophy seeks to interpret life, to understand it, and a life whose meaning is understood is a fuller thing than a life which is merely lived. We philosophise "not to get away from the facts into some pure abstract region, but to get close to them, to make them more of facts to us, to broaden them out through understanding their bearings" (*Philosophy and Life*, p. 8). Imbued with this conviction, it is but natural that the main attention of Professor Muirhead should be directed more to the practical applications of philosophy than to its purely theoretical aspects.

Professor Muirhead has not given us any detailed exposition of idealism. He, in general agreement with Green and Caird, holds that there is no division between knowledge and reality. The very aim of our knowing activity, he argues, proves the identity of ultimate reality (*vide* the essay on the "Goal of Knowledge" in

Philosophy and Life, p. 205). The ideal of knowledge is to "embrace reality in all its parts or details," to comprehend fully the relation of the component parts of the world to one another and to the whole. This ideal is operative more or less clearly in all actual knowledge. We are never satisfied with the mere accumulation of facts, but always seek to reduce them to interconnected elements of an all-inclusive and harmonious whole. That such is the ideal of knowledge shows that facts and ideas, the particulars of experience and the universals of thought, cannot be kept apart from each other. The existence of things in time and space is only an element in their reality. Their full reality consists in their being the embodiment of thought. This does not mean that things are reducible to abstract concepts. Thought is not simply a system of such concepts, but a unity realised in all differences, including the differences of subject and object, the universal and the particular. It comprehends all elements of experience within itself.

In his short but very suggestive article on idealism in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th edition, Professor Muirhead carefully distinguishes idealism from various other doctrines with which it is liable to be confused. The central truth of idealism is that knowledge or experience is a whole in which "the two factors of subject and object stand in a relation of active interdependence on each other as warp and woof." A thing-in-itself is an absolutely self-contradictory notion. Equally so is a subject unrelated to the object. "To seek for the true self in any region into which its opposite in the form of a not-self does not enter is to grasp a shadow." As the object owes its existence to the constructive activity of the subject, so the subject

exists by virtue of the activity by which the object is constructed.

Idealism, therefore, is opposed to dualism, which regards mind and matter as two distinct entities, to the doctrine which usually passes for idealism and reduces all reality to the states of the mind, and to realism which regards matter unrelated to mind or some unknown power whose manifestations mind and matter are, but which itself is neither, as the ultimate reality. According to it "absolute reality is to be sought not beyond the region of experience, but in the fullest and most harmonious statement of the facts of our experience." It is a mistake to suppose that idealism ignores experience and believes that there is some *a priori* path to truth. "In reality it stands for a more thoroughgoing and consistent application of the test of experience." Experience, it shows, does not mean "a pure unadulterated sense experience, but contains a universal element as its essential factor."

Professor Muirhead recognises that idealism no longer holds the position of undisputed supremacy which it did in the last century. There has recently been a strong reaction against it. It has been attacked from two different sides—by those who think that it subverts the reality of the external world and by those who imagine that "in the *statuesque* world of ideas into which it introduces us it leaves no room for the element of movement and process which recent psychology and metaphysics alike have taught us underlies all life." As regards the first charge, Professor Muirhead has no difficulty in showing that it is the outcome of misapprehension. Modern idealism is fully at one with dualism in insisting that "in all knowledge we are in touch not merely with the self and its passing states,

but with a real object which is different from them." There is no question of minimising the emphasis on the object. All that idealism contends for is that the object is comprised and has a definite place within the circle of experience. As it differs from Berkleianism in proclaiming the reality of the external world, so it differs from Spinozism in maintaining the reality of differences within it. To the monist's assertion of a pure undifferentiated unity the dualist opposes the assertion of absolute difference. "But if it is an error to treat the unity of the world as its only real aspect, it is equally an error to treat its differences as something ultimately irreducible." The dualist is right in laying stress upon the reality of differences, but he does not see that all differences, in the last resort, presuppose a unity, "that *in* which and that *by* which they differ from one another." Everywhere experience discloses multiplicity in unity.

The second charge is more serious. Professor Muirhead does not deny that idealism would be an entirely untenable theory if it really left no room for freedom, movement and change in the universe. But "the guarantee of freedom is to be sought for not in the denial of law, but in the whole nature of mind and its relation to the structure of experience." Without mind an orderly world is no more possible than is mind without the world. "In interpreting its environment first as a world of things that seem to stand in a relation of exclusion to one another and to itself, then as a rational system governed by rigid mechanical necessity, the mind can yet feel that in its very opposition the world is akin to it, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh." Freedom is to be saved not by denying the necessary order of nature but by finding

in it its own content. What the arguments of the critics of idealism suggest, says Professor Muirhead, is "not a rash departure from the general point of view of idealism, but a cautious inquiry into the possibility of reaching a conception of the world in which place can be found at once for the idea of unity and determination and of movement and freedom." The unity of the world is, for idealism, a spiritual unity. It conceives of the infinite as a universal spirit that realises itself in the finite "not as accidents or imperfections of it, but as its essential form." These, therefore, must be viewed as possessing a life of their own, as self-determining and creative. The activity of a subject does not merely reproduce what already exists. It involves the creation of something new, although the new grows out of the old. "Oldness, sameness, permanence of principle and direction, these must be, otherwise there is *nothing*; but newness of embodiment, existence, realisation also, otherwise nothing *is*." The perfection of the infinite, therefore, is not static; it involves origination, movement and change. The eternal includes the time process. Apart from the world and its processes, the finite selves and their activities, the infinite is nothing. The mistake of those who regard the finite and temporal world as an illusion is to be removed "not by giving up the idea of the infinite, but by ceasing to think of the infinite as of a being endowed with a static perfection which the finite will merely reproduces, and definitely recognising the forward effort of the finite as an essential element in its self-expression." Human life does not consist in an idle reproduction of a perfection already attained independently of it. We are as necessary to God as God is to us. It is through our efforts and

achievements that God's purpose is fulfilled. "If it be true that the finite spirit lives and moves and has its being in the infinite spirit, it is no less true that the infinite spirit lives and moves and has its being in the finite" (*The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, p. 354).

Professor Muirhead's ethical theory is, in the main, that of Green and Caird. It is briefly, though very lucidly, set forth in his *Elements of Ethics*. Professor Muirhead is very modest in his estimate of the value of this book. "Take my advice," he says, "and do not read *elements* and *outlines*. You may be sure that this advice is quite disinterested, because I have written elements myself. Go to the great writers" (*Philosophy and Life*, p. 18). The student of ethics may be assured that if he takes this advice he will decidedly be a loser. Nowhere else will he find the ethics of idealism outlined more succinctly and more clearly.

Professor Muirhead begins by pointing out that the problems of ethics arise when the established usages and modes of life are no longer sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the new age. Doubt is thrown on the validity of custom when in consequence of the growth of a nation there is no longer any congruity between its habits and the new interests which have been awakened. Old ways of life have to be modified to suit new needs. "The new wine has to be poured into the old bottles." Ethics helps us in understanding how this can be effectively done. It neither blindly accepts nor disdainfully rejects the older forms of thought and life, but seeks to interpret them, to discover the reason that underlies them.

Ethics is not, like psychology, concerned with conduct as a fact, but with judgments passed upon conduct.

Its aim is "to bring these judgments into organic relation with one another and with the known facts of experience; to strip them of their apparent arbitrariness, and clothe them with the livery of reason, by showing them to be necessary postulates of that organism of relations which we know as human society." Judgments upon conduct imply a standard of judgment and involve "the assumption that man is not merely a part of nature and the blind servant of her purposes, but is *conscious* of being a part, and of being subject to her laws." But such consciousness is impossible without a reference to the world as a whole. Ethics, therefore, is forced to consider the question of man's place in the universe. It is inseparable from metaphysics.

Conduct, which is the object of moral judgment, is willed action. It is to be distinguished from all kinds of involuntary action. Will is not a faculty belonging to the self, but "is the self apprehended as consciously moving towards the realisation of an object of interest." It "differs from conduct as the inward does from the outward aspect of the same fact." The object of interest which the self seeks to realise is the motive. It is desired because it has value for the self. Motive, therefore, is organically related to the will and does not, as determinists imagine, influence it from without. What the motive is to be depends on self and character. As character is the habit of will, judgment on conduct is also judgment on character.

Is an action judged for its motive or for its results? The controversy on this subject, Professor Muirhead thinks, is largely due to the ambiguity of the terms employed. If we carefully fix the meanings of the terms 'motive' and 'consequent,' we should see that

"the antithesis upon which the controversy turns is in reality a false one." In judging an act only its foreseen results can be taken into consideration. The whole of the foreseen results is intended, but only that part of it for the sake of which the act is done is the motive. "The consequences of the intermediate steps or the means adopted, though part of the intention, are not motive." Intention thus includes motive, which "is the ultimate consequent as apprehended and desired." If then we understand by 'motive' not a mere feeling but "the end with which the will identifies itself in the action, and by so doing reveals its character," and by 'consequent' only that part of the anticipated results for the sake of which the action is done, it is quite immaterial whether we say that the moral judgment is passed upon the motive or upon the consequent.

In judging conduct we apparently use two different standards, that of a law and that of an end. But Professor Muirhead shows that the former is subordinate to the latter. The ultimate standard of judgment is the end, which alone is intrinsically desirable. Laws are mere means to the attainment of the end. Although the earliest conception of morality is obedience to law, it is impossible to rest in this conception. Separate and independent laws cannot be all of equal authority. They are bound to come into conflict with each other. Nor is it possible to provide a rule for every conceivable situation in life. Even if this could be done, it would "mean the destruction of morality, which would thus be reduced to the unintelligent application of authoritative commands."

These difficulties have been sought to be obviated by conceiving of the moral law as an inner law revealed

by conscience. Intuitionist moralists maintain that conscience is an underived faculty whose judgments are intuitive and universally valid. Its authority is absolute and incapable of being questioned. But Professor Muirhead shows that the objections to intuitionism are no less serious than those to which the conception of morality as obedience to external law is open. The element of reason and the element of feeling in conscience may not be in harmony with each other. The judgments of conscience may be as much in conflict as external laws. It is by no means the case that men in all ages and countries are agreed in their views about right and wrong. And, finally, the law revealed by conscience is no more internal than the traditional codes. "To be 'internal' in the sense required, the law must be seen to be really our own, not merely the law of some *part* of us." The law which the higher self imposes upon the lower self is still external to the lower self.

Professor Muirhead holds that the intuitionist theory represents "a point midway between the view which identifies morality with obedience to a code of commandments received from without and that which seeks to find in it the expression of some intelligible principle." Morality is to be conceived as "free obedience to a law imposed by man as a self-conscious unity upon the various subordinate elements of his own nature." We must go beyond the conception of the standard as law and substitute for it the idea of an end. "Moral judgments do not rest on a number of isolated intuitions, but are organically related to an end or good."

The most important problem of ethics is to determine the nature of the end by which conduct is judged.

The end of life cannot be external to life itself. It is nothing else than the highest perfection of life, implying a harmonious development of all its elements. This is not always realised, and the result is that an exaggerated importance is attached to one of its elements only. Hedonism, for instance, conceives of man as essentially a sentient being, and regards the gratification of his sentient nature as his only possible end. Conduct, it teaches, has value in proportion to the amount of pleasure it produces. Professor Muirhead states the theory impartially, and allows it every advantage which its association with the doctrine of evolution may bring. But he rejects it mainly on the ground that its "assumption that the self is primarily and essentially feeling" is false. He is, however, not blind to its merits. It has been a corrective to the equally one-sided ascetic view of life, and "at a time when other theories by their conservatism and mysticism seemed to favour the maintenance of established abuses" has offered "an apparently simple and intelligible standard by which the value of laws and institutions might be estimated." As to evolutionary hedonism, Professor Muirhead regards its insistence on the organic character of society as its chief merit. But its association with the pleasure theory is arbitrary, and in substituting the end of "social health" or "increase of life" for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it does not see that "the end must be a form of personal good." In order to amend it, it is necessary "(1) to recognise that hedonism has become an anachronism; (2) to add to its empirical demonstration that the individual is essentially social a teleological demonstration that his good is essentially a common good."

The theory directly antithetical to hedonism is that which regards the end as self-conquest. It is founded on the view that reason is man's real self with which his sentient nature has no necessary connection. "In order to be good, an act must be done out of reverence for the reason which enjoins it, and without regard to the consequences to the sentient self, whether one's own or another's." The chief historical forms of this theory are Stoicism and Kantianism. Its value lies in this that it does not, like hedonism, confound virtue with mere expediency and lays stress on the truth that reason being the same for all is the true bond of union between men. It thus provides the foundation of the idea of the brotherhood of man. Although it errs in opposing reason to our animal nature too sharply, "it is undoubtedly true that at a certain stage in moral development, both in the individual and in the race, the negative or the ascetic element is the prominent one." No moral progress is possible without the subordination of the lower elements of life to the higher, and that involves struggle, self-denial and pain. "Readiness to suffer is an inexpugnable element in all virtue." But the defect of the ascetic theory is that it regards the negative aspect of morality as its only aspect. It does not see that self-realisation means not the annihilation of feelings and desires but the proper organisation of them. As the organising principle, reason has of course a position of supremacy, but its very function makes it impossible to separate it from the positive content of life. In spite of its opposition to hedonism, rationalism has one thing in common with it. It is "in fundamental agreement with it in holding that reason stands outside the object of desire, and is only externally related to it."

Professor Muirhead holds that "the standard of morality is to be found in the conception of end, not of law." Moral laws have validity because they flow from the idea of an end. Conformity to them is the necessary means of realising the end which is "an ideal form of life." "The ideal cannot consist in a mere state of feeling resulting from the satisfaction of qualitatively identical desires; nor yet in complete determination by reason apart from all desire; but in the subordination of the parts of our nature and the activities to which they prompt to the law of the self as a whole which includes both reason and desire" (*Elements of Ethics*, p. 167). The self so interpreted is not an isolated unit but "is only comprehensible as a member of a society whose moral judgments reflect a moral order already established in its environment." Ideas of right and wrong have no meaning except in relation to social life. The distinctions of egoistic and altruistic feelings, society and the individual, man and the state are not to be ignored, but it is essential to remember that they are relative distinctions within a whole which makes them possible. To say that men are moral beings only as inter-dependent members of society is not to deny their individuality. "Individuality must be sought for not in separation from the whole, but in the whole-hearted acceptance of a definite station within it." From this it follows that the good of the individual is inseparable from the common good. The man who identifies himself with the life of society finds his own. On the other hand, he who seeks to save his life by standing apart from society loses it. "The common good has a claim upon the individual because it corresponds to his own deepest need *to be an individual*." Social institutions seem to be limita-

tions on our liberty only when they are outgrown or when liberty is "conceived of as the absence of restraint rather than the presence of opportunity." Rightly viewed, they "stand for the more permanent ends of corporate life" and serve to "unite separate individual wills in a common humanly significant purpose."

Professor Muirhead denies that there is any incompatibility between self-assertion and self-surrender. Self-assertion is not to be identified with selfishness, nor is self-sacrifice a rational ideal unless it is an aspect of some form of self-fulfilment. "What we must mean in speaking of an ideal of self-sacrifice is the fulfilment of the self in some object of human worth which transcends the individual personality and involves apparent loss to it."

Are we not, it may be asked, arguing in a circle when we explain moral judgments by connecting them with the end of self-realisation and then say that the self is realised "by loyalty to the ordinary duties of life, the good parent, the honest worker, the upright citizen"? Professor Muirhead's answer is that moral judgments whose rationale is understood are not the same as unexplained moral judgments. Further, the ideal which it is the aim of good conduct to realise is not "something to be attained in the long run" but "is daily and hourly realised in the good act itself." In and through the moral duties the self is realised.

Professor Muirhead points out that duties, virtues and institutions are intimately connected with one another. On the one side, duties are related to "the qualities of character which lead to their recognition and performance," and, on the other, to "the social institutions which guarantee a field for their exercise." The subjective system of impulses and desires and the

activities which spring from them are the correlative of the system of objective institutions. A complete theory of ethics, therefore, would have to exhibit both aspects of the forms of the good.

Virtue, understood as "the quality of character which secures that action shall be controlled by the idea of the whole," being one, its forms, "as infinite as the passions to be regulated or the situations which have to be adequately met," are inter-dependent and inseparable. An exhaustive enumeration of them is impossible. All that can be usefully done is to indicate the main types. Professor Muirhead regards Plato's classification as sound in principle and discusses the cardinal virtues in the manner of Green.

The moral standard, the ideal by which conduct is judged, is not something absolute and unchangeable but varies in different times and countries. It is relative to the circumstances of the place and age in which it is accepted as valid. The Greek ideal of life is not the same as the medieval ideal, nor is the medieval ideal the same as the modern Christian ideal. This, however, does not mean that there is no universal standard of morality. "Underlying the apparent diversities in the content of the moral standard, there is at least a real unity of form." The idea of evolution enables us to understand how there may be a unity of principle underlying the variations of morality in different times and countries. The diverse moral standards are to be regarded as the stages through which one and the same moral ideal passes in the course of its development. They can be arranged in an ascending scale of worth according to the extent to which they represent a universal moral order.

How is the progress of morality to be conceived?

Can it be explained as mere adaptation to environment brought about by the operation of natural laws or does it "involve a reference to an end or ideal more or less consciously conceived by a subject, to whom changes in the environment and the adjustments rendered necessary by them are merely the opportunity for further self-realisation?" The question raises fundamental metaphysical issues. The gist of what Professor Muirhead has to say in answer to it from the idealistic standpoint is as follows: The postulate of thought and activity is the unity of the world. As the ideal of consciousness is "a completely unified world of mutually related parts" as distinguished from a mere aggregate of objects, so to conscience, which "is only another side of consciousness," the institutions of society are ideally "a system of moral relations, representing realisation of the self in the form of will." As progress in knowledge is the growing realisation of the ideal of a completely unified knowledge, so "progress in morality has its spring, not in mere adjustment of the self to changing circumstances, but in the interpreting, constructive power of conscience finding in new circumstances the occasion for the further realisation of its ideal of rationalised and unified conduct." The ideal is at once personal and social. Forms of goodness have all a social character, and "social progress cannot be safe in the hands of those in whom the desire for social improvement does not involve a keen sense of personal responsibility, and a high ideal of the kind of life required in those who claim to be its prophets and evangelists."

Professor Muirhead maintains that moral life is not possible apart from citizenship. The best that is in human nature cannot be developed without activities

inspired and regulated by a social ideal. The powers which are latent in man can only be actualised in a social environment of which the most complete form is the state. Human activities are organised into a systematic whole through their subordination to and control by a dominant plan or purpose of life. This involves the subordination of the individual to the social whole. What, on one side, is self-organisation is, on another side, social organisation. What a particular phase of the mind is to the mind as a whole, that the individual is to society organised as the state. The subordination of individuals to the state does not mean the loss of their distinctive personalities. It means the negation of their mere particularity in order that they may be enriched by sharing in its fuller life. If the state shapes the characters of men, it itself is sustained by their activities.

All this, Professor Muirhead points out, is not inconsistent with the idea of individuality, an increasing emphasis on which is a characteristic feature of modern civilisation. The individual is no doubt one and unique, but unity does not mean a characterless point, nor uniqueness mere difference and independence. The essence of unity lies in its power "to hold its parts together as elements in a whole." What gives unity to a thing is "not the exclusion of parts, but the penetration of the parts by a common principle of life; what threatens it is, not the possession of parts, but the inclusion in it of any secretion or excrescence impervious to the dominating principle of the whole" (*Social Purpose*, p. 102). And uniqueness means not that a thing is "singular in the sense of being separable from other things, but that it focusses at a particular point and responds to the forces, physical, chemical or

vital, which we call its environment in such a way that at the same time it maintains its own nature and is an essential part of the whole within which these act" (*Social Purpose*, p. 102). True individuality is attained by a man only when he gathers into himself the ideas and ideals, the feelings and aspirations of the community in which he lives. It presupposes social life which is "never mere imitation or the reproduction of other minds and wills, but the response called forth by the circumstances of the moment in a being who has the power of entering into a common purpose and adapting his actions to it." "All real society is co-operation, the embodiment of an idea or universal, in a particular form determined by one's place in a whole. When co-operation ceases and mere imitation begins there is an end to sociality—to all that makes a man a *socius* in any real sense of the term" (*Social Purpose*, p. 100).

As might be expected, Professor Muirhead is a strong supporter of the democratic form of government. "If the end of the state is the furthering of the good life, not only indirectly by the provision of external conditions, but directly, by the creation of an institution, participation in whose life offers to the individual the opportunity of attaining a finer quality of social will, then democracy may be not only the best but the inevitable form of political life" (*Social Purpose*, p. 249). But where is the justification for assuming that participation in the life of the state is not possible without actively directing the policy of the state? Democracy or no democracy, the will of the people will always in these days of general enlightenment be of sufficient potency to influence the management of affairs, and more than this is not necessary to satisfy the just demand

that the state shall be broad-based on the popular will. In order to render service to the state, one need not play a hand in governing the country. This ought to be the business of experts. It cannot be argued that while in every affair of life, great or small, the guidance of experts is essential, politics alone is to be the special preserve of amateurs. It is true that self-realisation is impossible without citizenship, but citizenship consists not in trying to govern the country, but in rendering that service to the state for which one is fitted by natural capacities and training. Every work, however insignificant, which in any way contributes to the common good, is service of the state.

CHAPTER XII.

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE.

Like Professor Watson and Sir Henry Jones, Professor Mackenzie was a student of Edward Caird at Glasgow. He was for many years Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College, Cardiff, and has made notable contributions to philosophy. His earlier views on metaphysics and ethics were substantially the same as those of his great teacher, but gradually he seems to have deviated a great deal from them, though precisely in what direction it is not easy to say. On the whole, he appears to retain his original idealistic convictions, but in his anxiety to make as much concession as possible to the opponents of idealism, he has allowed his own views to become somewhat nebulous. Much reading and reflection seems to have produced a state of indecision in Professor Mackenzie's mind. Very often he gives the impression of being unable to come to a decision on fundamental questions of philosophy. An eclectic tendency is visible in his writings, and although he is a very clear writer, it is not always easy to determine what exactly he means to teach. "I am," as he himself puts it, "only feeling my way as yet, and am very conscious that I have not so far succeeded in expressing even the truths that I think I see in a manner that can be regarded as clear and convincing" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 238).

According to Professor Mackenzie, the business of metaphysics is to deal with the universe as a systematic unity. The particular sciences are concerned only with special aspects of it. They study limited groups of phenomena and seek to ascertain the laws that govern them. The task of co-ordinating their results belongs to metaphysics. But metaphysics is not to be regarded as an encyclopædia of the sciences. Its special work is to examine critically the fundamental conceptions used by the various sciences and to see how they are related to one another. It has therefore to take a comprehensive view of reality, "to form a coherent view of the universe as a whole."

But is the universe a coherent whole? Is it possible to regard it as a cosmos? Professor Mackenzie holds that the only alternatives to cosmism are pluralism and singularism, the doctrines, namely, that there are many independent substances and that there is only one substance. But, obviously, reality contains both unity and difference, and cosmism is "the only view that offers any intelligible account of the existence of a many in one." The objects we apprehend are not isolated and independent but fall into connected orders. The principal modes of order recognised by Professor Mackenzie are the numerical order, the temporal order, the spatial order, the order of degrees, the qualitative order, the order of kinds, the causal order, the order of growth, the order of consciousness, the order of value, the moral order and the logical order. Within each order, the objects are variously related to one another, and between the orders there are different kinds of external relations. Objects within one order may also be related to objects within another. From the ordinary standpoint we regard these relations as external, but "if the universe

can be regarded as a completely ordered system, it would seem that even these external relations might be found to be intrinsic." From the consideration of these orders and relations, we naturally pass to the conclusion that the universe is a completely ordered system or cosmos.

But the universe as known to us is by no means a completely ordered system. In spite of the fact that it is a world in which all things are included within a single system of space and time and are connected with one another by causal relations, its orderliness is not so complete as to justify us in conceiving of it as a cosmos. The gulf between the various orders of experience is so great that it is not possible to regard it as a harmonious whole. Nevertheless, the amount of order visible in the universe is not negligible, and with the growth of knowledge is becoming more and more obvious. The human universe is not a cosmos, and yet it has features which indicate that it is not a chaos. The only conclusion which fits the actual facts of experience is that although our universe is real it is not the whole of reality. "There may," Professor Mackenzie thinks, "be many more qualities in the phenomenal world than we are as yet capable of apprehending —perhaps many more than we, as human beings, may ever be capable of apprehending. There may be more dimensions in space than the three within which we arrange the qualities that we know. And there may be other respects in which our universe is capable of further extension. If this is admitted, then the question before us is not, whether what we know is of such a kind as to justify us in regarding it as a Cosmos, but rather whether it is of such a kind as to justify us in regarding it as part of a larger whole to which the

conception of a self-explanatory Cosmos might be applicable" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 367-68). It is the total system of things alone and not the universe of our knowledge, which is only a part of it, that can be regarded as a cosmos. It may be argued that even a portion of a perfect world ought to be less chaotic than the world we know. But the disorderliness of a limited section of reality may not only be compatible with but be actually required by the perfection of the whole. "A perfect cosmos might present, from certain points of view, some appearance of disorder."

Professor Mackenzie considers in detail the difficulties that present themselves to the view that the universe, if not a perfect order, is a part of such an order. Our universe, it may be objected, contains such positive defects that they are wholly inconsistent with the idea of a perfect whole. Such defects are contingency, change and evils of various kinds. "Notwithstanding the apparent universality of causal connections in detail, the general structure of our universe conveys an impression of haphazard arrangement; and, though this impression might be modified by fuller knowledge, it is not easy to believe that it could be wholly removed." Why should there be change and evil in a perfect world? If the universe is rational, why should not its rationality be more apparent? The task of attempting to solve these difficulties is, in Professor Mackenzie's view, "a voyage of discovery through stormy seas," and he approaches it with considerable misgivings.

Although the world, as known to us, is not absolutely chaotic, there is, Professor Mackenzie thinks, a good deal of the elements of chance in it. It is true that

the progress of science has shown that nature is far more orderly than it seemed to Plato or even to Hegel, but it is not likely that science will ever succeed in completely eliminating chance from it. But chance is inconsistent only with a mechanical interpretation of nature, not with a teleological conception of its orderliness. It may be due to the fragmentariness of our knowledge of the universe, and "is not necessarily a fatal bar to the view that the universe as we know it may be a part of a perfect cosmos."

The problem of change has always been troublesome to philosophers. They have often assumed that the perfect must be eternal and unchanging and change is only an illusion. But even an illusion is a fact and has got to be explained. The key to the solution of the problem is to be found in the recognition that "the changing system of our experience is to be taken as only a partial aspect of a more complete whole." Permanence has no meaning apart from change, nor change apart from permanence. "In apprehending what changes, we apprehend it as still persisting."

"The problem of evil," says Professor Mackenzie, "is probably the hardest of all those that stand in the way of the conception of a perfect cosmos." The difficulty is to understand how there can be any place for evil in a perfect world. It is scarcely possible to deny the reality of evil. The innumerable forms of it afflict us every day in our life. If we are justified in believing that the universe is perfect, evil must in some way contribute to its perfection. We are apt to think that perfection is exclusive of change and process. The truth, however, is that it can be positively thought of only as that which satisfies the totality of our desires, and this means that it cannot be immediately attained.

"Now, if perfection is actually to be realised through a process, it would seem that an actual lack of perfection is involved in its very essence; and this can hardly be thought of otherwise than as implying evil." The perfection of the universe implies the elements of negation and conflict. "There can be no real unity without differentiation; and this involves the breaking up of the harmony of the whole and its restoration again. The broken music which arises in this process may, from the point of view of the whole, seem perfect harmony; but for us who are at the point of view of the parts, there is necessarily something of the nature of evil" (*Outlines of Metaphysics*, p. 155).

"The apparent contingency, change and evil," concludes Professor Mackenzie, "that we find in the Universe as we know it, might all be regarded as compatible with the reality of a perfect order, if we could suppose that the whole is in its essence spiritual, that it realises itself through a process of change, involving in its initial stages a certain lack of order and consequent appearance of contingency and evil, but advancing by degrees to a complete unity in which the process is eternally and consciously retained" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 392).

Professor Mackenzie holds that the conception of the universe as a self-explanatory system is the only one that can give satisfaction to the mind. The demand of our nature for an ultimate explanation of what we know cannot be permanently stifled. It would be satisfied if we could view "the universe as essentially a spiritual unity, the guiding principle in which may be described as God." Professor Mackenzie sees many difficulties in the way of such a conclusion, but, on the whole, he is inclined to think that "there is no inherent

absurdity in the conception of a perfect whole containing parts that, in themselves, are imperfect and evil." The infinite and perfect does not exclude the finite and imperfect but contains them within itself as its own necessary elements. We make perfection meaningless when we attempt to think of it as something absolutely apart from its opposite. "That there may be Order, we have to think of it as the arranging of something that, apart from such arranging, would be Disorder. Now, if this is once admitted, it would seem that there can hardly be any limit to the degree of disorder that may be allowed to enter into the constitution of a perfect whole. The more disorder, it may be urged, the greater is the resulting harmony" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 439-40). All that is required is that the element of imperfection should be subordinated to the perfection of the whole. Our universe which is so imperfect and in which evil is so rampant "might be regarded as a real and vital part of a perfect cosmos."

From his general standpoint, Professor Mackenzie interprets human life as "a partial manifestation of the life of an eternal spirit—or perhaps rather of a number of such spirits—having its significance in the gradual attainment of an attitude from which the perfection of the whole can be appreciated and apprehended. It would thus belong to the general upward movement of the Universe" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 445). The material system represents the downward path or the process of disruption. It is in incessant conflict with the downward course of matter that the upward movement of human life is maintained, and it is, therefore, necessarily very slow and gradual. If a great deal of human history "looks like a confused

fighting of kites and crows, rather than the unfolding of a divine idea," it is because the progress of civilisation is at every step hampered by the disruptive tendencies of nature. Without a hard struggle the spirit of man cannot emancipate itself from the dominance of matter. But "it is not difficult to regard the life of humanity, in spite of breaks and backward eddies, as a continually advancing tide."

These conclusions are regarded by Professor Mackenzie as only hypothetical. He is unwilling to accept them positively, and yet is unable to avoid them. He describes himself as "only a more or less bewildered metaphysician, trying to find an intelligible view of the universe and only very imperfectly succeeding" (*Hibbert Journal*, October, 1924, p. 124), and sees no prospect of arriving at definite results, for, in philosophy hypotheses cannot be tested in the ordinary way. The only possible test of philosophical hypotheses is "their intelligibility and explanatory power," but Professor Mackenzie does not think that our speculations can stand even this test satisfactorily. At the present stage of our development we cannot expect to "have any complete apprehension of the principle by which the whole is to be explained. Rather we may count ourselves fortunate if we can 'see it darkly,' or even if we can point to the direction in which it is to be sought" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 466).

Since the publication of his *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* Professor Mackenzie seems to have further modified his views. He has apparently been much influenced by Mr. Douglas Fawcett's theory of divine imagining and conceives of the divine life as a whole of which the divine love or goodness, the divine wisdom

or insight, and the divine power or creative imagination are distinguishable aspects. He suggests that "the eternal Love seeks to have as its counterpart a universe that is supremely lovely; that wisdom dictates the method of its construction, that creative imagination brings it into being; and that, after a long course of development, the insight of the divine understanding presents it to the everlasting love as its worthy counterpart" (*Hibbert Journal*, October, 1924). In ethics, he intimates that he no longer follows Green very closely, as he did in his *Manual of Ethics*. "I regret that I identified myself with his position as closely as I did." Self-realisation now seems to him to be "too subjective a basis for ethics," and he is "unable to accept the doctrine that the only ultimate good is goodness." He is "now inclined to regard the good life as consisting essentially in the effort to create and conserve what is beautiful." How this is incompatible with the conception of self-realisation as the moral end he does not explain.

CHAPTER XIII.

LORD HALDANE.

Viscount Haldane of Cloan, whose eminence as a statesman is universally recognised, is also a great figure in the philosophical world. It is the conviction of many who know the value of his work in philosophy that if he had not taken to politics he would have been in the very front rank of the world's great thinkers. As it is, it is hard to say whether he is greater as a statesman than as a philosopher or as a philosopher than as a statesman. He is a notable example of men who can gain distinction in more than one sphere.

"I am not by profession a philosopher," says Lord Haldane, but, all the same, in spite of his political preoccupation, he has been a philosopher all his life. He made his *début* in philosophy in the early eighties of the last century by editing, jointly with Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison, a volume of essays entitled *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*. It was a sort of manifesto of the younger members of the Neo-Hegelian school then rising into prominence, many of whom have subsequently made their mark in philosophy. Among the contributors are to be found, besides the editors, the names of Bernard Bosanquet, D. G. Ritchie, Professor Sorley, and Sir Henry Jones. The volume was dedicated to T. H. Green, and Edward Caird wrote a preface. The second essay in this volume was written

jointly by Lord Haldane and his distinguished brother, Professor J. S. Haldane. The point of view is thoroughly Hegelian. But soon after the publication of this book, Lord Haldane's faith in Hegelianism as an ontological theory seems to have weakened. In a short paper in *Mind* for October, 1888, he argues that the value of Hegelianism lies in it "merely being a point of view from which to criticise other modes of thought," in pointing out that categories valid in one sphere are not to be indiscriminately extended to other spheres. It is a mistake, he says, to regard it "as ground upon which to place props for speculations in both ontology and philosophy." What is essential in Hegelianism is its "mode of investigating knowledge itself," and not its "erection into a divine experience" of the synthetic unity of consciousness. In this article, Lord Haldane appreciates only Hegel's criticism of categories and not his conception of the Absolute and praises Professor Seth for having "cut himself adrift from Hegel if by this is meant the ontological developments of Hegel's results."

In his reply, Professor Seth rightly points out that theory of knowledge or criticism of categories is not the whole of philosophy. It is rather a preparation for the properly philosophical question. This question is, what is reality, and unless philosophy attempts to answer the question it evades its task. It must give some definite account of the universe. The impression left on Professor Seth's mind by Lord Haldane's article was that "he wishes to evade the necessity of taking up any metaphysical position at all. He clearly disclaims for himself the metaphysics of Hegel and Green." It must be admitted that there is much in Lord Haldane's paper to justify this impression.

But Lord Haldane's distrust of Hegel's metaphysical construction did not last long. In his *Pathway to Reality* he returns to his earlier position and definitely accepts Hegel's conception of the Absolute. He truly speaks of Hegel as "the greatest master of speculative philosophy that the world has seen since the days of Aristotle." Imitating Hegel's own words, "I am a Lutheran and wish to remain so," Lord Haldane declares, "I am content to say that I am a Hegelian and wish to be called so" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. II., p. 85). He does not conceal that "all that is best in these lectures I have either taken or adapted from Hegel." *The Pathway to Reality* is undoubtedly one of the best interpretations of the Hegelian philosophy in the English language.

In his *Reign of Relativity* Lord Haldane gives us a fresh treatment of the subject-matter of his earlier work in the light of the recent discoveries of science, particularly that of Einstein. He regards the theory of Einstein as only an application to a particular subject of the general theory of relativity implied in Hegel's criticism of categories. This is not an after-thought, for in the *Pathway to Reality* the significance of relativity in knowledge is distinctly pointed out. All that he does in the later work is to lay greater stress on this doctrine and to explain in detail some of its applications.

The Hegelian theory which Lord Haldane wholeheartedly accepts is that reality is no other than mind at the highest level of its self-comprehension. It is not something different from the world in which we live, but the self-same world adequately comprehended. "Viewed from a different standpoint, and with fuller insight, this world may turn out to be but appearance

and God the Ultimate Reality disclosing Himself in that very appearance" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I., p. 17). Nature, man and God are not different entities, but only distinguishable phases of a single reality contemplated from different standpoints. "To me," says Lord Haldane, "it seems that by God we mean and can only mean that which is most real, the ultimate reality into which all else can be resolved, and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond; that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot be itself expressed in terms of anything outside itself" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I., p. 19). Such a view of reality is very different from that of the men of science of the Victorian age who split up nature into two halves, one the genuine objective reality and the other but appearances in the mind. The real world was supposed to consist of an "assemblage of atoms and energy" in "a self-subsisting and uniform system of space and time, with its points and instants independent of the events that occurred at them." The qualities called secondary, which the plain man attributes to things, were regarded as existing only in relation to the mind of the percipient. This attitude, Lord Haldane thinks, is no longer prevalent. "People do not now try to bifurcate nature in the old fashion." It is realised that all the various contents of experience are actually there in the world as its distinguishable aspects. If reality has mechanical features, it no less has the features with which biology deals. And it is mind as much as life. "Separation in standpoint, or in order and level in knowledge, is thus tending to supersede the notion of separation in existence."

This changed outlook, Lord Haldane thinks, is largely due to the Kantian criticism. The essence of

Kant's achievement is to show that meaning cannot be separated from experience. "The mind found as there in nature what was of its own character and content, in objective form." Without being intelligible nothing can be real. The error of Kant was to "lay [knowledge] out on the dissecting table for dismemberment," to break it up into factors wrongly supposed to be independent. When this error is corrected, it is seen that "Reality lies in the foundational character of knowledge, and in the distinction between perceiver and perceived, knower and known, as being distinctions falling inside the entirety of that foundational character, in as much as they are made by and within knowledge itself" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 27). Do what we may, we cannot go behind knowledge itself.

Although reality is one, it may be viewed for different purposes from different standpoints. The mathematician, for example, fixes his attention upon the most general relations of things in time and space and abstracts from all other qualities which they possess. In this way he is enabled to accomplish the special purpose he has in view. Similarly, the physicist ignores everything except atoms and their movements and works with such conceptions as causality and conservation of energy. This does not mean that things are nothing more than matter and motion to which everything else is to be reduced. From the biologist's point of view, life as a self-conserving whole in which the parts co-operate for the fulfilment of an end is as real as the aspects of nature with which the physicist deals. The conceptions or categories with which the sciences work in their respective spheres are not to be hypostatised into independent entities, but are to be regarded as the stages through which the mind passes in the process of its self-

comprehension. The conception which is valid at one level of thought is not so at another. The varying outlooks do not conflict because they belong to different planes of intelligence. The great mistake to be avoided in interpreting the world is that of letting some of its aspects dominate and even negative the other aspects, of supposing that "what is in truth only a mere aspect of reality is the manifestation of its exclusive and ultimate nature."

With this principle of relativity philosophy has always been more or less familiar. It has recently been brought into prominence by science. "The researches of Einstein," says Lord Haldane, "have given a fresh importance to the principle of relativity." But the theory of Einstein is only a special application of the general principle. In the widest sense relativity means that reality has distinguishable degrees or grades for the interpretation of which conceptions of different kinds are needed. The categories which express the nature of reality from one point of view fail to do so from another. We must, therefore, guard against the tendency "to slip inconsiderately from the terms of one order of thought which is appropriate to the facts which are actual into the terms of a different order which is not so appropriate." The various levels of thought are relative to the corresponding levels of reality. In distinguishing these levels we do not distinguish independent entities of different kinds but only special phases of one and the same reality. Mechanism, for example, is not one thing, life another and mind another still: they are but aspects which reality presents from different standpoints.

"Knowledge," says Lord Haldane, "everywhere enters into reality with transforming power." Out-

side knowledge nothing is. "To be known in some form is the only way of being real." This truth is concealed from us by the view which the immediate appearance of things suggests that the materials of knowledge are provided by the sensations which objects external to our organism produce in the mind by acting upon it through the organs of sense. Concepts come to be regarded as the outcome of mere subjective reflection indifferently applicable *ab extra* to a variety of particulars. But "the reality of a world of space and time can only be stated in terms of concepts." On reflection, "nature turns out to have been permeated by the activity of reflection." Knowledge is foundational. Within it fall all the distinctions we make, including the distinction between the organism and its environment. But "Knowledge discloses itself as of degrees and at levels which are determined by the character of the concepts it employs. But these degrees and levels imply each other. They are not distinct entities apart. They are all of them required for the interpretation of the full character of reality" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 124). The principle of relativity means that the distinguishable orders in knowledge "imply, as determining their meanings, conceptions of characters logically diverse like those of mechanism, of life, of instinct and of conscious intelligence." The validity of each conception is limited to the particular grade of reality to which it is appropriate. Truth, therefore, is more than the fragmentary view of the universe which is all that we can get within the domain of a particular science. It "must imply the whole and nothing short of the whole, whether the whole be actually and fully attainable by the human mind or not." Ideally, it lies in the exhibition of the universe

as "embodying in a self-completing entirety a plurality of orders in existence as well as in knowledge of that existence."

Lord Haldane argues that what stands in the way of our realising that knowledge is the ultimate reality is the notion that it is the property of the finite mind which is supposed to be a kind of thing. Over against this thing the physical world appears to stand in its hard and fastness and knowledge seems to be a process set up in the mind by its influence. But mind is not a thing at all. It is subject for which alone the objective world can exist. For the finite purposes of our every-day life it is no doubt legitimate to distinguish the particular selves from one another and from the world. "Unless I, by an abstraction, which, for the purposes of social intercourse, is essential, looked upon myself as a thing with a particular mind and history attached to it, as a being standing in social relationships, it would be impossible for me to conduct any conversation with you or to live in a common social world" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. II., p. 102). But from the highest point of view the distinction between finite selves is only relative. The body with which the finite mind is connected is continuous with its environment. Between the two no rigid distinction can be drawn. But mind and body are not two different things arbitrarily conjoined. The former is the latter "taken at the higher degree of its reality." Between one mind and another, therefore, there can be no impassable gulf. It is by their feelings, which in their own nature are particular and incommunicable, that minds are distinguished from one another. Feelings have their setting in thought. Apart from thought they do not exist. The universal forms of thought are the framework of

experience and constitute the element of identity in individual selves. If men were sentient beings only they would be completely cut off from one another like the monads of Leibnitz. "It is only when the level of thought is reached that we can have identity in difference." The varying experiences of men correspond to one another because of the identical thought-forms which lie at their basis.

Experience, Lord Haldane maintains, has always the character of a whole. But it is a whole "conditioned and limited by a specially important fact, that I am the centre in which this experience has its focus, and from which it also, as it were, radiates. And I notice at once that the range and activity of my mind in this experience radiate far beyond what is in contact with me or even close to my living body. My experience is always in course of letting itself be enlarged by the thinking activity of the self" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 148). This shows that the conception of mind as a finite thing is not ultimate. We are forced to pass beyond it to the view that "it is a whole containing within itself the I who know and the entire field of knowledge, with the conceptual and sentient aspects distinguished within it through its own abstractions" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 155).

An object-world not known to mind has no meaning and what has no meaning has no existence. This seems to be an incredible doctrine, because the self is uncritically taken to be a mere thing in time and space. "The irrelevant and unmeaning metaphors which we carry with us as a burden on our backs" mislead us. It is not seen that presence to mind is the essential condition on which the existence of things depends. "Subject and object are undivorceable." As finite em-

bodied beings selves are, of course, objects having their places within nature, but at a higher level they are the subject for which the objective world exists. Within the entirety of knowledge its various grades must be carefully distinguished. A finite self, in one point of view, is a thing distinguished from other things. As such it is capable of being interpreted by means of the categories which the physicist and the chemist employ. But it is more than a thing. As a living organism it belongs to a higher order in knowledge and reality and its nature is disclosed only when it is conceived as "a whole that gives their meaning to parts, each of which performs a function in that whole, and each of which has itself no life except as a living member of the whole for which it functions." From the biological point of view, however, self-consciousness is a mystery. We cannot understand it unless we rise to a still higher level of thought and find in it the principle of unity of all things. In its proper nature it is infinite, and seems to be finite because of the obstacles to its expression arising from its connection with an animal organism in man. The self thus turns out to be the entirety of knowledge, and its adequate comprehension involves the survey of it from "points of view which differ in their logical character, and belong to different orders in knowledge, no one of which is reducible to the other, however much it may require its presence" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 179). The various aspects must be co-present in a single comprehensive view. As foundational, knowledge includes all things within itself and there is nothing beyond it in terms of which it can be described. "Its conception is an ultimate one within which both subject and object fall."

We thus see that mind or self-consciousness is not a thing in time and space, nor a subject with an object of a foreign nature. It is the ultimate unity self-distinguished into subject and object. As essentially related to the subject, the object-world is on one side a system of universals. But the universal apart from the particular is an abstraction. "You cannot deduce the universe out of the universals of thought any more than you can divide or divorce thought from its object or from the particulars of sense." In the actual, which is always individual, the universal and the particular are inseparably united as its moments. The distinctions between the self and the not-self, the universal and the particular, arise within the inclusive whole of knowledge.

"The picture of a pure self-consciousness," says Lord Haldane, "regarding things from the highest standpoint, finding itself in its objects and no longer troubled by any distinction between the object-world and itself, because it has got rid of all the abstractions of lower standpoints, such a picture we cannot present to ourselves, because we are compelled to view the universe from the standpoint of the particular individual. But by reflection we may get towards the grasp of the concrete truth that this is the final conception of the self, the real foundation and meaning of experience, and that it is really actualised in experience" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I., p. 112).

Lord Haldane contends that nature seems to be a self-contained entity independent of mind only from the point of view of a self "subject to the physical limitations of the organism." The relative validity of this conception is not to be denied. At the level of thought occupied by us as finite human beings, nature is inde-

pendent of us and irreducible to mere ideas of the mind. In so far as it lays stress on this truth the position of realism is sound. But the standpoint from which mind is set in opposition to the world is not final. It arises from the limitation which thought imposes upon itself. But thought "can spread its wings and fly beyond the limits of what appears immediately," reaching the summit from which it is seen that "the completed entirety within which falls all that is and was and will be, not less than the mind for which it is there, is the whole for thought short of which thinking cannot arrest its conception" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 196). That which lies at the basis of reality cannot be treated as a particular fact comprised within it. To be discursive and relational is not, as Bradley supposes, the whole nature of thought. It takes the relational form in order to accomplish limited purposes, but it has the power to rise above its self-limitation. If it distinguishes and relates, it also transcends the distinctions which it sets up. At its highest level it is the all-embracing experience of which feeling and will are aspects.

Lord Haldane is unwearied in urging that the nature of reality is not understood unless it is viewed from many standpoints. These standpoints "are moulded by the categories the mind in its freedom of purpose selects, and they give rise to degrees or levels in knowledge and reality which constitute a hierarchy within the all-embracing fact of mind" (*The Philosophy of Humanism*, pp. 62-63). "Most of the confusion," he says, "which has characterised the history of reflection has been due to the assumption that a particular set of universals would prove sufficient for the description of objects differently characterised in facts disclosed in nature. The inquirer has again and again pursued in

consequence a path which has led him away from these facts" (*The Philosophy of Humanism*, p. 300).

Reality, as interpreted by the categories of a particular standpoint, is not the whole but only an abstraction from the whole made for a specific purpose. The various interpretations from different standpoints can be arranged in an ascending scale in which "the higher stands to the lower at once as that in comparison with which the lower is less perfect because more abstract, and also as the more concrete individuality within the limits and range of which the lower falls." Ultimately, reality discloses itself as the all-inclusive mind within which the distinction of subject and object arises. What the general principle of relativity teaches us is that because a particular view of the universe is correct in its own place, we are not justified in concluding that every other view is false. "Each may be adequate in the order in experience with which for the time being we are concerned, and for each view what appears for the moment to constitute truth and reality may be accurately described in terms of the conceptions appropriate to the standpoint which we are occupying." In the constitution of the actual all of these conceptions are co-present.

Lord Haldane does not think that idealism, as he conceives it, has any reason to fear the criticisms of new realism. Indeed, it has much in common with the latter doctrine. The real quarrel of new realism is with subjective idealism or mentalism, the way to which was opened up by Locke's new way of ideas. Locke treated knowledge as "an instrument separable from knower and known alike and capable of being laid on a table and pulled to pieces." He held that the mind acquires knowledge of things through the medium of ideas

existing apart from them. Some of these ideas were supposed to be like and others unlike the actual qualities of things. Berkeley denied the possibility of separating the primary from the secondary qualities and argued that things cannot be other than their ideas. The ideas, he maintained, are the things. But he continued to believe in the reality of mind as substance and as the support of ideas. Hume carried Berkeley's principles to their logical conclusion and contended that we can have no idea of substance, mental or material. Besides impressions and ideas nothing can be proved to exist. Thus he conducted philosophy "down a slippery slope to a precipice." It was reserved for Reid to expose the fallacy of Locke. He denied the theory of representative perception and stoutly maintained that what is perceived is not an idea but a thing. In perception the mind is face to face with an objective fact. Between the perceived object and the perceiving mind no idea intervenes. In this he clearly anticipated the new realists, who are now busy returning to objects the qualities of which the subjective idealists robbed them so unjustly. And the dues of things are being returned to them with handsome interest. The new realists are all in favour of investing them with universal relations. Not only colour, sound and the other so-called secondary qualities, but universals also, including ends and the relation of an organic whole to its parts, we are told, belong to things. But a distinction is still maintained between mind and non-mental realities, and the function of the former is limited to passive awareness. But, as Lord Haldane asks very pertinently, "if the categories of life are as much part of a non-mental world as are those of mechanism, why are not the categories of morals and religion and beauty also part of it?" He

truly observes that "if the object-world is to swallow down the entire subject-world then there is no longer any need for distinguishing between non-mental and mental, or between matter and mind." If the new realists went further along the path pursued by them and had the courage to transfer to the side of things not only secondary qualities and universal relations but mind itself, they would see that "mind is no isolated thing, it is no attribute or property of a thing." It is the self-contained whole within which fall all distinctions made by thought, including the distinction between mind itself and the world of which it is conscious. The thought of a particular individual does not, of course, make things, but "that is very different from saying that thought is alien to the constitution of the universe and does not in the multitudinous phases in which we feel and know enter into the very essence of the real universe."

Lord Haldane has shown how universal is the sway of the principle of relativity; but he does not seem to have bestowed thought on one possible application of this principle. The relativity of knowledge not only means that the self-comprehension of reality involves its interpretation from different levels of thought, but also that it as subject knows itself as object in ways as various as the standpoints provided by particular objects. For, each of these objects is, at the highest level, the unity of mind in which the whole world is focussed and represented. If even an organism is a unity belonging equally to its parts, far more so is mind. It is not apart from the objects presented to it, but is in each of them, completely and indivisibly, as its ideality. In its own other it is itself. In no other way can we think of the relation of the experienced world to mind.

What is in all things as their ideal principle of unity is realised *as a complete whole* in every one of them. To deny this is to say either that mind is present generally in all things but not particularly in any of them, or that it is distinct from them and is therefore, like them, only a numerical unity, or that they are merely its transient modes. None of these alternatives, as the idealistic argument shows, is admissible. If, therefore, mind is to be regarded as the unity that goes out to the differences of objects, it must be conceived as immanent in each single object, whole and undivided, although not limited to it. It is present everywhere in its fulness. This means that what at the lowest level is a thing in time and space is, at the highest, a view-point from which the whole universe is surveyed and interpreted. The universe is real only as it is interpreted, and it is interpreted from standpoints as varied and numerous as its constituent objects. The difference of interpretation is not due to the difference of degrees or levels in reality only, but also to the difference of the points of view even at the highest level. And the mind that interprets is not separable from the standpoint from which the interpretation is made. The universal mind, therefore, is not an abstract unity nor a unity differentiated into mere things, but a unity, a confluence of many minds which, at a lower level, are objective entities, and its knowledge of the universe is a synopsis of the interpretations of the universe from an infinite number of view-points.

"Knowledge," Lord Haldane points out, "is more than merely theoretical. It not only issues in action but it is action." As rational beings men are never satisfied with the world as they find it; they seek to mould and fashion it in conformity with their ideal.

The values selected by them are no more dependent on their arbitrary will than are the objects known by them the products of their cognitive activity. Both in his knowledge and in his purposive activities, the individual is raised above his mere particularity. "It is the universal that is active in individual form and is therefore always dynamic as pointing beyond itself." The good is, no doubt, of the individual, but the nature of the activity determined by the idea of it cannot be understood apart from something of a higher degree of reality than "the isolated and fragmentary volition of the individual, looked at in his aspect of one organism among a numerical multitude." Beneath the difference of the ends of individuals, there is identity, and it is this identity that keeps them together and finds expression in the laws, institutions and customs by which their conduct is regulated. Man's "fitness to be a member of society is that he is no isolated particle, but a person living in relation to his fellow human beings, and permeated by ends held in common with them, by which however little consciously, his conduct is influenced at every turn. It is by the fulness of the life of the whole as shown in his activity that he is judged, and his individuality becomes larger and not smaller by his acceptance of the duties he owes to those around him" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 354). There is a general will because men are not exclusive and self-contained beings. It is not "an outside compelling power," nor a mere sum of particular wills, but "just our own wills at their social level." Apart from our own wills the general will has no being. It is outwardly embodied in the institutions of society and the state.

Lord Haldane regards the general will as the source of the sovereignty of the state, but he does not think

that it is an easy task to ascertain it. In the result of a general election public opinion may seem to find expression, but the actual fact may be quite different. It is often very difficult to say exactly what has been decided at an election. "One of the most delicate and difficult tasks confided to a newly elected Ministry is to determine what mandate has really been given. Not only may that mandate be really different from what it appeared to be from the language at the time employed by those who gave it, but it may be undergoing rapid and yet silent modification" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 367). This is unquestionably true, but then why speak of a mandate being given at all? The mandate theory is not an orthodox theory in British politics. Until quite recently, it was an unheard of thing, and until mob-rule is established it cannot be a reality. Lord Haldane truly observes that "it is not enough to say that in the ballot boxes a numerical majority for a particular plan was found. For it may have become obvious that these votes did not represent a clear or enduring state of mind." The electors, he justly thinks, "may have felt the points at issue to be too obscure, and have meant that the Ministers in effect chosen should decide for them what modifications of existing decisions and what fresh and further decisions might be required." The essential function of the true statesman is to interpret the general will. "That will may even be to devolve to him the duty of taking the initiative and of acting for his clients freely, as a man of courage and high intelligence should act, and he may have been chosen more on the ground of faith in his possession of these qualities than in order that he might take some specific action which the nation feels that it has not adequately thought out. Democracy, even in its most complete and

thoroughgoing form, may imply all this" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 368). But is not this a fancy-picture of democracy? Is it the thing that we know in actual working in various countries? Between the statesman as Lord Haldane conceives him and the demagogic politician practised in the art of vote-catching, is there not a world of difference? What Lord Haldane says about the duties of ministers is very true, but it is a condemnation of the existing forms of democratic government and a powerful plea for a genuine aristocracy or government by the wisest and best. So at least it seems to some of his readers. The democratic spirit has done great good to the world by breaking down the artificial barriers between man and man. It is removing "the gaps in mental life that exist to-day." After a lapse of two thousand years it is at last making the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man a really guiding principle in life. But in so far as it has ushered in the kind of government under which the thoughtful and worthy few are liable to be at the mercy of the thoughtless many, the capable and enterprising at the mercy of the never-do-well and lazy, the kind of government which, in its helpless dependence on the fickle will of a short-sighted multitude, is unable to do its first duty of governing properly, it has effected a change the full consequences of which it is not yet possible to calculate. Democracy, as we know it to-day, is no more a success than the forms of government it has supplanted. A constitution in which those who should be the representatives of the people interpreting their real will are merely their delegates pledge-bound to carry out their mandates is as indefensible as irresponsible autocracy. If civilisation is to endure, the human spirit must be equal to the

task of evolving a type of government which shall eschew the errors of democracy while satisfying its demand for equal opportunities for all. The eagerness of impatient idealists, or rather visionaries, to introduce it everywhere in the world needs to be checked. As the support of public opinion is essential to the existence and well-being of a state, representative government is, no doubt, the ideal, but representative government does not necessarily mean democracy.

The spirit of man that creates the fabric of the state also rises above its limitations. In virtue of their common human nature, men and women, however great their national differences may be, are capable of developing a common ideal. The state, therefore, can never be the final embodiment of the mind of a people. "The world is becoming more and more international. States are not isolated units. They continue to subsist only through relations with other states, relations which tend to multiply in volume as well as intensity, and which show no prospect of being superseded" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 375). As the citizens of a state are related to one another, so are the sovereign states of the world, although there is no universal empire to which they are subordinated. The need for an international bond of union finds expression, Lord Haldane thinks, in the desire for a league of nations. He regards its foundation as a hopeful sign of the times, although its growth depends upon the amount of the general goodwill it can secure. His attitude towards it is neither that of the pessimist who thinks that no good can ever come from it, nor that of the fanatic who imagines that it has brought in the millennium. He takes a hopeful view of its future because he thinks that "there are already some indications that higher than merely

national purposes are moving mankind and that it is struggling to express them in institutions that may in the end prove to have dominating influence."

Passing on to the discussion of the relation of man to God, Lord Haldane begins by pointing out that God cannot be a thing or substance. A thing is limited and distinguished from other things, which God is not. Nor is He a transcendent being beyond the reach of knowledge. He is rightly conceived as subject provided that we do not regard the object as foreign to it. God "must not stand for less than entirety, and such an entirety must be that within which all distinctions and resulting relations can fall." The object of the divine mind must be within itself. "It must find the necessary distinction from itself in an Other that is just itself. The mind of God must have in its Other itself, and must recognise in that Other just Himself in the form of otherness" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. II., p. 156). Lord Haldane agrees with Hegel in thinking that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity gives expression to this idea in a symbolical form. Mind in itself is the Father, mind "gone into otherness, hetereity, finite mind" is the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the fulness of self-consciousness in which the opposition of subject and object is reconciled. Such a conception is fundamentally opposed to the deistic view that God is other than the world. "It is just in the world that is here and now when fully comprehended and thought out that we shall find God, and in finding God shall find the reality of that world in Him" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I., p. 16).

"Man and God," says Lord Haldane, "are not numerically distinct subjects in knowledge. They are the one foundational mind, disclosing itself in different degrees or logical stages in the progress of reality, but

as identical throughout divergences in form. It is the identity that underlies the correspondence of our thoughts that relates man to his fellow man. It is the same identity in difference that relates him to God" (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 398). The human mind, hampered by the organic conditions on which it depends, is unable to comprehend the nature of the divine life as lived by God. It cannot envisage things from the divine point of view. But by reflection it can transcend its limitations and learn that "God is present in us and it is in God that our fully developed reality must centre."

"There is," Lord Haldane tells us, "only a single actual universe, the universe which in one abstract aspect is thought, in another, nature, in its concrete, individual, living actuality, mind. This same actuality presents to us its different aspects according to the plane of intelligence at which we approach it. With the categories we employ its degrees of appearance vary and arrange themselves. These degrees of appearance, degrees not of substance but of comprehension, give us the differing and changing aspects of the world as it seems, and, it may be, the justification for our faith in their several titles to places in reality" (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. I., p. 114).

Lord Haldane has done well to emphasise that there is only one reality and that beyond it there is nothing. 'Beyond reality' is a meaningless expression. Nature and spirit are not two entities antithetical to each other. It is not in any transcendent region that the spiritual is to be found. The spiritual world is the natural world at a higher level of interpretation. What seems to be purely physical at first sight is, viewed from within, the revelation of mind. But because spirit cannot be

divorced from matter, it does not follow that it is completely realised in what we call the material world. Of the objective expression of the Absolute mind, our present abode may form only a very insignificant part. The error of medieval thought was to suppose that the distinction between this world and any other possible world beyond it is the distinction of the material and the spiritual. Against this view idealism rightly urges that the same reality is at one plane of thought matter and at another mind. Mind includes the object-world within itself. But the object-world may consist not only of the material universe but also of an unseen universe continuous with it. There is no reason to suppose that because mind is revealed in nature it is revealed in nature only, and that there can be no sphere of existence other than the one in which we at present find ourselves. In his recoil against medieval dualism, Hegel went to the opposite extreme of equating the object of God's knowledge with nature, and his followers have endorsed this error. But may it not be that medieval thought, wrong in one way, was right in another? It was wrong in supposing that the spiritual world is beyond this world. The spiritual is not somewhere far away; it is here and now as the sustaining principle of everything that is. But, nevertheless, medievalism may have been in the right in divining that the present sensible world is not all, and that beyond it there are other worlds. Neither science nor philosophy has anything to say against this view. Some scientific men at any rate distinctly favour it. Sir Oliver Lodge, for example, speaks of the ether as "something more fundamental than matter, something of which matter is only a sensuous modification," and suggests that it may be the stuff of which worlds unknown to us are made (*Nineteenth*

Century and After, January, 1924). All that can justly be urged is that all these worlds must be regarded as elements of a single objective system in which the Absolute mind is revealed. Our conception of reality has been deepened by the idealistic interpretation of it. It will be broadened if we think that its objective side is not co-extensive with the sensible world only.

CHAPTER XIV.

Dr. J. E. McTAGGART AS AN INTERPRETER OF HEGEL.

Dr. J. E. McTaggart is a well-known interpreter of Hegel. He is also an independent constructive thinker. Of his own positive theory, as presented in his *Nature of Existence*, he says that it is not "the idealism of Kant, or of the school which is sometimes called neo-Hegelian." It is not, that is, "that idealism which rests on the essential dependence of the object of knowledge upon the knowing subject, or upon the fact of knowledge, but the idealism which rests on the assertion that nothing exists but spirit." It does not therefore come within the scope of the present work. But a history of British Neo-Hegelianism would be very incomplete indeed which did not take into account Dr. McTaggart's highly original and very unorthodox interpretation of Hegel. It is an interpretation in which unquestionably there is a great deal of truth. The most noticeable feature of it is the emphasis which it puts on the element of pluralism in Hegel's philosophy. Dr. McTaggart rightly holds that Hegel's system is far more pluralistic than is generally supposed. His interpretation of Hegel, therefore, is in some ways complementary to that of Caird and Wallace, and supplies a corrective of the somewhat exaggerated monism of Bradley and Bosanquet.

Alone among British thinkers Dr. McTaggart is not afraid of constructing a system and of frequenting the *a priori* road. In this respect he is a true follower of Hegel. The method adopted by him in his *Nature of Existence* resembles Hegel's dialectic, and does not rest on induction. The part of Hegel's work which is sometimes appreciated even by his hostile critics is the applications of his dialectic to the facts of human life and experience. Even G. H. Lewes was impressed by his *Philosophy of History*. Dr. McTaggart, however, thinks that "the really valid part of Hegel's system is his Logic and not his applications of it." "The general position of the Logic," he holds, "is justifiable. With regard to its applications, on the other hand, although they doubtless contain much that is most valuable, their general and systematic validity seems indefensible" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 235).

The aim of Hegel's dialectic is to exhibit the logical connection of the categories involved in experience. Like Kant, Hegel does not regard the categories as independent of each other. They mutually imply each other in such a manner that any attempt to use one of them to the exclusion of the others gives rise to self-contradiction. If we begin with the simplest and most abstract of them, we find that we are unable to rest in it, but are forced to move on from category to category in an ascending scale of adequacy until we reach the Absolute Idea which is "present to us in all reality, in all the phenomena of experience, and in our own selves." The advance takes place "not directly, but by moving from side to side, like a ship tacking against an unfavourable wind." The lower categories are not set aside, but are "partly altered and partly preserved in the higher one." It is a mistake to suppose that we

extract the higher categories from the lower ones by means of analysis. "The dialectic must be looked on as a process not of construction but of reconstruction. If the lower categories lead on to the higher, and these to the highest, the reason is that the lower categories have no independent existence, but are only abstractions from the highest. It is this alone which is independent and real." In an incomplete reality explicitly before the mind, nothing less than the concrete whole, the Absolute Idea, is implicitly present. The implicit inevitably seeks to be explicit and the dialectic movement is the outcome. As Bradley puts it, "before the mind there is a single conception, but the mind itself, which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the *datum*, and produces the result. The opposition between the real, in the fragmentary character in which the mind possesses it, and the true reality felt within the mind, is the moving cause of that unrest which sets up the dialectical process."

The postulate of the dialectic, says Dr. McTaggart, is the idea of being. In it all other ideas can be shown to be implicit. It is impossible to deny that something exists, for the denial itself proves the reality of the denial and of the person who denies. But if something is, the dialectic shows that it is ultimately mind. The basis of the dialectic "is the complete and concrete idea which is present in our minds, though only implicitly, and which renders it impossible that we should stop short of it by permanently acquiescing in any finite category."

The only category which adequately explains the world is the Absolute Idea. In it all the lower categories are involved. It contains them as its moments. They are real only as parts of the whole, and have therefore

no meaning apart from the relations in which they stand to one another. Each implies all the rest. The understanding, however, does not see this, and insists upon treating the categories as independent and self-subsistent. So treated, they inevitably fall into contradictions and fail to give us a consistent view of reality as a whole. But contradiction is a mark of error and has got to be removed somehow. Hegel has been accused of denying the validity of the law of contradiction. But Dr. McTaggart points out that "so far is the dialectic from denying the law of contradiction, that it is essentially based on it." It insists upon the impossibility of accepting a contradiction as ultimate and on the necessity of finding its solution. We can affirm nothing without affirming something else from which it is distinguished. Every positive assertion implies a negative assertion and contradiction results unless we are able to rise to a point of view from which the opposite assertions can be reconciled. We cannot acquiesce in unreconciled contradiction, to overcome which is the aim of the dialetic. It cannot be overcome by simply accepting *either* the one *or* the other of the conflicting alternatives. Both must be seen to be the complementary aspects of a more comprehensive truth. "Truth consists not of contradictions, but of moments which, if separated, would be contradictions, but which in their synthesis are reconciled and consistent." For the purposes of ordinary life it is often necessary to treat the abstractions of the understanding as stable and ultimate. But reason shows that "the lower categories are abstractions from the higher, and are unfit to be used for the ultimate explanation of anything, except in so far as they are moments in a higher unity." The understanding dissects and divides, but at the same time demands that the

separated aspects of reality shall be reduced to elements of a harmonious whole. "The need of the Absolute is thus a need of cognition." But the demand of the understanding can be satisfied only by reason. This does not mean that understanding and reason are two independent faculties of the mind, but two ways of working of one and the same mind. Reason goes beyond the understanding and completes it. It solves the problems which the latter raises.

Hegel has been accused of deducing the concrete contents of experience from abstract thought. But Dr. McTaggart shows that the accusation is unjust. Hegel never attempted to do anything so absurd. All along the Logic implies reference to experience, for pure thought has no meaning apart from the data of sense. The validity of the dialectic process does not of course depend on experience, but at the same time it is not possible independently of experience. What the dialectic does is to exhibit the necessary connection of the categories which represent the universal elements of reality and are inseparable from the immediate and particular. "Since we cannot observe pure thought at all, except in experience, it is clear that it is only in experience that we can observe the change from the less to the more adequate form which thought undergoes in the dialectic process. But this change of form is due to the nature of thought alone, and not to the other element in experience—the matter of intuition" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 18). But "the whole of thought, even when it has attained the utmost completeness of which it is capable, is only an abstraction from the fuller whole of reality" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 112). Of this fuller whole, thought and the matter of perception are equally necessary moments. "We

may regard pure thought as a mere abstraction of one side of experience, which is the only concrete reality, while the matter of intuition is an abstraction of the other side of the same reality—each, when considered by itself, being false and misleading" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 18). The rationality of the real does not mean the sufficiency of pure thought alone. "Thought may be perfectly capable of expressing the whole of reality, all that is real may be rational, but it will nevertheless remain true that all that is real cannot be merely reasoning" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 112).

Hegel's much criticised transition from Logic to nature is to be understood in the light of the truth just stated. Nothing is more absurd than to suppose that out of the abstract categories dealt with in the Logic, the facts of experience are produced. "If thought is a mere element in the whole of reality, having no more independent existence than mere sense has, it is certainly impossible that thought should produce reality—that the substantial and individual should depend on an abstraction formed from itself." The categories are only one side of the concrete whole of which the other side is nature. Just as the lower categories are abstractions from the higher, so is the Logical idea itself an abstraction from the reality which, in Hegel's view, is the Absolute Spirit. "As the comparison of the abstract idea with the concrete idea was the origin of the dialectical movement within the Logic, so the comparison of the concrete idea with the full whole of reality, compared with which the concrete notion itself was an abstraction, was the origin of the transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit—a transition in which there was no attempt to construct the world out of abstract

thought, because the foundation of the argument was the presence, implicit in all experience, of the concrete reality whose necessity was being demonstrated" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 57). The Absolute Idea, in short, is real only in connection with sensuous intuition, and there can, therefore, be no question of *deducing* the latter from the former.

Dr. McTaggart differs from most of the commentators of Hegel in thinking that in the dialectical evolution of the categories "the place of negation is only secondary." The essential thing, in his view, is that each category seeks not to negate itself but to complete itself. Negation is of importance only because without it, in the case of the earlier categories at any rate, the transition from the incomplete to the complete is not possible. "The motive force of the [dialectic] process lies in the discrepancy between the concrete and perfect idea implicitly in our minds, and the abstract and imperfect idea explicitly in our minds, and the essential characteristic of the process is in the search of this abstract and imperfect idea, not after its negation as such, but after its complement as such" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 132).

Dr. McTaggart observes that Hegel's method gradually changes as he passes from the categories of Being to those of Essence and the Notion. In the categories of Being, the thesis gives rise to its contrary, the antithesis, which is only complementary to it and is not in any way of greater value than it. Both of them are reconciled and find their truth in the synthesis. But "when we come to Essence the transition from thesis to antithesis is still indeed from positive to negative, but it is more than merely this. The antithesis is not merely complementary to the thesis, but is a correction of it.

It is consequently more concrete and true than the thesis, and represents a real advance. And the transition to the synthesis is not now made so much from the comparison of the other two terms as from the antithesis alone" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 122). Nevertheless, the antithesis is still the negative of the thesis. If it is its completion it is also its denial. In the categories of the Notion, however, the negative practically disappears, and each category is seen to have meaning only as it is developed into its successor. The movement from side to side gives place to a straight and steady forward movement in which "the steps are indeed discriminated from one another, but they can scarcely be said to be in opposition." There is a continuous development in which each stage necessarily arises out of its predecessor and passes into its successor. "The reality in any finite category, in this stage, consists only in its summing up those which went before, and in leading on to those which come after."

Does the dialectic merely represent the process by which we rise to the highest level of thought or does it indicate the nature of the relation which the categories bear to one another as moments of the Absolute Idea? All the stages of thought through which the dialectic passes are contained as its constituent elements in the Absolute Idea. It is not "something which is reached by the dialectic, and which then exists independently of the manner in which it was reached." Is the relation of the categories as moments of the Absolute Idea the same as their relation in the dialectic process? Dr. McTaggart's answer to the question is that "the dialectic does not adequately represent the nature of pure thought itself, although it does repre-

sent the inevitable course our minds are logically bound to follow when they attempt to deal with pure thought." A subjective element is invariably mixed up with our view of the ultimate nature of the relations between the categories. The reason is that we have necessarily to begin with the knowledge of only a part of reality and to laboriously work up to such knowledge of the whole as it is possible for us to acquire. The effort to comprehend the nature of the whole from the standpoint of the part can never be entirely successful. This does not in any way invalidate the dialectical method. It shows that from whatever point we may start we are bound in the end to mount up to the Absolute Idea. "It is not of the least importance what is the nature of the road we travel, provided that we must travel it, nor whether the process expresses truth fully, provided that the final conclusion does so." Although the dialectic cannot tell us how exactly the categories stand related to one another from the ultimate point of view, it does enable us to comprehend the nature of the Absolute. "Our inability to regard the process as an adequate analysis of the Absolute Idea will not leave us in ignorance of what the Absolute Idea really is." Further, the dialectic method is of service to us in estimating the value of the different ways of regarding the universe. It shows us that some categories are more adequate descriptions of reality than others, and enables us to arrange our various judgments about reality in order of completeness and truth.

It has been supposed by some that, according to Hegel, the dialectical evolution of the categories is a process that takes place in time. The categories succeed one another in time, and reality, which to begin with is pure being, ultimately develops into the Absolute

Idea. Dr. McTaggart easily shows that such an interpretation is against the whole spirit of Hegel's teaching. It makes time the ultimate reality, which, on Hegelian principles, it cannot be. The Absolute Idea "exists eternally in its full perfection" and is the presupposition of the lower categories. "The passage from category to category must not be taken as an actual advance, producing that which did not previously exist, but as an advance from an abstraction to the concrete whole from which the abstraction was made—demonstrating and rendering explicit what was before only implicit and immediately given, but still only reconstructing, and not constructing anything fresh" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 165).

But if the Absolute Idea is eternally perfect, how are we to account for the evils and imperfections of which the universe is notoriously full? If the dialectic were a process in time, we could say that the world is gradually passing from an imperfect to a perfect condition and the elements of irrationality in it are being progressively eliminated. But in a completely rational world how can there be any room for evils and contingencies? Dr. McTaggart does not think that this formidable problem can be solved by supposing that the appearance of imperfection is due to a delusion on our part. How can imperfect beings subject to delusion belong to a perfect universe? It may be said that the universe is perfect only when it is viewed *sub specie æternitatis*. Viewed *sub specie temporis*, it seems to be incomplete and irrational because its elements do not appear together as mutually connected members of a single whole, but as parted off from one another. "What reason can be given," asks Dr. McTaggart, "why the eternal reality should

manifest itself in a time process at all?" "Why should a concrete and perfect whole proceed to make itself imperfect for the sake of gradually getting rid of the imperfection again? If it gained nothing by the change, could it be completely rational to undergo it? But if it had anything to gain by the change, how could it previously have been perfect?" So stated, the problem is, of course, insoluble. But the idealist is under no compulsion to suppose that the Absolute is *first* changelessly perfect and *then* manifests itself in the phenomena of time. There is no such thing as perfection apart from the vicissitudes of the mundane world. The perfection of the whole is by reason of and not in spite of the imperfections of the parts. Just as the inanities and absurdities of particular scenes in a drama, of the witches' scene in *Macbeth*, for example, contribute to the meaning and purpose of the drama as a whole, so the blemishes of sections of the universe, taken piecemeal, may be the very means through which the rationality and perfection of the whole is realised. The perfect that absorbs imperfection into itself is *more* perfect than that which excludes it. Dr. McTaggart's solution of the difficulty is that we must accept both the teaching of experience that the world is very irrational and the conclusion of philosophy that the Absolute Idea is perfect and believe that the contradiction is somehow removed in a fuller truth of which we, at present, have no idea. "The two contradictory propositions—that the world was fundamentally perfect, and that imperfection did exist—would be harmonised and reconciled by a synthesis, in the same way that the contradictions within the dialectic itself are overcome. The two sides of the opposition would not so much be both false as both true. They would be

taken up into a higher sphere where the truth of both is preserved" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 191). This, as Wallace remarks, "is to throw too hard a task on the divine might of Higher Synthesis." Just as the opposition of mind and nature is reconciled not in a *neutrum* indifferent to both which we are unable to grasp, but in a subject that transcends the distinction between itself as knower and the object-world that is known, so is the opposition between reason and unreason within the world, as we know it, reconciled not in an incomprehensible something but in the rationality and righteousness of the total system of things.

Hegel never attempted to deduce the various facts of experience from pure thought, to explain, for example, why "a particular man should have red hair." His sole purpose "was to point out that through every part of reality there runs a thread of logical connection, so that the different parts stand in intelligible relations to one another and to Absolute Reality." But he undoubtedly sought to trace the manifestation of reason in the phenomena of nature and history. It is this part of his work that is generally appreciated. Dr. McTaggart, however, thinks that the dialectic of Hegel is of more value than its applications. The attempt to exhibit the working of reason in the facts of empirical observation he regards as invalid for three reasons. In the first place, we never can have the first term or the last term in the various series of concrete facts, no fixed points to start from or to end in. In the chain of the logical categories we know that pure being and the Absolute Idea are the two ends. In the second place, the course of the dialectic process in any particular sphere is continually inter-

fered with by external causes. Actual life is more than mere logic. And, lastly, our knowledge of reality is exceedingly fragmentary. No philosopher can ever hope to have the extensive knowledge, the thorough mastery of details which alone can put him in a position to rationalise experience. All that can legitimately be done is to attempt to discover a rational connection between the most general aspects of experience. The value of Hegel's philosophy, according to Dr. McTaggart, lies not in "his attempts to trace the manifestations of the dialectic process in the particular facts of our experience," but in the assurance which it gives us of the rationality and righteousness of the universe. Although we cannot know how particular things are rational, we may be convinced, on general philosophical grounds, that what is ultimately real must be spiritual, and therefore rational.

Dr. McTaggart's originality comes out most in his interpretation of Hegel's Absolute Idea. He points out that the Absolute Idea is spirit. And it is spirit which is "necessarily differentiated." It is the highest form of reality which, at a lower level, is life, and is, therefore, at least what life is. Now "according to that category, reality is a unity differentiated into a plurality (or a plurality combined into a unity) in such a way that the whole meaning and significance of the unity lies in its being differentiated into that particular plurality, and that the whole meaning and significance of the parts of the plurality lies in their being combined into that particular unity" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 9). The unity that holds together the plurality of individuals into which the Absolute is differentiated is not anything external to them. Nor is it to be found merely in their totality or in each

of them separately. "The unity must be completely in each individual, yet it must also be the bond which unites them." If these conditions are to be fulfilled and if the unity is not to be incompatible with the difference of the individuals, the Absolute must be conceived as "a system of conscious individuals." The unity, that is, must be "not only *in* the individuals, but also *for* the individuals." By this Dr. McTaggart means that the whole which is "completely present in each individual" is reproduced in it. This is impossible unless the individuals into which the unity of the whole is differentiated are self-conscious beings. "It is, I think, clear, from the category of the Absolute Idea, that reality can only be found in selves, which have their whole existence in finding themselves in harmony with other selves. And this plurality of selves, again, must be conceived, not as a mere aggregate, but as a unity whose intimacy and strength is only inadequately represented by the idea of organism" (*Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 209). If the differentiations of the Absolute are not to be like the modes of Spinoza, if they are to be as real and fundamental as its unity and to "have vitality to stand against a perfect unity," we must think of them as persons. The Absolute Idea, as interpreted by Dr. McTaggart, signifies that "the universe is differentiated. It consists of an organic system of individuals. And the subject-object relation of which Hegel speaks is one where the universe as a whole is object to *each* of the individuals as subjects" (*A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, p. 307).

The Absolute, in Dr. McTaggart's view, is a unity of persons, but it is not itself a person. It is "the deepest unity possible—one in which the parts have

no meaning but their unity, while that unity, again, has no meaning but its differentiations." There is no doubt that this unity is spiritual, but a spiritual unity need not be a person. "It might be said of a college, with as much truth as it has been said of the Absolute, that it is a unity, that it is a unity of spirit, and that none of that spirit exists except as personal. Yet the college is not a person. It is a unity of persons, but it is not a person itself" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 58). In the same way the Absolute may not be a person, although its fundamental differentiations, among which human selves are to be included, are persons, and although its unity is far greater than that of a college. A differentiation of the Absolute must be personal, because otherwise the whole cannot be completely in it. As finite, it excludes everything else, but it is only as conscious that it also includes what is excluded. The Absolute, however, does not exclude anything. All its differentiations are *in* it, and there is nothing from which it can be distinguished. It, therefore, "has not a characteristic which is admitted to be essential to all finite personality, which is all the personality of which we have experience." That characteristic is the consciousness of the non-ego. As there is nothing which falls outside the Absolute, it cannot have such a consciousness, and cannot, therefore, be a person.

In each finite self, says Dr. McTaggart, there is "an element of indivisible unity" on which the sense of self depends. It is not separable from "the other element of multiplicity," nor more essential than it. "But although not more essential, it may perhaps be called a more positive element in the synthesis than the antithesis is. The element of the unity in the person

belongs exclusively to him, while the element of the multiplicity, though it belongs to him, belongs also to the outside reality with which he is in connection" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 83). Finite selves are thus "unities of centre," each of which, although external to the others, contains them in itself by virtue of its self-consciousness. The Absolute, on the other hand, "is a unity of system, and the element of unity in it cannot be a simple and indivisible point, like that of the finite self." Unlike the unities of centre, it does not also exclude what it includes, but is "from all points of view all in every part." Not having the element of unity, "it cannot have the personality that we have."

Dr. McTaggart contends that Hegel's view of the Trinity shows that he does not regard the Absolute as a person. In the Trinity, as understood by him, the element of unity is the Father, the element of difference and multiplicity the Son, and Spirit is the One-in-many, the unity realised in its own differentiations. The Father and the Son are not on the same level with the Holy Spirit. They are the thesis and the antithesis of which the Holy Spirit is the synthesis, and exist not independently but only as its moments. "In other words, the Father and the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker makes from the concrete reality of the Holy Ghost" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 204). Now, according to Hegel, the "Kingdom of the Spirit" is the Church, not the imperfect visible church, but the "perfected community, which from one point of view is eternally present, while from another point of view it must be conceived as being in the future." But a community cannot be a person, although it consists of persons, no matter how complete its unity

may be. Hegel, argues Dr. McTaggart, would not have spoken of love as the bond of the community, if, besides being composed of persons, it were itself a person; for, in that case, the members of the community would be held together not merely by love but also by a personal unity.

It is not enough for an idealistic philosophy to prove that reality is not ultimately matter but spirit. It must determine what the essential nature of spirit is. Knowledge in the abstract that the universe is rational and righteous is of very little use unless we can say something definite about the nature of spirit. Dr. McTaggart thinks that philosophy is competent to give us this fuller insight. It shows that "spirit is ultimately made up of various finite individuals, each of which finds his character and individuality in his relations to the rest and in his perception that they are of the same nature as himself. In this way the Idea in each individual has as its object the Idea in other individuals" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 254). This implies that each member of the community of "perfect but finite individuals" which the Absolute is, is perfect in knowledge and volition. But perfect knowledge means that "we have seen through matter till it has disappeared" and "realised that the entire universe [is] an assembly of spirits" so absolutely inter-dependent that the qualities and characteristics of each are determined by his relations to the others and to the whole. And perfection of volition is not possible without a complete harmony between ourselves and our environment which must extend through the entire universe. But when knowledge and volition attain such perfection, they cease to be distinct from each other and "their real truth and meaning is found only in a state of consciousness in

which they themselves, together with feelings, are swallowed up and transcended in a more concrete unity." This state of unity, according to Dr. McTaggart, is love. "To know another person thoroughly, to know that he conforms to my highest standards, to feel that through him the end of my own life is realised —is this anything but love?" "All perfect life would lead up to and culminate in love." Dr. McTaggart goes further. "I want to assert that, as life became perfect, all other elements would actually die away—that knowledge and volition would disappear, swallowed up in a higher reality, and that love would reveal itself, not only as the highest thing, but as the only thing in the universe" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 262).

The Absolute is "not an aggregate but a system." It is the most perfect unity of its differentiations. These differentiations are selves, each of which has a unique character distinguishing it from the rest. This is possible because the selves are most intimately connected with one another. The differentiation of the individuals has no meaning apart from their unity, nor their unity apart from their differentiation. "The whole difference of each individual from the others has to be contained in its harmony with the others." Of this harmony, Dr. McTaggart insists, love alone can be the foundation.

On ethical questions, Dr. McTaggart's views differ considerably from those of the followers of Green and Caird, although he claims that they are consistent with the principles of Hegel. The supremely real, as Hegel conceives it, is also the supreme good, for in it the complete satisfaction of the nature of each individual involves the complete satisfaction of the natures of all.

Such a supreme good contains the two elements of perfection and happiness, both of which are essential. It cannot be identified with mere pleasure. But Dr. McTaggart does not think that the supreme good can be the moral criterion. It is not usable in practice. In deciding which of the alternative lines of action in a given situation should be preferred, it is useless to ask which will contribute most to perfection. We have no means of answering the question. Perfection is so remote from us that it gives no indication whatever in any particular case what is the right thing to do. We need guidance in our choice of the ends immediately before us, but for this the idea of perfection is of no use. Moreover, "Hegel has shown that good never comes except out of conquered evil, and that evil must arise before it can be conquered. To bring our conduct to-day as close as possible to the supreme good may be to help or to hinder the coming of the supreme good in all its perfection" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 98-99).

The case is otherwise with hedonism. It does give us a perfectly definite and available criterion by which we can judge the rightness or wrongness of actions. "The use of this criterion is not incompatible with the recognition of perfection as the supreme good, and would give us, if not unerring guidance, still guidance less erroneous than would be afforded by any other applicable criterion" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 99). Dr. McTaggart makes light of the various objections that have been urged against hedonism, but it cannot be said that he has succeeded in meeting them. He admits, however, that happiness is not always a correct criterion. The good implies both order and progress. Of the former, happiness is a reliable indication,

but progress is often brought about at the sacrifice of pleasure, "although in the long run the greatest development and the greatest happiness are inseparable." When actions calculated to promote happiness have an adverse effect on the development of our ideals, an insoluble moral problem arises. But the cause of progress can take care of itself. Dr. McTaggart finds consolation in the reflection that "the attainment of the good does not ultimately depend upon action." "If the nature of reality was hostile or indifferent to the good, nothing but the most meagre and transitory gains could ever be made by creatures so weak and insignificant as we should be in such a universe. But, if as Hegel teaches us, that which we recognise as the supreme good is also the supreme reality, then it must inevitably realise itself in the temporal process, and no mistakes of ours can hinder the advance and the eventual attainment" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 127).

Dr. McTaggart has given a very interesting exposition of Hegel's doctrine of sin and virtue. He points out that for Hegel there is no absolute opposition between moral good and moral evil. Sin is the assertion of the particular will of the individual, his isolation of himself from the universal order. But in the scale of values it is higher than innocence, which consists in the absence of will. Of course, no self-conscious being can be completely devoid of will. He can only approximate to that condition. What has no will of its own is necessarily in harmony with the universe, for, as elements of it, all things must be compatible with one another. Innocence, therefore, is so far good. But, from another point of view, it is an evil for a rational being like man to be in a state of innocence. His ideal

is to be a self-determining being, to be in harmony with the universe "not merely as a part which cannot be out of harmony," but "in the way which is appropriate to a conscious being." "A conscious being who imitates the goodness of a stone is not good, but bad." Sin is at least self-determination, and is for that reason better than innocence. Adam's fall was in truth a rise. "But while the sinner is right in treating himself as of supreme importance, he is wrong in his conception of his nature." In seeking to subordinate everything to his private and isolated will, he does violence to his own deeper and truer nature. He tries to find permanent satisfaction in ways of life which cannot yield it. "To commit sin is very like drinking sea-water to quench thirst." As "the universe agrees with the ideals of morality," sin is essentially self-destroying. It is inevitably followed by retribution, if not in the life of the individual, in the history of the race, and in the end passes into virtue. "The true self of any man is not something which exists in particularity and isolation, and which finds its satisfaction in the gratification of desires arising from its particular and isolated nature. On the contrary, it only exists in its individuality by reason of its necessary and vital unity with all other selves, and it can only find satisfaction in so far as it places its good in the realisation, by means of its individual nature, of that unity" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 162). To be consciously in harmony with the universe through free self-determination, to carry out its purpose because that purpose is our own real purpose, is virtue. It "freely accepts that order of the universe which innocence blindly obeys."

Dr. McTaggart does not think that society can pro-

perly be described as an organism. The fact that the nature of an individual is in every way determined by his relations to others in society does not prove that society is an organism. It only shows that it is a system. But a system may not be organic at all. What Hegel calls Absolute Mechanism is as much a system as a living body. Society would be an organism if it were "an end to itself and to its own parts." Dr. McTaggart does not think that any actual society of this world is such. Only "the ideal society of Heaven," the Absolute reality, can be the end of its members, for "it is a differentiated unity, of which the parts are perfectly individual, and which, for that very reason, is a perfect unity. To call such a unity organic would only be incorrect because it was inadequate" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 187). In it "just because the individual was such a complete individual, he would have all his perfection, and all his reality, in nothing else but in his relations to other individuals." Our ideal is certainly to realise such a perfect society, and "only through our present society can that ideal be reached. For we must begin from where we are, and at present we are in society." But this does not mean the unquestioned acceptance of the arrangements of society as they are now. "Our advance often—to some extent, always—consists in breaking up and rising above relations which, up to that point, had been part of the constitution of society." To suppose that the considerations which are so important in our estimation in determining our present social relations will also be important in Heaven is absurd. "We must express ourselves by them so long as we find them the best expression of the absolute end, or the best road to it, but only under the reservation that we are to throw them aside as worthless when we

find a more adequate expression or a more direct road." It is not to be supposed that our duty is to sever our connection with the defective earthly society, for "if that society is only a means, at least it is an indispensable means. If it is not a god to be worshipped, it is none the less a tool which must be used."

APPENDIX.

HEGELIANISM AND HUMAN PERSONALITY.

I.

"Interpreters of the Hegelian Philosophy," says Wallace, "have contradicted each other almost as variously as the several commentators on the Bible. He is claimed as their head by widely different schools of thought, all of which appeal to him as the original source of their line of argument." Perhaps on no subject connected with the Philosophy of Hegel has the divergence of opinion been more marked than on the question of the relation of human personality to the Absolute. In the judgment of critics of one class, Hegelianism is only revived Spinozism and merely inculcates the teachings of the great Jewish Philosopher in more puzzling and less straightforward language purposely designed to make an old thought appear new. Human personality, we are asked to believe, is, in Hegel's view, only a transient modification of the Absolute, as evanescent and unsubstantial as the passing waves upon the surface of the ocean. In direct antithesis to this oft-repeated interpretation, we have the theory put forward by one of the ablest and latest expositors of Hegel that the Absolute is an impersonal unity, a *society* of finite but perfect individuals. Hegel's Absolute, Dr. McTaggart assures us, is "a unity of persons, but it is not a person itself" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 58). Dr. McTaggart does not seem to be quite sure in his own mind that his interpretation of the nature of the Absolute Idea is the right one, for he tells us that he proposes "to consider not Hegel's own opinions on the personality of the Absolute, but the conclusions on the subject which ought logically to be deduced from his conception of the Absolute as determined in the Logic." Dr. McTaggart's theory must be distinguished from that of the Hegelians of the Left, according to whom the

Absolute is unconscious Reason and first comes to consciousness only in man. Dr. McTaggart, however, holds that the self-differentiations of the Absolute are "perfect finite persons," of some of whom our own selves are the imperfect and limited manifestations. Opposed to all these contradictory views is the conclusion of the bulk of the British expositors of Hegel that the Absolute is a person, a subject and not a mere substance, who necessarily reveals Himself in nature and more fully in man. A prolonged study of the philosophy of Hegel and the copious literature on it in the English language has brought me to the conclusion that the truth is to be found in the synthesis, in the Hegelian sense of the term, of the views of Caird, Wallace, and others on the one side, and of Dr. McTaggart on the other. My object in this essay is to expound and defend this thesis. There are three points of fundamental importance to be considered in connection with this subject. What is human personality, and how is it related to the personality of the Absolute, if it be a personality? How are the categories related to human knowledge and to the Absolute? What is the relation of the content of human experience to Reality? I propose to take up these points for discussion in succession.

Before we are in a position to determine the relation of man to the Absolute, it is necessary to acquire a clear comprehension of the nature of the Absolute. The commonly accepted view of the nature of Hegel's Absolute is that it is the self-conscious unity that comprehends within itself and transcends the relative distinction of subject and object. It is the central unity, the supreme spiritual principle, in which all things have their being and find their ultimate explanation and out of which they proceed. It is the absolute subject without relation to which no object can exist and whose own existence depends upon its manifestation in the universe of inter-related objects. Hegel's Absolute Idea is, as Caird interprets it, "the idea of a self-consciousness which manifests itself in the difference of self and not-self, that through this difference, and by overcoming it, it may attain the highest unity with itself" (*Hegel*, p. 183). It is not a unity in which all differences are lost; it is rather the unity which realises *itself* in the differences. The Absolute is not like the substance of Spinoza, omnipotent in swallowing up its modes but impotent to explain their origin. It is the unity of self-consciousness which exists in and through the plurality of finite objects and to which they refer themselves as their source and explanation. "The 'free' existence of the world," argues Caird, "as an external aggregate of objects

in space, with no appearance of relation to mind, and the 'free' existence of each object in the world, as external to the other objects and merely in contingent relation to them, are characteristics which belong to these objects just because they are the manifestations of a self-determined principle, which can realise itself only as it goes out of itself, or gives itself away, but which in this 'self-alienation' remains 'secure of itself and resting in itself.' On the other hand, this security of intelligence in the freedom of its object is possible just because its own nature is what it has given to the object which, therefore, in realising itself must return to its source" (*Ibid.*, p. 198).

If the foregoing statement gives a correct representation of Hegel's conception of the Absolute, the charge of Pantheism cannot, of course, be legitimately brought against it. The essence of Pantheism is to lay such stress on the unity of all reality that the element of difference is simply ignored or explained away. But Hegelianism, as understood by its leading British exponents, accords equal recognition to the elements of unity and difference in the concrete whole—the Absolute. We are constantly reminded that the ultimate unity of self-consciousness is meaningless apart from the plurality of finite objects, and the plurality of finite objects presupposes and has its being in the unity of self-consciousness. "As the consciousness of the self," says Caird, "is correlative with the consciousness of the not-self, no conception of either can be satisfactory which does not recognise a principle of unity, which manifests itself in both, which underlies all their difference and opposition, and which must, therefore, be regarded as capable of reconciling them" (*Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge*, p. 12). But in spite of this clear statement that in Hegel's system the unity of the Absolute is not incompatible with but presupposes the differences of Reality, Hegelianism has never been able to free itself from the imputation of Pantheism. It is easy to say that this is sheer misunderstanding, but a misunderstanding which cannot be removed even by the most lucid expositions of such a master of style as Edward Caird, must be presumed to have some justification. Now the main root of the misunderstanding, it seems to me, lies in the over-emphasis which is apt to be laid, unconsciously but inevitably, upon the supreme unity of self-consciousness to which all reality is traced, and in the line of cleavage, so to speak, which still remains between the subject and object in spite of the clearest possible demonstration of their correlativity. If all reality is at bottom one, and that unity is the unity of self-consciousness, its value and significance is

necessarily greater than that of the mere object, however much the existence of the object may be implied in that of the self. The self is more than the object, and the object, in spite of its essential correlativity with the self, is, when compared with it, unconsciously reduced to the position of a mere shadow. The correlativity, that is to say, is apt to become rather one-sided. This tendency to exalt the self at the expense of the object is intensified by the fact that the correlativity of the subject and object is unable to bridge over the gulf that lies fixed between them. The subject may have no reality apart from the object and conversely, but the subject, be it remembered, *is not* the object, nor is the object, subject. What is more natural under the circumstances than that the object, unable to attain to the level of the subject, should dwindle into insignificance in comparison with it? And when in this manner the objective world is tacitly taken to be less real than the unity of self-consciousness which is the basal principle of the universe, and, consequently, more and more stress is laid on the latter, the result is, if not Pantheism, something very like it. I do not, of course, argue that this is our explicit thought. On the contrary, so far as our conscious logic is concerned, we never allow ourselves to forget that "the real unity of the world manifests itself through its equally real differences." But the *under-current* of thought is what I have stated it to be. Emphasise the essential correlation of the self and not-self ever so much, the self is self and the not-self is not-self, and the two never cease to be different from each other. As long as the matter stands thus, the unity of the self tends to be fatal to the plurality of mere objects, however close and vital may be the relation of the latter to the former.

The only way to avoid this difficulty, this irresistible drift towards Pantheism, is to realise that the object in which the self manifests itself is not only *related* to the self, but *is* the self. Every object at a higher level of thought is also a subject. To say so is not to make a simple identification of the one with the other so as to obliterate all distinction between them. What is a subject from its own point of view is an object in relation to other selves. As a knowing self, a thing contains all other things within itself as its objects; but it, as an object, is itself embraced within the knowledge of the other things regarded as subjects. To A, regarded as a subject, B, C, D, E, etc., are related as objects of its knowledge, but A itself is an object to B conceived as subject and so on. A, B, C, D and the rest are thus both subjects and objects, but from different standpoints.

The unity of the Absolute is not something standing over against the differences of its objects. It is realised in the self-consciousness of each of its objects. It is a unity only in so far as it differentiates itself into the selves of its objects. It, in other words, is not an abstract unity, but a concrete and organic unity of its constituent selves. The Absolute present in the self-consciousness of A, whole and undivided, has B, C, D and the rest as its objects, present completely in B as *its* self-consciousness, it has A and others as objects and so on. As Ribot says of the human self that it is a co-ordination, so we may say even of the Absolute, that it is not a single unitary personality, but a co-ordination of many selves—a self of selves. Such a conception is certainly not destructive to the unity of the Absolute. It, on the contrary, deepens it by showing that in thus going out to its objects as their selves, it remains securely one with itself, supreme and undivided. The idea may best be illustrated by the Leibnitzian theory of the universe as a system of monads. Each monad is a complete whole which ideates the whole universe from its own point of view. The fundamental mistake of Leibnitz was to isolate the monads completely from each other. If we amend his theory by conceiving of the monads as in interaction with and organically related to each other, and regard the monad of monads not as a separate monad but as the unity of the monads realised in them, we shall get something analogous to the conception we need. So conceived, each monad would reproduce the whole universe within itself as its object, while it itself would form part of the objective world reproduced in the consciousness of the other monads, the monad of monads being the organic unity of all of them and its consciousness consisting of their consciousness.[1] The Absolute self, that is to say, is a society of selves correlated with the universe as a systematic whole of inter-related objects.[2] It, as the self of selves, has for its objective counterpart the universe as an organic

[1] The monads of Leibnitz ideate the universe with different degrees of clearness and distinctness. But in the illustration given the monads must be supposed to reflect the universe, each from its own point of view, with perfect clearness. What Leibnitz calls imperfect monads would, on this supposition, be imperfect *manifestations* of the monads which as the constituent elements of the monad of monads—the Absolute, are all perfect.

[2] The term " society " hardly conveys the meaning, but there is no suitable substitute for it. The personalities into which the Absolute is differentiated are unified in the absolute far more closely than are the individuals in society.

whole, while its constituent selves are the selves of the particular objects which form parts of the world.

"There is a sense," says Caird, "in which every idealist must admit that the only object of mind is mind. Every one who holds that the real is relative to mind, and, therefore, that the difference between mind and its object cannot be an absolute difference, must acknowledge that whatever is real (and just so far as it is real) has the nature of mind manifested in it. Reality cannot be alien to the subject that knows it, nor can the intelligence comprehend any object except as it finds *itself* in it" (*Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol. I., p. 193). But he goes on to say that "it is not necessary to infer from this that every object, which is in any sense real thinks or is a thinking subject" (*Ibid.*). It is not a question of inference however. As Caird himself admits, "the only object of mind is mind." Of course, every object is not a conscious subject in isolation from others or outside of the Absolute consciousness. But it can be an integral element of the Absolute personality only as having a self of its own. It is impossible to conceive of the Absolute, which is present, whole and undivided, as much in the meanest object as in the totality of nature, as a mere unity. It is a plurality as much as a unity. Caird is most emphatic in declaring that the unity of the Absolute embraces real differences. These differences, however, as self-differentiations of the Absolute cannot be *mere* objects. Objects which are the manifestations of a self, which cannot exist apart from the self, are, I submit, selves as much as objects. It is impossible to avoid this conclusion by arguing that there are differences of degree in Reality. Every object which is in relation to the consciousness of the Absolute, in which the Absolute consciousness is manifested, as it must be, completely and indivisibly, must partake of the perfection of the Absolute. If there are differences of degree in Reality, they belong to the particular phases of Reality and not to Reality as a whole. The *empirical* fact of the differences of degree in Reality cannot stand in the way of the conclusion, reached on speculative grounds, that the total system of things in which the Absolute is revealed shares in its perfection. Now, if the total system of things is perfect, there must be a point of view from which every constituent element of it is perfect. It is impossible to say that the universe in which everything is imperfect is, as a whole, perfect. One inclined to take such a view would do well to remember Mr. Bradley's joke about the best of possible worlds in which everything is bad.

Caird seems to imply that the view that the self-differentiations of the absolute are themselves selves leads to the conclusion that "nothing exists except minds and their states." Each object, we have seen, is a self from its own point of view and a not-self from the point of view of other objects. It is both a subject, or rather subject-object, and an object, but from different points of view. Every object, indeed, is from its own point of view not only a subject, but also an object to itself, but it is an object to itself in the same sense in which the body is the object of the self that animates it. What exist, therefore, are not minds and their *states* but minds and their *objects*, which objects, however, are themselves minds. Caird's objection can legitimately be urged only against a theory like that of Leibnitz which so cuts off things from each other that no sort of mutual influence is possible between them. Minds, therefore, become incapable of having any content except their own internal states. But a genuine Idealism conceives of objects as the differences in which the ultimate spiritual principle of unity is manifested, which is present in them as their selves, *particularised* but whole and undivided, and gathers them all up into itself without detriment to their distinctness.

Now the theory set forth above, I maintain, gives a correct and adequate representation of Hegel's conception of the Absolute. Most of the commentators of Hegel are agreed that the Absolute is a personality, but they lay so much stress on its unity that they overlook the important fact that it is only as a co-ordination, a *community* of selves, that the Absolute is a self. I agree with Dr. McTaggart in thinking "that the element of differentiation and multiplicity occupies a much stronger place in Hegel's system than is generally believed" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 3). No one denies that the unity of the Absolute is, in Hegel's view, the correlative of and founded on its differences. But what is the nature of these differences? Are they mere objects? Objects they most assuredly are, but what is all but universally forgotten is that they are selves as well, selves which exist not on their own account or in isolation from and in total disregard of each other, but as integral elements of the Absolute Personality. They, organically related to each other, constitute the Absolute Personality. The phrase 'organic relation' is indeed inadequate to express the truth. The union is much closer than any mere organic union can be. But however close the union may be, it is not incompatible with, but is the other aspect of the *relative* independence of the selves. Dr. McTaggart has rendered a valuable service to philosophy

by showing that in Hegel's system the self-differentiations of the Absolute are not mere things, but *persons*. But he has also converted an important truth into a serious error by declaring that the Absolute is not a person. I shall have later on to examine his conclusion at some length. At present, I wish to dwell upon that part of his theory in which I am most heartily in agreement with him, and to cite further evidence from Hegel's works in support of it than he has found it possible to do. "We are certain," says Dr. McTaggart very truly, "that the doctrine of the Absolute Idea teaches us that all reality is spirit. No one, I believe, has ever doubted that this is Hegel's meaning. And it is also beyond doubt, I think, that he conceived this spirit as necessarily differentiated. Each of these differentiations, as not being the whole of spirit, will be finite.[1] It is the eternal nature of spirit to be differentiated into finite spirits" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 7). Again, "The meaning of the Absolute Idea is that Reality is a differentiated unity, in which the unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the unity. The differentiations are individuals for each of whom the unity exists, and whose whole nature consists in the fact that the unity is for them, as the whole nature of the unity consists in the fact that it is for the individuals. And, finally, in this harmony between the unity and the individuals neither side is subordinated to the other, but the harmony is an immediate and ultimate fact" (*Ibid.*, p. 19).

Hegel defines the Absolute Idea thus: "The Idea, as unity of the subjective and objective idea, is the notion of the Idea,—a notion whose object is the Idea as such, and for which the objective is Idea,—an object which embraces all characteristics in its unity. This unity is consequently the Absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself—and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea" (*Hegel's Logic*, Wallace's Translation, second edition, pp. 373-74). This, to be sure, is one of the most enigmatical utterances of Hegel. It hardly affords us any clue to his inner meaning. Isolated passages and paragraphs, taken by themselves, will often be found to be of the same description. They are impenetrable and hard as adamant. The only way to compel this dark philosopher to surrender his meaning is laboriously and patiently to keep pace with him, with bad falls occasionally, no doubt, as he explains the movement of the cate-

[1] Dr. McTaggart's use of the term "finite" is apt to be misleading. As each differentiation of the Absolute has others outside it, it is, of course, finite, but inasmuch as its knowledge embraces the whole of Reality, it is Infinite in Hegel's sense of the term.

gories from Pure Being to the Absolute Idea. You must *think* with him, watch his thought, so to speak, in the making. One must understand the whole of Hegel or nothing of him. A hard task undoubtedly, but there is no way to avoid it. There is no royal road to the citadel of the Absolute Idea. Much help will also be found in the study of the application of his general principles to the concrete facts of life and experience. In order, therefore, to acquire an insight into the meaning of the Absolute Idea, we must go back to the early stages of the dialectic. But even in the definition of it quoted above, it is easy to see that, in Hegel's view, the object of the Idea is itself Idea. The highest Reality—the unity of the subjective and objective Idea, "the notion of the Idea" has for its object *Idea*. The object of mind or spirit, in plainer language, is not a mere thing but mind.

The categories which first reveal Hegel's central thought, incompletely no doubt, but unmistakably, are the Infinite and Being-for-self. Hegel heartily endorses Spinoza's dictum, *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. Everything, in order to be, must have a determinate nature, but determination implies affirmation as much as negation. To say that somewhat is, is also to say that it is not something else from which it is distinguished. "A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit." But that which limits it is itself another thing needing limitation as the condition of its rising into reality. "Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on *ad infinitum*" (*Hegel's Logic*, Wallace's translation, second edition, p. 174). Thus arises endless progression or what Hegel calls the false infinite. In endless progression we never leave the region of the finite, and have only a tedious iteration of it. Nor is the true infinite to be found somewhere beyond the finite. That which is beyond the finite, being outside it, is necessarily limited by it and is, therefore, only another finite. An infinite which steers clear of the finite and does not somehow include it within itself is a contradiction. The finite, as finite, passes over into another finite which, however, is not alien to it but is involved in its own being, is its *alter ego*. What thus passes over endlessly from one finite to another does in reality abide with itself. It is the *inner* being of the finite, the soul of it—the genuine Infinite. "Since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage

and in the other, is the genuine infinity" (*Hegel's Logic*, Wallace's translation, second edition, p. 176). What is involved here is the negation of negation, the overcoming of the limit which finitude implies, and, consequently, self-restoration. Being thus restored through the negation but not cancellation of limit, Hegel calls Being-for-self.

"In Being-for-self," says Hegel, "enters the category of Ideality" (*Ibid.*, p. 178). This is a pronouncement of the utmost importance. The finite which returns upon itself through the negation of its limit is Infinite and, as such, ideal. The determinate Being, "Being-there-and-then" is limited and real, but as the unity which refers to itself in passing over into its other, it is ideal. "The truth of the finite is rather its ideality." Everything, therefore, which exists has a two-fold aspect. As a reality, it is finite and limited and excludes all other things from it; but as ideal it comprehends everything within itself. What is real is also ideal and the ideal must have reality and limitedness of being. "Man," observes Hegel shrewdly, "if he wishes to be actual, must be there-and-then, and to this end he must set a limit to himself. People who are too fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality" (*Logic*, Wallace's translation, p. 173). The ideal and the real, the self and the object, body and soul are one and the same and the difference is one of aspects only. On its ideal side an object is co-extensive with the universe itself—it is omniscient, but as real it is lowly and humble, takes its proper place among other reals and ties its ideal, its self, down to itself. This explains how it is that every particular self includes all that it knows and yet excludes them. The reality of the ideal is its body and hence the body is not excluded in the same sense in which all other things are.[1] "Being-for-self," says Hegel, "may be described as ideality, just as Being-there-and-then was described as reality. It is said that besides reality there is *also* an ideality. Thus the two categories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking ideality is not somewhat outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation, when you allow that reality is not all in all,

[1] The interesting and suggestive thought of Leibnitz that the monad, which, as a spiritual entity, has the whole universe ideally within itself, is also a body through its own inherent limitedness—*materia prima*, does not, I think, usually get the consideration it deserves. It requires modification, no doubt, but it suggests an important truth.

but that an ideality must be recognised outside of it. Such an ideality external to or it may be even beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name. Ideality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something: but this something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence characterised as reality, which if retained in isolation, possesses no truth" (*Logic*, Wallace's translation, pp. 179-80).

Now it does not require much penetration to discern what Hegel is driving at. What he means to say is that the ideality of an object, its inmost essence, is its self. A thing, in so far as it is real, is only one among many things, but the ideal element of it, its unity of self-consciousness is that which has for its object the entire circle of reality. Indeed Hegel, who at times is so obscure, does not leave us in any doubt as to his meaning on this point. He expressly says that Being-for-self is self-consciousness. "The readiest instance of Being-for-self is found in the 'I.' We know ourselves as existents, distinguished in the first place from other existents, and with certain relations thereto. But we also come to know this expansion of existence (in these relations) reduced, as it were, to a point in the simple form of Being-for-self. When we say 'I,' we express the reference to self which is infinite, and at the same time negative" (*Logic*, Wallace's translation, p. 179). The finite things in their ideality are Beings-for-self, unities of self-consciousness. The whole of reality exists in and for each of them and they exist in the whole. It is clear that in Being-for-self, we have a plurality of selves, a connected system of ideating centres, in each of which the whole world is represented. What conceals this truth from view is, I suspect, the failure to distinguish Being-for-self from the category of the one and many which immediately follows it. Being-for-self, abstractly considered as a self-subsistent real, and in negative relation to others which it excludes, is one. The ideality is for the moment lost sight of and the mere Being-there-and-then, the somewhat, with the power, no doubt, of the ideal at its back, becomes the one. The profounder element is temporarily eclipsed and the development in the subsequent movement of the categories is, till the notion is reached, mainly on the real side. A great inequality exists between the two elements of Being-for-self. Its ideal factor is already "I," but the side of reality is little better than a mere *Daseyn*. It is like a strong soul animating a frail body. The dialectical movement which follows serves to remove this disparity. A serious and needless difficulty is thrown in the way of properly apprehending Hegel's meaning by the erroneous supposition that the evolution

of the categories is really as regular and rhythmical as he suggests it to be. On this subject Dr. McTaggart has thrown much valuable light (*Vide Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*), but even he, I think, is inclined to suppose that there is more regularity of movement than is really the case. In Being-for-self, the sublime height of the Absolute Idea is already visible, dimly outlined in the distance, even from the low ground of the categories of quality, but, in the process of the toilsome ascent to it, we, for long intervals, lose sight of it. If we take care to remember Hegel's explicit statement that "the readiest instance of Being-for-self is the 'I,' what we have at this stage is a plurality of selves, each infinite, confronting each other. The stress is laid decidedly on the aspect of plurality, and it is the unity that is in danger of being overlooked. In later categories, Hegel, as I shall show, brings out prominently the aspect of unity and harmonises it with plurality, but the result gained in the earlier stages is not allowed to be missed. The later stages of the dialectic do not annul the earlier ones. The more developed categories enrich and supplement the poorer and more abstract categories, but what is once gained is never lost.

In the Notion, we have the Ideality of Being-for-self back again, deepened and enriched, and with the unity of the whole strongly emphasised, though the element of plurality is by no means ignored. "The Notion," says Hegel, "is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the Notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original and complete determinateness" (*Logic*, Wallace's translation, p. 287). The explication of the Notion, Hegel calls Development, in order to signalise the truth that in the unfolding of the categories under this section no new element is added, but what is implicit in the universal is made explicit. The Notion is not an abstract universal, but a concrete universal, which involves particularisation in the individuals of which it is a system. In it "the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole Notion" (*Ibid.*, p. 289). The function of the judgment is to show that the universal cannot abide with itself in aloofness from the individuals, but must particularise itself in them, while the syllogism exhibits that these individuals, because of the immanence of the universal in them, form a systematic totality. It is to be doubted whether Hegel was happy in his choice of the terms notion, judgment and syllogism, with their inevitable

subjective implications and association with Formal Logic to express his meaning. But what he seeks to convey through the terminology of Formal Logic is obvious. The Notion is the spiritual principle of unity from which all things proceed and to which all things return. Each of these things is itself the Notion with a particular determination. "Each function and moment of the Notion is itself the whole Notion." The individual *is* the universal specified and determined in a particular way. It does not, however, exhaust the universal. A particular determination demands other determinations and every individual has other individuals as its *alter egos* and, therefore, in indissoluble connection with it. The relation between the universal and the individual, it is of the utmost importance to remember, is not one of the whole and the parts. This is a category which in the Hegelian dialectic is long left behind at the stage of the Notion. The universal, the whole, is differentiated into the individuals, each of which is itself a whole. "It is a macrocosm made up of microcosms, which is all in every part." The reality of the universal, it will thus be seen, lies in the individuals, so related to one another as to form a coherent whole. Hegel would have fully endorsed Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison's dictum that the individual alone is real, only that care must be taken not to tear off the individual from other individuals and the systematic totality of them—the universal, to which it belongs. The relation between universality, particularity and individuality is thus expressed by Hegel: "The universal is the self-identical, with the express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual. Again, the particular is the different or the specific character, but with the qualification that it is in itself universal and is as an individual. Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and possesses a substantial existence" (*Hegel's Logic*, Wallace's translation, pp. 294-95).

The individual, it is essential to remember, is not a mere object. It being a specific determination of the Notion is like the Notion, a *self*. It is subject-object, the unity of the ideal and real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body. The object is the individual with its subjectivity abstracted from. The Notion is realised in the individuals and the individuals live, move and have their being in the Notion. It is the unity of the whole that goes out of itself to them and only in this way reduces them to subordination to itself. "Every individual being," says Hegel, "is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn

appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the Notion is realised" (*Hegel's Logic*, Wallace's translation, p. 353). The Notion, in short, is a unity of self-consciousness which is a system, a totality, an organic unity of subordinate unities of self-consciousness, each of which, although determined and particularised and thus *embodied* in an object, is all-inclusive. At the stage of Being-for-self, we had the unity of the whole rather thrust into the background. Now, however, it is prominently forward, not extinguishing but vitalising the subordinate selves, the Beings-for-self, the individuals. It gives reality to them and apart from them it itself has no reality. Hegel's Absolute, we thus see, is the unity of the ideal and the real, which on the ideal side is a *community* of selves and on the real side a universe of inter-related objects.

The Notion completely developed and as a fully expressed totality of individuals is, when viewed externally, so to speak, the object. It, in its perfection, is the unity of the subject and the object——the Idea. Hegel begins with the ideality of the Notion and shows that when it is fully explicated, it is embodied in the object. The object, again, taken one-sidedly and in abstraction from the subject, is in contradiction with itself and leads us back to the ideal element, which is all along presupposed and without which it would not be. The evolution of objectivity towards ideality, we may pass over, as it is not of prime importance in illustrating our theme, but here also Hegel steadily keeps eye on the two aspects of Reality——unity and plurality. In object *qua* object, a reconciliation of these two moments is not possible, and it is this contradiction which is the spring that makes the dialectical coach move forward at this point. The object, says Hegel, is a totality "which breaks up into distinct parts each of which is itself the totality." Now the dialectic, in the second section of the doctrine of the Notion, seeks to prove that the part which is an independent totality, and yet is subordinated to a more comprehensive totality, must be a spiritual unity.

In the categories of Life and Cognition, the correlativity of oneness and difference is further exhibited on a higher plane and the teleological character of the unity of the whole is explicitly brought out. Dr. McTaggart has fully dealt with these categories in arguing that the self-differentiations of the Absolute are persons, and I do not, therefore, intend to say much about them. The importance of these categories lies in the fact that in them the unity of the Absolute is expressly shown to be a purposive unity. This is certainly implied in the conception of

the whole which so sunders itself into parts as to remain in each of them a whole, the parts, on their side, returning in mutual fellowship to the source from which they proceed. But here the implied idea is made explicit and prominent, and immanent design becomes the ground-plan of the world. According to the category of Life, "Reality," to quote Dr. McTaggart, "is a unity differentiated into plurality (or a plurality combined into unity) in such a way that the whole meaning and significance of the unity lies in its being differentiated in that particular plurality, and that the whole meaning and significance of the parts of the plurality lies in their being combined into that particular unity." The consideration that unless the unity exists in and for each individual, the unity is bound to be fatal to the plurality makes it impossible for us to rest in the category of Life and compels the transition to Cognition and ultimately to the Absolute Idea. Complete satisfaction is found only in the idea of a system of organically inter-connected and inter-conscious individuals that proceed from and surrender themselves to a supreme and all-embracing unity of self-consciousness realised in them and not beyond them.

The conclusion that the Absolute Idea is a spiritual principle of unity differentiated into selves, which have their being in it as constituent elements of it, is confirmed by what Hegel says in part III of the *Philosophy of Religion*, in which he treats of "The Absolute Religion." In the important discussion of this subject, which throws considerable light on his meaning, he distinguishes between, "God in His eternal idea in and for self; the kingdom of the Father," "The eternal idea of God in the element of consciousness or ordinary thought, or the kingdom of the Son," and "The Idea in the element of the Church or spiritual community—the Kingdom of the Spirit." These constitute the threefold aspect of the Absolute Spirit who, Hegel maintains, is correctly, though figuratively, represented as the Trinity. The first, it is easy to see, corresponds to the Absolute Idea of the Logic; the second to the externalisation of the Idea in nature and man, in so far as man is a natural being; and the third to the Absolute Spirit. God, the Father, or, as Hegel figuratively puts it, God as He was in Himself before creation, is not a unitary Being, but is Himself Triune.[1] He differentiates Himself within Himself, without

[1] The "unity" of the Absolute is, from Hegel's point of view, by no means a correct expression. The Absolute is more appropriately called the Trinity, though even this term, as suggestive of mere number, is far from adequate.

yet going out of Himself to nature and man. These self-differentiations of God are the Son, not the Son made flesh, but the Son who is eternally with God and is God. God, as the organic unity of these differentiations, is Spirit. Now nothing could be a greater mistake than to suppose that the differences in which the unity of the Absolute is realised constitute nature. This appears to be the current idea, but it is erroneous. Nature is the embodiment, the *incarnation* of the Son——the self-differentiations of God. These differences being of God *are* God. The differences of nature are the expression not of a unitary or monadic God, but of a *Triune* God. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Hegel so constantly speaks of the Trinity in order to accommodate himself to Christianity. It is a well-known fact of his life that he, at the outset of his philosophic career, used to extol the Greek religion of beauty and to disparage Christianity. Later on, he, on speculative grounds, first came to the conclusion that it is the nature of the Absolute to be differentiated into selves which form an organic totality in which they cannot be isolated from one another, to become, in other words, a spirit and then began to appreciate what he, rightly or wrongly, regarded as the genuine kernel lying within the husks of orthodox Christianity. The ordinary representation of Hegel's thought that nature is the manifestation of a spiritual principle of unity, though approximately correct, is by no means exact. The spiritual principle of unity is not a barren identity, but a differentiated unity, and nature is not the differentiations but the *real* side, the sensible expression of these differentiations. God, who as spirit is the union of His differentiations, His sons, freely lets Himself go into nature and through the ascending *stadia* of nature and the progressive civilisation and spiritualisation of man, the incarnation of the Son, returns to Himself in man's religious and philosophic knowledge of Him. As such, He is the Absolute Spirit. Such, in bare outline, is Hegel's thought.

"For the understanding," says Hegel, "God is the one, the essence of essences. This empty identity without difference is the false representation of God given by the understanding and by modern Theology. God is spirit, who gives itself an objective form and knows itself in that" (*Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, Vol. III., p. 21). Real identity, concrete identity, is founded upon difference. "It is only the dead understanding that is self-identical." God is Spirit, the concrete universal, only as a totality of His determinations into which He resolves Himself and to which He imparts Himself without

losing His own unity. "God," observes Hegel, "who represents Being-in-and-for-self eternally produces Himself in the form of His Son, distinguishes Himself from Himself, and is the absolute act of judgment and differentiation. What He thus distinguishes from Himself does not take on the form of something which is other than Himself; but, on the contrary, what is thus distinguished is nothing more or less than that from which it has been distinguished. . . . In being in the Other whom He has brought into definite existence, or posited, He is simply with Himself, has not gone outside of Himself. . . . God is Himself just this entire act. He is the beginning, He does this definite thing, but He is equally the end only, the totality, and it is as totality that God is spirit" (*Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, Vol. III., p. 12). Again, "God beholds Himself in what is differentiated; and when in His Other He is united merely with Himself, He is there with no other but Himself, He is in close union only with Himself, He beholds *Himself*, in His Other" (*Ibid.*, p. 18). "God thought of simply as the Father," Hegel tells us, "is not yet the true." So conceived He is the "abstract God." It is only as the all-embracing totality, in which He is characterised as Himself that God is Spirit, the true Triune God. The passages which I have quoted and many others which might be quoted make it, I think, abundantly clear that, in Hegel's view, the differentiations of God are not mere objects, but are like Himself, subjects, selves. The object is the self in so far as it is real, limited and externalised. It is the other of self, its body. These selves, Hegel is careful to explain, do not exist in independence of God regarded as Father and in isolation from each other. They "are posited not as exclusive but as existing only in the mutual inclusion of the one by the other." God not only distinguishes Himself but "is at the same time the eternal abolition of the distinction. He posits Himself in the element of difference, but He also abolishes it as well." The unity of God is not prior to His differences. The differentiation which it undergoes "is not of an external kind, but must be defined as an inward differentiation in such a way that the First or the Father is to be conceived of as the Last."

A different interpretation of Hegel's theory of the Trinity, in so far as it relates to the "Kingdom of the Father," is possible, but is not, I think, tenable. It is that God as Spirit is the unity of subject and object. As subject, He is the Father, and as object, opposed to the subject, He is the Son. This appears to be the interpretation usually put upon his doctrine, but it

is not adequate. There is this much of truth in it that God as the totality of the selves into which He is differentiated is also the unity that explains and transcends the distinction between subject and object. What God distinguishes from and opposes to Himself is, no doubt, the object or, more precisely, a universe of inter-related objects, but the object, Hegel maintains, is *Himself*. This cannot mean that the object which God distinguishes from Himself is Himself in the sense that it is not the other of Him as the Spirit that over-reaches the distinction between self and object. To the Spirit, nothing is *opposed*: it *reconciles* moments of it opposed to and distinguished from each other. By the expressions which he uses Hegel, therefore, can only mean that the objects which God, as the *first* person in the Trinity, opposes to Himself are like Him, selves. It must be remembered that Hegel calls the totality of objects which God distinguishes from Himself the Son. Now if the object were *mere* object, such a characterisation of it would be, to say the least, extremely inappropriate. It would also entail the absurdity of saying that man, who is the incarnation of the Son, is the incarnation of the object. Of course, as I have already said, what is opposed to God as subject is the totality of objects, but the objects are also selves. The unity of the Divine self goes out to the plurality of finite objects, in each of which, as the ideality of it, it is realised. Its differentiation into objects, that is to say, is a corresponding differentiation into selves. The objects are exclusive of each other, but their selves exist only "in the mutual inclusion of the one by the other." It is for this reason that Hegel says that what God distinguishes from Himself "does not take on the form of something which is other than Himself, but, on the contrary, what is thus distinguished is nothing more nor less than that from which it has been distinguished." This, at all events, seems to me to be the interpretation of his meaning which is more appropriate. In fine, God as Spirit is both the totality of selves and the unity that transcends the distinction between subject and object. What He is *not* is a solitary subject-object.

To sum up: The conclusion to which the Logic unmistakably points and which is confirmed by the *Philosophy of Religion* is that the Absolute is not a principle of unity differentiated into objects, but a self whose nature it is to communicate itself to its constituent selves, in each of which it is present, completely and indivisibly, and to bring them back into its own unity, the objective world being the otherness of this system of selves. Nature, to express the idea in another way, is related to a

spiritual principle which is not a barren identity but a concrete unity of persons.

In the Absolute as a totality of persons, what is the place of man? This is a question to which it is not easy to find an unambiguous answer in Hegel. "Man as Spirit," he says, "is a reflection of God" (*Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, Vol. III., p. 46). But what is the nature of this reflection? Is his existence essential to God? Does God need him as he needs God, or is he only a creature of the hour, an essentially ephemeral being, whose existence or non-existence makes no difference whatsoever to the fulness of His life? Various solutions have been given of the problem. It is very hard to find passages in Hegel's writings which unequivocally express his meaning, but, on the whole, I am inclined to think that he regards man's existence as essential to the self-realisation of the Absolute. In the return movement from nature to God, man, in Hegel's system, plays the part of the mediator. It is in him that nature comes to a consciousness of itself, and religion and philosophy, and Hegel even suggests that his own philosophy, are the mediums through which God, incarnated as man, returns to Himself. The ideas of incarnation and atonement figure conspicuously in his system, he is almost obsessed with them and it is impossible not to take him seriously when he descants upon these high themes. Man is the connecting link between nature and God; he is the incarnation of God, not of God the Father but of God the Son. This distinction is of very great importance. Man is the incarnation of the Son. That this should be Hegel's view is antecedently probable. The Absolute, as we have seen, is differentiated into selves; it is the organic unity of these selves and there is no surplusage of it above and beyond them. If, therefore, man is the reproduction of God, he can only be the reproduction of one of his differentiations.

This view is, I think, supported by a number of passages in the *Philosophy of Religion*. The self-differentiations of God are persons, but they exist *in* God as the elements of His being. "This act of differentiation is merely a movement, a playing of love with itself, in which it does not get to the otherness or Other-being in any serious sense, nor actually reach a condition of separation and division" (*Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, Vol. III., p. 35). "Eternal Being-in-and-for-itself is something which unfolds itself, determines itself, differentiates itself, posits itself as its own difference, but the difference, again, is at the same time eternally done away with and absorbed; what has essential Being, Being-in-and-for-itself, eternally returns

to itself in this, and only in so far as it does this is it Spirit" (*Ibid.*, p. 35). When, however, the element of difference acquires what Hegel calls the form of "Otherness which is possessed of Being," that is to say, when in one aspect of it, it is relatively detached from the whole to which it belongs, we have the Son incarnated as man. "What first appears in the Idea," says Hegel, "is merely the relation of Father and Son; but the Other also comes to have the characteristic of Other-being or otherness, of something which *is*" (*Ibid.*, p. 37). The Other is a self differentiation of God, the Son of God as he is eternally *with* the Father, but the Other, which *also comes to have the characteristic of Other-being or otherness* is man.

But apart from Hegel's own conclusion on the subject of the relation of man to the Absolute, it is, I think, possible to show on general speculative grounds and in accordance with his principles, that the essential nature of human personality is such that it could not have it unless it were a manifestation of a fundamental differentiation of the Absolute. A differentiation of the Absolute is an individual which contains in itself the content of the whole and yet excludes it. As a finite object, it excludes all other finite objects, but as the ideality of it, it is such that there is nothing which is not within it. This double function of the inclusion and exclusion of all, is the fundamental characteristic of the individual. What, as finite, is a real and excludes everything else is, as ideal, infinite and inclusive of everything. It is one and the same thing viewed from two different sides. Now the human self possesses exactly these characteristics and the legitimate inference therefore is, that it is a particular determination of the Absolute, with this difference, that inasmuch as it does not reflect the whole actually but only potentially, it must be regarded as an incomplete reproduction of it. Knowledge implies that the object of knowledge is relative to the self that knows and yet is opposed to it. To imagine that the knowing mind is distinct from the thing that is known is the mistake of Realism, and to reduce the objects of knowledge to mere states of mind is the opposite mistake of subjective Idealism. If things were really external to the knowing mind, no miracle could ever bring them inside it, and Kant, in his famous refutation of Idealism, has shown once and for all that knowledge presupposes the existence of objects as the correlative of the knowing mind. Human knowledge, besides conforming to this general condition of knowledge, possesses a characteristic which is not a necessary consequence of that condition. The things which we know are not only

relative and *opposed* to our minds, but are also in a manner *independent* of them. This independence is due to, is, in fact, an aspect of, their externality to the body, while the knowledge of them is possible because the mind, which is the ideality of the body, is all-inclusive. Now this inclusion of all things in knowledge, and the exclusion of them as particular facts of existence, is what we have seen to be the essential nature of a self-differentiation of the Absolute, arising from the circumstance that it, as one among many differentiations, is finite and limited. The characteristics of the human self as subject of knowledge, we thus see, are identical with those of a fundamental differentiation of the Absolute.[1] Its relation to the human body is analogous to the relation between the ideal and real aspects of Being-for-self, and any difference that exists is explicable by the fact that the body of man is the expression not of the fractional entity we call man, but of his true being, viz. a specific determination of the Absolute. There does not seem to be the same intimate connection between man's soul and his body, so much so that the latter has, to some extent, the character of being an other-being like anything else to the former, as there is between the infinite and the finite, the ideal and real, because the body is the objectivity not of the finite man but of his truer self, or, if you like the expression, his subliminal self.

The body of man, as is well known, is an organic unity. Ideally, therefore, it must be a system of selves, a self-differentiation of the Absolute which is itself a system of differentiations. There is nothing surprising in this. On the contrary, it is exactly what was to be expected. The parts of an organic whole are likely to be organic wholes themselves. If the universe be an organism which is organic in every part, it, subjectively, is a system of selves, each of which is itself a system of selves. Which objects of nature are organic wholes is a question on which speculative philosophy can have nothing to say. It must be settled by means of scientific observation. In strict deduction, therefore, from the principle which has been expounded in this essay and which, I am convinced, is the principle of Hegel, it follows that man's real self, the ideality of his body, is, like the Absolute whose differentiation it is, a society of selves, though, of course, it is a subordinate society. And is not this the nature of man himself, the fragmentary manifestation? Let empirical psychology answer this question. The day does not seem to be far distant, if it has not already arrived, when it will be definitely

[1] Dr. McTaggart has treated of this point, though in a slightly different way, at some length and I, therefore, do not dwell further on it.

established that human personality is a colony rather than an abstract unity. No other hypothesis, it seems, would serve to explain various normal and abnormal phenomena of the mind. Leonie, Felida X, Sally Beauchamp and a host of others proclaim from the housetops that the self of man is not a simple unitary self, but a complex whole of component selves.[1]

To conclude: The human self is a fragmentary manifestation of a differentiation of the Absolute, which is itself a system of differentiations, with the aspect of otherness strongly emphasised and in relative detachment from the totality of the Absolute life and consciousness, in which its transcendental self—the self-differentiation of the Absolute, has its being.

II.

Dr. McTaggart, to whom I have already referred several times, is, so far as I am aware, the only commentator of Hegel who clearly recognises that the Absolute is not a solitary self, but a unity of selves. He, however, is so carried away by the enthusiasm of his new discovery of Hegel's real meaning that he forgets altogether the unity of the Absolute, in the only sense in which that unity can have any meaning for us. He denies that the Absolute is a personality. It is a "unity of individuals, each of whom is perfectly individual through his perfect unity with all the rest," but it is not itself a person. And as personality is the essential attribute of God, it is better, he concludes, "to express our result by saying that the Absolute is not God, and, in consequence, that there is no God." This, in all conscience, is a startling conclusion, and we cannot help asking what are the arguments that drive one to it. I am bound to say that his reasoning, when closely examined, is found to be utterly inadequate to support a conclusion like this. Indeed, it seems to me that it is an apt illustration of Mr. Bradley's epigram that "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

The personality of the Absolute as an all-embracing unity is clearly demanded by the paradoxical character of each constituent self of it, if it be taken as the ultimate form of personality. "If we ask," observes Dr. McTaggart, "what is contained in each individual differentiation, the answer is Everything.

[1] This theory does not by any means destroy the unity of the human personality which consists not in its substantiality but in its *purposiveness*. It is too large a subject for me to introduce into this paper.

But if we ask what is contained in each differentiation in such a way as not to be also outside it, the answer is Nothing. Now this is exactly the form that the paradox of the self would take, if we suppose a self whose knowledge and volition were perfect, so that it knew and acquiesced in the whole of Reality" [1] (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 26). And thus he thinks that the paradox of the self would be justified and it cannot, in his view, be justified in any other way. Dr. McTaggart rightly says that any attempt to solve the paradox by either denying that the self includes anything which is external to it, or denying that it excludes what it includes will simply not do. But his own solution is hardly a solution. Incredible as it seems, he contents himself with the assertion that the paradox of the self would be justified by the mere process of recognising that it *is* a paradox. His reason for thinking so is that "if we are to take the idea of the self, not as a mere error, yet as less than absolute truth, we must find some justification of it which will show that the necessary course of thought leads up to it, and also over it—that it is relatively true as transcending contradictions which would otherwise be unreconciled, but relatively false as itself developing contradictions which must again be transcended. Can such a deduction be found? We cannot say with certainty that it never will be, but at any rate it does not seem to have been suggested yet" (*Ibid.*, p. 26). Now Dr. McTaggart deliberately deprives himself of the means of solving the contradiction involved in the idea of the finite self, in the manner which he himself suggests. Of course, the higher idea to which the finite self leads up cannot be anything which transforms the essential characteristics of self beyond recognition, but it is to be found in the conception of the Absolute as a self differentiated into many selves. Dr. McTaggart does not deny the reality of an ultimate unity which embraces all particular selves within itself. On the contrary, he strongly insists upon it. The only question is whether it is a personal unity or not. Now each particular self, in so far as it contains everything, is identical with the Supreme Reality within which everything falls. Its consciousness as all-embracing must *coincide with* the Supreme Reality, and the Supreme Reality, on its part,

[1] In a footnote to the second edition of his book McTaggart says, "I do not now hold the views as to the relation of the self and the objects of which it is conscious, which are explained in sections 24-30. But I have not altered the text because, although I no longer hold them to be correct, I still hold them to be Hegelian, and therefore relevant to the purpose of the book (p. 55).

must, therefore, coincide with its consciousness and hence *be* consciousness. I do not see how it is possible to evade this conclusion. A particular differentiation of the Absolute, as a finite determinate thing, excludes all others, but it includes everything not in its own strength, but in virtue of the identity of its all-embracing consciousness with the Ultimate Reality, which cannot, consequently, be other than consciousness. The conception of a particular self ideally including everything becomes tenable only on the supposition that, from the point of view of the Absolute, the inclusion is also real, and if the ideal inclusion is conscious inclusion, so the real inclusion must also be.

Dr. McTaggart argues that "while the unity is for the individuals, the individuals are not for the unity," though they are *in* it. He devotes considerable space to the consideration of this point and evidently attaches much importance to it. His meaning is that as the *whole* of the unity must be *completely* in each individual and also be the bond which unites all the individuals, the problem arises, "How is it possible that the whole can be in each of its parts and yet be the whole of which they are parts." "The solution," he tells us, "can only be found by the introduction of a new and higher idea. The conception which, according to Hegel, will overcome the difficulties of the categories of Life, is that of a unity which is not only *in* the individuals, but also *for* the individuals. There is only one example of such a category known to us in experience, and that is a system of conscious individuals" (*Ibid.*, p. 13). "The whole point of saying that the unity is *for* an individual," he further explains, "is that it exists both out of him and in him." The individuals do not certainly exist *for* the unity, in the sense in which Dr. McTaggart uses the word, because it is not itself an individual, but such a mode of existence is surely a *defect* due to the finitude of the individual and cannot be regarded as the test of the personality of the Absolute. The externality to the individual which the existence of the whole of Reality *for* it implies, and which nevertheless is *in* it, is prevented from being a downright contradiction and sheer nonsense, by the fact that the self-consciousness of the individual is identical with the unity of the Absolute within which all reality falls. Dr. McTaggart's objection turns on the unwarrantable assumption that as the individuals do not exist *for* the unity, it cannot be a self-conscious unity. A relation of this kind is not the *condition* of self-consciousness, but the consequence of the incompleteness and one-sidedness of it. The truth underlying

Dr. McTaggart's contention of course is that consciousness implies distinction and opposition. A's consciousness of B, C, D implies the opposition of B, C, D to A. But the inclusion of all individuals in the Absolute does not mean the cancellation of difference and opposition. The Absolute, in so far as it is a particular individual, excludes others, but the other aspect of this reciprocal exclusion is that they are gathered up, focussed in the unity of the Absolute, without the difference and opposition disappearing.

No one is more emphatic than Dr. McTaggart in declaring that the unity of the Absolute is not less real than its differentiations. To him it is not an abstraction or only another name for a mere aggregate. It is a real unity, a harmonious and coherent whole. All finite selves which are its differentiations are included in it. It is not above and beyond these differentiations but in and through them. The relation of each finite self to the Absolute is organic. The whole is in each part and is equal to the part. Now if the whole, in so far as it is in the part, is personal and can say, "I am," how can the whole itself be impersonal? Once touched with self-consciousness at a particular point, where, be it remembered, it is completely present, how can it ever shake it off? The part is not a fraction of the whole, and it is impossible to argue that though one part of the Absolute is self-conscious, it, as a whole, may not be so. The part *is* the whole and if it is self-conscious, so must the whole be. If my eyes see a thing, I see it; if my ears hear a sound, I hear it; so if the Absolute is a person in me, it must itself have personality. To think otherwise is not to be serious with the doctrine that "the whole of the unity shall be in each individual." The differentiations of the Absolute are admittedly persons. If so, it is inconceivable that their unity, the Absolute, should not be a person. The unity may be more but cannot certainly be less than a person.

The Absolute, as Dr. McTaggart conceives it, is a society of perfect but finite individuals and, as such, is a spiritual unity. Each individual, as perfect, includes and, as finite, excludes all the rest. P, Q, R, let us suppose, are the individuals, whose unity is M, the Absolute. Now M as P consciously includes Q and R, M as Q includes P and R and so on. Between the inclusion of Q and R in the consciousness of M as P and that of P and R in the consciousness of M as Q, there can be no breach of continuity. This continuity, however, which must necessarily be a fact of consciousness is not in the consciousness either of P or of Q or of R. P does not itself carry forward the

items of its consciousness to Q, nor Q to R. This is the function which belongs to M. The only fact present in the consciousness of P is that it includes Q and R and so with each of the rest. The *inference* that there is such a continuity must not be confounded with the *fact* of it. Now it is this continuity which, as I have said, must be a conscious fact that is realised in M. The facts in the separate consciousnesses of P, Q and R get re-interpreted in the light of their continuity, and so re-interpreted constitute M. This simple and unavoidable reasoning does, I think, establish beyond dispute that the Absolute is a conscious unity. The only alternative is to deny that it is a unity at all and so to be driven to monadism.[1]

"If the Absolute," argues Dr. McTaggart, "is to be called a person because it is a spiritual unity, then every college, every goose-club, every gang of thieves, must also be called a person. For they are all spiritual unities. They all consist exclusively of human beings, and they all unite their members in some sort of unity. Their unities are indeed much less perfect than the unity of the Absolute. But if an imperfect unity is not to be called an imperfect person, then the name of person must be denied to ourselves as manifested here and now. . . . Now we call ourselves persons, but no one, I believe, has ever proposed to call a football team a person. But if we call the Absolute a person, we should have no defence for refusing the name to the football team" (*Ibid.*, p. 86). The analogy between a college or a football team and the Absolute is by no means self-evident. Subordinate unities like the college or the football team exist for temporary and particular purposes and can be formed or dissolved without the least advantage or detriment to the essential nature of their members, but all such subordinate unities presuppose and are grounded on the unity of the Absolute, apart from which nothing can even exist. A football team is a union of its members in so far as they are sportsmen and has no bearing on their life in other respects. So a college is a combination for purposes which cannot be realised without it and the members of it, considered as interested and concerned in the execution of these purposes, have no being apart from it, but as individuals with other capacities and functions they have no relation to it. The relation, however, of the Absolute to its constituent individuals is different. It is

[1] In the *Nature of Existence* McTaggart abandons the conception of a differentiation of the Absolute excluding other differentiations and yet ideally including them all, and falls back upon a frankly pluralistic position.

a union which makes not this or that phase of their existence but the whole of their existence, including their existence *as inter-conscious members of it* possible. It is the pre-condition of and is realised in the inter-consciousness of the individuals it unites, and is *ipso facto* a conscious unity. If any analogy between such widely disparate entities is at all to be drawn, it is, I venture to think, least misleading to express it in this way. The unity of the football team is no other than the community of purpose of the sportsmen. The unity of the college consists in the common academic interests of its members. So the unity of the Absolute is, besides other things, the continuity of consciousness involved in the inter-consciousness of the selves that constitute it.

Dr. McTaggart justly contends that the consciousness of the non-ego is an essential condition of the personality of a finite person. " Such a consciousness the Absolute cannot possess. For there is nothing outside it, from which it can distinguish itself. . . . The Absolute has not a characteristic which is admitted to be essential to all finite personality, which is all the personality of which we have any experience. Is this characteristic essential to personality or only to finite personality ? We know of no personality without a non-ego. Nor can we imagine what such a personality would be like. For *we* certainly can never say ' I ' without raising the idea of the non-ego, and so we can never form any idea of the way in which the Absolute would say ' I ' " (*Ibid.*, pp. 68-69). The essential condition of self-consciousness is the *opposition* and not the *externality* of the non-ego to the ego. The non-ego is external to the body and thus comes to have the appearance of externality to the finite mind, because the finite mind is the ideality of the body. Dr. McTaggart fails to distinguish an accidental circumstance of our self-consciousness from the essential condition of it. The Absolute, of course, has nothing *outside* it from which it can distinguish itself, but from this it does not follow that *within* it there is no non-ego in distinction from which it has the consciousness of self. For, in relation to every finite differentiation of the Absolute, the other differentiations are non-egos. These differentiations, therefore, are by turns egos and non-egos. In the Absolute, all its differences are united but not lost. They retain their fundamental characteristics. The Absolute which says " I " in each of its determinations, has self-consciousness in so far as these egos are brought together in its unity. *Their* self-consciousness is *its* self-consciousness. On the other hand, the differences, in so far as they are non-egos, do not

cease to be so by their coming together in it. In the unity of the Absolute, therefore, the double character which belongs to its differentiations is preserved. To say that the element of the non-ego is absent from it, is to say that an essential feature of its component factors is somehow lost in it. But this is impossible if the Absolute is "the differentiated unity or the unified differentiations." The Absolute is self-conscious *in* and as the totality of the selves which compose it, and the non-ego which it is not without in them is not lost to it. It, in fine, is the unity which transcends but does not annul the relative distinction between ego and non-ego set up in the process of differentiation which it undergoes, in order to exist as the deepest and most comprehensive unity.

Dr. McTaggart takes it for granted that "personality cannot be the attribute of a unity which has no indivisible centre of reference and which is from all points of view all in every part." His thought, it seems to me, is coloured throughout by his view that the self is a *substance*. "In the identity of the substance," we are told, "lies the personal identity." Dr. McTaggart admits that "this is a rather unfashionable mode of expression." "Unfashionable mode of thought," he might have said. It certainly is not the thought of Hegel, who repeatedly insists on the difference between a substance and a subject. It is substantially a revival of the pre-Kantian dogmatic theory of the soul, however much it may be modified by the reflection that "each self can only exist in virtue of its connection with all the others and with the Absolute which is their unity." A differentiation of the Absolute is no doubt a substance, but it is much more. On Hegel's principles it, as a moment of the Absolute Idea, shares in the nature of the Absolute Idea and the Absolute Idea as the ultimate category is immeasurably richer than substance. Instead of saying that personal identity lies in the identity of substance, we should rather invert the proposition and say that the identity of substance lies in its being the objective expression of the identity of self. The unity of the self is, no doubt, realised in each "unity of centre," but is by no means confined to it. The fact that it is realised in an individual centre, as a particular, is made possible by its going beyond it to other individuals which are thus gathered up into the synthetic unity of the Absolute and thereby reduced to a systematic totality. This is the important lesson that we learn from Hegel's doctrine of the Notion. The Absolute is, as Dr. McTaggart says, the "unity of system," but a unity of system which is not the expression of a unity of self-consciousness is only a mechanical

aggregate, or, at best, what Hegel calls absolute mechanism. Dr. McTaggart speaks as if the conception of an individual including in its knowledge the whole of Reality, which, at the same time, it excludes, is, in itself, a satisfying conception. It is nothing of the kind. It is in reality a contradictory conception, pointing to the solution of it in the inclusion of the individuals in a wider unity, where it and other selves like it come together and are commingled without loss of their individuality. The *one-sidedness* of the being and consciousness of the individual, to which the exclusion of the rest is due, presupposes a *many-sided* and all-embracing consciousness in which each individual gets its proper place in relation to others.

This leads us to the consideration of the question whether the self can be conceived as the totality of selves. "Can we attach," asks Dr. McTaggart, "any meaning to the statement that one self-conscious being should consist of a multiplicity of self-conscious beings in such a way that it had no reality apart from them? Or that one self-conscious being should be part of another in such a way that it had no reality apart from it?" This question must emphatically be answered in the affirmative. Our own self is, within its limits, of such a nature. It is nothing if not a totality. The true nature of the self is hidden from us by the manner in which the distinction between the self and its states is usually drawn. Each mental state is not merely a state *of* the self, but *is* the self in that state. It is because this is so that the states of consciousness are not accidentally associated with, but are intrinsically related to, one another. "All self-consciousness," as Professor Stout says, "implies a division of the total self. When I think about myself, the I and the myself are never quite identical. The self of which I have an idea is always distinguished from the self which has the idea" (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 545). The conscious states are not related to the self as the modes of Spinoza are related to the substance. The self is split up into its states in each of which the whole of it is present. When Hume said that he was unable to get at the pure self, but always stumbled upon some particular state of the self, he said no more than the truth, only that he failed to realise that the particular mental state is itself the self so expressed. Had he discerned this the problem of the relatedness of impressions would have been solved for him. Fortunately this is a conclusion which does not rest on mere speculative grounds. Empirical facts establish it beyond all reasonable doubt. The phenomenon which abnormal cases of the disintegration of personality present, is explicable only on the hypothesis

that the normal self consists in the integration of selves. To say so is not to imply that the self is a mere aggregate. It is a totality, no doubt, but a totality whose ground lies in its purposiveness. Its unity is not to be sought for in its substantiality, but in the abiding aim or purpose which holds together the units of it.[1] Such an abiding purpose is not a *single* purpose but a system of purposes in and through which the ultimate meaning of life is progressively realised. The self is one, as far as and no further than, a common purpose runs through it. When the last vestige of a common purpose is gone, the last preparation for the mad-house is completed.

If we are to say that the unity of the Absolute is not a personal unity, what alternative has Dr. McTaggart to offer? How is that unity to be conceived? It will scarcely do to say that it is the unity of unconscious Reason. Dr. McTaggart is hardly likely to resuscitate a theory once fashionable but now decently buried. Unconscious Reason is as much a chimera as unconscious matter unrelated to intelligence. If the Absolute is not a person, if it is not unconscious Reason, the only alternative that remains is to conceive of it as realised in the self-consciousness of each individual and the unity of it becomes a mere name. It is only the self-consciousness of P + the self-consciousness of Q + the self-consciousness of R and so on. Of what avail is it to reiterate, as Dr. McTaggart does, that the unity of the Absolute is as real as its differences, that it is an organic unity and so forth, when all conception of it is rendered impossible by the assertion that consciousness does not belong to it? Of course, it is not personal as man is personal. Probably it is better to call it, as Mr. Bradley suggests, super-personal; but to regard it as spiritual minus consciousness is, I maintain, impossible. That the denial of self-consciousness to the Absolute must inevitably lead to pluralism is evidenced by Dr. McTaggart's comparison of it to such things as a football team or a gang of thieves. Of course, these are mere illustrations, though perhaps not particularly happy ones; but does not a straw show which way the wind blows? I suspect that in spite of his stout disclaimers, pluralism silently dominates the thought of Dr. McTaggart more than he himself realises. Between pluralism and the doctrine that the Absolute is a self-conscious unity, there is really no choice.

Dr. McTaggart asserts, though with some hesitation, that "Hegel does not himself regard the Absolute as personal." "It seems clear," he argues, "from the Philosophy of Religion

[1] Royce has exhaustively treated of the relation of purposiveness to personality in his *Conception of God* and Gifford lectures.

that the truth of God's nature, according to Hegel, is to be found in the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost. And the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost appears to be not a person but a community" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 59). Again, "if God is really personal, He must be personal in the kingdom of the Spirit. For that is the synthesis and in that alone do we get an adequate representation of God's nature" (*Ibid.*, p. 208). I have already stated what, in my judgment, Hegel's view on this subject is and need not dwell on it at any length here. Suffice it to say, that if the kingdom of the Father taken by itself and in isolation from the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Spirit is an abstraction, the kingdom of the Spirit apart from the kingdom of the Father, is equally so. The validity of Dr. McTaggart's argument depends upon the assumption that the kingdom of the Father is merged in the kingdom of the Holy Ghost. But, most assuredly, this is not Hegel's meaning. Hegel, who tells us that nature—and to this, be it remembered, the kingdom of the Son corresponds—"is the extreme self-alienation of Spirit, in which it yet remains one with itself" and that "the idea freely lets itself go out of itself, while yet resting in itself, and remaining absolutely secure of itself," cannot possibly teach that in the return to Himself which the stage of the kingdom of the Spirit represents, He ceases to be what He is even in the second kingdom of "extreme self-alienation of Spirit." The Church as a spiritual community is not a person, but has for its presupposition the Personality of God the Father who on His part, "is not God," as Hegel tells us, "without the world" and the community of His incarnate Sons, viz. the Church. In the kingdom of the Spirit, God, who "in the extreme self-alienation of Spirit" (nature) "remains absolutely secure" of Himself, returns to Himself, through man's consciousness of Him. "If God were personal," says Dr. McTaggart, "as manifested in the first and second Kingdoms, but not in the third, it would mean that He was personal when viewed inadequately but not when viewed adequately" (*Ibid.*, p. 208). But why should He *not* be Personal when viewed adequately? The truth is that Dr. McTaggart conceives of the kingdom of the Spirit as a mere brotherhood of finite Spirits, but in reality and, as I believe, in Hegel's view, it is the brotherhood of finite spirits grounded on the Fatherhood of God or the Fatherhood of God realised in the brotherhood of His children. And this is the view which is in harmony with the substance of Christianity, the defence of which by Hegel is not half-hearted, but whole-hearted and sincere.

III

We now come to the second subject of our enquiry, viz. the relation of the categories to the Absolute and to human knowledge. It is hardly appropriate to speak of the *relation* of the categories to the Absolute. The categories, according to Hegel, are to be looked upon "as definitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God" or the expression of "God's nature in thoughts as such." The dialectic does not describe the movement of mere human thought, but unfolds the content of the Absolute Mind. This is unquestionably Hegel's view. Logic is Absolute knowledge. In other words, it is the Absolute Mind's consciousness of itself as it really is. It is the self-consciousness of God. No doubt the philosopher who traces out the inter-connections of the categories is a human being, but in Absolute knowledge he rises to the standpoint of the Absolute and transcends the limitations of his nature. "The object of religion, as of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its very objectivity,—God and nothing but God—and the explication of God." Philosophic knowledge is God's knowledge of Himself through man's knowledge of Him. In so far as man has true philosophic knowledge of God, he is one with God. To be cognisant of the dialectical evolution of the categories is, therefore, to feel the very pulse-beats of the Absolute. "Philosophy," Hegel tells us, "has to consider its object in its necessity, not, indeed, in its subjective necessity or external arrangement, classification, etc., but it has to unfold and demonstrate the object out of the necessity of its own inner nature." It exhibits in systematic completeness the elements of the inmost life of the Absolute.

All this may sound strange to ordinary common sense and may seem to be little better than the meaningless utterances of a philosophy gone mad. Yet a little reflection will show that these paradoxical statements contain nothing but the sober truth. "I think Thy thoughts after Thee, O God!" exclaimed Kepler, and nobody ever dreams of accusing him of blasphemy and overweening conceit. On the contrary, it is taken as an indication of Kepler's great piety. Hegel says exactly the same thing in the technical language of philosophy. The only difference between him and others like Kepler is that the truth which flashes upon their minds only on rare occasions is the permanent basis of his thought which is never off his mind. The agreement of thought with Reality is the tacit presupposition on which both science and philosophy proceed. If there were

a chasm between our thought and Reality, how could we by means of thinking become aware of even the most insignificant truths about things? To interpose a barrier between human thought and Reality is to make all knowledge impossible, even the knowledge that there *is* a Reality. Indeed the very problem as to the relation between Thought and Reality can arise only if the distinction between the two has somehow been overcome. In so far as man's thought lays hold of Reality, it is not a mere subjective process, but coincides with the inmost essence of things. The great error of Hegel, no doubt, is that he supposes that man's philosophical knowledge of Reality coincides with the whole content of Reality, but this should not make us blind to the element of truth of what he teaches. Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of truth so far as it goes, and knowledge of truth is the thinking of God's thought after God, or what Hegel calls the explication of the Absolute.

Green has given a different account of the method of Hegel. If, he says, Thought is to be identified with Reality, it "cannot be the process of philosophising, though Hegel himself, by what seems to us the one essential aberration of his doctrine, treats this process as a sort of movement of the Absolute Thought" (*Works*, Vol. III., p. 143). Hegel's fault, we are told, is that for an answer to the question, What is Thought, the questioner, "instead of being duly directed to an investigation of the objective world, and the source of the relations which determine its content, is rather put on the track of an introspective inquiry what and how he can or cannot conceive" (*Ibid.*, p. 143). The world, Green tells us, will not accept the Hegelian view of the relation between God and the world "until it is made clear that the nature of that thought, which Hegel declares to be the reality of things, is to be ascertained, if at all, from analysis of the objective world, not from reflection on the processes of our intelligence which really presuppose that world. . . . Language which seems to imply the identification of our discursive understanding with God, or with the world in its spiritual reality can lead to nothing but confusion" (*Works*, Vol. III., pp. 144-45). Green sums up his criticism of Hegel by declaring that he suspects that "all along Hegel's method has stood in the way of an acceptance of his conclusion, because he, at any rate, seemed to arrive at his conclusion as to the spirituality of the world, not by interrogating the world, but by interrogating his own thoughts." The fundamental conclusion of Hegel however, that "all that is real is the activity or expression of one spiritual self-conscious being," Green

heartily accepts, but he states that whoever would present this conclusion in "a form which will command some general acceptance among serious and scientific men, though he cannot drink too deep of Hegel should rather sit loose to the dialectical method" (*Ibid.*, p. 146).

Now this decidedly unfavourable judgment of the dialectical method is, as Caird rightly says, "not valid against Hegel." The point of it is the assumption that the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of Thought and Being means that there is not even a relative difference between them and that Reality is the same as the psychological process of thinking. This is, of course, far from Hegel's meaning. The process of thinking, as Green says, presupposes the world, but the dependence is not one-sided. The world equally presupposes the process of thinking and the unity of the two does not mean their simple sameness, but the higher synthesis of them in which their relative opposition to each other is at once preserved and annulled. The opposition between the subjective process of thinking and the objective reality of the world, in the manner in which Green states that opposition, is really irrelevant from Hegel's point of view. Hegel deals with Reality as a whole and the distinctions between the various phases of that Reality, including the distinction between subject and object, fall within its unity. The business of philosophy is to explain the precise meaning of these distinctions and to show their proper places in the systematic unity of the whole. This is the great task which the dialectical method seeks to accomplish and to sit loose to it is to give up philosophy altogether in despair. An inquiry into the nature of Reality is in one sense "reflection on the processes of our intelligence," in another, it is not. All Reality is relative to intelligence and is the manifestation of it. The distinction between subject and object is created and overcome by intelligence. The various phases of Reality are, therefore, at the same time modes of intelligence, and as our intelligence is an integral part of the Absolute, an investigation of the objective world is also a study of the forms of intelligence, which are as much forms of the Absolute Thought as of our intelligence. But if any one supposes that an introspective examination of the contents of his particular consciousness will reveal to him the nature of Reality, he is, no doubt, open to the censure of Green. Hegel, however, has not in any way made himself amenable to the censure. In his system, if Thought is identified with Being, it is also opposed to it. Thought, as the subject of knowledge, is the correlative of, and, therefore, opposed to the object of knowledge. But

this correlativity and opposition implies a unity which transcends the opposition. The ultimate unity within which the distinction of subject and object falls is Thought, as is the subject to which the object is correlative. It is with Thought as the ultimate unity —the Absolute, that Hegel identifies Reality and not with it as the mere subject of knowledge. Green, I think, overlooks this important distinction.

What, after all, is the dialectical method which is so obnoxious to Green ? It is not, as he seems to think, a means of determining what and how a man can or cannot conceive, but the method which seeks to show that a partial and inadequate conception of Reality is inherently contradictory and therefore leads on to a fuller and more adequate conception, which, in turn, is found to be equally one-sided and defective, till we reach the conception of a systematic totality of things in which a single spiritual principle is manifested, or what Hegel calls the Absolute Idea. The final conclusion of a philosophical system does not rest on the mere *ipse dixit* of the philosopher. Its justification lies in the fact that from the standpoint of the philosopher no other conception is found to be equally adequate and satisfactory. The truth is that every philosophy must employ the dialectical method consciously or unconsciously. The only question is whether it is to be employed thoroughly and systematically or in a perfunctory manner. Green's own method of developing his theory is, in effect, the dialectical method. An object, he shows, taken by itself and held in isolation is a self-contradictory thing. Its apparent being is in reality non-being. This contradiction, latent in the unscientific view that objects are self-subsistent entities, is overcome when we realise that to be is to stand in relations. A thing has reality only in so far as it is related to other things. The world, therefore, is not a mere assemblage of things, but a unity based on the connectedness of things. Relativity, again, reveals a fresh contradiction, unless it is remembered that the objects related to one another can become one, without ceasing to be many, only if we suppose them to be co-present to, and expressions of, a unifying consciousness. Apart from such a unifying consciousness, the idea of the relatedness of objects leads us to the flagrant contradiction that objects, as related to one another, are one, and yet they are not one, because, unless they are many, they cannot become related to one another. An argument of this kind is essentially Hegelian and the method of it is, in effect, the much decried dialectical method. The great merit of Hegel is that he is not content with examining only a few conceptions picked up at

random, but undergoes a truly Herculean labour in bringing to light the fundamental categories of thought and in showing them to be different phases of the life of the Absolute. He turns to man's theoretic and practical life, to language and science, to art and religion and by an exhaustive survey of them, such as no man has ever undertaken, discovers their ground-conceptions and shows that each of them represents a phase of the Absolute, valid in its own proper sphere, but, taken as complete and self-sufficing, self-contradictory, and necessitating a forward movement till we find that nothing less than the Absolute itself can afford us a final and secure resting ground.

But when all this is said, all difficulties are not obviated and all doubts are not finally set at rest. The student of Hegel is forced to recognise that philosophy, if it is to be of any worth, must be an explication of Reality as a whole. To admit this is to admit that man, in so far as he possesses philosophical knowledge, is a participator in the Thought of the Absolute. But, nevertheless, it is impossible not to find a certain unsatisfactoriness in a doctrine which seems to remove all distinction between frail and finite man and the Absolute. This feeling is well expressed by Green when he says that " when we have satisfied ourselves that the world in its truth or full reality is spiritual, because on no other supposition is its unity explicable, we may still have to confess that a knowledge of it in its spiritual reality —such a knowledge of it as would be a knowledge of God is impossible to us. To know God, we must be God. The unifying principle of the world is indeed in us; it is our self. But, as in us, it is so conditioned by a particular animal nature that, while it yields the idea of the world as one which regulates all our knowledge, our actual knowledge is a piecemeal process. We spell out the relations of things one by one, we pass from condition to condition, from effect to effect; but, as one fragment of truth is grasped another has escaped us and we never reach that totality of apprehension through which alone we could know the world as it is and God in it " (*Works*, Vol. III., p. 145). In preaching the truth that man's knowledge of Reality is knowledge of the Absolute, Hegel is apt to forget that the whole content of Absolute knowledge is not revealed to him. Between the proposition that the categories of human knowledge are not merely subjective, but integral elements of Absolute Reality, and the proposition that man's knowledge of the Absolute is co-extensive with the Absolute, there is no necessary connection whatsoever. The cardinal error of Hegel, the " one essential aberration of his doctrine," to use the language

of Green, is that he passes from the first proposition, which is tenable, to the second proposition, which is untenable and absurd, without warrant or justification. It is ridiculous to imagine that the 60 or 70 categories of Hegel's Logic exhaust the wealth of Divine knowledge. This wholly gratuitous and presumptuous limitation imposed on the possibilities of Divine knowledge and not his method, as Green supposes, has really stood in the way of an acceptance of his conclusions. In the fundamental principles of Hegel there is nothing which makes such a conclusion necessary. On the contrary, there is a great deal to show that although the logical categories are aspects of Reality, they are only a fraction of it which comes within the purview of human knowledge. The notion that to follow the movement of the categories from Pure Being to the Absolute Idea is to take a full measure of the Absolute is, in fact, only a peculiar whim of Hegel's. Everywhere he is inclined to claim finality. The Absolute Thought is analysable exactly into the categories treated of in the Logic, neither more nor less; Nature is rational—only in so far as it is the other of the logical categories, the extra element that refuses to fit into the categories is only the play of chance; the quintessence of political wisdom is embodied in the Prussian constitution as it was about the year 1826; God reveals Himself in History only on the shores of the Mediterranean and returns to Himself only in the philosophy of Hegel, which, of course, contains the last word of philosophy. All this is perhaps excusable in Hegel himself, for, the greatest philosopher of the world though he is, he is only a man and has his prejudices and bias from which no man is free. But there is no reason why his followers should be tied down to the letter of his system. To deny that the categories of Logic are a complete explication of the Absolute is not to set up a barrier between our knowledge and Reality. They, so far as they go, *do* reveal the Absolute, but there is more in the Absolute than is dreamt of in Hegel's Logic. What we know, we truly know, but we do not know all.

The categories of Hegel bear marks which indicate that they do not constitute the whole of Reality. If they exhausted the content of the Absolute Life, why should the task of tracing out their inter-connections be so puzzling and difficult of achievement? We should see at a glance the mutual relations of the categories, if we had all of them before us and there ought to be no uncertainty and hesitation in determining the exact place of each of them in relation to the rest. What is once found to be true would not be liable to subsequent revision and modifica-

tion. There is no room for tentative procedure in Absolute cognition. Having the whole of Reality and all its constituent elements before him, nothing would be easier for the philosopher than to comprehend how exactly the whole is expressed in the parts and in what precise manner the parts are related to one another. And the experience of the student of Hegel's philosophy would be equally delightful. Scanning the pages of the Logic, he would find the whole panorama of Reality unrolled before his eyes and the comprehension of it a process unerring, immediate and facile. The actual fact, however, is very different from all this. It is well known that Hegel did not by any means find the task of linking up the categories an easy one. He speaks of the "labour of the notion" and the hesitancy of his procedure is evidenced by the modifications in the arrangement of the categories which he made in the several editions of the *Greater Logic* and the *Encyclopædia*. Is it not strange that there should be so much uncertainty as to the exact relations of the categories to one another, when Hegel professes to know *all* of them as organic elements of the Absolute? The logical implication of the claim to a complete knowledge of the Absolute is omniscience, and if there is no omniscience, it follows that the only knowledge of the Absolute possible to man is piecemeal and sketchy and not detailed and complete.

It is sometimes supposed that the dialectical evolution of the categories is independent of experience. If only the philosophic gaze is fixed steadfastly on Pure Being a movement will set in which will ultimately carry the philosopher to the crowning summit of the Absolute Idea. The dialectic, it is imagined, not only interprets but also generates the categories and for the discovery of them no reference to empirical facts is necessary. Pure Being, by an inner necessity, by its own immanent energy, passes into the next category and this into the next and so on and so on, till in an automatic manner the process is completed when the final category of the Absolute Idea is reached. All this, however, is only a fancy-picture of Hegel's method and is very far from the actual truth. What Hegel really does is that he gathers, mainly from science and language, the root-conceptions which underlie experience and constitute experience, and which, therefore, we employ in order to interpret experience and shows how they belong to, are members of, one all-inclusive Reality. Such a procedure, it is needless to explain, depends from beginning to end on experience. Its presupposition is experience and its goal is experience; presupposition, because the categories are derived from it, goal, because the highest effort

of philosophy is directed towards the demonstration of it as the systematic unity and embodiment of the categories. Philosophy, therefore, can begin its work only when the sciences have, partially at least, completed theirs. It must wait for a prior interpretation of experience by science. Each science brings to light the fundamental principles or the categories which rule the phenomena with which it deals. Philosophy takes up these categories themselves for investigation. It examines them with a view to determine their scope and limitations and the manner in which the lower or more abstract ones lead up to, become merged into, the higher. Depending for its materials on the sciences it must from time to time revise and correct itself, as the sciences make progress in their interpretation of the world. It must follow in the wake of the sciences and cannot anticipate their results. Any claim, therefore, of the finality of philosophy is bound to be futile. If Hegel could come to life again and re-write the Logic to-day, it is certain that he would write it very differently. The old sciences have made enormous progress and profoundly modified many of their conclusions and new ones have come into existence since his time. Any scheme of the mutual filiation of the categories drawn up to-day would be so materially different from Hegel's Logic that very little similarity could be traced between the two. The science of Biology alone, which had no existence in Hegel's time, would furnish so many new categories that, viewed in their light, some at least of the categories of Hegel's Logic would necessarily present a very different appearance. These considerations are enough to show that it is absurd to imagine that Hegel's categories are a complete and final explication of the Absolute. Such a supposition would imply the finality of the scientific knowledge which the world had in the first quarter of the last century. "We have no claim," as Professor Baillie says, "to regard Hegel's Logic as finished and unalterable body of truth, the validity of which as a whole stands or falls with the validity of each part of it." "No stress," he rightly observes, "can be laid on the seeming finality which is characteristic of the system" (*Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, p. 255).

That there are large gaps between the categories in spite of their apparently seamless continuity with each other becomes evident if we glance at some of them. What the missing links are we cannot even conjecture, but that they do exist is clear. Take the category of quantity, for example, and the puzzle of the endlessness of space and the infinite divisibility of matter. Hegel's solution of these Kantian antinomies of Cosmology is

that they arise from our failure to take together the two moments of quantity, continuity and discreteness, and allowing them to alternate with each other. The difficulty about the endlessness of space troubles us when we forget that quantity is not only continuous but also discrete, and the idea of the limitedness of the world in space becomes an embarrassment when we abstract from continuity. An object, in so far as its quantitative aspect is concerned, is the synthesis of continuity and discreteness. Now this answer is no doubt valid, so far as it goes, but it does not ultimately obviate the difficulties involved in the antinomies of Kant. Continuity and discreteness are abstractions apart from each other and are true only as mutually related aspects of quantity. To show this, however, is not to perfectly harmonise these opposed moments of quantity with each other. What Hegel proves is that continuity *implies* discreteness and not that it *becomes* or *turns over* into discreteness and *vice versa*. The point will become clear if we compare the triad of continuity, discreteness and quantum with the triad Being, nothing and Becoming. Being, carefully scrutinised, turns out to *be* Nothing and Nothing *is* Being. Of course the identity is not mere sameness, but with all their difference, Being *is* Nothing and Nothing *is* Being and the process of the one *passing over* into the other is Becoming. Becoming is thus a real reconciliation of Being and Nothing. The reason of this, no doubt, is that Being and Nothing being the poorest and most abstract categories are, for that very reason, nearest each other. But continuity does not *become* discreteness, nor discreteness continuity. The one *presupposes* the other and quantum is their reconciliation only in the sense that the concept of it is analysable into the concepts of continuity and discreteness. Continuity is an element of quantity and cannot be torn off from it. Its correlative, eternal partner, is discreteness, but *on its own ground*, as distinct, though not separate from discreteness, it gives rise to the puzzle of the endlessness of space. Similarly, in another direction, continuity, as opposed to discreteness, leads to the difficulty of the infinite divisibility of matter. To point to the correlativity of these two categories is not to solve the problem which each from its own point of view raises. To move on to the higher categories is, no doubt, to avoid but not necessarily to conquer the difficulties connected with the lower ones. Had continuit and discreteness passed over into each other, while retainin their difference, like Being and Nothing, the defects of the one might have been supplied by the other, but this is not what happens. The problems arising from continuity and discreteness,

in so far as they are distinct from each other, remain unsolved in spite of their correlativity. The truth is that Hegel does not overcome the antinomies of Kant, but only shows that the failure of the two opposed moments of quantity to come into perfect harmony with each other does not in any way discredit Reality, for Reality is vastly more than mere quantity. Nevertheless, the antinomies arising from quantity remain unsolved and suggest that though the solution is beyond our comprehension, there must be supplementary categories in the Absolute consciousness of such a nature that in the light of them the mysteries of quantity are fully explained.

The false infinite of quality is another illustration of a *lacuna* in the Hegelian scheme of categories. The difficulty about quantity considered above is, in fact, only a recurrence on a higher plane of that connected with qualitatively infinite progression. A somewhat passes over into another, this into somewhat else and so on *ad infinitum*. The *truth* of this infinite series, as we have seen, is the genuine Infinite, which comprehends the infinite series within itself. Reality is more than an infinite series. But this insight does not help us in summing up the infinite series itself. The difficulty inherent in it is not solved by our advancing to a more adequate category. But in the Absolute, the series must somehow be summed up. In other words, the Absolute must have a form of cognition which enables it to comprehend the series *as a whole*, but we, lacking in it, are burdened with the difficulty without the means of solving it.

The idea of Time conveys the same lesson.[1] It implies unending succession and yet in the Absolute consciousness the infinite series must be completed. One of the ablest discussions of the relation of Time to the Absolute is to be found in Royce's great work, *The World and the Individual*. A condensed statement of his views is to be found in a note to his little book, *The Conception of Immortality*. Royce convincingly explains that Eternity means neither the momentary now, nor timelessness, but the whole of Time which overreaches the distinction between past, present and future. "Let the sequence be a, b, c. Then, in our *first* sense of the term *present*, when b is present, a is *no longer*, and c is *not yet*. And this fact makes the temporal sequence what it is. But in the *second* sense of the term *present*, a, b, c, despite this perfectly genuine but relative difference of *no longer* and *not yet* or of *past*

[1] Time, of course, is not a category in Hegel's Logic. It is an aspect of the "otherness"—nature, in which the categories are embodied.

and *future*, are *all* present as a *totum simul* to the consciousness that grasps the entire sequence" (*Conception of Immortality*, p. 86). "There is no sort of contradiction," Royce goes on to observe, "in supposing a form of consciousness for which the events of the Archæan and of the Silurian and of the later geological periods should be present *at once* together with the facts of to-day's history" (*Ibid.*). The term *Eternal consciousness*, Royce justly argues, does not mean consciousness *not in time* but "a consciousness whose span embraces the whole of Time." "What is present *at once* to such a consciousness, viz. the whole of what happens in time, taken together with all the distinctions of past and of future that hold *within* the series of temporal events—this whole, I say, constitutes *Eternity*." That a consciousness which is eternally complete must mean a whole within which the relative distinctions of past, present and future fall is indisputable, but it is also true that it is a notion entirely beyond us. It is not enough to say, as Royce does, that we ourselves possess the type of an eternal consciousness. The time of our consciousness is, no doubt, a whole, but it is not a *complete* whole. It is interminable at both ends. But what for us is an interminable series and a complete whole only *ideally* must, for the Absolute, be a *really* complete whole, an actually experienced fact. Have we the faintest conception of what this is like? Do we possess any idea of a "consciousness whose span embraces the whole of Time?" Because it must be so, it does not follow that we understand *how* it is so. The dilemma is that while we cannot deny that Time, as a complete series, is a real element of the Absolute, we have not the least idea as to what the higher consciousness is which has the idea of Time, with its antinomies perfectly solved. The indication, however, is that in the Absolute there are categories—modes of consciousness, which so supplement and modify Time as to free it from its inconsistencies. The contradiction of the category of Life, for example, disappears when it passes into Cognition, and the contradiction of Cognition is solved when it is viewed as a moment of the Absolute Idea. But the contradiction involved in the idea of Time as an infinite series, which is nevertheless a complete whole, is *not* overcome by the consideration that the whole of Time is present to the Absolute consciousness. The Absolute has evidently a mode of consciousness—a category or categories into which the contradiction of Time vanishes and which, if it formed an element of our consciousness, would obviate for us too the difficulties involved in the idea of Time.

The admissions which we have made may, at first sight, seem to be fatal to the validity of the dialectical method, but a little reflection will serve to remove this doubt. The categories of human knowledge are constitutive elements of Reality, but in Reality there are more of them than come within the ken of human knowledge. Only a section of them is, so to speak, fenced off from their context and constitutes human knowledge. As such, they present the appearance of an artificial aggregate. Nevertheless, the categories are organic elements of the Absolute, and however much they may seem to be parted off from one another, as known to us, they are members one of another. They, therefore, as participators in one life, as different expressions of one Reality, are naturally drawn towards one another. They have a craving for each other and seek to come together. It is this underlying unity that the dialectic brings to light and becomes possible because of it. But there is another aspect of the matter. The categories, though interwoven with one another as organic elements of a single whole, are, in so far as they are factors of our knowledge, artificially kept asunder by their partial discontinuity arising from the fragmentariness of our knowledge. Their mutual relations, therefore, are somewhat puzzling to us. While driven resistlessly towards one another, they are yet unable to come completely together. It is this circumstance which makes the task of tracing out their mutual relations possible but difficult. The categories being expressions of a single Reality, a connection between any two of them is discoverable, but it would seem to be natural, or forced and artificial, according to the extent of the breach of continuity between them. This is the reason why, in Hegel's Logic, we find that while in many, perhaps in the majority of instances, the transition of one category into another is perfectly natural and intelligible, there are other instances in which the dialectic is little better than verbal quibbling, and the almost complete breakdown of the argument is concealed by a cloud of words. This is only what was to be expected. When a missing link separates one category from another, it would be difficult to connect the one with the other, though it is not impossible; for, in virtue of the ultimate unity of all of them, there must be an affinity between any two of them.

There is thus a sense in which the dialectic is a subjective procedure, or, as Green says, "an interrogation of subjective consciousness." The inter-connections between the categories which we succeed in tracing out are only such as exist between them *as elements of our knowledge* and not as they really are

between the phases of the Absolute, as known to the Absolute. But this does not mean that our knowledge is merely subjective or false. It is subjective, because it is not *completely* objective, but valid so far as it goes, and, to that extent, objective. With the growth of knowledge, new elements of it are brought to light and its old relations have necessarily to be recast and modified, but the incomplete knowledge, although absorbed and transformed into the more complete knowledge, does not cease to be valid on its own level. All development implies the absorption of the lower stage into the higher stage, but the lower stage is not thereby proved to be unreal. When we, doubting and hesitating, spell out piecemeal the relations between the elements of Reality, we are veritably in touch with it, though touch with Reality does not mean an exhaustive knowledge of it. Hegel's contention that philosophic knowledge is Absolute knowledge or God's knowledge of Himself is not wrong, only that he is apt to forget the correlative truth that, in man, God knows Himself under the conditions and limitations of human knowledge.

After what has been already stated, it is not necessary to say much on the third branch of our inquiry, viz. the relation of man's experience to the content of Absolute Experience. There is an idea that the Logical categories are complete by themselves and the transition from Logic to nature is similar to the transition from a lower category to a higher category. This supposed transition to nature has always been regarded by the critics of Hegelianism as its weakest point and their main attack has accordingly been directed to that point. Schelling, for example, laid the flattering unction to his soul that he had demolished Hegelianism once and for all by showing that nature could not be deduced from pure Thought. In truth, however, Hegel was never so absurd as to imagine that he could deduce empirical facts *a priori*. He has repeatedly told us that nature is the other of Thought. If nature has no meaning apart from Thought, it is equally true that Thought has no meaning apart from nature. Thought without nature is empty and nature without Thought a non-entity. Logic is an exposition of God as He was in Himself before creation, but the existence of God before creation, Hegel has expressly told us, is an unreal abstraction. He exists only as revealed in the world. Logic deals with the universal aspect of Reality, but the universal is an abstraction apart from particularity. Nature is the totality of the particular elements in which the Logical Idea is realised and apart from which it has no being. There is, therefore, no transition at all

from Logic to nature. In passing on from Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel does not pretend to *deduce* nature, but only draws attention to the element of particularity implied throughout the Logic, but abstracted from, for purposes of exposition. Absolute Thought is embodied in Absolute Experience and nature is a part of Absolute Experience.

I have said that nature is a part of Absolute Experience. This is not what Hegel says but what he ought to have said. He supposes that in nature the Logical Idea is completely realised and that the Logic expresses the whole universe. Both the propositions are absolutely untenable. The conclusion which Hegel draws from these false premisses of course is, that in God there is nothing which is not manifested in the sensible world. As Professor Pringle-Pattison rightly says, " in preaching the truth that the Absolute is revealed in the world of its appearances, not craftily concealed behind them, Hegel seems to pass to a sheer identification of the two. But while it is true that the two aspects must be everywhere combined—an absolute which does not appear or reveal itself, and an appearance without something which appears being correlative abstractions—that is not tantamount to saying that the appearance of the absolute to itself—the divine Life as lived by God Himself—is identical with the appearance which the world presents to the Hegelian philosopher" (*Two Lectures on Theism*, pp. 34-35). Hegel, however, finds nature, even as it is known to us, rather a hard nut to crack. It refuses to be squeezed into his symmetrically constructed scheme of categories. Evidently, it is more than a mere embodiment of the categories recognised in his Logic. Instead of frankly admitting, under the circumstances, that the Logic is *not* a complete exposition of the Absolute, Hegel adopts the strange course of disparaging nature. In so far as he fails to understand it, it is not rational at all ! He concludes that there is an element of contingency in nature of which no rational explanation is possible, and does not stop to enquire whether such a conclusion is consistent with his fundamental principles and whether the seeming contingency of nature may not be due to the fact that it is the incomplete expression of a Thought richer and more comprehensive than that of which the Logic is the exposition. Because he fails to explain all the mysteries of nature, Hegel seems to bear a sort of grudge against it. He never misses an opportunity of belittling it. He, for example, is unwilling to recognise the beauty of nature. Beauty, he tells us, belongs to Art rather than to nature. In the starry heavens above, which filled the mind of Immanuel Kant with awe and wonder, Hegel

finds only eruptions in the face of the sky! The philosopher, in his study, makes up his mind that inasmuch as he with his logical tape, as wonderful as Aladdin's lamp, has taken a full measure of the Absolute Thought, nature, as the embodiment of that Thought, shall be intelligible through and through and all mystery shall vanish from it. But nature does not obey the philosopher any more than the waves obeyed Canute. What wonder then that he should lose all patience with it, and unable to punish it in any other way, pour contempt on it!

Nature is a part of Absolute Experience and is not co-extensive with it. It is the name given to only so much of the section of Reality which our senses can cognise as is the subject of common discourse, and is the product of inter-subjective communication. It is, therefore, a mere skeleton. The living Reality is a much bigger thing and has endless aspects of which our senses take in only a few. From God, Spinoza truly observes, an infinite number of things follow in an infinite number of ways. It is the ignorance of man that leads him to imagine that his perception is the measure of Reality. Are we the sole denizens of the universe to whom Reality is revealed? The dumb creatures around us are presumably capable of perception and not mere automata, as Descartes imagined. They too belong to the Absolute and participate in its life. Some measure of the self-revelation of the Absolute is vouchsafed to them too. The aspects of Reality presented to them are, in their own grades, as much real as those presented to us, but, evidently, they are different. The bird that flies in the air, the fish that lives in water and the worm that crawls on earth has each a perception of Reality with which ours can have very little in common. The vulture feeding on the carcass surely finds its repast as enjoyable as the banquet provided for us by Peliti or Kellner! Evidently the filthy drain is to the rat what the finest quarters of Simla or Darjeeling are to us! How, one wonders, does the world look to the house-lizard that creeps over the ceiling! Can we deny that the Absolute Experience must include and is the source of all these diverse experiences? It is the pride of man that makes him rebel against the notion. If the rat in the drain could philosophise it would, no doubt, dogmatise that the world, in its true nature, is as it appears to it. And if there be beings higher than man in the universe, what reason is there to suppose that they do not exceed man's measure of the perception of Reality? The truth is that the experiences of all finite creatures, however humble and however exalted, are included, supplemented and rearranged in the Absolute

Experience. It is, therefore, a much bigger thing than any finite being can comprehend. The Absolute Experience is the embodiment of Absolute Thought and if the Absolute Thought is infinitely richer than ours, so must the Absolute Experience be. Our notion of Reality is very much like the blind man's idea of the elephant in the fable. One blind man touching a leg of the elephant says that the elephant is like a pillar; another, touching the ear, says that it is like the winnowing fan; a third touching the trunk declares that the elephant is like the thigh. The elephant, of course, is much more than these blind men imagine, though the perception of it of every one of them is quite correct, so far as it goes.

There is a fine passage in the *Sartor Resartus* which inimitably expresses the truth. "Systems of Nature," observes Carlyle; "to the wisest man, wide as is his vision, Nature remains of quite *infinite* depth, of quite infinite expression; and all experience thereof limits itself to some few computed centuries and measured square miles. The course of nature's phases, on this our little fraction of a planet, is partially known to us; but who knows what deeper courses these depend on—what infinitely larger Cycle (of causes) our little Epicycle revolves on? To the minnow every cranny and pebble, and quality and accident of its little native creek may have become familiar; but does the minnow understand the Ocean Tides, and periodic currents, the Trade-Winds, and Monsoons, and Moon's Eclipses; by all which the condition of its little creek is regulated, and may, from time to time (*un*miraculously enough) be quite overset and reversed? Such a minnow is man; his creek this planet Earth; his Ocean the immeasurable All; his Monsoons and periodic Currents the mysterious course of Providence through Aeons of Aeons."

Such a theory as I have endeavoured to sketch out in this essay goes, I think, as far in the direction of a knowledge of the Absolute as it is possible to go. We can reasonably conclude that man is a partial manifestation of a self-differentiation of the Absolute, which is the ideality of his body. His knowledge and experience forms part of the Absolute Thought and Experience and is valid so far as it goes. What he understands and perceives, the Absolute understands and perceives *in him*, but the Absolute understands and perceives infinitely more than he ever does. It is sheer presumption to equate the content of the Divine consciousness with the world in which we live. Such an absurdity is by no means a necessary consequence of Hegelianism. There is nothing in the fundamental principles

of Hegel's philosophy which makes its air of omniscience necessary. It is the accident and not the essence of the system, and is due to the personal equation of Hegel. It is also, partly, the result of an extreme reaction against the medieval dualism of the sensible and the super-sensible world. The Absolute is undoubtedly within our knowledge, but is also over and beyond it. In the wise words of Professor Pringle-Pattison, we may conclude that "the truth about the Absolute which we extract from our experience is hardly likely to be the final truth; it may be taken up and superseded in a wider and fuller truth. And in this way we might pass, in successive cycles of finite existence, from sphere to sphere of experience, from orb to orb of truth; and even the highest would still remain a finite truth; and fall infinitely short of the truth of God. But such a doctrine of relativity in no way invalidates the truth of the revelation at any given stage. The fact that the truth I reach is the truth for me does not make it, on that account, less true. It is true so far as it goes, and if my experience can carry me no further, I am justified in treating it as ultimate *until it is superseded.* Should it ever be superseded I shall then see both how it is modified by being comprehended in a higher truth, and also how it and no other statement of the truth could have been true at my former stand-point. But *before* that higher stand-point is reached, to seek to discredit our present insight by the general reflection that its truth is partial and requires correction, is a perfectly empty truth, which, in its bearing upon human life, must almost certainly have the effect of an untruth" (*Two Lectures on Theism*, pp. 61-62).

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Note.—This index contains all the books and persons mentioned, criticised, or quoted in the text, together with the more important subject headings. Names of books are in italics, and where a book is summarised or quoted in closely following pages, the first and last pages alone are given, with a hyphen between. When under a subject heading a proper name is given in brackets, the indication is that this particular philosopher's views on the subject will be found in the pages, the numbers of which immediately precede.

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